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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to understand the influence of various institutional elements on the transfer of 
multinational corporations' human resource policies and practices to their international subsidiaries. 
Drawing upon comparative institutionalist theory, the thesis considers the host- and home-country 
national business systems at the macro level as the most significant impact factors on the formation 
and transfer of these policies. The thesis also aims to test the applicability of the national business 
systems approach in a distinctive 'hybrid transitional' business system, which is argued to be different 
from various typologies developed in the literature. To test 'dominance' effects, multinationals 
originating from one of the most powerful systems, the US, are studied. To investigate the influences 
of other significant institutional elements at the industry and organisational levels on the substantive 
human resource management issues, a four-level analytical framework is developed. 
At the empirical level, the thesis carries out qualitative case studies of American multinationals in the 
distinctive business environment of Turkey mainly by using interviews. The cases are chosen 
according to theoretical sampling, and companies that exhibit features hypothesised to be important 
variables - sector, size, age, ownership structure, and unionisation - are investigated. 
Overall, the thesis argues that, firstly, the distinctiveness of `hybrid transitional' business systems 
result from two elements. On the one hand such systems are characterised by a combination of the 
various institutional elements of the theoretical typologies, hence ̀ hybrid'. On the other hand, they are 
open to direct and significant influences of globalisation for institutional change from both internal 
and external organisations through `trickle-down' and ̀ trickle-up' trajectories, thus `transitional'. 
Such openness results not only from a permissive legal environment but also from the willingness of 
significant internal actors for change. Secondly, such ̀ hybrid transitional' business systems present 
both challenges and opportunities for the transfer of human resource policies and practices for 
multinationals. In the case of Turkey, challenges stem mostly from labour market conditions, in terms 
of availability of skills and qualifications. The permissiveness and pro-business nature of the Turkish 
legal framework, and the weakness and cooperativeness of labour unions make it easier to transfer 
home-country policies. Large Turkish holding companies, although strong partners in international 
joint ventures, do not present major challenges. Local actors, including owners and professional 
managers of large Turkish companies with a positive attitude towards particularly American policies 
and practices, mean strong ̀ pull' effects are observed, in addition to `push' effects of transnational and 
international institutions internally and externally. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of this thesis is to empirically explore the influence of host country institutional 
system on the transfer and formation of multinational corporations' HRM policies and practices to 
their subsidiaries. It is also aimed to test the applicability of the national business systems approach 
for investigating transfer and formation of management practices in a 'hybrid transitional' 
environment, which is different from both developed, less developed or emerging economies. Similar 
research in comparative and international HRM concentrates mostly on developed economies at both 
the receiving and supplying ends. This study, by focusing on a distinct developing country at the 
receiving end, aims to make a contribution by extending the range of national business environments, 
hence increasing the `context generalisability' of how NBS influence the transfer of HRM. These 
research purposes inevitably necessitate bringing various lines of literature together. At the macro 
level, two opposing lines of literature on the dissemination of management policies are considered. 
While convergence theories, including the more recent globalisation approach, claim the transfer and 
application of `best', i. e. usually American, management practices across national borders, divergence 
theories commonly maintain that the national systems are still so diverse that management policies 
cannot be applied uniformly in different countries. 
Although the arguments of the convergence approach make sense at the theoretical level, this approach 
is based on limited empirical evidence and does not provide a rigorous analytical framework for 
comparative studies at the national level. Similarly, the culturalist line of argument within the 
divergence literature, although widely used in management research, does not satisfactorily explain 
differences in the national environments, and links differences and similarities to vaguely defined 
`cultural indices'. The institutionalist literature on the other hand is a well-developed field with 
contributions from sociology, political science and international relations and presents a systematic 
background to investigate the research questions. Within this strand, the national business systems 
(NBS) approach (Lane, 1995; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001) is valuable for the main 
purposes of this study. 
One of the major limitations of traditional institutional theory is the assumption about the robustness 
of the institutions, hence the business systems, which does not account for the dynamic nature of NBS. 
Although this is a drawback for investigating any NBS, it particularly constrains investigating those 
countries that are indisputably albeit slowly changing as a result of being more directly and strongly 
influenced by globalisation through transnational and international organisations. Younger, newly 
developing or weaker market economies are considerably more prone to such influences than the 
developed and established systems. The stalactite institutional change theory by Djelic and Quack 
(2003) is therefore considered together with the NBS approach particularly for analysing such national 
environments. A detailed discussion of the institutionalist theory is provided in Chapter 2. 
In the main lines of literature on the business systems approach, in general developed capitalist 
economies are considered. Whitley (1999) for instance bases his divergent capitalisms approach on 
the argument that institutionally different national economic control and coordination mechanisms in 
developed economies create varieties of capitalism. Hall and Soskice (2001) further develop two main 
varieties of capitalism, i. e. liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs), by considering various developed capitalist economies, such as the UK, Germany, France, 
Japan and the USA. To what extent these NBS models are applicable to newly developing, younger 
and open economies is questionable. Furthermore, the concept of a `hybrid transitional' business 
system is proposed, which is defined as a NBS that comprises elements of both LMEs and CMEs (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001), and others defined in Whitley's typology (1999), and that is more highly subject 
to globalisation influences. Turkey is presented as an example of such a business system, and the 
Turkish business system as the host-country is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Although the influences of globalisation and national systems on the dissemination and formation of 
management policies can be investigated by looking at domestic companies, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) present more interesting cases firstly because they are among the main transfer 
actors through their operations in many countries, and secondly and more importantly because of the 
possible influences of their home-country NBS on their managerial philosophies, strategies and 
practices. The influences of national institutional patterns are imprinted in firms' behaviour, as 
companies are embedded in their own business systems and drawn towards those coordination forms 
for which there is institutional support (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Moreover some MNCs are inclined 
to reflect their national identities in their international operations (Ferner, 2001). Thus in their 
international operations MNCs find themselves in the middle of two powerful sources of influence: 
their country of origin whose institutional influences are reflected on their management policies, and 
the country of operation where there is a different environment that calls for `institutional 
isomorphism' in managerial practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Subsidiaries are thus faced with 
what Kostova and Roth (2002: 216) refer to as ̀ institutional duality' and the question is how far these 
two distinct sets of 'isomorphic pressures' influence MNCs' management practices. Influences of 
countries with integrated and strong, i. e. dominant, economies are reflected in their companies' 
inclination to transfer their home-country policies and practices to other 'weaker', open environments. 
USA, with its overwhelming power in the world economy and politics, is considered the most 
dominant country, which leads to an uneven balance of power between particularly less-developed / 
developing NBS and American MNCs in these host countries. Consideration of dominance effects of 
home-countries as well as host-country influences can add significant insight to this field of research. 
Therefore the USA is chosen as the home-country in this research mainly because of its 'dominance 
effect', in addition to other reasons such as the size and length of its FDI in the host-country. The US 
NBS is discussed in Chapter 5. 
In addition to home- and host-country influences, sectoral and organisation level factors can be 
significant in the formation and transfer of IIRM policies and practices. Although these meso (sector) 
and micro (organisational) level factors are sometimes considered separately, they might act in 
conjunction with macro (NBS) level factors. Or their influences might be moderated or accentuated in 
some NBS and/or in some HR/IR issues more than in others. Therefore a four-level analytical 
framework is discussed and presented in Chapter 2. 
In the light of the above issues, this study aims to understand the influences of various factors at three 
levels (i. e. macro, meso and micro) on the transfer of HRM/IR policies and practices of MNCs from a 
dominant economy in a distinctive host environment. To explore sectoral influences, companies from 
various sectors are chosen. At the company-level, organisational factors such as age, size, ownership 
structure are taken into consideration to understand possible influences. The substantive HR/IR issues 
studied are labour market orientations and employment systems, performance management and 
compensation systems, and industrial relations. Within this perspective, the study on the whole tries to 
answer the following questions: 
How does the distinctive business environment of Turkey influence American MNCs' HR/IR policies 
and practices in their Turkish subsidiaries? To what extent are they transferred from home-country 
practices and shaped by host-country business system factors? How do sectoral factors and company 
features impact on the formation and transmission of HR applications in conjunction with the host- 
country business system influences? What transmission mechanisms are used for the transfer of home- 
country approaches? 
1.2. OVERVIEW AND OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
In the rest of this chapter, an overview of the thesis is provided through a short synopsis of each 
chapter. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Analytical Framework 
In this chapter, the theoretical ground for the study is laid out: while major arguments of convergence 
and divergence approaches are discussed briefly, emphasis is put on institutionalist theory, particularly 
the NBS approach, which provides a powerful tool for the comparative analysis of different business 
systems and market hierarchies. While NBS is critically reviewed, the concept of a `hybrid 
transitional' business system is introduced. In the second part of the chapter, a four-level analytical 
framework, which aims to understand the influences at different levels on a firm's HRM behaviour, is 
proposed, consisting of macro (national business systems), meso (sectoral), micro (organisational) and 
substantive IR/HRM issues levels. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
In Chapter 3, research methodology and design are discussed and justified for their suitability for the 
purposes and research questions of this study. In terms of the research design, the rationale for 
choosing Turkey as the host- and the USA as the home-country is presented. Additionally, the 
qualitative case study approach, and criteria for the selection of case studies are theoretically and 
practically justified. Triangulation by using various data collection methods (i. e. interviews, 
documents and observation) and interviewees in different organisations and levels are explained. 
Generalisability from qualitative cases, in addition to other reliability and validity issues are presented. 
A short section on data analysis process and methods conclude the chapter. 
Chapter 4: National Business Systems: Turkey as the host country 
Based on the basic argument of the NBS approach, i. e. the institutional environment and coordination 
and control mechanisms of a business system shape firms' management behaviour, this chapter 
explains the distinctiveness of the Turkish business system. Combining features of different market 
economies and their business systems in itself, Turkey is a `hybrid transitional' business system that 
has different institutional elements from various forms of capitalism. Moreover, it is argued that such 
'hybrid transitional' systems are more open to the impact of globalisation from transnational 
institutions. It is argued that these factors in combination make Turkey a distinctive business 
environment to examine MNCs' HR/IR behaviour. 
Chapter 5: National Business Systems: USA as the home country 
The home-country business system is of key importance as firstly, firms are embedded in their own 
NBS, secondly, home-country influences are crucial for shaping corporate management behaviour, 
and thirdly, national identity is important for the inclination of MNCs to transmit their corporate 
practices to foreign subsidiaries. In this chapter, NBS of the most dominant economy in the world, the 
USA, is reviewed to understand the structure and managerial behaviour of its domestic firms. 
The next three chapters, six through eight, discuss the empirical findings of the fieldwork, within the 
analytical framework of the study, whereas the last chapter brings these findings and analyses 
together. 
Chapter 6: Employment Systems and Labour Market Orientations 
In this first empirical chapter, labour market orientations and employment systems of the case 
companies are discussed. A strong internal labour market (ILM) approach for various employee 
groups is observed, with salaried and industrial employment systems used. This approach is found to 
be shaped by the constraints and opportunities presented in the Turkish business environment (e. g. 
availability and cost of skilled labour force), together with organisational factors (e. g. corporate 
policies, ownership structure, global restructuring, size and structure) and industry requirements (e. g. 
production systems, export markets). 
Chapter 7: Performance Management Systems 
This chapter discusses pay and performance management systems (PMS) in the case companies. The 
most direct transfer of corporate HR policies is observed in these areas, while the TBS (labour markets 
in particular) manifests significant influences on their application, despite the lack of limiting legal or 
cultural obstacles. Highly centralised, standardised and sophisticated PMS, which are linked to pay, 
training and development (T&D), and promotions are observed. Strong home-country influences are 
additionally evident in the limited flexibility given to the subsidiary managements in the application of 
performance management and reward systems. Compensation and benefits policies and practices 
reflect the ILM approaches discussed in the previous chapter, while T&D, promotion and career 
opportunities are used as recruitment and retention tools in the Turkish labour market. 
Chapter 8: Industrial Relations 
Discussion of the empirical evidence on IR issues in the US MNCs is the main focus of this chapter. 
It is argued that US MNCs could pursue their corporate attitudes in IR within the permissive and pro- 
business legislative environment in Turkey. However, only a few common corporate guidelines are 
transferred to the Turkish subsidiaries from the US parents. This is explained by the still highly 
regulated position of IR in many European countries, which makes IR a country-specific field. 
Although there are only a few corporate guidelines, they are strictly applied. Among these, handling 
IR issues by observing the local rules and regulations is emphasised. The most significant factor in 
explaining the unionisation of American MNCs within the permissive Turkish IR environment that 
presents unions with difficult obstacles but provides companies extensive flexibility is argued to be 
the US parent's attitude: if it is anti-unionist and decides to de-unionise or stay non-unionised, it is 
almost impossible for any union to stay organised in this company. The main reason for unionisation 
in this permissive environment is found to be also the corporate attitude (sometimes that of the 
Turkish parent, in the case of IJVs). 
Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusions 
In the final chapter of this thesis, firstly, the main findings are reviewed. Different forces of influence 
at three levels are discussed first individually and then in combination to show how they interact to 
shape HR/IR policies and practices at Turkish subsidiary level. Secondly, the concept of 'hybrid 
transitional' business systems and their implications for HRM theory are discussed, particularly in 
terms of transfer of policies and practices in a distinctive `hybrid transitional' business environment. 
The chapter concludes by addressing the research limitations and suggestions for future. 
1.3. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this study aims, firstly, to develop a better understanding of host-country influences on the 
nature and process of transfer of management policies and practices from dominant economies to more 
novel environments of `hybrid transitional' countries, which involve characteristics of various 
business systems and are highly open to change and impact of transnational and international 
institutions particularly through trickle-down trajectories. As such it also contributes to the 
international HRM literature particularly with a combined approach that takes both the influences of 
NBS and change processes into consideration. 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SETTING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is divided into two parts, each of which addresses the two main purposes of the chapter. 
The first part provides a critical synthesis of the literature concerning the complex set of forces acting upon 
national business systems and the implications for their future development. This discussion centres on the 
convergence-divergence debate and the related debate concerning the impact of globalisation. The first school 
of thought about the effects of nationality on the behaviour of firms is the culturalist one. As one 
important approach within the institutionalist approach, i. e. the national business systems (NBS), is 
adopted in this study, literature on various forms of institutionalism is discussed in more detail. In the 
second part of the chapter, the analytical framework that incorporates the theoretical approaches to 
explore and analyse the research questions is presented. This framework seeks to understand how and 
to what extent the macro level, i. e. NBS, the meso level, i. e. industry, and the micro level, i. e. firm, 
characteristics influence the HRM behaviour of MNCs in their subsidiaries. The chapter ends with the 
concluding remarks. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, relevant theoretical approaches in the literature are reviewed in an effort to set a 
framework in which economic behaviour can be analysed. Firstly the main lines of debate on 
convergence versus divergence are sketched out as a prelude to the discussion of the institutionalist 
approach. This is followed by a critical discussion of the institutionalist theory, in particular the 
national business systems approach. 
2.2.1. CONVERGENCE DEBATE 
The acceleration of international business in the 1950s started a discussion in terms of finding a `one 
best way' in production and management practices. One of the dominant strands in international 
management research has been the convergence approach, or the `universalist paradigm' (Brewster, 
2000: 256). Convergence of social institutions in different countries as a result of technological 
modernisation had been argued since Kerr et al. (1960), who supported firmly the argument that 
institutions that shape business around the world would converge towards the most efficient model of 
the time, i. e. the American one, as the `iron hand of technology' imposes similar structures and work 
organisation. This perspective has three main assumptions: firstly, improving performance through 
high performance work systems is the ultimate objective in all organisations and cases; secondly, 
`sound' and ̀ effective' management principles are applicable regardless of national environments; 
finally, if local practices are different from these principles, they are expected to be replaced with the 
`one best way' converging mainly on the American model as the leading industrial economy during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Dowling, Welch and Schuler, 1999). In the 1970s, in a similar approach, it was 
the Japanese model that prevailed among the European countries and the USA, when 'Japanization' 
was starting to be discussed. As the successful economy of its time, various aspects of the Japanese 
model were applied in the other major economies, but not always successfully, which was explained 
by the impossibility of importing all the elements of the model without the necessary institutional 
environment, that is the business system, in which firms are embedded. 
Another approach that claims convergence of institutions and organisational behaviour in different 
countries is the more recent globalisation debate. This perspective draws, not on technological 
determinism, but on the impact of increasing economic, political, social and cultural relations across 
borders. The forces of globalisation, such as the liberalisation of economies and markets, 
deregulation, regional economic integration and trading blocs (e. g. EU, NAFTA, APEC), and 
improvements in communication technologies have been presented as encouraging notions of 
convergence around `one best way' practices. Theorists propose that the nationality factors in the 
operation of economic systems and companies are no longer as influential or important as MNCs 
become 'transnationals' that converge to a new 'best model' (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). According 
to Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) the new organisation model of the 'transnational firm' emerges as a 
result of common responses to global economic challenges by international companies, which in turn 
enables them to develop and use the advantages of 'global efficiency', `multinational responsiveness' 
and 'worldwide learning'. Some proponents of the globalisation theory make a sweeping claim that a 
`borderless world' is emerging where 'transnational' or `global' companies operate in many countries 
like 'insiders' and are detached from their original nationalities (Ohmae, 1990; Reich, 1990). In 
summary, proponents of the globalisation thesis assert that national institutions face strong challenges 
from the globalising economic, political, cultural and social activities. In order to survive successfully 
in this environment, firms will have to change in a way that leads to similar structure and behaviour, 
which would in turn result in the erasure of national differences in management. 
The convergence hypothesis has been revitalised in the context of intensifying global political and 
economic competition. It has become influential in the management and international HRM literature 
since the 1990s, although evidence showed ̀ little blurring or convergence at the cores offirms based 
in Germany, Japan, or the United States' (Pauly and Reich, 1997: 1). The challenge to the 
convergence thesis gained ground especially in the 1970s when Japan, with its distinctive work 
organisation and managerial practices, started to emerge as an industrial power in the world economy: 
there was much less convergence found than expected in Japanese organisations towards western 
employment policies and practices. Exponents of the more recent globalisation thesis have been 
criticised mainly for their theoretical over-enthusiasm that was not supported by empirical evidence. It 
has been argued that world economy has not become significantly more global than it had been in the 
past. 
Although empirical evidence was found against the sweeping propositions of the convergence and 
globalisation arguments, they 'became an established paradigm which many researchers found 
di cult to give up' (Dowling et al. 1999: 13). Debates and evidence for divergence challenging 
globalisation and convergence are provided, among others, mainly by two strands of the nationality 
literature, i. e. the culturalist and comparative institutionalist perspectives. Both of these approaches 
argue against the convergence thesis based on the continued influence of nationality on shaping the 
business environment, and consequently behaviour of companies, but with different theoretical 
frameworks. 
2.2.2. DIVERGENCE DEBATE 
The divergence approach, or 'contextual paradigm' (Brewster, 2000: 258), does not seek the 
similarities in policies and practices to prove that firm behaviour becomes more alike around the 
world. Instead it searches to find and explain the `contextually unique'. Firstly the culturalist 
perspective is discussed, followed by a more detailed discussion of the institutionalist approach, which 
is one of the main elements of the conceptual framework. 
2.2.2.1. The Culturalist Approach 
Researchers emphasising divergence in managerial and organisational behaviour generally view 
convergence arguments as being too simplistic, particularly in their appropriateness in all contexts. 
Among them, those that take the cultural approach explain the differences in managerial behaviour and 
organisational structure as mainly stemming from the dimensions of national culture (Hofstede, 1980; 
Laurent, 1983; Trompenaars, 1993; Adler, 1991). The main argument of this approach is that 
globalisation or technology cannot produce profound changes in economic behaviour in different 
countries towards a single model because of the deep and multi-layered influences of national culture 
on the organisation and behaviour of companies (Adler, 1991). The culturalist perspective attempts to 
explain variations in work organisation, managerial behaviour and HR/personnel practices by the 
`cultural distinctiveness in terms of values, ideas and beliefs shared by people in a society' at the 
national level (Olie, 1996: 127). By using bipolar dimensions and values of a national culture, 
prominent researchers of this approach, e. g. Hofstede (1980), Laurent (1983) and Trompenaars (1993), 
make causal linkages between the national cultures and differences in managerial behaviour. 
The culturalist approach provided a challenge to the uni-dimensional claims of the convergence 
theorists. However this approach is not without some conceptual and methodological problems. One 
major problem is about the causal relationship claimed between cultural values and firm behaviour. It 
is generally accepted that national cultures have distinctive aspects, which might influence certain HR 
applications and traditions. Many researchers acknowledge the significance of culture and the 
influence of underlying cultural differences on company behaviour. Within the institutionalist 
approach, new institutionalists for instance argue that assumptions, beliefs and expectations in a 
society determine organisational structure and behaviour (Scott and Meyer, 1994). While the new 
institutionalism also focuses on the influence of cultural and societal environment on organisations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) it refers to institutionalised rules and expectations, and how these 
constitute organisational behaviour (Scott, 1991), incorporating normative frameworks as part of the 
institutional settings in which organisations operate. Institutionalists therefore acknowledge the 
mutual interaction between 'values' and institutions, i. e. values shape institutional arrangements and 
vice versa. Therefore institutionalists in practice see no obstacles to integrating cultural values as one 
element of their conceptual framework. The problem with the culturalist approach is about values 
seen as 'free-floating', detached from embeddedness in any institutional context. Accordingly, 
differences in organisational behaviour are linked to loosely and vaguely defined variations in culture. 
Hofstede (1980) for instance conceptualises national culture as 'implicit; core; systematically causal; 
territorially unique; and shared' (McSweeney, 2002: 9 1). The cultural values indices developed by 
Hofstede (1980), which are claimed to depict national values and norms, are used to classify countries 
into clusters according to bipolar values, where similar managerial behaviour is theoretically expected. 
Ferner and Quintanilla (2002) argue that such an approach explains very little as to the reasons for 
differences in organisational structures and behaviour. Edwards and Kuruvilla (2005) further claim 
that such indices, particularly those developed by Hofstede (1980), raise additional questions: e. g. how 
do specific values and attitudes come to characterise a particular country? 
Hofstede's (1980) work, which defines value-based indices for over 40 countries, found widespread 
acceptance in the international HRM literature (see e. g. Kogut and Singh, 1988; Wong and Birnbaum- 
More, 1994). It has, however, been criticised on not only the weak conceptualisations of culture but 
also on serious methodological flaws. McSweeney (2002) for instance criticises Hofstede's (1980) 
use of questionnaires on a number of accounts, e. g. that two organisational surveys, which were not 
originally administered for research purposes, were used, with `minuscule' samples from many 
countries; the population surveyed was too narrow, i. e. respondents exclusively from a single 
company, etc. McSweeney (2002) moreover argues that Hofstede (1980) makes five crucial 
assumptions to identify influences of the national culture on work behaviour (e. g. uniform 
organisational, occupational and national cultures; national culture is identifiable in the micro-local 
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organisational culture, etc. ). While each of these assumptions is claimed to be necessary to fulfil the 
claims of the research, McSweeney (2002) discusses in detail that they are all flawed. 
Given the conceptual and methodological problems, and particularly the weak explanatory power of 
the culturalist approach, it is deemed to be a less appropriate tool as the main theoretical framework 
for the aims of this research. Comparative institutionalism within the institutionalist approach is 
adopted as the alternative approach, by incorporating these dimensions into the institutionalist 
framework, which acknowledges the significant influences of cultural and societal elements on 
organisational behaviour. This perspective allows for systematic comparison of firm behaviour within 
national institutional systems, and will be discussed in the next part within the more general 
framework of institutionalism. 
2.2.2.2. The Institutionalist Perspective 
The roots of institutionalist theory can be traced back to the late 19`h century, when there was little 
attention to organisations and focus was on wider institutional structures (for a broad historical and 
analytical overview, see Scott, 1995: 1-62). Institutional theory began to focus on organisations in the 
second half of the 20'h century, and particularly since the 1970s, neo-institutionalist perspectives had 
been developed in economics, political science (and international relations) and sociology. Various 
perspectives and approaches can be found within the large and diverse `institutionalism' or 
`institutional theory' literature that originates mainly from these disciplines. Djelic and Quack (2003) 
classify this literature into three broad groups. Firstly, the rational choice approach, which 
predominates particularly among economists and political scientists, focuses on formal and structural 
political and economic institutions. Literature within this strand considers institutions from a 
functionalist perspective where economic and political actors are argued to make decisions and create 
institutions that they believe are most efficient in a given situation. 
Secondly, there is the cultural perspective whose roots are tracked down to classical, and particularly 
Weberian sociology (e. g. Meyer and Scott, 1983; Scott, 1995). Generally conceptualised as the `new 
institutionalism', it focuses on the influence of the cultural or more vaguely defined societal 
environment of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutions are regarded as wider 
cultural and symbolic patterns that shape organisations, structures or actors and their behaviours and 
interactions. More precisely, institutions are defined as consisting of `cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour' (Scott, 
1995: 33). As generally is the case within institutionalist theory, new institutionalism also assumes that 
organisations are embedded in their institutional environments. In order to gain legitimacy, they are 
forced to fulfill institutionalised expectations by adopting the appropriate organisational structures and 
managerial applications, i. e. they strive for 'institutional isomorphism' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) suggest three mechanisms, i. e. coercive, mimetic and normative 
isomorphism, through which an organisation becomes more `isomorphic' with its organisational field. 
Together with the business systems perspective, new institutionalism is regarded as one of the two 
most significant strands in organisation theory. Both argue that firms or business actors are embedded 
in their institutional environments, and organisational behaviour is shaped by the institutionalised 
rules. However there are also significant discrepancies between the two approaches: firstly, 
definitions of the central elements, particularly of 'institutions' in the new institutionalism are argued 
to be too general (Tempel and Walgenbach, 2003). For instance, what constitutes an 'organisational 
field' is ambiguous. Secondly, new institutionalism focuses on the micro level, where cognitive 
aspects of institutions are strongly emphasised. Its focus on the 'organisational field' as the unit of 
analysis and institutions at the micro level provides a less precise tool for the comparison of the 
influences of macro level (i. e. national) institutions on individual firm behaviour. As Tempel and 
Walgenbach (2003) argue, in the few comparative studies done within the new institutionalism (e. g. 
Orru, Biggart and Hamilton, 1991; Dobbin, 1994), the influences of national (macro level) institutional 
environments become evident, which brings new institutionalism closer to the historical comparative 
approach. In the business systems approach the focus is on the macro level institutional system, i. e. 
the state, financial, education and industrial systems, trust and authority relations. These main national 
institutional elements are clearly defined to understand the general pattern of economic coordination 
and control within a nation state and its influences on firm behaviour. 
Thirdly, although both approaches are empirically oriented, the application of the new institutionalism 
in organisational studies has been mostly confined to the context of the USA. It has only recently been 
used in comparative organisational studies in MNCs to understand, for instance, the transfer of 
strategic organisational practices (Kostova, 1999), gaining organisational legitimacy (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999) and the adoption of organisational practices by subsidiaries under `institutional duality' 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). The business systems approach on the other hand provides a clearly 
defined framework that allows comparative study of different national systems. Moreover, a 
significant amount of research within the context of MNCs that adopted the business systems approach 
has accumulated recently, particularly by Ferner et al. investigating US MNCs in the UK, Germany, 
Spain and Ireland (Almond and Ferner, 2006). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the core 
argument of these two main institutionalist approaches is to some extent contradictory: while new 
institutionalism emphasises convergence of organisational structures and behaviour within an 
`organisational field' through the mechanisms of `isomorphism', the business systems (and other 
historical approaches) claim continued diversity as a result of variations in national institutional 
arrangements and business systems. 
12 
New institutionalism was among the theoretical approaches considered for the analytical framework of 
this study and some of its arguments were incorporated into the analysis. However, it was not adopted 
as one of the main theoretical elements in view of the above issues. It is argued that the business 
systems approach presents the most appropriate theoretical perspective for the conceptual framework 
at the macro level for the purposes of this comparative study. A detailed discussion of the 
comparative institutionalist, and particularly the business systems, approaches is presented next. 
2.2.3. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONALISM: BUSINESS SYSTEMS APPROACH 
Historical approaches within institutionalist theory focus on the macro level social institutions and 
define them as political, legal and societal frameworks at the nation state level. According to the 
comparative institutionalist perspective, institutions are robust and 'interlocking' frameworks that 
consist of organisations, rules and regulations, and they present significant constraints for 
organisational behaviour and structures at the national level. These constraints establish the path 
dependencies in each national institutional framework, which explains the self-supportiveness of the 
elements and robustness of the framework as well as differences in behavioural and organisational 
patterns across nation states. In this approach origins of institutions are external to actors and they 
represent constraints and coercive mechanisms. 
There are various theories within comparative institutionalism that are classified as the 'business 
systems' approach and used for the comparative analysis of firm behaviour in different national 
settings. The `societal effects' by the Aix school (e. g. Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980), the 
`national business system' by Whitley (1992,1999) and Lane (1995), the 'social systems of 
production' by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997), and more recently the `varieties of capitalism' by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) are significant models within this approach. There are some variations 
between these approaches, usually in terms of the main elements of a national business system. 
However they all agree on the basic arguments, discussed in more detail below, and most importantly, 
they provide a theoretical framework that allows systematic comparative studies of HRM and 
organisational behaviour between different countries. 
Whitley (1992) defines business systems as ̀ particular arrangements of hierarchy-market relations 
which become institutionalised and relatively successful in particular contexts' (p. 6) and emphasises 
the basic arguments of this approach as follows: 
"business systems are distinctive configurations of hierarchy-market relations which 
become institutionalized as relatively successful ways of organizing economic activities in 
different institutional environments. They develop and change in relation to dominant 
social institutions, especially those important during processes of industrialization. The 
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coherence and stability of these institutions, together with their dissimilarity between nation 
states, determine the extent to which business systems are distinctive, integrated, and 
nationally differentiated. " 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) similarly argue that the `social systems of production' consist of: 
"institutions or structures of a country or a region ... 
integrated into a social configuration: 
the industrial relations system; the system of training of workers and managers; the internal 
structure of corporate firms, the structured relationship among firms in the same industry on 
the one hand, and on the other hand firms' relations with the suppliers and customers; the 
financial markets of a society; the conceptions of fairness and justice held by capital and 
labour; the structure of the state and its policies; and a society's idiosyncratic customs and 
traditions as well as norms, moral principles, rules, laws, and recipes for action. " (p. 2) 
These definitions reflect the commonly shared, basic notions of business systems approaches. Firstly, 
they emphasise the `interlocking' character of the structures and institutions that shape the markets, 
competition and business in general. That is, there is no one best way of coordinating and controlling 
economic activities successfully in a market economy. Firm behaviour is determined by the social- 
institutional environment of nation states (sometimes at sub- or supra-national levels), thus 
constituting diverse ways of organising economic activity. Therefore different patterns of economic 
organisation are claimed to be the outcome of particular dominant national institutional arrangements. 
A second major notion is the `path dependency', i. e. the historical, path-dependent evolutionary nature 
of national institutions and business systems. The path-dependence perspective looks for the causal 
relationships among social phenomena: i. e. what happens at one point in time has so significant an 
influence that it changes the outcomes of future events (Mahoney, 2003). Accordingly, dominant 
institutions gain their distinctive characters at a very early stage of industrialisation and they shape the 
subsequent developments of national business systems as they continue to evolve facing social, 
economic, political and technological challenges. The `interlocking' nature of the key institutions also 
reinforces their tendency to persist. 
The comparative institutionalist approach provides a macro-level conceptual framework that allows 
the comparison of FIRM in different national environments. The contributions of this substantial 
literature can be summarised in three main points: firstly, comparative institutionalist literature 
investigates how key national institutions are formed, emphasising the significance of the historical 
and path-dependent nature of their development. Secondly, it investigates the 'embeddedness' of 
firms in their own national institutional environment, stressing how the interaction effects and 
institutional complementarities shape firm behaviour (Deeg and Jackson, 2007). Various approaches 
contend that dominant and mutually supportive national institutions were developed as a result of 
historical paths favouring certain kinds of market arrangements while deterring others. Among others, 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Whitley (1999) emphasise ̀institutional complementarity' to explain the 
relationship between specific market organisation and market-hierarchy relations. Finally, recent 
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approaches provide an analytical framework to explain national systems' responses to economic forces 
or shocks, such as globalisation or European integration by using models that incorporate influences of 
continuous change, particularly in the transnational institutional arena and their effects on national 
institutions, as well as functional change in institutions (e. g. Djelic and Quack, 2003; Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Thelen, 2005). 
As such it avoids the conceptual and methodological shortcomings of the culturalist approach and is 
better structured than the new institutionalism for a systematic cross-national comparative study. Thus 
it is chosen as one of the main elements of the conceptual framework of this research. There are 
nevertheless a number of limitations of the comparative institutionalism. It has been criticised for, 
firstly, overemphasising the robustness of national institutional systems, and not considering 
mechanisms for continuous change; secondly, predominantly focusing on the macro-level national 
institutions, and neglecting intermediate levels of analysis below the national business systems, such 
as sub-national or regional, sectoral and organisational level institutions and their influences on firm 
behaviour (Ferner, Quintanilla and Sanchez-Runde, 2006). Moreover, typologies of business systems 
developed by comparative institutionalist research have focused heavily on the Triad. While research 
on Eastern Asian countries is available to a much lesser extent, in other developing countries and 
particularly those in transitional periods it is non-existent. These limitations however are tackled by 
the incorporation of sector and organisational levels into the analytical framework of this study and the 
proposal for a `hybrid transitional' NBS model, discussed in the second part of this chapter. Before 
presenting the analytical framework, literature for limitations of the business systems approach will be 
discussed next. 
Institutional Robustness versus Mechanisms of Transformation 
Business systems approaches do not emphasise change, but the durability and persistence of 
institutional elements over time as a result of the mutually reinforcing features and integrated nature of 
the dominant institutions. The path-dependence perspective proposes that institutional change is 
expected to occur only in what can be described as a punctuated equilibrium model, where sudden and 
major, `rupture-like' changes occur at the critical junctures because of some dramatic events, such as 
revolutions or wars (Thelen, 2003; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Other smaller exogenous influences are 
expected to be absorbed by the system as a whole, not resulting in any major change. Therefore 
change is usually regarded to be path-dependent, where pre-existing institutions limit the perceptions 
of the actors and alternatives thus resulting in only incremental but non-consequential change in the 
major institutions (Djelic and Quack, 2003). 
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However critical junctures that lead to sudden and radical changes in institutions are experienced 
relatively rarely, whereas the cumulative influence of seemingly less dramatic but ongoing changes 
might be more significant (Djelic and Quack, 2003). Moreover, even in the face of radical changes in 
the social order, persistence of some institutional elements is noteworthy, as in the re-emergence of 
specific institutions facilitating employer coordination in Germany and Japan after World War 2 
(Thelen, 2003). Although there is good empirical evidence against the sweeping claims of the 
globalisation proponents, it can also be claimed that more changes are experienced in national 
institutional environments. The `stalactite' model proposed by Djelic and Quack (2003) combines the 
elements of comparative institutionalist and globalisation approaches: it provides space for the 
influences of globalisation as an incremental but consequential change process on the national 
institutional systems while also arguing for the variability of national frameworks stemming from their 
own historical development processes. 
This approach, supported by empirical evidence from different countries or sectors and professions, is 
also based on the embeddedness of economic activity within the larger, i. e. national, level institutional 
framework. The `embeddedness' notion has been further developed by the inclusion of the 
transnational environment together with the national framework, which is used to explain, at least 
partly, the change process in the national rules of the game. While the historically dominant national, 
or `incumbent', rules still have a prominent role in shaping business systems, 'challenger' rules 
brought by globalisation gain significance. Globalisation is redefined in this approach not as a given 
but as a process, "a phenomenon in the making, to be explained and understood. " (p. 302). 
Using the metaphor of formation of stalactites in a cave from tiny but continuous drops of water under 
certain conditions, the stalactite model argues that change in the national institutional systems over a 
long period through a succession of individually insignificant looking transformations of the elements 
(through trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories) can lead to consequential changes in the whole 
system. This image is argued to be more probable than a `Big Bang' explanation of national 
institutional change. It can be a very slow process, where a minor change in each element leads to that 
of the others, bringing about transformation of the part or whole of the system eventually. Djelic and 
Quack (2003) propose that: 
"under repeated, multidirectional and multilevel attacks from challenger rules, both through 
trickle-up and trickle-down trajectories, national configurations may erode and be reshaped 
progressively through time. " (p. 310) 
Their combined approach continues to argue along the lines of path dependency to explain 
individuality of national institutional systems: at certain junctures NBS are expected to take on a new 
path: it is not a simple evolution or change of the old path nor a radical break from it. It is described 
as an `hybridisation', but not a simple convergence process where "many of the institutions of the old 
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path continue as before, some old institutions are transformed to new purposes, and new institutions 
are introduced. " (p. 310; cited from Deeg, 2001: 7). This approach has much in common with Thelen's 
(2003) notion that gradual change can take place without 'big shocks' and within systems without 
external influences. Thelen (2003) suggests two mechanisms where institutional changes can be 
produced endogenously: institutional `layering' involves partial redefinition of some institutional 
elements while leaving others in place, and institutional 'conversion' means that institutions developed 
for certain purposes are used for a different set of aims. 
One of the core elements of Djelic and Quack's (2003) model is the interplay between national 
institutional change and transnational institution building through trickle-down or trickle-up 
trajectories where the impact can be directly from the transnational to national (i. e. trickle down 
mechanisms) or more indirectly through sub-societal actors. For instance when EU or other 
transnational institutions such as IMF, World Bank or WTO exercise pressure on national 
governments to amend national laws or develop new ones, which would redefine the economic rules, 
national institutional systems are changed through direct, trickle-down mechanisms. Globalisation 
also increases cross-national interactions at the sub-societal levels (sectors, industries, sub-regions) 
where sub-societal actors can act as the transmitters and mediators of new rules they have brought into 
a certain national system. Trickle-up trajectories are followed when these new rules are pushed from 
below to change national institutional frames at the higher level. MNCs are among such major sub- 
societal actors. 
The combined approach by Djelic and Quack (2003) therefore compensates for the mostly neglected 
change process in the business systems approach by accounting for the most recent change agent, i. e. 
globalisation as a process. Such an approach is regarded as appropriate to understand particularly 
those NBS that are in a transitional period, where incremental but consequential change is more often 
experienced through trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories. 
Business systems approaches consider the boundaries of the nation state as their natural unit of 
analysis. One of the core assumptions underlying this approach is that the dominant institutions such 
as the state, legal, education and financial systems, are organised at the nation state level, therefore 
they impose their influences on the business system as a whole. Although the nation state serves the 
purposes of institutional comparison at the macro level well, it is doubtful whether it is possible to 
understand business systems and compare organisational behaviour by only considering the macro 
level. Consequently, a multi-level conceptual framework is adopted in this study and in the next part, 
the literature on the intermediate levels of analysis is discussed. 
17 
Intermediate Levels ofAnalysis: Below the National Business Systems 
Below the macro institutional level of nation states, there might be institutional differences 
geographically, at the sub-national level, as for instance in the case of federal states. Moreover, as in 
the cases of northern and southern Italy, or eastern and western Germany, discrepancies in economic 
level and political culture within the same nation state can generate significantly different business 
systems within a country. 
In addition to geographical disparities, structure and influences of industrial sectors need to be 
considered. Räsänen and Whipp (1992) accordingly argue that: 
"It may be necessary to pay careful attention to a host of meso-level and even micro-level 
units around which collective action can be organised within a country, and sometimes 
across national borders. " (p. 47) 
National and international economies can also be defined as a collection of various sectors. An 
historical sectoral approach might 'conceptualise how sectors emerge and become constituted in 
certain ways, how they are reproduced and developed, and how their dynamics influence individual 
businesses and corporations' (Räsänen and Whipp, 1992: 47). The historical sector approach by 
Räsänen and Whipp (1992) goes beyond the economic definition of a sector. It defines sectors as 
historically evolving economic, social and political relations, which might also bear certain national 
characteristics. This perspective suggests that there are multiple sectoral constitutions within nation 
states that compete to establish their own `rules of the game'. Even though Whitley (1992: 14) 
acknowledges possible regional variations within nation states, he still argues for the dominance of 
general national institutions and maintains that sectors do not differ significantly enough to form 
'industrial business systems'. Räsänen and Whipp (1992) however claim that there might be 
'institutionalised' patterns of economic as well as social, cultural and political behaviour at the 
industry level within a national business system. Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and Streeck (1994) make 
similar arguments, in that there are sectoral specific arrangements that are also specific to the national 
business system. 
Djelic and Quack (2003) similarly argue for the significance of the sectoral level, particularly in terms 
of the transmitter role the sectoral agents can play (see above). ̀ Minor' changes in the rules at certain 
sub-societal levels can exert indirect influences on the national institutional systems, eventually 
leading to a re-definition of rules and regulations at higher levels. FDI in a major industry is given as 
one possible source of such indirect influence. 
Such an approach also assumes that social actors are not passive objects of institutional influences. 
Djelic and Quack (2003) claim that institutional change is brought about by certain groups (or 
18 
networks) of actors when they develop new patterns of action, or copy or adapt from other prevailing 
examples. Räsänen and Whipp (1992) also argue that `units of collective activity' should not be taken 
as passive agents, constrained by the national institutions. They argue that different actors at sectoral 
level can use the dominant national institutions in locally different ways and for various purposes. 
In summary, the business systems approach at the macro-level, with the incorporation of mechanisms 
to account for the evolution of dominant national institutions, and sub-national (geographical and 
sectoral) levels, presents a framework useful for the comparative study of how firms, as controlling 
and coordinating mechanisms of economic activity, are organised within different hierarchy-market 
arrangements. To use this framework for the comparative study of MNCs, relevant literature on the 
transfer of HRM policies is discussed in the next section. 
2.3. TRANSFER OF HRM POLICIES BETWEEN NATIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
Comparative institutionalism, with the incorporation of other theories to compensate for its criticised 
aspects as discussed above, is a useful tool to understand national business systems and their impact 
on f irm and management behaviour. Another key issue for the analysis of HRM policies and practices 
of MNCs in various host systems is the 'political and contested process' (Ferner and Tempel, 2006: 29) 
of international transfer of I IR policies and practices between the different national systems. To 
investigate the complex nature and mechanisms of international transfer we need to understand how 
policies and practices developed in one institutional environment are integrated into a considerably 
different one. A number of factors operating at different levels (national institutional, sector, 
organisational) have been considered by a variety of approaches in the international business literature. 
Firstly, in more conventional approaches drawing on the resource-based theory of the firm, structural 
and strategy factors are taken into consideration. According to this approach, transfer is based on the 
`rational' choice of decision-makers at the corporate and sometimes subsidiary level. They consider 
the role of a subsidiary within the MNCs and the extent of interdependency between subsidiaries and 
the headquarters (IIQ). For instance, if the subsidiary is dependent on the parent company for 
resources, transfer of home-grown policies and practices can be expected (Rozensweig and Nohria, 
1994). Taylor, Beechler and Napier (1996) similarly argue that the higher the degree of 
interdependency between parent and the subsidiary, the higher the likelihood of the transfer of HRM 
policies. Particularly if the subsidiary is of significance for the company, where the HRM strategies 
are considered important to realise subsidiary success, then the parent-company opts for the transfer 
for strategic reasons. Moreover if parent-company policies are regarded as a source of international 
competitive advantage and essential for subsidiary success, transfer is argued to be more likely (Taylor 
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et al., 1996). The level of functional integration of subsidiaries is argued to be another structural 
factor that explains the transfer process internationally (e. g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998) 
However, it is not possible to understand international transfer of policies by considering it only as a 
result of rational corporate choice for increased efficiency decided by top-level decision-makers. 
Issues both at the macro (national and supra-national) and micro (inter- and intra-organisational) levels 
must also be taken into account. A third approach thus explores the influence of factors related to the 
national and supra-national institutional systems on the transfer of policies and practices. The most 
significant analytical issues at the macro-level are, firstly, the impact of the level of similarity (or 
difference) between the national institutional systems on the success of transfer (e. g. Kostova, 1999); 
and secondly, power relations at the macro-level, i. e. `dominance effects' of some economically and 
politically powerful countries (e. g. Smith and Meiksins, 1995; Elger and Smith, 2006). 
As a part of her construct that specifies 'the factors that contribute to the transnational transfer of 
strategic organizational practices within MNCs' (p. 308) Kostova (1999) conceptualises 'institutional 
distance' as an important factor that influences the institutionalisation of the practice at the recipient 
unit. Drawing on the new institutionalist approach, she proposes the 'country institutional profile' 
(CIP) consisting of regulatory, cognitive and normative institutions in a country. `Institutional 
distance' specifies the difference between these three pillars of institutions at home and in recipient 
`social contexts'. Kostova (1999) argues that the level of consistency between the home and host 
CIPs, i. e. the `institutional distance', particularly with regard to the practices that MNCs intend to 
transfer, is a significant factor that influences the success of the transfer. She accordingly hypothesises 
that the greater the difference between CIPs, the higher the likelihood of 'misfit' between the 
transferred practice and the recipient unit, which results in low success rate for the transfer. 
In addition to the `institutional distance' argument by Kostova (1999), another significant macro-level 
issue is related to the power relations between countries. Conceptualised as ̀ dominance effects' by 
Smith and Meisksins (1996), it is argued that transfer of 'best practice' by companies that are from 
economically more successful, hence powerful, countries is easier to those in less ̀ dominant' 
countries. As such, elements of 'dominance effects' can be found as early as in Perlmutter's (1969) 
ethnocentric approach in MNCs' tendency to transfer their home-grown HRM practices to host 
countries. Moreover actors in the less powerful countries might assume that the 'best practices' 
developed in dominant economies are superior, therefore perceive an interest in adopting them in their 
organisations. Therefore `dominance effects' can be experienced either way, i. e. in addition to `push' 
by companies from dominant countries, subsidiaries in less developed countries might be willing to 
attract parent-company practices from more developed countries, resulting in `pull' effects (Meardi 
and Toth, 2006). In addition to 'dominance effects' of developed countries, Elger and Smith (2006) 
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claim that practices developed in leading industrial sectors or even firms have the potential to exert 
pressure for the diffusion of `best practices'. Finally, Ferner and Tempel (2006) claim that power 
struggles are not limited to transfer of best practices between countries, but dominance effects might 
be experienced in terms of pressure from dominant states over subordinate ones to change the latter's 
legal frameworks, which in turn can result in transfer of practices, where MNCs might play an active 
role, directly or indirectly through political networks. 
In addition to power relations at the macro level, more recently another line of research has considered 
the significance of interests, power and dynamics of politics at the micro organisational level (Ferner, 
Almond and Colling, 2005a; Ferner et al., 2006; Ferner and Tempel, 2006; Edwards, Colling and 
Ferner, 2007). It is argued that, until recently, international business literature generally neglected 
inter- and intra-organisational power dynamics, particularly between parent and subsidiary, with a few 
exceptions where subsidiary and HQ power resources in terms of resource-dependency were taken into 
consideration (e. g. Taylor et al., 1996). However Ferner and Tempel (2006) argue that 
"[T]he transfer process within the MNC is determined not so much by the rational decision- 
making of senior corporate executives but by the inter-play of interests and the possession 
and deployment of power resources by a variety of actors at different organizational levels. " 
(p. 31) 
The ways in which actors at the organisational level behave strategically in order to pursue their own 
interests by using their power bases and the effects of such strategic behaviour on the transfer of 
policies and practices are at the centre of the micro political approach (Edwards et al., 2007: 203). 
This approach acknowledges that transfer in multinationals is not simply a function of rationalistic 
determinism, national institutional systems or macro-level power issues. It is argued that the 
transferability of practices is influenced also by micro-level choices and power bases of subsidiaries 
and actors. Importance (e. g. competitive performance) and substitutability of the subsidiary in the 
global value chain of the MNCs is one such source of power for subsidiaries to resist or negotiate 
transfer of policies and practices. Similarly, subsidiaries can also use their knowledge and experience 
of the local system, in addition to other power resources gained from the legal framework (e. g. 
statutory rights for employee participation through works councils) and local and international 
networks. Pulignano (2006) for instance found evidence for the significant influences of organisation- 
specific elements in transfer and, more importantly, local adaptation of employment relations in 
British and Italian subsidiaries of a US MNC. 
Kostova (1999) also hypothesises that the process of transfer is affected by the `attitudinal' and 
`power/dependence' relationships between the parent company and subsidiary. In terms of the 
attitudinal relationship, she argues that higher commitment and trust of the subsidiary in the parent 
company results in higher success of transfer. Drawing on both the resource-dependence and 
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institutional theories, Kostova (1999) argues that subsidiaries can transfer home policies in order to 
compete for parent-company resources or to gain legitimacy within the MNC. Both of these motives 
reflect inter- and intra-organisational politics influencing policy transfer from HHQ to subsidiaries. 
The various approaches discussed above make significant analytical contributions towards 
understanding the transfer of policies and practices cross-nationally within the context of MNCs. 
While individually they might not present the whole picture, within a combined perspective they can 
complement each other. In an effort to `better understand how transfer is shaped by the 
interrelationships between the context of firms on the one hand and the relations between groups of 
actors within the firm on the other', Edwards et al. (2007: 204) suggest a `political economy approach' 
(p. 213), i. e. an amalgamated perspective that draws on the crucial tenets of the market-based, cross- 
national comparative and micro political perspectives. Based on an extensive case study of an 
American MNC operating in the UK, Edwards et al. (2007) found significant evidence for the 
intertwined nature of institutional, political and market-based influences both at the macro national 
and micro organisational level. Their analysis revealed that, firstly, while MNCs are embedded in 
multiple national institutional systems, which can theoretically prohibit the transfer of policies and 
practices, there is still some scope for manoeuvre. Secondly, actors involved can use external and 
internal factors politically to increase their power to shape the transfer process according to their own 
objectives and agenda. Sources of power can be various, i. e. market-based (e. g. pressure to increase 
`shareholder value', or local knowledge and expertise) or more institutional (e. g. local legal 
frameworks and expert knowledge in them). Edwards et al. (2007) argue that while power and ability 
of actors have an important role in shaping the transfer, it is to a large extent shaped by the 
institutional elements. 
Consequently, one final issue in the `diffusibility' of HR policies and practices within the MNCs is 
about the degree of changes, i. e. 'hybridisation' when policies are transferred between different 
national institutional systems (e. g. Boyer et al., 1998; Tolliday et al., 1998). The findings of a growing 
number of studies suggest that 'transfer is not an either-or matter' (Ferner et al., 2006: 306). The 
complex framework of transfer that is influenced by a variety of factors at different levels results in 
partial or transformed application of policies in subsidiaries. Indeed, Tolliday et al. (1998), based on 
case studies of various production systems, claim that 
"[.. ] the process of transfer and adaptation of a productive model from a parent context to 
another site will always lead to the hybridization of the logic and elements of the productive 
organization. " (p. 4) 
Three important characteristics of hybridisation are emphasised by Tolliday et a!. (1998): firstly, it 
occurs as a result of the interaction of the production model with different institutional, political, and 
societal systems, including labour markets and skill structures. Secondly, hybridisation is a dynamic, 
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not static, process. Finally, it is not limited to contemporary times but `a recurring historical 
phenomenon', where some of the best known examples range from the imitation of the "`American 
system' in the late nineteenth century to the dissemination of the M -form corporation, particularly to 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s". (p. 4). Boyer (1998) also emphasises that hybridisation is a complex 
process, where `causality is not unidirectional' (p. 37). He underlines the conflict between 'desire' of 
the organisation to transfer the model in its original form and the necessity to adapt it to another 
'social fabric'. Ineffective implantation runs the risk of rejection at the subsidiary, therefore 
hybridisation follows where a learning and innovation process is experienced by both local and parent 
actors. While Boyer (1998) emphasises the differences between external economic institutions and 
organisational structures that necessitate adaptation, Kostova (1999) considers cognitive and 
normative dimensions of integration of a practice in the subsidiary. She differentiates between 
`implementation' and ̀ internalisation' where the former involves formal adherence while the latter 
means 'attaching meaning to the practice and infusing it with value'. Therefore for increased 
`internalisation', it can be argued that hybridisation according to economic as well as cognitive and 
normative institutions is necessary. 
In summary, it is argued that cross-national transfer of policies and practices is a complex and 
contested process influenced by a variety of factors at different levels. Literature in this field 
considered market-based, cross-national and micro-political influences on the transfer of policies and 
practices within MNCs. The review of this literature reveals that no one line of approach is sufficient 
on its own to understand the process coherently; instead, a combined approach is necessary. It is 
concluded that firstly, although national institutional systems present certain limitations on the 
transfer, it is still possible to find space for manoeuvre. Secondly, dynamics and politics at the micro 
organisational level also exert significant influences on transfer, where implementation and 
internalisation of the transferred practice by the local actors can be quite different. Thirdly, 
hybridisation of transferred practices is argued to be almost inevitable. Such hybridisation can 
possibly result in differentiation of applications in different subsidiaries even though one of the main 
goals in transfer might be standardisation across MNCs (Edwards et al., 2007). After the discussion of 
the relevant literature, in the next part the research framework developed for this study is presented. 
2.4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING HRM POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES IN MNCs' SUBSIDIARIES 
In this section an analytical framework that is used to analyse how HRM policies and practices of 
American subsidiaries are shaped in a distinctive host environment is presented. This framework 
seeks to understand the multi-layered, multi-dimensional and interwoven context of transfer within 
MNCs. Therefore a four-level research framework is presented: the macro level, i. e. NBS, is 
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paramount, which is complemented by meso, i. e. sector, and micro, i. e. firm, levels. The fourth level 
of analysis is the HR/IR functional level. This multi-layered framework allows the investigation of the 
main research questions by systematically considering social, economic, structural and political factors 
at various levels. These generally interwoven factors exhibit intertwined influences, making the 
context even more complex. The components of the framework are discussed next. 
2.4.1. MACRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS: HOST-COUNTRYAND HOME-COUNTRYINFLUENCES 
Of the theories explaining economic and organisational behaviour, various approaches within 
convergence and divergence debates are discussed above. While in general earlier convergence and 
more recent globalisation perspectives argue for an aggregate change in organisational behaviour 
towards `one best model', culturalist and institutionalist approaches claim the opposite on the basis of 
survival of national patterns of economic behaviour. It is concluded that although both perspectives 
have their own merits to understand management behaviour in different nations comparatively, 
conceptual and methodological shortcomings of culturalist approach evidently reduce its value in 
explaining the underlying reasons for patterns of similarities and differences between nations. 
Institutionalist theories on the other hand maintain that organisational behaviour is structured and 
governed by certain historically evolved political, legal and social institutional frameworks in which 
firms are embedded and develop their behaviour to survive most successfully within these 
environments. Distinctive conceptual frameworks of comparative and new institutionalism, the two 
main perspectives within this approach, are also discussed separately. While both make valuable 
contributions to the understanding of firm behaviour in different contexts, NBS emphasises the macro 
(national) and new institutionalism the micro (organisational) level more. Moreover, as the discussion 
of transfer literature reveals, there are various issues at all levels to be considered to understand 
transfer within MNCs. Therefore an integrated framework is developed that brings essential concepts 
from the above literature review together. Finally the notion of a `hybrid transitional' business system 
is conceptualised, which combines issues of power relations with significant and continuous change at 
particularly the macro level. 
2.4.1.1. National Business Systems 
Comparative institutionalist approaches, or `comparative capitalisms', consist of various models 
and perspectives developed to understand 'the institutional foundations of diverse national 
'varieties' of business organisation' (Deeg and Jackson, 2007: 150). It is important to understand 
home- and host-country national business systems to ultimately analyse MNCs' organisational 
behaviour. For this purpose, the NBS approach, in combination with more recent comparative 
institutionalism literature, particularly that which addresses the challenges imposed by 
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`transnationalisation' upon national institutions, is used as the macro-level component of the 
analytical framework. While considering influences of the host and home country business 
systems, host country analysis is complemented by the proposition of a `hybrid transitional' system. 
Firstly macro level national institutions are briefly discussed. 
In the NBS approach Whitley (1992b) differentiates between background and proximate institutions. 
In the former category are those social institutions that are argued to have supported the development 
and structure of economic systems and form the backbone of industrialisation and modem market 
economy. Key background institutions are usually formed and transmitted through family, religious 
organisations and the education system and include `those dealing with trust relations, organising 
collective loyalties and ensuring cooperation between individuals and families and those governing 
relations of subordination and obedience' (p. 20). The proximate institutions on the other hand include 
those that affect economic behaviour now and in the recent past, and explain differences between 
managerial organisation and behaviour, i. e. `social-institutional complexes' (Lane, 1992: 66). Included 
in this group are the structure and role of the state, the nature of the financial system, the education and 
training system, industrial relations system, and business associations. Hollingsworth and Boyer 
(1997) include an almost identical set of institutions in their formulation of social system of 
production (listed above), while Hall and Soskice (2001) similarly emphasise financial systems and 
corporate governance, industrial relations, education and training systems, and inter-firm relations in 
their `varieties of capitalism' model that puts firms and their coordination problems into the centre. 
These institutions are therefore considered as the most important elements of the macro-level 
institutional systems and their significance is briefly discussed. 
The State 
The state as the single most important proximate institution is widely discussed in historical 
approaches since it has ̀ the strongest and pervasive impact on business systems' (Lane, 1992: 65). Its 
importance in the NBS approach is due to its direct and indirect influences in shaping the business 
system and forming the other institutions, i. e. education and training system, industrial relations 
system, financial system, etc., through regulations and legislation. Different characteristics of the state 
as an institution are stressed according to the roles it takes on in the economic and legal environment, 
e. g. developmental, regulatory, interventionist, etc. Variations in its structure and policies, and its 
ability in creating and maintaining a stable and suitable environment for economic growth are argued 
to be closely related to the characteristics of the national business environment (Whitley, 1999). 
The financial system 
The financial system is argued to be one of the crucial elements of the social-institutional environment 
because it '... affects both the ability of the state to support and guide industrial development and the 
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nature offirms'strategic choices and risk management' (Zysman, 1983). Two main types of financial 
systems are capital-market based and credit-based systems. The prevalent type of the financial system 
in a country shapes, firstly, firms' dependence on the state for the distribution of resources and thus 
their choices, and secondly, relations between firms and banks. As an indication of the 
interrelatedness of the various components of the institutional system, it is argued that the state in 
capital-based financial systems is limited principally to a regulatory role, thus for instance it cannot 
readily intervene in firms' financial decisions or to support certain industries. In credit-based systems 
however the state can perform these roles easily, especially where the system is dominated by state- 
owned banks (Whitley, 1999). In capital-market based systems, relations between banks and firms 
tend to be short-term, impersonal and specific to certain transactions whereas in credit-based systems, 
long-term relations and risk-sharing are the norms. Public financial reporting is less important in the 
latter while finding funds through specialised financial institutions depends on the ratings of financial 
reports in the capital-market based systems. 
Education and training system 
The third component of the social-institutional environment of NBS is the system of education and 
training. It is particularly important because 'industry depends not only on money capital but also on 
human capital, in the form of skills, professional expertise and scientific/technological knowledge' 
(Lane, 1992: 69). There are major differences in the national education and training systems. These 
differences have certain consequences for the management of human resources of firms, especially in 
terms of recruitment, promotion and training (Whitley, 1999). Other significant consequences can be 
observed in the organisation and control of the division of labour, as was illustrated in the studies by 
Lane (1988) and Maurice et al. (1980). 
Industrial relations system 
The industrial relations (IR) system is one of the major institutional elements of a national business 
system as it directly influences firm behaviour through the structure of labour markets and the strength 
of labour organisations (Whitley, 1992b; Lane, 1992). The characteristics of the labour market and the 
strength of trade unions to a large extent define the relationship between labour and management and 
influence management practices, especially in terms of work organisation and control (Whitley, 1999). 
The IR system has clear connections with the education and training system in terms of skills and 
knowledge level of employees, which in turn influences labour strategies of companies. 
Business associations 
Defined as ̀ the collective organisation offirms on an industry and geographical basis' (Lane, 
1992: 72), Lane (1992) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) argue that the structured relationship 
among firms in the same industry is a significant social-institutional complex in shaping business 
26 
systems. The amount of support given to collective organisations by individual firms and the type of 
services and functions provided by them are among the important features. The degree of industrial 
self-administration and formalisation of inter-firm relations defines the effects of trade associations 
and chambers (Lane, 1992). 
2.4.1.2. Conceptualising a `Hybrid Transitional' Business System 
Distinctive and internally consistent models of national economies have been developed by 
considering these institutional complementarities. These models have been formed by considering 
almost exclusively developed economies of the western world, excluding a few studies that included 
Far Eastern countries (e. g. Whitley, 1999; Orru et al., 1991). There is a need to consider other, 
developing and less developed economies from different geographical parts of the world, particularly 
in the rapidly `transnationalising' world economy. The critical question is whether these theoretical 
models can be used effectively for understanding other, less developed or developing national business 
systems in non-western parts of the world. Moreover, the issue of change and particularly the 
influences of globalisation and power at the macro level need to be considered more extensively 
within the discussion and development of typologies, even though these issues are now openly dealt 
with in the comparative political literature. A `hybrid transitional' business system is therefore 
proposed to address these two main issues that the current comparative institutionalism fails to address 
properly. 
Among the typologies developed, the dichotomous model of LME versus CME is proposed by Hall 
and Soskice (2001) in their `varieties of capitalism' framework. These two models of contrasting 
market coordination and control mechanisms are developed by analysing the larger OECD countries. 
The USA, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland are classified as LME, while Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Austria are put into 
the CME group (p. 19-20). The remaining six countries in more 'ambiguous positions', i. e. France, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey, are classified into a separate cluster, arguing that they 
constitute a different type of capitalism. This 'Mediterranean' cluster is claimed to be marked by: 
"a large agrarian sector and recent histories of extensive state intervention that have left 
them with specific kinds of capacities for non-market coordination in the sphere of 
corporate finance but more liberal arrangements in the sphere of labor relations. " (p. 21) 
Although these characteristics might be shared by these six countries, there are certainly other 
significant differences between them. However, Hall and Soskice (2001) simply develop a 
geographical cluster and put all the `deviant' countries into it, without considering these economies in 
any more depth, which sounds too simplistic. 
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Whitley's (1999) classification, where he considers various combinations of significant features of the 
significant national institutions, is more detailed and represents a continuum rather than a dichotomy. 
The six typologies (i. e. fragmented, coordinated industrial district, compartmentalized, state organized, 
collaborative and highly coordinated) are robust and non-porous and leave no space for the possible 
influences of transnational organisations on changes in national institutional systems. Although 
Whitley (1999) discusses influences of globalisation and of developments in the transnational 
organisation of companies, he keeps his original argument intact, claiming that such influences will 
not result in rapid or considerable changes in national business systems. Additionally, his arguments 
are based on extensive evidence also from the most developed economies, including those countries 
such as Germany and Japan that went through abrupt influences of wars and economic system changes 
in the second half of the last century. However, influences of transnational organisations and 
companies were considerably limited during the pre-globalisation period and national economies were 
relatively insulated from international influences. 
With a similar approach to those of Hall and Soskice (2001), and Whitley (1999), Amable (2003) 
further suggests five `ideal types' of capitalisms. Considering complementarities between five main 
institutional elements (i. e. product-market competition, the wage-labour nexus and labour-market 
institutions, the financial-intermediation sector and corporate governance, social protection, and the 
education sector), he argues that the diverse models of capitalism are the market-based model (similar 
to LME or Anglo-Saxon model), social-democratic model, Asian capitalism, Continental European 
capitalism, and South European capitalism (Amable, 2003: 93-114). Although Amable (2003) 
empirically tests the applicability of his proposed ideal types of diverse capitalisms by using statistical 
analyses, the usual set of most developed, Western, economies is used, with the addition of Japan and 
Korea as the most developed Asian economies. While Amable's (2003) analysis includes discussion 
of factors that may cause institutional change, like Whitley he does not explore the possible ways in 
which this may generate changes in NBS. 
Considering the various classifications developed so far, it is argued that there is a need for a further 
developed approach that, firstly, incorporates the issue of transnational influences on institutional 
change and business systems, and secondly, goes beyond the most developed economies of the world 
and considers business systems of different countries. This study therefore proposes the 'hybrid 
transitional' business system that integrates these dimensions, by using the Turkish business system as 
an exemplary model. 
The first main issue is about the changes experienced in institutional environments particularly as a 
result of transnational organisations and influences. It can be argued that continuous change is 
experienced in all countries, and it is not a phenomenon limited to less-developed or developing 
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countries. Djelic and Quack's (2003) proposed approach for instance is discussed mainly within the 
domain of developed European economies. While this argument is basically correct, it can also be 
rightly claimed that a developing country that is struggling to advance in economic development and 
growth is under considerably higher and continuous pressure for structural and institutional change. 
Developed economies experience higher robustness in their national institutions as they have been 
developed and shaped much earlier during the industrialisation process. However, the influences of 
transnational organisations can result in more significant changes in more recently industrialising 
countries, particularly as a result of `dominance' effects and degree of openness to change. 
Using Djelic and Quack's (2003) terminology, it is argued that the pace and extent of the impact of 
'challenger' rules originating in the transnational environment on the 'incumbent' rules of the local 
institutional environment is not the same in all countries. In 'trickle-up' trajectories, the strength and 
legitimacy of foreign actors and the level of institutionalisation in the local environment are 
recognised to be significant. The degree of centrality, hence power, of a particular country (or group 
of countries) in the formation and stabilisation of transnational rules is considered as a very important 
factor in `trickle-down' trajectories. Also important is the degree of weakness and dependence of the 
local system on external actors, hence the latter's relative power, for how these trajectories work 
(Djelic and Quack, 2001: 312-319). Some countries have higher power and a more central position in 
cultivating, disseminating and imposing transnational rules on other countries, i. e. 'dominance' effects 
(Smith and Meisksins, 1995). The USA is found to be one of the most important such actors, if not 
the most important, while a group of rich and highly developed E. U. countries comprise the next 
significant group. Explained by its `unique position of geopolitical dominance that characterizes the 
US after 1945' (Djelic and Quack, 2003), the USA has been able to impose its influence through such 
international institutions in 'trickle-down' trajectories for institutional change as well in some 
particular sectors (e. g. consultancy, financial services, genetically modified food, etc) in `trickle-up' 
trajectories. Concomitantly, 'dominance' effects can result in rapid and considerable change through 
trickle-down trajectories, where the influences of transnational institutions are experienced in a 
developing country as a result of accessing membership of a regional economic structure, e. g. the EU, 
or taking on a restructuring programme by IMF. 
The second significant issue is about the level of openness of the national institutional environment to 
change. It can be higher or lower in terms of firstly the permissiveness of the legal and structural 
environment, and secondly, the willingness of the main actors to support change. Even in less 
permissive, stricter environments, the willingness of significant actors (e. g. private sector leaders, 
investors, unions, etc) can result in changes in the legislation and in the institutions subsequently. 
`Pull' effects are experienced in such cases where significant actors strive to bring legal, structural and 
institutional changes with a belief that these will result in increased success. In combination, i. e. 
29 
`push' effects of dominant transnational organisations and ̀ pull' effects of local (and sometimes 
international, in the case of MNCs) actors, make developing less powerful national economies more 
open to continuous and considerable change. 
Turkey is used as an example for a separate categorisation to incorporate these issues, namely a 
`hybrid transitional' business system. Turkey is categorised among the developing countries by 
various international institutions, such as the OECD, or as an `emergent' economy by the USA. 
Although it is not classified among the `transitional' economies, i. e. those transforming from centrally- 
planned to market systems, such as the former Soviet Union states or China, it in practice went 
through a similar process in the 1980s. With the liberalisation of the economy from an import- 
substitution system, it has become open to influences for rapid change in its institutional system. As a 
result of the national economic strategy changes since 1980, the Turkish business system has been 
experiencing significant transformation in terms of the state's role in the economy, and legal, financial 
and industrial relations systems. The majority of these changes have been initiated as a result of 
`trickle-down' mechanisms by transnational organisations, most importantly the stand-by agreements 
with the IMF and the accession to the EU. Moreover, considerable increases in FDI, particularly in 
some sectors (e. g. financial services and banking, communication technologies, consultancy, packaged 
food, etc. ) bring changes to the market dynamics through `trickle-up' trajectories, where individual 
firms (micro level) influence government (macro level) institutions. 
`Dominance' effects can be identified in the continuous and significant changes in the institutional 
environment in Turkey. As a candidate member country with its developing national economy 
dependent on international trade, loans and FDI, Turkey is clearly in a weaker position in comparison 
to the EU in accepting its influence, i. e. `trickle-down' trajectories, particularly for changes in legal as 
well as economic and trade rules. The IMF is also in a stronger position against Turkey in imposing its 
rules as Turkey had to sign stand-by agreements to find solutions for its extreme economic problems. 
However, Turkey cannot be defined as a 'low-power country' (Vo, 2004) particularly in comparison to 
newly developing, emergent and transitional countries. There are some factors that provide a certain 
degree of leverage to Turkey's institutional strength. A relatively earlier start in industrialisation and 
transition to a market economy, accumulation of private capital, and experience in certain industries 
are such factors, which are discussed in more detail later in the thesis. The socio-economic and 
institutional background of Turkey and the current changes in its business system are discussed in 
depth in Chapter 4, considering the important issues for a 'hybrid transitional' business system. It 
suffices here to state that there is a certain 'hybridisation' process in the institutional environment, 
many aspects of which are triggered by transnational organisations and globalisation. 
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In summary, there are a number of variables at the macro level that influence the institutional 
environment and business systems, which in turn affect the transfer of HR/IR. At the host country 
level, the distinctiveness of the business system, its relative power and its openness to change through 
global influences are the most significant factors. The nature of the home-country business system, 
the distinctiveness of its HR/IR system and the dominance of the country of origin are the other most 
influential factors at the macro, i. e. NBS, level. In this study, the transfer of IHR/IR policies and 
practices of MNCs originating from a strong home-country with distinctive HR/IR models to a `hybrid 
transitional' host country defined in terms of its relative strength and openness to global influences on 
its institutional business environment is investigated, by also considering the additional factors at the 
meso (i. e. industry) and micro (i. e. organisational) levels, which are discussed in the next part. 
2.4.2. MESO-LEVEL ANALYSIS: SECTORAL INFLUENCES 
Porter argues that the sectoral characteristics, such as product types, production factors (resources, 
technology, economies of scale, etc), demand, etc., define different patterns of competition, which 
might in turn directly influence employment systems and practices. The institutionalist approach, 
however, argues that there are problems in such an approach when moving from national to 
transnational as the `constitution of sectors varies by national context' (Whitley, 1992). For example, 
employer or trade associations are strong features of German and Asian economies whereas they are 
weak or absent in Anglo-Saxon economies (Traxler et al., 2001). Within the institutionalist approach 
therefore, sector is generally treated as a second-order influence on employment systems, in an 
interplay between home- and host-country effects. However, as argued by Colling and Clark (2002) in 
their case study of an US MNC in the UK, sectoral characteristics can change that interplay and, 
moreover, present alternative influences of their own. 
At the heart of Porter's classification lies the argument that the pattern of international competition in 
industries varies along a spectrum of multi-domestic to global. In multi-domestic industries, 
competition is confined to individual countries, therefore there are few MNCs in these sectors as they 
cannot benefit from their international competencies, i. e. brand names, reputation, economies of scale, 
customer base, etc. Subsidiaries are left considerably independent of the corporate control, as they 
depend more on local inputs. It is argued that the (HR) management in these sectors is less 
international, and more locally responsive. At the other end of the spectrum, in global industries, 
firms compete on a truly global scale in many countries making use of their international assets. As 
competition in one country influences competition in others, a higher level of support from HQ is 
provided in terms of technology and know-how, as local subsidiaries are less dependent on the local 
environment. In such sectors, more significant effects of home-country are claimed in the 
management of MNCs (e. g. Ferner, 1997). However many industries become more global as a result 
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of changes in technology, demand, government policies and infrastructure (e. g. banking, auditing, 
garments). There might also be differences within sectors, where global competition is observed 
within a sub-sector of a multi-domestic industry. Therefore, HRM transfer in MNCs needs to be 
analysed by considering different sectoral conditions and influences. Consequently, sectoral level 
analysis is incorporated to the analytical framework of this study to investigate possible influences of 
industry as a mediating factor below the macro, NBS, level. 
2.4.3. MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS: ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCES 
Influences of the home- and host-country business systems are analysed at the macro-level of this 
framework, while possible influences of sector are considered at the meso-level. However these two 
levels of analysis might not be sufficient to fully understand variations and similarities between HRM 
behaviour of MNCs in different host countries. Therefore the impact of organisational characteristics 
of the MNCs is considered as the third, micro, level of the conceptual framework. HRM behaviour of 
MNCs is shaped at the intersection of these three different levels of variables. 
Many studies state the influence of such organisational characteristics as the company's age, size, 
ownership structure, employee relations, management style, organisational culture, etc. (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira, 1987; Yuen and Kee, 1993, to 
name a few). The age, time and length of internationalisation of the company can predict some 
aspects of its HRM behaviour. For instance, according to Yuen and Kee (1993) tendency for 
developing more standardised and formalised HRM policies increases with time while formalised HR 
function and less dependence on external labour market are found in larger companies. Moreover, the 
MNC might be large internationally but its size in that particular host country might be comparatively 
smaller, which might predict either an ethnocentric approach (Perlmutter, 1969; Dowling et al., 1999), 
i. e. transferring its home-country applications directly to the subsidiary, or oppositely, by a polycentric 
approach, which means adopting the host-country applications. 
Evidence from studies in MNCs with different structures of ownership is used to argue for the 
significance of ownership structure of the subsidiary as another important variable in shaping the 
HRM behaviour. Research findings suggest that there are certain implications of shared ownership 
(i. e. IJVs) for the transfer of home-country HR/IR policies and host-country applications adopted. The 
parent on which the subsidiary is more resource-dependent, for example, is found to be more 
influential on the HR decisions of US companies in Mexico (Martinez and Ricks, 1989). While the 
ability of the local partner to use its expertise and knowledge to access raw materials and local markets 
is a source of influence, control of product and process technologies is stated as the main source of 
power in decision-making (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987). The ownership structure can therefore be 
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considered as a possible source of impact on the transfer of parent-country HR policies and 
applications to subsidiaries. 
Another organisational factor is about the investment type: direct transfer of a foreign parent- 
company's HRM policies to greenfield subsidiaries are observed to be more likely than to brownfield 
ones, as their introduction and acceptance at a newly established organisation receives much less 
resistance than at an ongoing operation that has already established policies and practices (Lu and 
Bjorkman, 1997). 
Finally there are issues of power and political behaviour at the organisational level within the 
subsidiary and MNC that constitute another micro-level influence (see above). To investigate the 
influences of various organisational factors and issues the micro organisational level is incorporated to 
the analytical framework below the NBS and sectoral levels. 
2.4.4. FUNCTIONAL-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Although the macro (i. e. NBS) and meso (i. e. sector) level frameworks are argued to set certain types 
of organisational behaviour, there can be internal differentiation of management policies and practices 
within an MNC in different functions as well as within the HRM function. Therefore a generalist 
approach in international HRM, such as Perlmutter's (1969) typology of ethnocentric versus 
polycentric, might not be sufficient to understand and explain different policies in various 
management functions. Therefore substantial issues in HR/IR need to be analysed separately (Kostova 
and Roth, 2002). 
While considering host- and home-country influences, it is possible to see that some HRM practices 
closely follow foreign parent ones while others are similar to those of the host-country or local parent 
(in the case of IJVs). Some issues, such as work hours, holidays, retirement, pensions, etc. are found 
to be closely following host-country practices, as a result of being subject to restrictive local 
regulations. Other aspects of HRM are found to be much less limited by such local regulations, such 
as salary structure, promotion, etc. therefore being more easily and directly transferred from foreign 
parent's applications (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). In the issues where local and sectoral 
regulations and conditions are highly constraining (e. g. unionisation) decentralisation of the 
management of these to the local managements is often observed (e. g. Schmitt and Sadowski, 2003). 
There might be other sectoral influences on specific issues, such as training and development, benefits, 
etc. Emphasis placed on certain substantive areas might finally reflect MNCs' individual 
characteristics, such as a major organisational change period. Therefore substantive areas in HR/IR 
need to be separately analysed by taking conditions and constraints at the previously discussed three 
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levels of the framework. At the bottom of the framework for this research thus lies the HR/IR 
functional level. 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, relevant literature has been critically reviewed in order to propose an analytical 
framework to study the research questions by using an appropriate line of inquiry, methods and the 
conceptual tools to analyse the empirical evidence. The proposed four-level framework consists of the 
macro (the national business system), meso (the industry), micro (the company) and functional 
(HR/IR) levels of analysis. Such a framework is established in an effort to bring various influential 
factors and analyse their individual and combined effects on the economic and managerial behaviour 
of MNCs organisations at the subsidiary level. 
For the macro level, two opposite theories of convergence and divergence are reviewed. Earlier 
theories of technological determinism and more recent theories of globalisation claim increasing 
similarities, i. e. convergence towards `best models', between economic behaviour in different 
countries. Divergence theories on the other hand claim an opposite view by arguing that significant 
differences between national cultures and institutions will continue to exist despite influential pressure 
from intensified economic globalisation, and shape economic behaviour in different nations 
accordingly. In fact, these two approaches (i. e. globalisation and comparative institutionalism) 
complement each other in certain aspects, particularly given the empirical evidence in the recent years, 
as in the model suggested by Djelic and Quack (2003). Their `stalactite' model proposes that 
influences of globalisation result in consequential changes, though slowly, in the institutional 
environments of national systems through `trickle-up' and ̀ trickle-down' trajectories. This approach 
is particularly suitable to research the questions of this study in a `hybrid transitional' national 
environment, which is argued to be affected more from such changes due to certain institutional 
characteristics. At the macro level therefore influences of the national institutional systems and 
globalisation on the business systems and economic behaviour of companies are both considered. 
Sectoral influences are considered at the second level of the framework, as literature suggests that 
apart from national institutional effects, industry in which the company operates can have a mediating 
role in shaping economic behaviour. In addition to industry, organisational aspects as the third level 
of the conceptual framework are also considered to analyse the transfer of policies and practices of 
MNCs at various substantial areas of HRM/IR, such as recruitment and selection, compensation and 
benefits, and employment relations. 
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the discussion of literature and presentation of the analytical framework, this chapter aims 
to justify the research methodology and design adopted, and methods used in terms of their suitability 
for the purposes and research questions of this study. The chapter begins with the research design, 
where the rationale for the choice of home- and host-countries to investigate their influences on the 
transfer of HR/IR policies and practices is discussed. In the rest of section 2, qualitative case study 
methodology is evaluated for its appropriateness for this research. Section 3 comprises discussion of 
hypothetical sampling of cases, i. e. detailed analysis of criteria for the selection of core and non-core 
case companies. Next section presents data collection methods and fieldwork, and discusses reliability 
and validity issues. In the last section data analysis process and methods are discussed before a short 
conclusion closes the chapter. 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This research aimed to investigate the interaction of parent- and host-country effects and their impact 
on the HR policies and practices of MNCs in a distinctive host business environment. More 
specifically, primary research aims were: 
1. to understand to what extent and how parent-country HRM policies and practices of 
American companies were transferred to their subsidiaries operating in the novel business 
environment of Turkey; and 
2. the effects of the latter on these policies and practices. 
To examine the HR behaviour of American MNCs operating in Turkey, a `hybrid transitional' 
business system, one exhibiting a mix of traits of both developed and developing economies, detailed 
case studies in American MNCs were carried out. Companies from various sectors were studied with 
a qualitative research approach, to consider sectoral and ownership effects. In the rest of this section, 
firstly, rationale for the choice of host- and home-countries is presented and, secondly, qualitative 
case-study methodology is justified. 
3.2.1. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING AMERICAN MNCS 
The United States (US), as the predominant economy in the world, has led the way as the originator 
and receiver of FDI. American MNCs comprise the majority of those listed in the top 100 TNCs by 
UNCTAD (1999). Between 2000 and 2004 American FDI outflow was annually on average US$150 
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billion'. As the dominant economic power and foreign investor, the USA has long been seen as the 
model not only for other MNCs but also all business around the world. Although divergence theory, 
and this research, argues that there is no single best model for effective management because of the 
variations in business systems, American MNCs have nevertheless been the diffusers of HRM 
practices given their dominant position in the international economy. 
American MNCs are moreover argued to be `ethnocentric' in their (HR/IR) management approach in 
other countries they operate in that they tend to transfer their home-country policies and practices to 
foreign subsidiaries, thus usually referred as ̀ innovators' in HR/IR. US MNCs were therefore chosen 
as marked cases to investigate home-country influences on the HR/IR policies in foreign subsidiaries. 
Another reason for studying American MNCs in Turkey was that the USA has been the dominant 
political and economic ally of Turkey. Starting in the 1950s with Marshall Aid, mainly because of 
Turkey's location during the Cold War, American aid and capital have always been the major source 
of foreign support for Turkey. Large American MNCs, such as Coca Cola and Pfizer, were among the 
few earliest foreign direct investment (FDI) companies in Turkey, in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Turkey has been classified among the ten Big Emerging Markets (BEMs) by the US government, 
along with China, India, Russia and Brazil, which are expected to offer the greatest commercial 
growth opportunities in the 21s` century (Tatoglu and Glaister, 2000: 4). American FDI in Turkey 
ranked fourth in 2005 in terms of the total number of companies (Table 3.1) and first in 2005 
according to the quantity of total capital inflow (Table 3.2). Moreover, it is now widely known that 
many foreign companies make their investments through the Netherlands and Belgium due to the tax 
advantages in these countries (a recent example was Vodafone of the UK) and the country of origin is 
registered as the country from which the capital is transferred to Turkey, not the home-country of the 
company2. Although exact percentages could not be calculated, it was convincingly argued by 
Treasury specialists that a significant proportion of the FDI registered from the Netherlands (and 
Belgium, more recently) has actually been made by prominent American companies. Therefore the 
role of US companies in Turkey might well be understated as the ultimate origin has not necessarily 
been accurately recorded in government statistics. In any case, the analytical reasons for choosing the 
USA as the home country outweigh practical reasons. 
To investigate home and host country influences on the transfer and formation of HRM policies and 
practices by looking at theoretically significant examples of national business systems, a single 
country research design was adopted. It can be argued that a comparative design where MNCs from 
two different host countries were researched would have provided a stronger perspective for analysing 
www. bea. eov 
2Interviews 
with Treasury specialists, General Directorate for FDI; Radikal newspaper, 03.05.2007, p. 15 
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host country influences. While such a design would have had its own merits, the aim of this particular 
study was to explore both home and host country influences. Especially as an initial example of an 
exploratory research on MNCs and HRM policies in Turkey, it was decided to stick with the single 
host nationality design to do an in-depth data collection and analysis. Moreover, cases from various 
sectors were selected to examine meso-level influences of industry, and it was not possible to find 
matching cases of American and another nationality in different industries. Therefore a single country 
design was implemented for this exploratory study, to use the findings for a comparative study 
subsequently. 
Total number of foreign 
capital firms 
2002 2005 
Germany 992 2,045 
United Kingdom 385 926 
The Netherlands 495 925 
USA 369 624 
France 271 459 
Italy 240 417 
Others 2,874 6,289 
TOTAL 5,626 11,685 
Table 3.1. Major foreign direct investor countries in 
Turkey, 2002 and 2005 (Source: General Directorate for Foreign Capital) 
No of new investments FDI Capital (million US$) 
2002 2005 2002 2005 
USA 40 103 2 1,894 
Germany 65 520 86 335 
Belgium 5 51 5 1,076 
France 23 81 22 263 
The Netherlands 46 214 72 296 
UK 35 330 8 267 
Italy 16 68 241 676 
Table 3.2. Distribution of FDI inflow and number of established companies 
by major investor countries in Turkey, 2002 and 2005 
(Source: General Directorate for Foreign Capital) 
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3.2.2. RATIONALE FOR STUDYING TURKEYAS THE HOST COUNTRY 
A key reason for choosing Turkey as the host country is to extend the limited range of countries where 
similar research has been carried out. The Triad, i. e. USA, E. U. and Japan, as the originator and 
receiver of the largest share of FDI, also dominated the research arena. Recently, more studies in 
other parts of the world, e. g. eastern European, China, India, Brazil, etc. have been done. Additionally, 
although classified as a developing country by OECD and the World Bank, Turkey in this study is 
argued to be a distinctive `hybrid transitional' host environment with its characteristic business 
system, i. e. the complicated nature and role of the state, education, financial and IR system, as a result 
of its economic developmental history. While distinguishing characteristics of the Turkish business 
environment (including FDI inflow) are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, it suffices to note here that 
Turkey has been in an important transition period since 2000, in terms of many of the elements of its 
NBS, especially as a result of influences of transnational institutions, e. g. the IMF-supported economic 
stabilisation programmes and E. U. accession plans. 
3.2.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONSAND QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES 
Within the analytical framework, the main research questions of this study were: 
1. What are the effects of the elements of the Turkish business environment on the transfer of 
employment policies and practices of US MNCs? 
2. To what extent are American HR policies and practices transferred from the parent 
companies to the Turkish subsidiaries? 
3. To the extent such policies and practices are transferred, how do the parent companies 
transmit them? 
4. How do sector and ownership structures impact on the formation and transmission of HR 
policies and practices of US MNCs within the distinctive Turkish business environment? 
In a research project, purposes and research questions determine the methodology (Berg, 1995). This 
study, due to its exploratory nature, and its 'how' and ̀ why' type questions, is conducted in case study 
format (Yin, 1994). According to Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (1991), a case study is: 
"[A]n in-depth, multi-faceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single 
social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of 
several data sources. [... ] In case study research the nature of the social phenomenon 
studied has varied. It can be an organization; it can be a role or role-occupants; it can be a 
city; it can even be an entire group of people. The case study is usually seen as an instance 
of a broader phenomenon, as part of a larger set of parallel instances. " (p. 2) 
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As the definition implies, qualitative case study has a number of advantages for this type of a research. 
Firstly, like other qualitative designs, it employs a holistic approach, collecting rich and in-depth data 
about the various aspects of the phenomenon in hand. Studying at `close hand' (0rum et al., 1991: 6), 
it takes the context and history into account while gathering and analysing data. Contextual 
embeddedness of the research allows for an understanding of events, institutions or processes and their 
interaction within the particular context (Snow and Anderson, 1991). Studied over time, by taking the 
historical and contextual dimensions into account, case studies provide us with a holistic and in-depth 
understanding of the issue studied. In a similar vein, Yin (1994) explains that case study allows the 
researcher to `investigate(s) a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context', therefore it is 
the preferred research approach when `the investigator has little control over events and wants to 
cover contextual conditions' (p. 13). 
As the strength of the case study approach lies in its ability to investigate the analytical research 
questions in depth in context, it was used as the most appropriate instrument to explore the 
`Americanness' of HR behaviour in the Turkish business environment. Although a quantitative survey 
might have gathered more cross-sectional information, qualitative case study design permitted the 
investigation of causal relationships and an understanding of the processes in the transfer of home- 
country or adoption of host-country HR practices of American MNCs. Moreover, there is very little 
empirical or theoretical knowledge base in HRM in Turkey, let alone HHRM in MNCs. Statistical data 
in Turkey is also very problematic to find and trust. Although it draws upon a variety of theories from 
different fields developed in different institutional and cultural environments, qualitative case study 
was chosen as an appropriate approach for this exploratory study. 
A multiple, instead of single, case study design was adopted for a number of reasons. Firstly, multiple 
cases are suggested in a comparative framework in attempt to support the findings from a single case 
(Drum et al., 1991). Developing several cases with different ownership and IR structures, that operate 
in different sectors in Turkey provided a basis to investigate the influences of these significant issues 
on the transfer and adaptation of HR policies and practices, in addition to host- and home-country 
effects. Yin (1994) argues that multiple cases increase the possibility of replication of findings, thus 
improving the generalisability of case study, similar to the logic of doing multiple experiments. 
Eisenhardt (1989), especially for building theory from cases, in a similar vein claims that one major 
advantage of using multiple cases is that a `replication logic' across cases can develop (where there are 
more than five cases studied) to test findings and explanations generated from industry cases. 
Using detailed and rich data, collected mainly by interviews, and analysed in context in the case-study 
format, this research helped gain insight into the `how? ' and ̀ why? ' questions. Other features and 
39 
issues of the case study design are discussed in more detail in the last section, after case selection 
criteria are explained in section 3. 
3.3. SELECTION OF CASES 
The case study companies were chosen on the basis of 'hypothetical sampling' (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) or `criterion-based sampling' (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993: 63) rather than 'statistical 
sampling'. That is, analytically significant criteria determined the choice of the cases from among 
those American companies operating in Turkey. Janesick (1994: 218) argues that theoretical sampling 
not only directs the study in the right way at the beginning of the fieldwork but also provides the 
researcher with more confidence in his/her data and the categories as they emerge and are re- 
formulated along the way. In this instance, the case study approach was chosen deliberately to explain 
how the substantive HR issues were influenced by elements of the host country and parent company. 
The cases were selected to ensure that analytical generalisations can be drawn. 
As such, firstly, companies that involved the substantive HR areas and issues present were included by 
controlling for size and accounting for unionisation. Large and established US subsidiaries were 
selected as ̀ formal' HR/IR policy and systems were expected to be in place in such companies than in 
smaller and younger organisations. Studying unionised and non/de-unionised companies was needed 
to understand the transfer of IR policies and practices. Secondly, by basing the sample design on 
ownership and industry characteristics, cases that reflected the different company types that are known 
to affect the substantive issues under investigation were selected. These two independent variables 
have been identified through previous research as having a profound influence on company practice in 
any given country context. 
3.3.1. SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Size, in terms of a company's workforce, market share and capital investment, is a major criterion. 
Comparatively larger subsidiaries with established positions in the Turkish business environment were 
expected to have formal HR/IR policies and systems in place that might have been transferred from 
parent companies but influenced by the Turkish business system. This expectation was proven to be 
correct during the initial stages of the fieldwork, where interviews at smaller sales organisations 
revealed that HRM function was handled by one of the assistant general managers, also responsible for 
other support functions, such as IT, and that they did not have explicitly established and transferred 
HR/IR policies. Moreover, mature organisations were selected by looking at the year of investment by 
the American parent: oldest had over 50 years of history while most recent investment was made in the 
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early 1990s. Therefore (relatively) large, well-established subsidiaries of American MNCs, instead of 
newly set up and/or small representative, liaison and sales organisations, were chosen for this study. 
3.3.2. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
A significant analytical variable is the ownership structure of the American subsidiary. In line with 
the global trend, Demirbag, Mina and Weir (1995) find that 48 per cent of all FDI projects and 69 per 
cent of FDI projects in manufacturing in Turkey are formed in IJVs, defined as 20-80 per cent capital 
belonging to the foreign partner (see also Tatoglu and Glaister 2000: 4). This is despite the fact that 
since 1980 (the period in which the largest amount of FDI was received) there have been no legal 
obligations to establish joint ventures as a condition for entering the host environment. Both IJVs and 
WOS were included as case study companies to investigate the influence of ownership structure on the 
transmission of HRM policies and practices. 
Within IJVs, the percentage distribution of equity is argued to be a significant issue (Root, 1988). In 
the literature a distinction is often made between majority, fifty-fifty and minority ownership. In this 
research a similar approach was adopted. However the definition of `majority' and ̀ minority' can 
show variances in different countries. For instance, the Turkish commercial law gives the majority 
ownership rights to a minimum of 51 per cent equity share. That is, the partner that has 51 per cent or 
more of the company equity has the complete power in the management of the company. That partner 
has the majority board memberships, therefore can take decisions by the majority vote. Thus, legally, 
there is no difference between, say, 15 per cent and 49 per cent ownership, if one of the partners has 
more than half of the equity shares. Accordingly, for Turkey, 'majority' ownership is defined as 51 
per cent and higher equity ownership. 
Another important issue in the choice of IJV case companies was the Turkish partner. Turkish 
business environment is characterised, among other issues discussed in Chapter 4, by large and 
diversified, conglomerate holding companies. It was hypothesised to be important to include IJV 
cases where the Turkish parent was among such holding companies to investigate the influence of 
different company characteristics. These holdings usually are proud to have established IJVs with 
partners from various countries, particularly the US. Lastly, type of initial investment, i. e. greenfield 
versus brownfield, was also hypothesised to be significant in the transfer and formation of HR 
practices. 
In this study, case companies were chosen accounting for the above ownership issues. Four of the 
seven main cases and two of the supporting cases were IJVs, with varying degrees of equity shares 
(Table 3.4) and representing major Turkish holding companies as partners. Although TexCO had been 
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bought out by the American parent after the fieldwork was completed, it was still considered as an IJV 
in this research. It should be noted that in none of the IJVs, American partner had a minority share, 
whereas the Turkish partner(s) had a minority share in three cases. In PharmaCO1 ownership was 
shared ̀ fifty-fifty', whereas in AutoCOI both parents had equal equity and a minority share was 
publicly traded. In both of these core cases, board memberships and management were equally shared 
between the American and Turkish partners. In both PharmaCOI and AutoCOI (and FMCG4), and at 
their Turkish parents' HQ, top-level managers argued that these Turkish holding companies never 
accepted minority ownership in their joint ventures with foreign partners. The documentary research 
conducted later assured the same result. In the other (1 main and I supporting) IJV cases, the Turkish 
partners, who were also among the largest holdings, had minority ownership from the beginning. In 
TexCO seven Turkish partners (corporate and individual) shared 49 per cent equity among themselves. 
Other cases represent WOS, while three of them started as brownfield IJVs, where the American 
partner bought out the company afterwards. Of all the cases, six (three in core and non-core each) 
were brownfield and 11 were greenfield investments. 
3.3.3. SECTOR 
Industry characteristics are argued to have a significant effect on shaping the management of 
subsidiaries, including HRM, and explaining variations in HRM/IR patterns (Colling and Clark, 2002). 
As discussed in Chapter 2, within the institutionalist approach, sectoral influences are commonly given 
a secondary role to home- and host-country influences and discussed as a mediating factor. The 
institutionalist approach takes the development of sectors as ̀ embedded' in their national business 
systems, shaped by the features of institutions i. e. training and education, state's role, financial system 
etc (e. g. Hall and Soskice, 2001). Although this approach is very useful in comparatively analysing 
sectoral employment systems in different countries, other approaches need to be incorporated into the 
institutionalist framework to analyse the employment systems in the transnational arena. 
Drawing on Porter's (1998) and Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1998) studies on types of international 
competition, one approach argues that sectoral characteristics, such as product types, production 
factors (resources, technology, economies of scale, etc), demand, etc., define different patterns of 
competition which imply certain management approaches across national boundaries and in turn 
directly influence the employment systems and practices. Ferner (1997) for instance hypothesises that 
the transmission of home-country influences will be more significant in more 'globalised', highly 
internationalised sectors as opposed to domestically oriented industries. In this approach, sector is still 
given a secondary role, although for example Marginson and Sisson (1994) claim that the nature of 
particular business sectors has even more effect on the HRM practices of MNCs than home- or host 
country effects. 
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One problem with this approach is the inclination towards classifying industries into 'boxes' of global 
and multi-national. Porter's (1998) classification is rather a spectrum, where many multi-domestic 
industries are in fact moving towards more global, just has been the case in clothing and garment 
industry which is now considered as highly globalised sectors, especially due to internationalised 
supply chains (Lane and Probert, 2004). There can also be differences between segments of an 
industry, such as in the luxury hotel segment, where competition is global within the hotel industry, 
which is generally considered as domestically oriented. Therefore it was important to incorporate 
patterns of sectoral specialisation into the discussion of home- and host-country influences. 
Industry is therefore argued to be the other theoretically significant variable. Cases from various 
sectors and segments were chosen to understand sectoral formation and its direct and indirect 
influences on (HR) management systems at national and transnational levels, while also accounting for 
major fields of American investment in Turkey (Table 3.3). 
According to Turkish official data (Table 3.3), the largest share of American investment (72 per cent) 
was in manufacturing, which is not in line with the general trend: services (including utilities, 
construction, and commerce and trading) has received almost 75 per cent of the total FDI in Turkey3. 
Within manufacturing, according to Treasury's classification, food and drinks, transportation vehicles 
(cars and trucks), chemicals, iron-steel, tobacco, and textiles have the largest share in American 
investment in Turkey. This pattern was in general in line with American investment globally: 
American companies invested highly in manufacturing (chemicals, computers and electronic devices, 
automobile production and foods manufacturing in particular)4. Moreover, within the manufacturing 
sector, FDI investment in Turkey was concentrated in food and drinks, textiles, chemicals, and 
automobile production. American investments in services in Turkey were not classified in detail, 
which was explained by the high number of small firms operating in various activities5. Especially 
from 2002, and in 2005 in particular, banking and finance received considerable FDI (including 
American) through mergers and acquisitions as well as privatisation, which increased the share of FDI 
in the sector. Although the selection of cases was made before that trend started, a financial institution 
was included in the core cases. 
3 Calculated according to the total number of foreign capital companies, FDI in 2005 Report, by General Directorate for FDI, May 2006 
available at www. treasurv. izovemment. tr 
FDI in 2005 Report, by General Directorate for FDI, May 2006, available at www. trcasurv. eovemment. tr 
5 Interview with Treasury specialists, General Directorate for FDI. 
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SECTORS No. of Total capital of % share of this sector 
firms American FDI in the total American 
companies FDI in Turkey 
MANUFACTURING 
Food/drink manufacturing 24 60,441,066 17 
Transportation vehicles 5 37,643,694 11 
Iron-Steel 1 36,218,900 10 
Other chemical products 13 24,318,475 7 
Tobacco products 5 21,359,368 6 
Industrial chemicals 3 21,091,317 6 
Textiles 7 20,314,907 6 
Other manufacturing 73 33,423,458 9 
MANUFACTURING TOTAL 131 254,811,185 72 
SERVICES 
Other consumer services 46 27,425,353 8 
Trade 106 25,921,958 7 
Banking and other financial 7 17,054,184 5 
services 
Other services 121 22,476,611 6 
SERVICES TOTAL 280 92,878,106 26 
MINING TOTAL 5 5,988,883 2 
AGRICULTURE TOTAL 11 1,838,393 1 
GRAND TOTAL 427 355,516,567 100 
Table 3.3: Sectoral distribution of American investment in Turkey (USS. as of 28.02.2( 
Source: General Directorate for Foreign Capital 
)O J)6 
While sectors were chosen to reflect the industrial dimensions discussed above, priority was given to 
accessing the key players within them. Various organisational level variables, i. e. having a large 
market share, being a dominant actor, a leading investor, and a large employer in the domestic market, 
might mean more power for MNCs in transmitting home-country policies and practices to the host- 
country environment. Accordingly, main American companies in major segments of theoretically 
significant manufacturing sectors, i. e. food and drinks, automobiles, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, textiles, 
`This table was compiled by changing Turkish Lira figures into USS by using the average exchange rate in 2001 (1 US$-1,224,554 TL) 
announced by the Central Bank of Turkey (www. tcmb. eovernment. tr). The sectoral distribution according to countries was not publicly 
available and was provided to the researcher by the Treasury specialists interviewed. This information was not available for more recent 
years. Particularly since 2002, American FDI has been increasing, therefore these figures do not reflect the up-to-date information; however 
they are still useful to give an idea. Moreover, the selection of cases was based on the situation at the time of the fieldwork. 
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and packaged consumer products, were studied. Other cases were chosen to represent the various 
segments of services, i. e. retail banking, auditing and consultancy, hotel and IT. 
3.3.4. UNIONISATION 
Industrial relations (IR) is one of the substantive issues discussed within the functional level of the 
analytical framework as a dependent variable for addressing questions of parent- and host-country 
influence. It is commonly agreed that American companies have an anti-unionist stance, a distinctive 
indication of US home-country influences on their 1R behaviour in other countries. Subsidiary's 
unionisation was therefore a key aspect. To explore collective employment relations in terms of how 
far it reflected pressure from parent-country, adaptations to local environment or a combination 
thereof, unionised, de- and non-unionised companies were chosen as case studies to compare HRM/IR 
policies and practices of unionised, sophisticated non-union and, anti-union American MNCs. Table 
3.4 provides a breakdown of the cases according to the selection criteria. 
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Company Line of Activity Ownership Mode of IR Turkish US Parent No of 
structure entry Parent employee 
CORE CASES 
1. AutoCOl Commercial IJV (equal Brownfield Unionised HoldingI USAuto1 8,008 
vehicles and cars US* & TR*) 
(production and 
sales) 
2. FMCGI FMCG (packaged WOS Brownfield De-unionised USFMCGI 510 
food; production 
and sales) 
3. FMCG2 FMCG (tobacco IJV (majority Greenfield Non- Holding2 USFMCG2 1,600 
products; US*) unionised 
production & sales) 
4. PharmaCO1 Pharmaceuticals IJV (equal Brownfield De-unionised Holding3 USHealthl 554 
(hospital care; US* & TR*) 
production and 
sales) 
5. TexCO Clothing / garment IJV (majority Greenfield Unionised 4 TR USClothing 660 
(production and US*) JVPS 
sales) 
6. FinCO Retail and corporate WOS Greenfield Non- USFinance 2,249 
banking unionised 
7. IloteICO Hotel WOS Greenfield Non- USHotel 260 1 
unionised 
SUPPORTING CASES 




9. FoodCO Food (cornstarch- WOS Brownfield De-unionised USFood 300 
based sugar & nuts; & unionised 
production & sales) (I plant) 
10. DefCO Defence industry IJV (majority Greenfield Non- Holding4 USDefence 
(production and US*) unionised 
sales) 








13. ITCO1 IT (sales) WOS Greenfield Non- USITI 
unionised 
14. ITCO2 IT (sales) WOS Greenfield Non- USIT2 100 
unionised 
15. PharmaCO2 Pharmaceuticals WOS Greenfield Non- USHealth2 
sales unionised 
16. PharmaC03 Pharmaceuticals (eye WOS Greenfield Non- USHealth3 45 
care; sales) unionised 
17. FMCG3 FMCG (cleaning, WOS Brownfield Unionised USFMCG3 650 
health & beauty care, (only at one 
pet food; production plant) 
& sales) 
18. FMCG4 FMCG (tissue & 1JV (equal Brownfield Unionised Holding3 USFMCG4 
paper products; US" & TR*) 
production & sales 
Table 3.4. Companies studied *US: American partner, *TR: Turkish partner 
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3.4. DATA COLLECTION 
3.4.1. GAINING ACCESS 
Possible case-study companies were determined according to theoretically significant criteria 
discussed above and by researching company information from various sources (e. g. commercial 
section of the US Embassy in Turkey, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce, FDI Department of the 
Treasury, web sites of companies, etc). Access was initially sought through friends who either work 
for these companies or have professional relations with high-level managers. An introduction letter 
(see Appendix 1) was sent directly to these contact people, after they were contacted by friends, with 
an additional note reminding the referral, asking for their help in contacting HR/IR department. This 
'effective use of elements and actors in the natural environment in order to develop working 
relationships' (Berg, 1995: 48) had proven to be a sound approach for the Turkish business 
environment for a number of reasons: firstly, there is not yet an established research ̀culture' in 
Turkey. Managers are not accustomed to, particularly qualitative, research, therefore are very 
reluctant to provide information through interviews or deeper access to companies. Some have had 
very disappointing previous experiences and lost trust in researchers, such as in the instance where an 
HR manager provided the company pay scheme (with figures) in confidence, only to see it published 
in the HR supplement of the highest selling national newspaper the next day. Even with credential 
referrals, gaining trust was the key in getting the first interview appointment; therefore confidentiality 
and ethical issues, as well as the research aims, methods and researcher's affiliations with reputable 
universities in Turkey and the UK were emphasised in the introduction letter and subsequent e-mails 
exchanged. 
Once having managed to meet managers, the researcher was usually able to build a trusting and 
professional research relationship, through establishing a positive rapport, conforming to the 
expectations of business people in Turkey, which included a dress code appearance and courteous 
behaviour (Berg, 1995). The researcher's identity as a lecturer in a reputable university in Turkey and 
a doctoral candidate in the UK proved to provide a favourable image at the outset. Always keeping a 
professional appearance, the respondents were briefed at the beginning of each initial interview about 
the research project (by going over all the issues emphasised in the introduction letter once again in 
person), and the interview process (explaining the major fields of interest, plans to do the interview, 
asking for their consent for taping etc). Despite not being among the western and developed countries, 
the Turkish business culture in large organisations is quite similar to the western understanding: it is 
quite formal, kept at a professional level. Personal matters are not even mentioned in most instances, 
except where particular mutual interest points come into the scene after a few meetings, and the warm- 
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up chat at the beginning of interviews is usually kept short, as opposed to the usual practice in some 
other eastern cultures. 
Recommendations from well-trusted friends provided the initial access (except in two cases where 
access was denied at the beginning or no response returned to subsequent calls). However it depended 
on the researcher to build and keep the research relationship going. In some cases, due to special 
circumstances of the company, gaining access depended a great deal on the researcher's tenacity and 
flexibility despite the initial referrals and contact people. In only two companies, it was obvious that 
the manager accepted to give an interview only because s/he could not refuse the person who 
recommended the researcher and it was not possible to continue after the initial interview. Many other 
HR/IR managers helped in various ways (giving interviews, providing company documents, arranging 
interviews with other managers in the subsidiary and at the regional HQ, and in a few cases, in other 
companies) because of a general belief in `the importance of education and its contribution to the 
future of our country7'. 
In addition to the referrals used especially at the initial stages of fieldwork, every opportunity was 
deliberately used to meet (HR and other) managers of prospective case companies to personally 
explain about the research and build that crucial trust. The researcher followed Personnel/h R 
conferences for practitioners in Turkey; was involved in the organisation and implementation of a 
national HR workshop at the university where she works; and attended college recruitment 
presentations of possible case companies and/or the Turkish holding companies that were partners in 
the IJV cases. When it was possible to explain about this research in person with much enthusiasm 
and the nature of help needed, it was much easier to get the affirmative reply, even from the highest- 
level managers. The researcher was able to gain access to a significant number of interviewees and 
companies with this method. Accordingly, the researcher's experience in and innate knowledge of the 
local business culture has been key in this research in accessing case companies. 
Using these various access methods, the researcher was able to secure research at 18 companies. Only 
seven were developed into core cases, while the others were used as supplementary cases in particular 
for relevant issues (e. g. unionisation). The choice of the core cases depended on two main factors: 
firstly, these companies met the most important analytical criteria, i. e. sector (major American 
investment in Turkey and major players in their sectors), ownership (wholly-owned or IJVs where 
Turkish parents included the major Turkish Holdings), and unionisation issues. Although 
supplementary cases were also major players in their sectors and sub-sector and satisfied some of 
these criteria, core cases in general included all of the analytically interesting elements. To illustrate 
7 Interviews with HR managers at various companies, e. g. AutoCOI, FMCGI, DeftO, etc. 
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with an example, AutoCOI for instance was a major player in the automobile production, with a long 
history in Turkey, an IJV with the Turkish JVP among the most important Turkish Holdings, and 
unionised. AutoCO2 on the other hand was a much more recent player, in the supply sub-sector, 
unionised and a WOS. It was therefore used for comparison purposes, and as complementary data to 
understand the significant issues in this sector and unionisation. Secondly, practical reasons guided 
the selection of core versus non-core cases: smaller number of interviews at the subsidiary and 
especially regional HQ levels were attainable in the supplementary cases. Those companies that could 
be investigated in more detail were selected as core cases. 
3.4.2. FIELDWORK 
Fieldwork was conducted in three time periods, during spring-summer (March-August) in 2002,2003 
and 2004, mainly due to the location of the case companies and work arrangements of the researcher. 
Location was not a significant variable for the choice of companies, as only a very few large FDI 
companies are located out of the Istanbul-Izmit region, industrial, financial and commercial capital of 
Turkey, whose official capital is Ankara. Accordingly, all but one of the case companies' HQ was in 
this region (in many of the cases, production facilities were also in this area, with a few exceptions). 
As the researcher lives in Ankara, which is about 6 hours' drive to Istanbul, fieldwork could only be 
arranged in extended free periods when the researcher was not teaching. Arrangement of interviews 
with very busy high-level managers required flexibility, time and organisational skills. Therefore it 
was not worth travelling to Istanbul for only one or two interviews, which was nevertheless done a few 
times, not to miss the promised opportunity of interviewing a key person. Arrangement and conduct of 
interviews at the regional HQ in various European cities also needed unrestricted free time for the 
same reasons. Hence the 3 intervals, which in fact were consistent with the longitudinal characteristic 
of case studies. According to Snow and Anderson (1991) the fact that case study is conducted over a 
time provides a major advantage that it facilitates the possibility of capturing and analysing events 
and happenings, interactions and relationships, and groups and institutions as they emerge and evolve 
across time' (p. 161). This longer fieldwork phase provided an opportunity by following-up changes 
in HR policies and practices in the case companies, and a clearer understanding of how changes and 
interactions in the institutions and business environments influenced the former. However it was also 
a major challenge for learning how to keep research relations going for a longer time and deal with 
frequent changes in appointments. The fieldwork consisted mainly of interviews and site visits. 
Document analyses and non-participant observation were the other data collection methods used to 




Weiss (1994) argues that it is the research purposes that determine research methods and qualitative 
interviews can be used for a variety of research aims, including `developing detailed descriptions' and 
`describing process' (p. 9). Therefore qualitative interviews were used for this exploratory study to 
understand the complex causal relationships and the processes through which employment systems are 
developed and transferred within a MNC. Rich data were mainly collected through in-depth semi- 
structured interviews with significant respondents in the case companies. Interviewees were primarily 
the most senior HR/IR managers of the Turkish subsidiaries. In Turkey, subsequent interviews with 
the more specialised HR staff, e. g. plant HR managers and HR specialists where available, provided 
more detailed information on recruitment and selection, training and development, and industrial 
relations issues, from a different level of the organisation. 
One of the important advantages of case study research is that it is `multi-perspectival': it brings 
perspectives of various related actors and institutions, and their interaction, into the picture (Snow and 
Anderson, 1991: 154). Accordingly, in addition to HR managers, information from other related parties 
from within and outside the company, was also sought in this research. Interviews with general 
managers, managing directors and other key relevant functional managers were carried out where 
necessary and justifiable in terms of the substantive issues chosen for investigation. For instance, 
expatriate top-level managers (i. e. general and deputy/assistant general managers, chief financial 
officers, sales and marketing directors, operations directors etc) were interviewed not only to get the 
company perspective from the highest level of management in Turkey but also the American corporate 
perspective. 
In the case of IJVs, where the Turkish parents were among Turkey's largest holding companies, HR 
co-ordinators of the Turkish Holding companies were interviewed to build the Turkish partner's 
corporate perspective into the picture. Interviews with operations managers were attained in the 
manufacturing companies during site visits, to better understand the HR related issues of operations. 
Work force composition, training and development as well as related parts of performance assessment 
were among the issues discussed. Depending on the amount of access, in many of the core cases, 
finance, and sales and marketing managers were also interviewed as these line managers provide 
additional information on recruitment and selection as well as the application of performance 
evaluation systems. Additionally, previous HR managers and Holding HR co-ordinators were 
interviewed in the cases where getting a historical view (especially about de-unionisation) was 
important. In such cases, these managers were involved in the initial establishment of the companies 
and their HR/IR systems and they were able to share their knowledge and experiences. Additionally, 
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one of the HR managers had worked at the regional HQ as a Turkish expatriate in IIRM, so she was 
able to fill in about the corporate perspective. 
In line with the efforts to bring in multiple perspectives from related actors and institutions, interviews 
were conducted also with top-level union representatives of unionised and de-unionised companies, as 
well as non-union companies where there had been attempts by unions to get organised. Employers' 
associations are organised in many sectors in Turkey as counterparts to labour unions. Interviews with 
representatives of the employers' association were held to take all the related actors into account, 
hence to triangulate information on the IR issues. 
Originally interviews were planned at the US IHQ levels to capture the corporate perspective on 
international HR policy and for triangulating data. During the course of fieldwork, it is found that in 
all but two of the cases there were no direct lines established between the Turkish subsidiary and the 
American HQ. Reporting and communication lines at the IHR manager/director level were with the 
regional IHQ, although in one or two cases occasional contact with the corporate IHQ in the USA was 
reported. Moreover some of the higher level respondents claimed that policies were developed 
separately for the main regional areas (e. g. North America, Latin America, Europe, Rest of the World, 
etc) and 'rolled out' from the regional IHQ to sub-regional HQ on to individual countries. It therefore 
proved to be very difficult to access the relevant people at corporate HQ level as the Turkish (IHR and 
even general) managers did not have any direct contact. Access was primarily sought and gained at 
the regional HQ level through the respondents at the Turkish subsidiaries. In most companies, 
regional HQ was in Europe and interviews with top-level HR directors in various European cities were 
conducted face to face by the researcher. In two cases where the Turkish subsidiaries were directly 
reporting to the US and ̀ rest of the world' IHQ, telephone interviews were done, as a substitute, due to 
financial and time constraints. 
A total of 118 interviews were conducted in 18 companies, trade unions, employers' associations and 
the Treasury's FDI Department. Interviewees comprised HR specialists, managers, directors and co- 
ordinators, functional and general managers, expatriates, (regional/corporate) IIR directors, and union 
representatives. Table 3.5 provides a summary of the distribution of interviews according to 
companies; those not included in this table were done with the objective of understanding the general 
environment, i. e. cannot be traced to a specific company, for instance at the FDI Department of the 
Treasury, etc). In the fully developed, i. e. core, cases, six to 19 interviews, depending on the size of 
the company and access gained, of between one to three hours were completed. In some (especially 
service sector) companies the management team consisted of smaller number of people or there were 
no specialists, hence the smaller number of interviews. Also a smaller number of interviews were 
done in the WOS, where there were no Turkish partners, or in the non-union companies, where there 
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had never been a union or an attempt for unionisation, as these were also theoretically important cases, 
particularly for comparison purposes. 
Interviews with HR/Personnel managers, as the main data collection tool, were semi-structured. The 
initial fieldwork guide, which included a detailed list of issues to be covered, had been revised as 
interviews progressed and specific issues arose, to uncover the particularities of companies and the 
host-country (see Appendix 2). Although the same list of the topics that focus on the substantive issues 
of the research were completed with all the HR managers and regional HQ managers, emphasis 
changed from company to company. Except when the respondents explicitly preferred their 
interviews not to be taped when asked for their consent, or the interviews with trade union 
representatives where taping was not even considered an option, a vast majority (97 out of 118) 
interviews were taped and verbatim transcribed. Detailed notes and direct quotations were taken 
during the interviews that were not taped and these were also transcribed, and all transcriptions were 
shared with respondents for any possible misunderstandings and/or corrections and used as data only 
after being agreed by the respondents. 
Besides the formal interviews listed in Table 3.5, more informal (and non-taped) exchanges about the 
companies' HR policies and practices had taken place with friends, acquaintances and colleagues who 
(still or used to) work in those companies. These people, who in some cases were the ones introduced 
the researcher to the HR managers, knew about the research project and gave specific examples from 
their own experiences. These exchanges were therefore more than just friendly conversations, but 
took place in'more relaxed environments. Detailed, non-interpretative field notes were used to record 
such exchanges and shared with the respondents. 
As well as one-to-one interviews, college recruitment presentations mentioned above provided an 
additional source of information. MNCs in particular and large Turkish companies use universities' 
career days/fairs extensively, as an important recruitment and advertisement tool. These formal 
presentations to students were regarded as an additional source of information, to compare or add on 
to the data provided in the interviews on such substantive issues as recruitment and selection, training 
and development, policies. During the write-up period, relevant HHR people at the subsidiary level 
were contacted via e-mail to fill in a short survey about the benefits provided in the case companies 
(see Appendix 3). The purpose of this questionnaire was twofold: first, to compile a standardised list 
of benefits provided, and secondly, to see whether any changes had occurred since the interviews had 
been completed. Answers were followed-up via further e-mails where explanations were sought. The 
majority of the respondents were very helpful and data were gathered in a few days. As a final source 
of information, the researcher attended high profile conferences organised by prominent FDI bodies 
(e. g. the Foreign Direct Investment Association (YASED) and the Treasury) on macro policy issues 
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about FDI flows to Turkey, and Personnel/HR conferences for HR practitioners in Turkey, where 
some of the interviewees made presentations on their companies. These sources collectively provided 
an opportunity to accumulate information on the HR policies and applications of not only American 
but also other MNCs and Turkish companies. 














AutoCOl 19 6 4 Chief Finance Officer (expatriate); Vice General 
Manager (expatriate); Assistant General Manager 
(Sales & Marketing; expatriate); Assistant General 
Manager (Sales & Marketing, Turkish); Work 
Team Leaders; Employers' Association President 
6 
3 
FMCG1 10 5 1 Production Manager; Corporate company General 
Manager ex at ; General Manager (3) 
I 
F111CG2 10 7 Plant Production Manager, Sales & Distribution 
Director 2 
1 
PharmaCOl 8 4 1 Plant Manager (expatriate), Employers' Association 
General Secretary (2) 
2 
TexCO 17 5 3 (3) General Manager, Finance Director, Sales 
Director (6) 
3 
FinCO 7 3 2 Senior Manager (EMEA); Chief of Staff (2) n/a 
IloteICO 6 2 3 General Manager (expatriate) (1) 1 
Sub-total 
(Main cases) 
79 32 14 22 11 
SUPPORTING CASES 
AutoCO2 5 2 Quality Manager; Plant Manager (2) 1 
FoodCO 6 3 1 2 
DefCO 3 3 n/a 
TACI 6 3 2 Senior Manager (1) n/a 
TAC2 I I n/a 
ITCOI 2 1 Sales Manager (1) n/a 
ITCO2 4 1 2 General Manager (1) n/a 
PharmaCO2 7 7 n/a 
PharmaCO3 1 1 n/a 
FNMCG3 1 1 
FMCG4 I I 
Sub- total 37 24 S 5 3 
TOTAL 116 56 19 27 14 
Table 3.5. Distribution of interviews conducted in the case studies 
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3.4.4. DOCUMENTANALYSIS 
The significant features of case study approach, i. e. holistic contextualisation and multi-perspectivity, 
require triangulation (Snow and Anderson, 1991). In addition to interviews, therefore, document 
analysis and observation, where viable, were used as the other methods for enriched, in-depth and 
triangulated data (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Maxwell, 1996; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
Internal company documents, including for example mission statements, company values lists, 
organisation charts, personnel handbooks, selection and performance assessment forms, Intranets 
(where access was allowed), internal company and news magazines, annual reports etc complemented 
the data collected by in-depth interviews. Corporate and subsidiary web sites, newspaper and 
magazine articles, journal and book references on the parent companies were also used. Such 
documents were used for two purposes: first, to understand subsidiary as well as HQ policies, and 
second, to validate information collected by interviews. Published research findings on the 
employment policies and practices of American companies at home and abroad were used as 
secondary sources of data to explain the extent and effects of home-country practices. 
Problems of gaining access to company documents had been experienced, as was initially expected. 
In many of the instances, HR managers did not want to give out any written material, as in the Turkish 
environment company-specific information is usually considered to be highly confidential and 
revealing such information is not favoured. However, by seeking to establish a trusting relationship 
with the respondents from the outset and to convince them that no information gathered would be used 
publicly, without their consent and made anonymous, it had been possible to access only a limited 
quantity of documents mentioned above. 
Document analysis was also used for a better understanding of the Turkish institutional environment, 
for example by looking at laws and regulations, government and union policies, public statistics and 
published research and data by business associations. 
3.4.5. OBSERVATION 
Non-participant observation had been continuously carried out on site while conducting interviews or 
paying site visits. Originally it was planned that permission was to be sought for non-participant 
observation at different levels: departmental and/or company meetings, union negotiations and on the 
shop floor to be able to acquire additional information about the application of parent-company HR 
policies, industrial relations where the company was unionised, and the nature of work organisation. 
However after a number of unsuccessful attempts, which also seemed to be damaging the trusting 
relationship being built with the respondents, it was decided not to push further. Although observation 
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provides additional and complementary information especially about relationships and work 
organisation within the companies, in this research it provided only a limited degree of use. 
Nevertheless, non-interpretative, extensive field notes from the site visits were made. However it 
must be stressed that non-participative observations were mainly used as a supporting method and to 
triangulate data collected by the other methods. 
3.4.6. VALIDITYAND RELIABILITY ISSUES 
Validity, the extent to which the researcher is measuring what is intended, is among the most 
discussed issues in qualitative research. The traditional definition of validity for quantitative research, 
with its 'technical microdefinitions' (Janesick, 1994) is not completely appropriate for a different type 
of, i. e. qualitative, research. According to Patton (1990) validity in qualitative research can be 
considered in terms of credibility, i. e. what techniques and methods are used to ensure integrity, 
validity, and accuracy of the findings. Janesick (1994) defines validity for qualitative research in a 
similar vein, that it is about ̀ description and explanation, and whether or not a given explanation fits 
a given description. In other words, is the explanation credible? ' (p. 216). Accordingly, validity and 
reliability issues in qualitative research are different from those in quantitative research. 
Possible steps were taken to ensure the highest level of validity in this research: through triangulation 
of sources and methods, and collection of rich data, increased descriptive validity was sought 
(Maxwell, 1996). By using multiple sources of data and methods, construct validity was increased 
(Yin, 1994). Information from a variety of people and member checks (i. e. by the interviewees 
themselves) on interview transcriptions and data analysis were used to ensure higher interpretative 
validity. Finally, comparisons between different cases and with the published data and research 
findings were made. 
Therefore, to achieve a higher level of rigor, breadth and depth, hence 'to secure in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question' (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994: 2), triangulation of both 
methods and data sources was sought in this study (Maxwell, 1996; Snow and Anderson, 1991; Yin, 
1994). Accordingly, data were collected through a combination of methods and multiple sources of 
information were used to develop `converging lines of inquiry' (Yin, 1994: 92) about the transfer of 
IIRM policies of American companies to the Turkish environment. Information from different levels 
of management was gathered, by interviewing HR, functional and general managers. Moreover, 
perspectives of both subsidiary and corporate levels, as well as of unions and employers' associations, 
were sought to compare 'what people say they do and what actually happens' (Maxwell, 1996). Such 
triangulation of methods and data sources is argued to be an important tool in increasing the validity of 
data collected by interviews (Maxwell, 1996; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
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As Snow and Anderson argue (1991), case study, as a contextual, in-depth and rigorous reading of a 
phenomenon within a historical framework, is rather time-consuming and labour-intensive. Due to 
time and financial constraints of a single-researcher study, information collected for this research 
reflected mainly management views, except in the unionised companies where at least the collectively 
organised voice of labour was also incorporated. Despite all the efforts to achieve ̀ multi- 
perspectivity', i. e. voices of all the related parties, there can arguably be a gap between the 
management accounts on HR/IR policies and non-managers' perceptions. Variances might occur 
depending on the informant's position. This problem could have been dealt with by obtaining 
information from non-managerial staff and it might have been very interesting to compare and contrast 
management's view with that of labour. However if this information were not systematically obtained 
from a significant number of non-managerial employees (relative to the total number of employees), 
because of various possible methodological problems, it would have been of limited for use in 
triangulation of data. A small number of non-managerial employees, chosen by the management to 
respond, do not necessarily increase the reliability of information collected from the management. 
Inconsistency or complementary information from non-managerial employees can arguably result 
from perceptions or personal agendas. To get an acceptable quantity and quality of employee view, 
collection of substantial data at this level was beyond the time and financial constraints of this 
research. Even if achieved, such information would be of relatively small additional value considering 
the focus of this research. The main purposes of this research were to understand the transferability of 
IIRM policies and practices of American companies to a novel business environment, and the effects 
of the latter on these policies and practices. Focus is therefore on the interaction of parent- and host- 
country effects ('Turkishness' versus ̀ Americanness') and their impact on the transfer of HR policies 
and practices of American MNCs to the Turkish business environment. In this respect, management 
accounts from various levels, supplemented by documents and observation, provided the necessary 
information from company perspective. 
A final validity issue in this study related to language, which is usually a problem in cross-cultural 
research. Through the researcher's intimate knowledge of the Turkish system and the language, unlike 
in many studies of MNCs in host environments where interpreters are often used, issues of researcher 
bias due to language were diminished. All the interviews were conducted by the researcher herself, in 
Turkish with the Turkish respondents and in English with the expatriates in Turkey and IiR/JR 
managers at the American parents' (regional or corporate) IIQ. Turkish managers of American MNCs 
all have an excellent command of English and in fact use English phrases often, which enabled mutual 
understanding of concepts more easily. The interview schedule (see Appendix 3), initially drawn in 
English, had been translated into Turkish and then back to English by the researcher, with the help of a 
56 
former manager of an MNC, an academic colleague and a translator, to increase consistency, hence 
reliability. 
3.4.7. GENERALISABILITY OF CASE STUDIES 
One final widely discussed validity issue about case studies is the generalisability (external validity) of 
the findings. As a result of the very nature of the approach, i. e. contextual embeddedness and 
historical dimension, which in fact provide the strength of this approach, standardisation of data 
collection procedures and statistical generalisations as understood by positivistic social science, are 
almost unattainable in case studies (Snow and Anderson, 1991). Considering the characteristic 
features of this type of research, Yin (1994: 36) argues for the differences between 'statistical 
generalisation', i. e. samples from universe, and frequencies and generalisation within a population, as 
understood by positivistic scientists and 'analytic' or `theoretical generalisation'. He claims that the 
case study is more like an experiment in the sense that its findings can be generalised to a broader 
theory, not to the population. By using the findings of a case study, one can develop new explanations 
to an existing theory or come up with a different theory. 
The qualitative case study approach rests on a strong analytical framework (Yin, 1994) and clearly 
defined research question(s) from the beginning (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Janesick, 1994), which 
are also important for increased generalisability: we need to be carefully aware of what is being 
researched. Since the transfer policies and processes of American MNCs in Turkey were studied, we 
were concerned with covering and generalising to the population of such policies and processes, not 
the population ofAmerican MNCs in Turkey. In other words, as Orum et al (1991) conclude: 
"[T]he nature of the phenomenon that one studies is the true gauge of the population to 
which one seeks to generalize. It is not merely a question of how many units but rather 
what kind of unit one is studying. " (p. 15) 
As argued elsewhere in this chapter, employing multiple case studies is suggested as a way of 
supporting the conclusions from a single case, hence to improve the generalisability of its findings 
(Drum et al., 1991; Yin, 1994). Yin (1994: 43) argues that case study method has the 'replication 
logic' that underlies the use of multiple experiments. Studying carefully selected multiple cases that 
will either produce similar results ('literal replication') or contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons ('theoretical replication') uses the same logic with experiments used in positivistic science. 
As already discussed in the above section, multiple cases in this study were selected according to 
specific analytical criteria to study literal replication and theoretical replication cases. This approach of 
selecting and studying multiple cases does not use a sampling logic, in that cases were not selected 
because they are thought to be representative of a larger population but because they were 
theoretically significant. 
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3.5. DATA ANALYSIS 
Through data analysis, order, structure and meaning are brought to the mass of data collected (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1994). Mainly explanation building and within and cross-case analyses were used in this 
study. Explanation building is accomplished by a series of iterations as more data is collected against 
the theoretical propositions (Yin, 1994). Therefore the final explanation might not be fully predicted at 
the beginning of the research. The researcher started this study with an initial literature review, which 
enabled her to formulate and revise the issues for the preliminary stages of the fieldwork. As the 
fieldwork progressed, main themes were recognised, interview questions were restructured and the 
foci of the main substantive issues were narrowed down. 
Data collected through interviews, documents and observation were stored to create an electronic 
database using electronic tools, including specialised software, i. e. QSR N6. Taped interviews and 
field notes were transcribed as soon as possible after the interviews. Initial analysis in terms of 
emerging themes and significant issues from individual cases was done concurrently with the 
fieldwork, usually in terms of fieldwork notes and short case write-ups. Within-case analysis allowed 
the researcher to detect the distinctive patterns of substantive issues in each case, before attempting to 
generalise across cases. Preliminary contextual analysis of data collected was subsequently followed 
by the systematic coding of data to identify patterns and divergence in the material. Coded individual 
interviews were initially organised and structured according to the main themes within the cases. 
Subsequently similarities and differences between the cases were sought, main by restructuring the 
interviews across the cases and using large tables with the elements of the main themes. 
3.6. CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this study was to investigate the complex sources of influence on the transmission of 
HR/IR policies and practices of MNCs from a dominant economy to their subsidiaries in a 'hybrid 
transitional' business environment, one that shows a combination of traits. For a deeper understanding 
of host- and home-country influences, American MNCs in Turkey were studied in qualitative case 
study format. Cases were selected according to a set of criteria so as to reflect other sources of 
influence, namely industry and ownership structure. Thus large and established WOS and JJVs from 
various sectors were chosen. Rich and in-depth data were gathered by using different methods, i. e. 
interviews, observation and documentary analysis from a range of key informants and levels, i. e. 
HR/IR, other functional and managers at subsidiary and corporate level, to increase reliability and 
validity. Data collected were stored, coded and analysed by using electronic methods, including 
qualitative research software. Findings of within- and cross-case analyses are presented in the 
empirical chapters. 
58 
CHAPTER 4. TURKEY AS A `HYBRID TRANSITIONAL' HOST COUNTRY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is essential to understand the political, economic and social aspects of the institutional 
environment in Turkey for analysing the HRM/IR behaviour of US MNCs in this host country. 
Such an understanding will help to critically evaluate the host-country influences on the transfer of 
HR policies and practices. This chapter therefore proposes to introduce the Turkish business 
system (TBS) by using the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2. It is argued that Turkey 
is a `hybrid transitional' country in terms of its institutional environment and business system. 
A 'hybrid transitional' business system is defined as one that incorporates the institutional elements of 
various models developed in the national business systems (NBS) literature and one that is also 
changing rapidly and considerably. According to Hall and Soskice's (2001) varieties of capitalism 
approach, the Turkish system comprises elements of both LMEs and CMEs. Turning to Whitley's 
(1999) typology, which includes a wider variety of systems, the TBS, particularly considering its 
historical development and early institutional elements, could be classified as a state organized 
business system where the business environment is typically dirigiste. However certain elements of 
the TBS, particularly the role of the state, are going through considerable change through trickle-down 
trajectories imposed by transnational institutions, an important feature that is not considered in 
Whitley's categorisation. As argued in Chapter 3, the analytical framework of this study recognises 
the considerable influence of transnational institutions through trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories 
(Djelic and Quack, 2003) on the changes experienced in all NBS, but particularly in those developing 
into more open NBS, such as TBS. 
This chapter starts with an analytical presentation of the Turkish economy, emphasising the major and 
minor but consequential changes it has been experiencing since the establishment of the Republic. In 
the second part, major proximate institutions, i. e. the state, education, industrial relations (IR) and 
financial systems, and the business associations that shape the TBS are examined where the more 
recent changes are emphasised. This is followed by the analysis of the TBS, where the main elements 
of a `hybrid transitional' system are highlighted. The chapter ends with concluding remarks. 
4.2. SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF TURKEY 
It is argued that the particular role of the state and the changes in the economic system especially after 
the 1980s as a result of domestic and international factors have been influential in the shaping of the 
institutional environment and the recent changes in the main elements of the TBS (Bugra, 1994). An 
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understanding of the historical development of the system is important to identify the path-dependent 
nature and the continuity in certain policy and processes in the main features of the TBS. Therefore 
firstly the socio-political history of the Turkish economic system, emphasising the most important 
factors that impacted the elements of the TBS, is discussed. 
Following the disastrous experiences of the Ottoman Empire with its heavy dependence on foreign 
debt and concessions given to foreign countries and companies, the first and most essential goal of the 
Turkish state after the Republic was established in 1923 was identified as creating a national 
bourgeoisie that would lead the economic development (Bugra, 1994). Incentives to encourage 
domestic entrepreneurs were put into effect and institutional structures for a market economy was 
implemented. 
Early efforts to create a market-based, private enterprise economy were undermined by two significant 
international events. The first was the Great Depression in the USA that led to a questioning of the 
value and efficiency of a market-based economy for an optimal distribution of economic resources. 
The second was the outbreak of the Second World War soon after the Great Depression that increased 
the chaos in the international economic structure. Within such an unstable international economic 
environment, the Turkish experience of the economic institutionalisation process was quite different 
from that of other countries that had gone through a similar process under more stable international 
economic conditions where free market economies could be more easily justified (BuAra, 1994). State 
intervention in the economy in the face of instability was accepted by entrepreneurs and private sector 
without much questioning. These experiences resulted in an interventionist state that has taken on 
both a developmental and regulatory role. 
During the `statist' era that started in the early 1930s, to stabilise the economy, the interventionist 
approach followed by the state assumed no significant role for the private sector in the planning and 
designing of economic policies (Bugra, 1994). Despite the preference for state intervention over 
instability, the private sector complained about the uncertainty about the limits of this intervention and 
the space given to the private sector. This has continued to be one of the defining issues of the TBS: 
the Turkish private sector was not given a `stakeholder' role in planning and regulation of the 
economy and market. 
However this attitude of the state has started to change in recent years, particularly as a result of 
Turkey's EU accession process: firstly, alignment with EU policies and regulations requires more 
cooperation with civil and non-governmental organisations. Secondly, governments seemed to have 
noticed the significant role such organisations can play in promoting EU membership both in Turkey 
and abroad. The state now considers input from the 'social partners', particularly private business, 
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although it is still far from a social partnership model as understood in the coordinated market 
economies (CME) e. g. Germany. 
To be able to get financial support from the Marshall Plan, Turkey had to start providing a larger and 
more secure space to the private sector (Bugra, 1994). Thus the relations between the state and private 
business turned positive at the beginning of the 1950s. During this era, some of the largest Turkish 
businesses of today were established. The new party in government promised to include the private 
sector in economic decision-making and provide the most liberal conditions for it to flourish. 
However, Bugra (1994) argues that the 'paradox of Turkish liberalism' marked this era: 'pro-market' 
governments pursued economic policy processes that intervened strongly in and distorted market 
competition. They created severe problems and uncertainty for the private sector by making 
continuous and unexpected changes by using various methods of intervention throughout the 1950s. 
Similar approaches by governments were observed during the initial stages of the second liberalising 
efforts after 1980. Therefore free market competition and market-led economic conditions were not 
achieved in Turkey, despite policy changes aimed at establishing them. Within an uncertain 
environment where changes in economic policies created a major source of problems, the traditional 
`love-hate' relationship between the state and private business was observed clearly. The tension 
between the state and private sector has continued for the rest of the history of the Turkish economy. 
Economic crisis and political repression, experienced at a time when there were parallel tendencies of 
more interventionist approaches globally, resulted in the first military intervention in Turkey in 1960 
(Öz, 1999). Contrary to many other countries where military interventions end up with dictatorships, 
in Turkey the constitution was replaced by a much more liberal one, free elections were held and the 
military government was replaced by a civil one within a year. The economic policy was changed 
from a liberal market-driven one to a planned, inward looking, 'import-substitution' policy, taking up 
the Republic's original goal of creating a self-sufficient national economy. Five-year development 
plans were prepared but their application was very pragmatic and sporadic; sometimes they could not 
be applied at all. Significant state investments in various sectors continued, increasing the role of the 
state as an economic actor, which continued until recently. 
Although the private sector complained about economic uncertainty and political chaos, it grew during 
the import-substitution period. Firms increased their wealth with the help of protectionist measures, 
such as high taxes for imports and incentives for domestic investment and production. Moreover, 
large companies received most of the incentives, through their ability to directly reach the information 
and decision-making bodies in the state, as the rules of application for these incentives were not 
established and communicated clearly to the public. The particularistic nature of relations between the 
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state and private businesses has been another significant characteristics of the TBS, which still 
continues to a large degree. 
The incentives and other measures in an import-substitution strategy, together with tax and financial 
advantages, helped establish the foundations for the 'holding' structure, which now forms one of the 
most important characteristics of the Turkish business system. Another important reason for their 
popularity was to reduce the operational risks and increase profit opportunities that emerge as a result 
of frequent policy changes by the state through diversification. The Turkish holding structure, with its 
diversified nature and role of the state in its establishment and development, is comparable to similar 
structures in late industrialised countries, for instance Korean 'chaebol' (Bugra, 1994). 
The first Turkish holdings were established in the 1960s, while the majority were established in the 
1970s and 1980s. The state gave specific holdings the responsibility of investment in certain fields 
through `suggestions' and advice, and by supporting the investments with various incentives, all of 
which provide supporting evidence for the particularistic nature of state-firm relations. In this way, 
the state actually helped the development of large private companies in the 1960s within an inward- 
looking economy. As a result, the private business sector in Turkey started to flourish from the 1960s. 
The state's supportive attitude continued with increased intensity after the 1980s, firstly with 
incentives for investments and exports, and secondly by pro-business legislation against workers. 
Almost 50 years of experience in manufacturing and services, even in a protected domestic market, 
has provided Turkish holdings and their affiliates with a considerable degree of strength, particularly 
noticeable when globalisation started to influence Turkey, and when they negotiated partnerships with 
foreign firms after the 1980s. 
Turkish holdings have a significant role in the Turkish economy as the largest firms in terms of 
revenues, exports and employment. More recently, some of them were listed among the largest firms 
by international rankings, e. g. World's Largest 500 Companies by Forbes in 20068. They are also 
among the main players in the financial sector through their group banks. Group banks in many cases 
were established to finance the affiliates through credits, which was legally allowed under certain 
structural arrangements. However during the 1980s most of the funding was provided through low- 
interest investment credits by the state, therefore owning a group bank did not reduce the dependence 
of holdings on the state. As the cheap state credits were reduced starting from the early 1990s, other 
holdings started to enter the banking sector, sometimes with foreign partners. 13ugra (1994) argues 
that foreign partners were included in the new and already established group banks as a new source of 
cheaper financing to replace the state credits. 
' Radikal newspaper, 08.05.2007, p. 11 
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Turkish holdings are family-owned enterprises where the significant role of the family members 
particularly in the holding (as the main planning and controlling body) and also in the affiliates 
continue despite a certain degree of professional management. Even in the most professional and 
`institutionalised' holdings, a well-educated younger generation (sometimes with degrees from 
abroad) holds top-level management positions, and the board of directors usually includes a number of 
family members. Managements in the affiliates cannot make strategic decisions without their consent. 
Bugra (1994) found that the holding strictly controls its affiliate firms in three main areas in particular: 
investment decisions, financial coordination, and HR policies, especially in employment systems and 
reward management (p. 290). This centrally controlling role by holdings has been important in the 
rapid development of HR practices, where new policies and applications developed by the holding I IR 
coordination bodies by adapting the most recent international trends and practices were distributed 
easily and quickly. 
Another military intervention in 1980 marked a major change in the Turkish economic system, the 
import-substitution policy of the 1960s and 1970s to an IMF supported export-oriented one (Kepenek 
and Yentürk, 2000). The international economic environment was changing, and the Turkish 
economy was influenced heavily through trickle-down trajectories, which resulted in major 
transformations in the main elements of the TBS. However, between 1980-1995 many of the old rules 
and norms were still observed: firstly, it was a pro-market government but sudden and unexpected 
policy changes created an unstable and chaotic economic environment. Secondly, the state's 
overwhelming presence in the economy continued despite changes in intervention methods. That is, 
controls on interest rates, foreign exchange rates and prices of the commodities produced by the SOEs 
continued, but the state started to take notice of market forces while making these interventions. The 
share of the state in the economy did not shrink in the 1980s, mainly because of increased 
infrastructure investments until the end of the 1980s (Bugra, 1994). It continued to dominate the 
financial sector, including banking. Thirdly, the decision-making process in the economic policy 
arena was centralised and the power of the prime minister increased especially through the 
establishment of new state institutions (Öncü and Gökce, 1991). The increased power of the office of 
the prime minister in the economic decision-making process intensified the 'particularistic' approach 
towards private business (Bugra, 1994). Significant businessmen were still able to contact the highest. 
level government officers and bureaucrats directly, which resulted in both positive and negative 
consequences for these former. 
Impact of trickle-down trajectories started to increase particularly after 1999, with the intensified 
relation between the EU and Turkey, firstly through the Customs Union and then with the acceptance 
of Turkey as a candidate member. Another major transnational institutional influence came from the 
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IMF after the massive economic crisis in 2001. Legal and structural changes were initiated in almost 
every aspect of business. In the financial institutional field, the Central Bank has been given relatively 
more independence from the government. The share of the state banks has been reduced through 
restructuring and privatisation of some of these banks. Inflation reduced to around 10% in 2006 from 
an average of 65% p. a. between 1980-2001. Economic and political stability, which made privatisation 
of some of the largest SOEs possible, have been achieved. Together with changed regulations, the 
economy has been internationalised with increased FDI especially in telecommunications, banking, 
automobile production, food, and tobacco sectors. 
The history of FDI in Turkey started as early as 1954 with one of the most liberal FDI regimes in 
the world, leading to the establishment of foreign capital in Turkey. This regime has been 
liberalised even more especially from the 1980s. Ownership structures, total amount of 
investments, transfers of profits back to the home countries, labour policies, etc., were not 
restricted, unlike in many other developing or transitional economies. The only restrictions were in 
the sectors, e. g. telecommunications, tobacco, defence, etc., which were state monopolies until 
recently. Most of these restrictions have now been lifted as explained above, with the exception of 
defence where there is still a high level of control and restrictions. The total amount of FDI inflows 
stayed at negligible levels until 2003, especially in comparison to those in some other developing 
countries (UNCTAD, 2000). The main explanation given for the low levels of FDI inflow despite 
the unrestricted investment environment and other positive factors (e. g. large domestic market, 
geographical proximity to export markets, cheaper labour cost, etc. ) was the unstable political and 
economic conditions. FDI has been rising considerably since 2003, once political and economic 
stability started to be achieved, and with the introduction of a new law that reduced bureaucracy 
and red tape in FDI to a minimum. 
Another significant factor in FDI is the preference of foreign companies for engaging in IJVs with 
local businesses, particularly holdings, although there is not any legal obligation. For instance, in 
1989 among the largest 500 manufacturing companies in Turkey, there were 72 companies that had 
foreign capital, 47 of which involved Turkish holdings (or their affiliates) as the joint venture 
partner (JVP) (Bugra, 1994). Turkish companies have also become more willing to establish IJVs 
since the 1980s to take advantage of foreign companies' know-how in international business and 
technological capabilities. Nevertheless many of the large Turkish holdings are not weak partners 
in the IJVs, unlike their counterparts in some emerging markets such as Eastern Europe, India or 
China (Child and Faulkner, 1998). Some specific sources of their strength, which are sometimes 
also the reasons for the foreign companies to engage in IJVs, are: 
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" operational experience in many manufacturing and services sectors, including banking 
and finance; 
0 reputable names and large market shares; 
" considerable financial (corporate and personal) resources, therefore not entirely 
submissive when it comes to making or increasing capital investments in the IJVs; 
" powerful relationship with the state and governments, important to receive various 
sources of state support, e. g. investment incentives (land, preferential credits, etc. ) or 
necessary changes in laws and regulations. 
The last point goes in the opposite direction to the argument of Bugra (1994) who claims that 
foreign partners emerged as new actors who could change the nature of relations between the large 
Turkish holdings and the state, in that the former as strong global partners could reduce the 
dependence of the latter on the state. However there is evidence found in this study for the 
inclusion of Turkish JVPs for their strong relations with the state, as a result of the particularistic 
nature of the state-business relationship, which is discussed above. 
In short, changes in legislation in many areas have been taking place in Turkey as a result of the EU 
accession process and IMF stabilisation programme, although the implementation has been still 
limited. The key points of the most recent period can be summarised as liberalisation and outward 
orientation, but in a way that still favours particularistic relationships between the state and business; 
and the opening up of economic activity for foreign investment. 
In the light of the discussion above, the most significant early elements of Turkey's socio-economic 
environment that have been highly influential in the formation of the elements of its current business 
system and that in turn led it to become a 'hybrid transitional' one are summarised as: 
" Comparatively early start with industrialisation among the late-industrialised and 
developing countries, initiated by the state; 
" State-led industrialisation and establishment of the state as a major economic actor 
through the SOEs; 
" Continued tension between state-led and market-driven systems; 
" Late development of the private sector in the early 1960s, through import-substitution 
industrialisation, which was nevertheless relatively early among many developing and 
emerging markets; 
" The particularistic nature of relationships between the state and private businesses; 
" Frequent tension between the state role and the development of private business, 
exacerbating economic instability; 
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" Political and economic instability that resulted in two military interventions, which in turn 
led to two economic system changes; 
"A private business that was not against state intervention when faced with instability, but 
that was concerned with the inconsistent, frequent and unpredictable nature of state 
intervention; 
"A traditionally paternalistic relationship between the state and private businesses where 
the latter are not included in the development of state policies; 
" Domination of the financial system by the state through fiscal and monetary institutions 
and policies. 
In this section an overview of Turkish economic history has been provided while incorporating issues 
of FDI. It is argued that Turkey is among the developing economies, with a medium level income, 
some considerably developed manufacturing and service industries. After long periods of political and 
economic instability, Turkey has reached a point where certain changes in the institutional 
environment can be achieved. Within such an environment, the importance of FDI increases, bringing 
with it possibly significant influences as well. The influences of its transitional economic situation on 
the institutional environment will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
4.3. ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL-INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Ball and Soskice (2001) argue that Turkey, together with France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, 
can be classified as a specific type of capitalism, i. e. 'Mediterranean', 'with a large agrarian sector 
and recent history of extensive state intervention that have left them with specific kinds of capacities 
for non-market coordination in the sphere of corporate finance but more liberal arrangements in 
the sphere of labor relations' (p. 21). Given the recent changes in the extent and type of state 
intervention, and the drastically shrinking contribution of agriculture to the GDP, together with 
other changes in the legal framework, TBS is defined as a 'hybrid transitional' market economy in 
this study, which comprises elements of both CMEs and LMEs. 
Firstly, stock market capitalisation in Turkey is still very low, and corporate financing, which used 
to be highly dependent on state incentives and subsidised credits, is currently provided externally 
by bank credits and internally by retained earnings. Corporate financing has been attained through 
earlier government credits and subsidies, in addition to credits from group banks, retained earnings, 
and personal wealth in the largely family-owned private sector. These sources provide what Hall 
and Soskice (2001) call `patient capital' (p. 22), which does not present an excessive pressure to 
satisfy investor expectations in the short run and allows firms to invest in long-term projects and 
retain their skilled workforce during economic downturns. Turning to industry networks and 
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sharing knowledge, the TBS is on the one hand more similar to LMEs where arms' length relations 
with major suppliers and clients prevail, but also shows similarities to CMEs, as a result of the large 
and diversified holding structure, where extensive networks of cross-shareholding in the affiliates 
secure knowledge and close relations. Thirdly, production strategies until recently remained simple 
and did not rely on a highly skilled workforce unlike in CMEs, although industrialisation efforts 
started earlier than in many comparable developing countries. However, this has started to change 
as more FDI inflow has been experienced, bringing high technology and improved production 
systems. Increased FDI is in turn argued to be an outcome of the economic stability achieved with 
the application of IMF stabilisation programme since 2001. 
However, the education and skills formation system is still not capable of providing labour for such 
sophisticated production systems, with industry or firm specific skills. Coordination of education 
between business and state has not traditionally been achieved. Formal education provides general 
skills, and companies have to make substantial investment in in-house training, more like in most 
LMEs. However, there is large group of uneducated people and the quality of the general education 
is low. Finally the industrial relations system in Turkey, unlike those in CMEs, does not allow 
employee cooperation in companies and wage moderation. Firms have extensive freedom for 
employment at will and top management exercises unilateral control over the firm. In Turkey 
employers have no obligation to set up representative bodies such as works councils, and trade 
unions are considerably weaker than in CMEs. IR is one of the elements of the TBS least 
influenced by trickle-down trajectories despite the requirements for alignment of national 
procedures and practices with those of the EU. However, in the sectors where wage coordination 
and skills development become more important because of sophisticated production technologies 
and sales to export markets, e. g. in metalwork, industry-wide employers' associations and trade 
unions are able to establish sectoral collective agreements. 
These are briefly the key characteristics that mark TBS out as a 'hybrid transitional' system. 
Institutional elements similar to both those found in CMEs and LMEs, as well as other distinct ones 
differentiate it from either system and place it in a separate category. Another important 
characteristic of a `hybrid transitional' system is its greater openness to continuous change 
experienced in the elements of the institutional system as a result particularly of trickle-down 
trajectories (Djelic and Quack, 2003). All institutional systems are subject to `stalactite' change 
processes, however their influences are more significant in `hybrid transitional' systems as a result 
of, firstly, late institutionalisation, and secondly, being subject to dominance effects of other 
systems. In the next part, the outstanding characteristics of the most significant elements of the 
TBS, i. e. the nature and role of the state, financial system, education and training system, the 
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system of industrial relations, and business associations, are discussed while emphasising the 
changes experienced recently. 
4.3.1. TILE ROLE OF THESTATE 
Berkman and Özen (2007: 3) argue that Turkey has had basically a state-dependent business system 
that is characterised by a strong state actively coordinating and controlling economic activities. 
Moreover, one of the most significant characteristics of the Turkish state is the developmental role it 
has taken on. Johnson (1982) argues that the states in the late industrialised countries took on 
developmental functions to lead the industrialisation themselves, which resulted in different types of 
relationships between the state and the business from those where the state took a regulatory role, and 
accordingly different business environments. The US will be discussed in Chapter 5 as the most 
prominent example of the states that have a regulatory orientation, a market-rational state that 
concerns itself with the forms and procedures, the rules, of the economic competition (Johnson, 
1982: 18-19). The Turkish state is claimed to be an example of the developmental state, as 
industrialisation took place much later and the main feature of the state's role has been setting 
substantive social and economic goals, and acting as a major economic actor by directly operating 
economic enterprises. The main reason for the developmental orientation of the Turkish state at the 
beginning was the lack of indigenous entrepreneurial elites and of opportunities to raise capital 
(BuAra, 1994; Kepenek and Yentürk, 2000). It has performed a leading role in economic development 
with the SOEs in many sectors, including manufacturing (e. g. food, textiles, oil, tobacco, etc. ) and 
services (banking, tourism, telecommunication, etc. ). 
Johnson (1982) argues that contemplating a state's priorities in economic policy is another way to 
differentiate between developmental and regulatory orientations of a state. If a state is developmental, 
`plan-rational', in orientation, the very existence of its industrial policy will be the most significant 
clue. The rationale behind promoting the industrial policy is that it will structure the domestic industry 
and economy in a way to enhance its effectiveness and competitiveness (Johnson, 1982: 19). The 
Turkish state might be argued to be a 'plan rational' one particularly in the import-substitution period 
between 1960-1980 when 5-year Development Plans were made under the centralised State Planning 
Institution ('DPT') and the important social and economic goals were decided centrally. These plans 
set forth for example which industries would be established or developed. The main goal was the 
development of domestic production in the certain important sectors as decided by the state, with the 
aim of improving the economy by using central planning and state ownership of production. 
While the state dominated the business system both as an economic actor and the regulator, it also 
created an elite bourgeoisie that resulted in large business groups, i. e. holdings. It supported business 
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interests by protectionist policies, financial incentives (e. g. tax, credits, etc. ) and particularly since the 
1980s, by suppressive legislation for workers. However, there has been a contradictory relationship 
between the state and business as a result of, firstly, particularistic relations and arbitrary acts that 
cannot be predicted by transparent rules; and secondly, the ambiguous and unpredictable nature of 
state intervention. 
This was generally the situation until the beginning of the 21" century. As the influence of economic 
internationalisation has started to be felt more, especially through transnational institutions such as the 
EU, IMF, OECD and World Bank, the reflections of 'trickle-down' mechanisms have started to be 
seen in the Turkish business system. To prove Turkey's eligibility for EU membership, governments 
have accepted the importance of establishing a functioning market economy. Therefore rapid and 
comprehensive privatisation and institutionalisation of market regulations are now being realised. 
Some changes in the legislation for increased transparency in corporate governance have also been 
made. For instance, international accounting and auditing standards (particularly for large and 
incorporated companies) have been made compulsory. Financial markets are now being more 
effectively managed and monitored by relevant bodies, which increases both domestic and 
international investors' trust in the system. More examples of such changes are discussed below for 
the various elements of the institutional system. There are also still many issues to be solved and rules 
and regulations to be changed. It is argued the state-dependent nature of the TBS has currently being 
changed to a state-coordinated system, where influences of transnational bodies such as the IMF and 
EU are felt on the government and private businesses to follow and incorporate international best 
practices. 
4.3.2. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 
The Turkish education system is a unitary one, where formal academic standards and certification are 
dominant, and attending prestigious schools and academic success are the most important criteria to 
access notable positions in the public and private sectors. It functions similarly to other examples of 
unitary education systems that work as ̀ a series offilters designed to select the most academically 
competent, who are then guaranteed to elite positions in the state and private industry' (Whitley, 
1992: 32). However, attending a university is a major challenge: for example, in 1999, of the 
1,479,000 applicants who took the centrally administered university entrance exam, a mere 267,500 
(excluding those who are admitted to distant learning programs), or 18%, were actually admitted to 
any university9. As is the case in other countries, there is a ranking among the universities. There are 
0 hnp: //www. yo , rov. tr 
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`elite' universities whose graduates are almost always guaranteed the best positions. Previously being 
a graduate of any university used to be enough, but with the addition of many new universities, the 
quality of education, hence the name of the institution, has become an issue. 
Turkish employers are almost completely excluded from the formal education system, as is generally 
the case in unitary systems (Whitley, 1992). Such an education system, which only provides graduates 
with academic and general knowledge but very little practical and technical skills, has consequences 
for firms' recruitment, promotion and training. Firstly, for recruitment purposes, the young population 
entering the workforce for the first time from universities and high schools have a fairly good general 
education but lack practical and technical skills. The majority of the young and growing workforce in 
Turkey, however, consists of unskilled and uneducated labour that lacks both practical training and 
general education. Therefore firms have to provide considerable in-house training after they hire new 
and young employees. Some of such training is inevitably firm-specif ic, however some of the skills 
learnt through company-provided training can be applied in other firms especially in the same sector. 
Vocational education and training (VET) in Turkey has not attained the social prestige of academic 
education. It was not given much importance in the education system by the state. Moreover, firms 
were not included in the planning or delivery of VET. Special VET high schools provide education at 
school and training at firms, similar to that in a dual system. VET has more recently started to receive 
more consideration particularly from businesses, which want to collaborate with the government to 
improve the system and graduates. It has also gained recognition among the public, as a result of 
increased placement opportunities. Moreover there has been increased state and public interest in 
increasing basic education opportunities particularly in the deprived regions of Turkey. There have 
been some changes particularly in that VET has gained recognition in the last decade. This is more 
the result of a trickle-up effect of (domestic and international) investor demands to find labour with 
necessary qualif ications. 
The education and training system has been the very slowly changing despite the influence of trickle- 
down mechanisms exerted through transnational organisations. The Ministry of Education (MoE) still 
receives one of the smallest shares of the government budget. The schooling rate, particularly in the 
underdeveloped regions (i. e. eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey) and the quality of education in 
Turkey as assessed by OECD and EU put it at the bottom of the EU league10. One of the few 
significant changes in the education system has been the increase in compulsory primary education, 
from five to eight years as a result of trickle-down effects of state education development policy. 
Another significant trickle-down influence has been realised through the EU Funding for research and 
10 hnn: //www. meb tov. tr 
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development (R&D), which had been negligible and very difficult to get, has increased considerably in 
recent years firstly as a result of Turkey's inclusion in the EU Framework programmes, and secondly, 
by exponential increases in the amount allocated to R&D funds from government budgets to be able to 
comply with EU guidelines. 
4.3.3. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The Turkish financial system is a credit-based system, and it is safe to state that its main element is 
banking: 
"The Turkish financial system is characterized by an overwhelming dominance of banks, 
and the correspondingly limited role of other financial institutions. Thus, for all practical 
purposes, to talk about the Turkish financial system is to talk about banks" (Öncü and 
Gökce, 1991: 107). 
Other financial institutions, especially the stock exchange, are underdeveloped. Only a few Turkish 
businesses are traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE), which remains small and not a primary 
way of raising new capital. Yurtoglu (2000) finds that families own more than 75% of all publicly 
traded companies and keep majority control. 
The strong connections between the banks and companies constitute a significant characteristic of the 
Turkish banking system. Yurtoglu (2000) claims that almost every private f inn is under the control of 
families who typically control a large number of other financial (e. g. insurance, factoring, leasing 
companies) and industrial companies. These financial institutions were originally established to 
operate as the `financiers' of the group companies. There are cross-ownership and board memberships 
between the holding companies, including the banks and other financial firms. 
The state's impact on the Turkish banking system, where the state-owned banks dominated the system 
particularly until recently, has been unquestionable. The banking system has however gone through a 
trickle-down reform from 2001. Acting on IMF suggestions, the state's role in the system was 
reduced considerably, the Central Bank gained greater independence, and managerial and operational 
control on banks' management increased. Moreover, the sector has been internationalising 
particularly since 2003, with the stabilising and strengthening of the Turkish economy in general and 
the banking system in particular. The major impact of this change has not been felt very strongly yet, 
except for increased employment opportunities as a result of growth policies of new players, while 
trickle-up changes can be expected in the sector and the business. 
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4.3.4. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM 
4.3.4.1. Role of the State and Legal Framework 
The state has had a dominant role in the Turkish IR system, both as the regulator who sets the legal 
framework, and as the largest employer for a long time through the SOEs. Koray (1992) claims that 
"The State, as regulator and employer, influenced the other parties to the extent that the 
system did not gain an independent development. " (p. 10) 
The state owed much to its paternalistic approach especially during the initial stages of worker 
organisation to gain such a dominance and power in the IR system. Initially the state itself had been 
directly involved in the process of organising the workers in trade unions when unionisation right was 
first given in the late 1940s (Koray, 1992; Koc, 1999a; Yazici, 1996). Sakallhoglu (1991: 57) argues 
that `the labour question was easily dealt with until the 1960s' by granting basic rights and 
considerably better financial conditions to civil servants and public sector officers and workers, 
together with job security and some other further privileges. 
The reasons for such a state policy are argued to be firstly, to win over the sympathy of the workers, 
and secondly, to inhibit the development of a tradition of acquiring rights through common struggle 
(Koc, 1999a: 26). Koc (1999a) argues that it was mainly this attitude of the state that prevented the 
growth of a labour movement until the 1970s, rather than the limiting regulations and mild sanctions. 
Both as the regulator and employer, governments gave the trade unions the message that they should 
keep good relations with the state to get better terms and conditions for their members. 
Koc (1999a) claims that the direct involvement of the state in the process of establishing trade unions 
has had both positive and negative effects on the subsequent history of labour organisation in Turkey. 
On the one hand, it has negatively affected the independence of the trade unions from the state. The 
oldest and the largest trade union in Turkey, Türk-1q, the Confederation of Labour Unions of Turkey, 
which still comprises over 70% of total union members, is argued to be 'a product of 'legalism' as 
opposed to being a spontaneous association formed from below' (Sakallioglu, 1991: 64). Moreover, 
the unions, particularly Türk-t , mostly preferred not to 
have ideological attitudes. Türk-1ý has always 
followed a policy of having good relations with the state and reaching its desired goals through 
communication and goodwill (Koc, 1999a; Sakallioglu, 1991). 
In the two decades between the two military interventions, in 1960 and 1980, labour organisations 
experienced a relaxed political environment with the help of the liberal 1961 Constitution and the 
accompanying labour laws that provided workers and unions with more rights. The import- 
substitution strategy also helped unions in getting favourable financial conditions for their members. 
This period was the only exception when unions were ideologically driven and were able to mobilise 
labour with a class consciousness. Extended strikes where thousands of workers participated reached 
their peak in 1979-80, creating major unrest in society. The military intervention in September 1980 
was argued to be the consequences of such (and other major) societal unrest combined with worsening 
economic conditions. The military government initially, and then the subsequent new Constitution and 
new labour laws were very restrictive and inevitably brought negative consequences for labour 
organisations. The new export-oriented economic strategy, aligned with the deepening anti-unionist 
attitude internationally, resulted not only in restricted collective action but also reduced wages. 
It is generally agreed that the legal framework is very suppressive and limiting on worker organisation, 
union activity and collective bargaining rights whereas it provides a permissive environment for 
employers (Koray, 1992; Koc, 1999a; Nichols and Sugur, 2004). Koq (1999b) argues that Turkish 
labour laws need to be adjusted according to ILO standards. Although Turkey is a long-standing 
member of the ILO and has signed its conventions, transfer of their application to the Turkish legal 
system has always been equivocal. Particularly controversial issues have been unionisation rights, job 
security and unemployment insurance. 
IR has been the other element of the business system where `trickle-down' trajectories stemming from 
particularly the IMF stability programme have brought significant positive change. A new labour 
code brought only a few changes, such as unemployment pay, put into effect in 2003, after a decade of 
discussion. Another significant change was in job security issues, where it was made more difficult 
for employers to lay off workers `if not based on fair grounds'. Employers were strongly against it, as 
workers are given a right to take their case to the court and if the court decides in favour of the worker, 
the employer has to re-employ him/her. Previously employment at will prevailed, although the new 
law is not entirely inflexible. Temporary employment contracts, which do not entitle workers to a 
termination period, severance pay, or union membership, still continue, and the new law provides only 
insignificant additional job security. 
The minimum wage, set annually and subject to taxation, still continues, despite suggestions from the 
IMF for its complete discontinuation or recalculation for various regions. Although employers 
welcome the idea, arguing their case based on high labour costs, the government seems to be against 
it, particularly because of political reasons (i. e. not to lose their electoral base shortly before the 
general elections). At the same time, the value of the minimum wage is debated given that there are 
many who accept to work for less than the minimum wage, unregistered and without any rights or 
social security. Lastly, the new labour law for the first time brought specific clauses for equal 
employment opportunities and non-discrimination, but their enforcement, especially for women's 
issues, is yet to be seen. 
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4.3.4.2. Unionisation and Collective Bargaining 
Unionisation in Turkey has a limited scope. This can be partly explained by the relatively small size of 
the industrial base. There is still high employment in the agriculture sector, although its contribution 
to the GDP is limited, and employment in this sector does not necessarily mean paid-work as most of 
workers are unpaid family workers. Those in the agriculture sector are not unionised. Moreover, the 
average size of the typical firm is small and the majority of workers are employed in SMEs. 
According to 1992-93 figures announced by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MoLSS), 
only around 8% of unionised workers were in SMEs (cetik and Akkaya, 1999). Thirdly, in addition to 
family workers, there are also many un-unionised self-employed in various sectors (Koray, 1992; 
$enkal, 1999). Lastly, the large volume of informal employment reduces the base for unionisation. 
Unregistered and part-time workers cannot be union members. Therefore it can justifiably be argued 
that the base for unions is not large. 
Although it is argued that the rate of unionisation in Turkey is low, official labour and unionisation 
statistics by the MoLSS tell a different story. According to official statistics the unionisation rate in 
Turkey was 67% in 1998 (tretik and Akkaya, 1999: 103). However as many officers and 
administrators in the labour market agree, evident in their public speeches, newspaper articles or 
newsletters (of trade unions and employers' associations), statistics kept by the MoLSS are argued to 
be inflated, therefore not reliable". The published statistics by the MoLSS have been amended 
recently, hence are now regarded as more reliable. The rate of unionisation is however still considered 
noticeably inflated because of the widespread existence of the large informal labour sector, as the 
percentage unionisation rates are calculated by taking only the registered employment into account 
(Koc, 1999a; $enkal, 1999). However the MoLSS is argued to prefer publishing higher unionisation 
rates than actual ones, to use them as evidence for the government's claim for widespread unionisation 
and non-suppressed labour, especially in international arenas such as the ILO and the EU. 
In fact, unionisation in Turkey is quite difficult because of the restrictive legislation that came into 
effect after the 1980 military coup, `a structure within which the state has sought to fetter trade 
unionism' (Nichols and Sugur, 2004: 153). Unions have to be organised both nationally at the sectoral 
and enterprise level. According to the current legislation, a union has to satisfy two conditions to be 
recognised, i. e. get the right to represent the workforce in a company in collective bargaining: firstly, 
at the macro level, it should attain 10% density nationally in the respective industry. Secondly, at the 
11 Koc claimed in an interview that the figures do not show the rate of unionisation but the number of union members, which is by no means 
correct as membership figures are not amended for job changes to different sectors and unions, retirements, job losses due to resignations or 
layoffs, deaths, etc. In some years during the 1970s, for instance, the rate of unionisation exceeded 100% because of multiple union 
memberships and the MoLSS acknowledged this fact (Cetik and Akkaya, 1999). 
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micro level, it should obtain at least 50% +1 membership in the particular workplace or enterprise. 
This combined threshold at macro (industry) and micro (company) levels makes it very difficult for 
unions to claim authorisation for collective bargaining. Moreover it is inevitably a single union at 
workplace and/or enterprise level, as only one union can achieve the company level threshold to get 
the recognition certificate, hence the authorisation for collective bargaining. 
There are additional clauses in the law that provide firms with other ways of keeping unions at bay. 
For instance, firms are given a choice to be regarded either as a 'workplace' at its various plant(s), 
headquarters, sales offices etc. separately, or as an `enterprise' that includes all employees in the 
whole company (i. e. all blue- and white-collar employees in various parts of the company). Many 
companies in Turkey used to prefer to be regarded as 'workplace' because then a union had to reach 
the company threshold level separately in each plant. However more recent practice is in favour of 
being considered as an `enterprise' instead of 'workplace', which makes it almost impossible for the 
union to reach the company-level threshold in many cases. For example, the number of blue-collar 
workers in some manufacturing sectors (such as the food industry), is far less than half of the total 
number of employees, due to improvements in technology and increased automation. Such rules are 
argued to violate the transnational legislation by ILO, of which Turkey is a member12. However, no 
changes have been made, except a discussion on reducing the macro (national) level threshold. Many 
commentators agree that: 
"The state's intention [in the post-1980 arrangements] was to de-activate, re-organize and 
then to exclude the present unions from the political sphere. " (Sakallioglu, 1991: 69) 
The industries in which union organisation is allowed are determined by MoLSS. Currently there are 
28 sectors and 94 unions 13. Within the range of the above-mentioned reservations about the available 
data, the highest rate of unionisation is in the manufacturing sector, where some of the industries with 
the largest number of union members are Oil, Chemicals and Tyres, Textiles, Metal, Food, Energy, 
Construction, and Local Government. As a result of the double-threshold rules, unionisation at the 
national level is led by the three big Union Confederations: Türk-1 , DISK and Hak-1q. Of the 94 
unions, the majority are affiliated with these confederations. As already mentioned above, Türk-i is 
the oldest and largest of the three, and is generally argued to be very pro-state, and right wing, 
although it includes also left wing unions (Koray, 1992; Nichols and Sugur, 2004). It has always had 
its largest membership in the public sector, where the state both has a regulating role and is the unions' 
counterpart in collective bargaining as the employer. It has had a pragmatic approach towards 
political parties, shifting with the political tide (Nichols and Sugur, 2004: 157). Koc (1999a) similarly 
argues that: 
12 Interviews with various union officials 
13 httn: //www. calisma. cov. tr, including independent nationally non-qualifying unions. 
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"If there is a force that has had its imprint on Türk-l , 
it is the Turkish state, apart from 
the government. Türk-l§ has from time to time opposed to the policies of the 
governments and has defied government authority. But it has never detracted from the 
general state policy and has never challenged the State. " (p. 35-6) 
The second largest labour unions confederation in Turkey, DISK, was established towards the end of 
the 1960s by those who had left Türk-t on ideological grounds. It was always a leftist organisation, 
ideologically driven in its activities. It still continues to be in strong opposition especially towards 
privatisation and also the mild unionism approach adopted by Türk-1 . The majority of its members 
are in the private sector. There have always been significant differences between the approaches of 
the two largest trade union confederations towards IR: while Türk-1 followed a mild and pragmatic 
unionism, DISK had a militant, ideological, class-conscious approach. It was 'punished' for having 
such an attitude, and suppressed severely and for a longer time than Türk-1ý and Hak-f§: the former 
was allowed operate within months of the coup and the latter within a year, while DISK remained 
banned until 1991 after the military coup in 1980. Although even DISK cannot operate militantly any 
more within the tightly constrained legal environment, it still has a leftist ideological attitude. The 
third largest confederation, Hak-t§, is also ideologically driven, a 'conservative' organisation, which is 
generally known to be the 'Islamists' labour organisation. In addition to these main 3 confederations 
and their affiliated unions, there are some other small, independent unions, and so-called ̀ yellow' 
unions. These are in fact 'employers' unions, which are established and organised by employers 
themselves at their own workplaces only to deter the entrance of other, real, unions. 
One of the most significant characteristics of collective bargaining in Turkey is that it has never 
progressed beyond bargaining over financial terms: 
"Right from the beginning, Turkish trade unions have concentrated more on 'bread and 
butter issues' than on broad 'political and class' issues. " (Koray, 1992: 11). 
In general, collective agreements include extensive and detailed provisions about the wages and 
benefits. The unions have been successful in attaining their goals in this respect, and unionised 
workers earn considerably higher wages and benefits than non-unionised within their respective 
sectors. There are also significant wage differentials between manufacturing and services, where 
majority of the workers are not unionised. Public sector workers, many of whom are unionised, earn 
significantly more than those in the private sector. Finally, there are much more favourable wages 
paid in the large enterprises than in the SMEs, where the workforce is generally not unionised. 
Issues such as training and development, productivity, job evaluation and job security have only 
recently started to be covered in a very limited number of agreements signed between a few of the 
largest labour unions and employers' associations, e. g. in the metal workers industry. There are only 
limited provisions with regards to union-employer relations, and clauses about employee participation 
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still do not come to the bargaining table, except that of the `discipline committees'. Koray (1992) 
argues that the main reason had been the unwillingness of the employers in sharing their management 
authority and flexibility with workers or their representatives. 
Labour unions could not attribute importance to these issues because of the priority of income 
demands given the low income levels in the country. In addition to the economic conditions faced by 
workers, one of the other reasons for such an attitude of the trade unions could be the lack of class 
structures in Turkey as understood in Western societies. Mainly due to late and underdeveloped 
industrialisation, and a state-led policy of 'a united national society and a unity without classes', a 
working class and class-consciousness emerged only in the 1960s (Yazici, 1996: 14; Koc, 1999a). 
However workers have never really gained class-consciousness, except perhaps during the 1970s, 
which was harshly ended by the military intervention. 
It is also argued that the close contact of Türk-tq and its affiliated unions with American unions during 
the initial stages of Turkish unionisation might have been influential in establishing such a pragmatic 
approach of concentrating on 'bread and butter issues' (Koray, 1992; Nichols and Sugur, 2004). 
Employers in Turkey used high unemployment rates as a threat against labour demands, especially in 
terms of wage and job security issues, as they enjoyed extensive power in compensation and 
employment issues under the prevailing legal framework. The employers imply that workers should 
take the offer under the conditions the former set, or simply leave it, as there are thousands of others 
with similar skill and education waiting to be employed, ready to accept the given conditions (Parlak, 
1996). This threat can be read from the following opinion of TISK: 
"The welfare level of our unionised workers has reached far beyond that of civil service 
employees. If we also take into account the existence of nearly 3 million unemployed, it 
is possible to claim that workers in our country form a happy minority. " (Türk"Ig 
Working Report, 1983; cited from Sakallioglu, 1991: 63) 
Therefore, the relationship between the two parties in IR, i. e. employers and workers, generally was 
not perceived as co-operative and participative, but hostile and distributive. 
4.3.4.3. Unionisation In Foreign Capital Companies 
It is argued that the majority of the foreign capital firms operating in Turkey are not unionised, and 
they deliberately follow a de-unionisation policy (Koc, 1999b; $enkal, 1999). It has been easy to 
follow such a policy, as the Turkish governments has created the suitable national environment since 
the 1980s for non-unionisation in an effort to decrease labour costs and to increase the competitiveness 
of Turkish products in the international markets. 
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Koc (19996) argues that foreign capital firms, like domestic firms, used not to be against unions until 
the late 1970s. With the transformation of the Turkish economic system from import-substitution to 
export-orientation and liberalisation, they did not tolerate unions any more (Koc, 1999b). Between 
1960 and 1980 when the Turkish economic strategy was import-substitution, only a few foreign 
companies invested directly in Turkey with the objective of serving the protected and unsaturated 
domestic market. Within this strategy, domestic and foreign capital firms alike could operate at higher 
profit margins, therefore they were not concerned too much about the labour costs. Workers therefore 
had enjoyed high earnings and good increases in real wages (Kor, 1999a; Koray, 1992; Yazici, 1996). 
However when the import-substitution policy was changed to an open-market, liberal one, 
emphasising export-led growth, it meant stiffer competition for the Turkish companies both in the 
domestic and international markets (Kepenek and Yentürk, 2000; Öz, 1999). The main advantage of 
Turkish products was their low prices, attained through low labour cost. Therefore the companies 
could no longer be tolerant of high earnings and wage increases. 
Koc (1999b) claims that the FDI firms thus adopted a non-union policy after the 1980s. Figures show 
that the proportion of FDI firms that had a unionised workforce indeed decreased dramatically after 
1980. 
Total no. of FDI 
firms 
No of unionised FDI 
firms 
% of unionised FDI 
firms 
Before 1980 78 37 47 
1998 4,400 192 4 
1999 4,600 232 5 
Table 4.1. Unionisation in foreign capital firms 
Source: Koc, 1999b: 18 
Koc (1999b) claims that FDI firms adapted their employee participation policies to the conditions in 
the Turkish environment, ignoring their home-country policies and supranational rules and standards, 
such as ILO ones. He states that foreign capital firms generally use the permissive pro-business 
legislation to get rid of unions without causing labour unrest or loss of public support, instead of 
employing aggressive union and labour suppression methods. Local partners and high-level Turkish 
managers in these companies are claimed to employ a very negative attitude towards unions, 
sometimes even more openly than their foreign partners. Widespread de-unionisation experienced in 
FDI firms particularly in the oil, chemicals and pharmaceuticals sectors was argued to be, firstly, a 
result of negative attitudes against unionisation, and secondly, to decrease labour costs within the new 
economic system. 
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It is argued that the changes in a business system brought by trickle-down mechanisms can be negative 
for some of the parties involved. The changes in the Turkish IR system since the beginning of 1980s, 
as a result of combined influences of national and international conditions are claimed to have created 
mostly a much less favourable environment for workers. There have been some relatively positive 
legal changes for labour recently, and more negative changes proposed by supranational institutions 
such as the IMF have not been realised yet. An amendment in the Trade Unions Law, which would 
reduce or cancel the sectoral threshold level has been discussed but not yet put into effect. 
4.3.5. BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
It is argued that the high level of business dependence on the state has hindered horizontal networks 
between Turkish firms (Berkman and Özen, 2007). Business associations in Turkey have therefore 
been weak, firstly, as a result of particularistic and individualistic nature of relations between the 
business and the state, and secondly, the traditional hostility of the state towards organised interest 
groups (Bianchi, 1984). The traditional business association has been TOBB (the National 
Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry), which represents SMEs. TOBB membership is 
organised on a geographical rather than industrial basis and is compulsory. TOBB has a quasi- 
governmental structure and it has been subject to strict state control. Therefore it has not been very 
successful in representing the diverse interests of its fragmented members against the state. 
Voluntary business organisations in addition to compulsory Chambers started to be established in the 
1970s and the 1980s, in an effort to increase the independent collective contribution of private sector 
business people as their social status changed positively in line with the increased importance in their 
economic position (Bugra, 1994). The first and most important of these voluntary organisations was 
TÜSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's {sic} Association), generally known as the 
`Bosses Club', established by the founders / managers of the 12 largest leading Turkish holdings, with 
the main objective of `proving the social existence of the private business sector, not to defend certain 
benefits of their members' (Bugra, 1994). 
Founders and some later members of TÜSIAD aimed to perform a significant representative role, 
which the government-controlled Chambers could not do. However, whether it has been successful in 
reaching its goals of representing all of its members and securing their social position remains 
debatable. Its members usually refrained from openly criticising government members and politicians, 
sometimes even openly disapproving statements made by the management board (BuAra, 1994) as 
particularistic relations between business and the state continued. Although recent governments have 
been more positive towards business associations particularly to secure their support in international 
economic relations, e. g. EU accession, they still react severely to negative criticisms. 
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4.4. CONCLUSION: TURKEY AS A'HYBRID TRANSITIONAL' HOST COUNTRY 
In the previous sections, socio-economic background and the institutional elements of the Turkish 
business system are analysed. Table 4.1. highlights the major factors of this analysis: early 
elements and more recent changes are listed to emphasise the significant characteristics of the 
`hybrid transitional' TBS. 
Institutional complexes 
The Role of Early Elements: 
the State State-led economic development: due to lack of private capital in the early periods, 
supported by unstable international conditions. Increased state intervention and 
import-substitution policy between 1960 and 1980, similar to global trends. 
State as a major economic actor in main industries through SOEs: developmental 
role. 
State assumed no role for businesses in the planning or application of industrial 
policies. 
State also supported private businesses with subsidised credits and other 
incentives: private sector started to flourish in the 1960s. 
Small amount of FDI inflows, particularly in comparison to some other developing 
countries, despite liberal FDI policies, due to economic and political instability. 
Continued role and presence of the state in the economy despite economic policy 
change to an export-oriented, outward looking one in 1980 and liberalisation of 
financial and money markets. 
Recent Elements of Chance: 
- Significant and extensive changes particularly in the legal framework and 
the role of the state as a result of direct influences by transnational 
organisations, i. e. IMF, EU and OECD, such as: 
- Stabilised economy since 2002 with an IMF structural programme; 
reduced inflation and interest rates, stabilised foreign exchange rates, 
increased GDP and growth rate. 
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- Diminished role of the state as an economic actor, due to accelerated rate 
and increased amount of privatisation. 
- More transparency in the public domain and change in the particularistic 
nature of state-business relations, as a result of changes in the regulations. 
- Significantly higher amount of FDI as a result of economic and political 
stability. 
Educational   Unitary system: academic education needed to reach good positions in the 
System and public and private sectors, while VET has not been highly respected 
Skills 
Mostly uneducated unskilled workforce 
Formation 
Scarcity of highly-educated highly-skilled workforce 
  Recent changes: 
- compulsory schooling increased to eight years, 
- more schools built and teachers assigned, 
- government funding for research increased considerably, 
- VET started to attract more attention and willingness from the 
business for collaboration with the state. 
The Financial   Credit-based system, where banking comprises the financial system. 
System Weak and underdeveloped stock markets: low ratio of private businesses 
traded. 
" Strong influence of state-owned banks in the system until 2003. 
  Recent changes: 
Significantly diminished role and share the state through privatisation and 
downsizing; 
Increased share of foreign capital through acquisitions and mergers, after the 
economic stabilisation and strengthening of the banking system. 
Industrial and   Collective organisation rights 'given' and unionisation first organised by the 
Employment state, which gave the state extensive power in labour relations as both the largest 
Relations employer and regulator of the system. 
System 
Changes in the IR system after 1980 limited unionisation rates, decreased 
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unions' power, and created a disadvantaged position for workers through tight 
regulations. 
  Suppression of labour and unions continues, while the state is pro-business 
against labour. 
  Minimal change experienced in IR as a result of trickle-down trajectories, 
despite the need for the alignment of labour laws that violate international norms 
and agreements. 
  Recent changes: amendments in labour law increasing job security, 
unemployment pay and equal employment opportunities. 
Business Business associations were not very strong, as a result of particularistic and 
Associations individual relations between the state and large business owners. 
Diversified, family-owned 'Holdings' emerged as the major form of large 
economic enterprises, as a result of state support, e. g. tax advantages in addition to 
credits etc. 
Cross-ownership and strict control by family members in the holding and 
affiliates. 
Strong state control and influence on compulsory business associations, i. e. 
Chambers and TOBB, while voluntary business associations, e. g. TÜSIAD, 
establish more equal relations. 
Stronger employers' associations organised at the industry level, as 
counterparts to trade unions especially in collective bargaining. 
Recent changes: 
- Stronger voluntary business associations as a result of increased role in the 
EU accession process; 
- However governments still unable to accept negative criticism although 
they highly welcome favourable criticisms and help in e. g. lobbying 
- Increased involvement opportunities for business associations in policy 
making, e. g. in the EU accession process, although state dominance continues. 
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Turkey is presented as a `hybrid transitional' business system where the various elements of the 
system have been going through both abrupt and more long-term changes. The establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, and the two military coups can be given as examples of abrupt changes that 
altered the political and economic scenes radically. Longer-term change process has been 
experienced more recently, when the influences of increased internationalisation have started to be 
felt more in Turkey after it liberalised its economy and particularly after 1999 as a result of EU 
accession process, hence became more open to the influences of transnational institutions. The 
evolution of the TBS also illustrates the influence both of 'trickle-down' trajectories from 
transnational institutions and of'trickle-up' mechanisms from sectors and professions that end up 
causing considerable changes in the system. 
In conclusion, this chapter has presented an overview of the socio-economic system of Turkey in order 
to understand the path-dependent nature of the development process that the TBS went through. The 
most relevant elements for the analysis of the transfer of American MNCs' HR policies and practices 
to the Turkish business environment have been emphasised. Key institutional elements, i. e. the role of 
the state, financial system, the system of education and training, industrial relations system and 
business associations, have been discussed while pointing out the outcomes of the change processes 
they have been experiencing. 
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CHAPTER 5. AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM AND HOME-COUNTRY INFLUENCES 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main premises of this study is that firms are rooted in their NBS, therefore national 
influences are significant for MNCs' behaviour both at home and abroad. Accordingly, US companies 
develop their management practices within the distinctive American business system, in which they 
are embedded and find the necessary control and coordination mechanisms. In this chapter, the NBS 
of the USA as the country of origin of the MNCs studied in this thesis is analysed according to the 
framework presented in Chapter 2. In the next section, the distinguishing characteristics of the US 
business system are presented. The influences of its significant elements, i. e. role of the state and 
business associations, financial system, educational system and skills formation, industrial relations 
and labour markets, on the formation of IR/HR behaviour of large American companies in their 
domestic environments are discussed. In the third section, the implications of the US business system 
for the formation and transfer of HR/IR policies to their international subsidiaries are examined. A 
tabular summary of the US business system's elements concludes the chapter. 
5.2. DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS SYSTEM 
The American business system is generally classified as a `compartmentalized' system (Whitley, 
1999) or among the 'liberal market economies' (Hall and Soskice, 2001), or as a 'competitive 
managerial capitalism' (Chandler, 1990). The main characteristics of these business system types are 
an `arm's length' coordination between economic actors, combined with prevalent flexible external 
labour markets, weak public training systems, occupational trade unionism and decentralised 
collective bargaining. However the US business system has various features different from other 
`compartmentalized' systems, in particular the European ones. The main elements of the US business 
system that distinguish it from other systems are presented below. These elements, through complex 
interactions. provide a distinctive environment for American MNCs and their management practices. 
5.2.1. ROLE OF THE STATE AND BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
The weakness of the American state, mainly due to the federal structure where power is diffused to the 
state levels, has been a major feature of the US business system. This weakness has been traced back, 
firstly, to the absence of feudalism, which led to the establishment of strong states in Europe, and, 
secondly, the early start of the industrial revolution (Jacoby, 1991). The operation of the US state 
below the federal level has been fragmented, where for instance states compete fiercely among each 
other to receive more private-sector investment by giving additional incentives. Therefore the 
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American state's main role has been limited to setting the framework for other economic actors, 
particularly in terms of creating a favourable investment environment for the private sector. The 
government has not however intervened to coordinate and plan economic activity as has been the case 
in e. g. Japan, or needed to supplement the comparatively late industrialisation as in e. g. Germany and 
France as a major economic actor. The US government therefore `only acts as an arbitrator, 
supervising the adherence to rules of conduct by the participants in the national economy' (Pudelko, 
2006: 146). 
Economic coordination therefore has been predominantly left to markets, where investment, 
production and distribution decisions are made by private companies, without any explicit `industrial 
policy'. The state has had a strong opposition towards inter-organisational coordination, reflected in 
the anti-trust and anti-cartel laws, which has paved the way for corporate consolidation through 
mergers, resulting in large size of American companies. The result of the combination of state's 
antagonism with the diverse interests of a large number of companies has been weak business 
associations. Limited business networks involving close links with university researchers were 
observed only for instance in high-tech areas such as defence, computers and pharmaceuticals, where 
coordination was achieved by the state (Hollingsworth, 1997). Moreover, the strong sense of 
responsibility among businesses for their own performance is argued to have resulted in weak business 
associations (Pudelko, 2006). 
A final significant feature of the US state has been its success in shaping economic activity outside the 
USA, especially in the post-war period to promote the liberal market values in the face of the threat 
from non-capitalist systems, in particular the Soviet Union (Clark, 2000). Through now well- 
documented interventions, such as the Marshall Plan, it secured the current hegemony of American 
economy in the world by forming the necessary environment for American MNCs and the 
establishment of transnational economic organisations in which the USA plays a major role. 
In brief, these characteristics resulted in a market-based economic coordination, where atomistic, 
arm's length, contractually-driven relationships between firms prevail. Long-term, trust-based 
relations between firms and providers of capital or labour resources were not established, as a result of 
the logic of the system (Clark and Almond, 2006). 
5.2.2. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The American financial system is characterised by two important features: the absence of long-term 
relations between industry and financial institutions, and a strong `market for corporate control' and 
`shareholder capitalism' especially after the 1980s (O'Sullivan, 2000). Historically banks had a 
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significant role in financing the core industries (e. g. railways, steel, oil and telephone), which 
continued until the early twentieth century. However the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, and later the 
government intervention in 1933 that separated commercial and investment banks brought the 
possibility of long-term relationships between companies and banks to an end. As a result of the 
weakened role of banks and capital markets in corporate finance, equity markets had developed early 
on. American business finance is therefore strongly reliant on equity markets, rather than banks. 
Effective communication between shareholders and managements has been restricted to protect small 
investors from the possible outcomes of `insider trading' by large investors. The primary option given 
to shareholders has been ̀ exit' rather than 'voice', which resulted in rapid turnover of shares (Jacoby, 
2005). As shareholders base 'invest or divest' decisions on easily accessible short-term measures, e. g. 
quarterly reports, companies feel the strong pressure to increase their short-term profits and reduce 
costs. Especially with the increased international competition, which reduced the ability of American 
firms to achieve steady growth in sales and profits, increasing `shareholder value' has been the main 
management ideology particularly for the last two decades (O'Sullivan, 2000; Pudelko, 2006). Major 
consequences of this widespread ideology have been experienced in labour issues, particularly in 
terms of downsizing, affecting all types and ranks of employees in all sectors. Downsizing together 
with the distribution of revenues to shareholders have been utilised for keeping an attractive profile in 
the stock market. 
This structure of the financial markets at the same time has certain advantages especially for the 
development of new business, through the funding opportunities for small firm start-ups with venture 
capital. As a result, and in particular with the interaction of various elements of the business system, 
e. g. strong individualism, tradition of entrepreneurship, and flexibility of external labour markets, 
small and profitable start-up companies have been significant in technological innovation, and 
particularly creation of wealth, jobs and management techniques (Pudelko, 2006). 
5.2.3. EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND SKILL FORMATION 
The USA has been the leader in the development and use of standardised mass production and 
application of scientific management principles. The American model of mass production system 
moreover implied a strict `hierarchical segmentation' between managers and workers, and `functional 
segmentation' in highly skilled labour (Lazonick, 1998: 206). These factors had profound influences 
on the American education and training systems. Firstly, the national system produced potential 
employees with basic skills and education to accommodate the less skilled labour needs of mass 
manufacturing sectors. Pudelko (2006) argues that the American educational system involves an 
outstanding `elite' education while neglecting mass education. Top universities produce high 
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performers, particularly managers, with high salaries and fast-track careers. Secondly, at the company 
level, the subsequent training of blue-collar workers has been limited, short and job-specific. There 
has been little incentive for companies to invest in training for complex skills, as firstly the production 
system was based on low-skill, easily replaceable rank and file workers who could be fired and re- 
hired according to the business' needs, and secondly, firms relied mainly on poaching from external 
markets for their skilled labour needs. Firms have invested comparatively more in the training and 
development of managers, technicians and supervisors, as they relied on managerial organisation for 
the development of new productive capabilities. While graduates from good universities have been 
the managerial and technical backbone of strong American companies, basic education that left under- 
qualified workers with a few basic skills is claimed to be responsible for under-performance with 
complex production systems that required sophisticated skills, flexibility and adaptability. 
5.2.4. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSAND LABOUR MARKETS 
Unionised industrial relations (IR) in the USA has been strongly adversarial, formalised and 
standardised (Pudelko, 2006). The key characteristic of IR in general has been a profound anti- 
unionism among the majority of employers throughout its history. Even the New Deal model could 
not change most employers' negative attitude towards collective representation, although many firms 
were legally forced to accept the collective employment relations. This deep-rooted ideological anti- 
unionism was explained by historical and institutional features, such as the extreme, market-oriented 
individualism, the `American Dream' that emphasises personal ambition and endeavour, and the 
economic and political dominance of the market in the US system, particularly in the absence of a 
strong state and feudal heritage (Jacoby, 1991; Colling, 2001). The state contributed to union 
suppression by employers, by creating a permissive legal environment, in support of a market 
orientation and employer interests throughout American labour history, excluding the New Deal 
period (Clark and Almond, 2006). The impact of deep-rooted anti-unionism by employers combined 
with state support has been weak unions, evidenced in the low levels of union density and growth in 
membership: as a result of the New Deal reforms, union membership as a percentage of non- 
agricultural labour reached its historical peak in 1945 at 36%, from as low as 13% in 1935. It has 
since been suffering decline, a slow one in the 1950s and rapidly since the 1970s, reaching 14% at the 
end of the 1990s, almost the same level in the 1930s. 
The basis for the New Deal model of industrial relations was laid by the National Industrial Recovery 
Act 1933 and the National Labour Relations Act (commonly known as the Wagner Act) of 1935. The 
New Deal model established the legal mechanisms for unions to get organised and formally 
recognised. Employers were forced to recognise unions' rights and accept collective bargaining to set 
wages. With the help of the New Deal, unions were able to organise, gain recognition and made 
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detailed and binding collective agreements in many large American manufacturing companies. 
However neither the US state nor the employers' have ever been strongly committed to pluralist 
industrial relations, and unionised IR has not been deeply embedded in the American business system 
(Clark and Almond, 2006). 
This unionised model was based on strictly defined jobs, pay rates linked to job types, and seniority- 
based rules for promotion and layoffs. The `industrial' employment system (Osterman, 1987), which 
provided employees with elements of job security suited the mass production system that needed 
labour stability and predictability to exploit economies of scale. Collective agreements in this system 
had the force of legal contracts, making strikes during the period of a collective agreement unlawful. 
Strikes could therefore only occur lawfully during disputes over the renegotiation of an expiring 
contract. The contractual status of agreements meant that they were highly detailed in content and had 
formal grievance and disputes procedures to keep the industrial peace. 
However the New Deal system started to lose ground from the 1960s, which resulted in the emergence 
of a non-union industrial relations system (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994). Jacoby (1997) argues 
that `modern welfare capitalism' has taken the place of unionism in many of the larger f irms, as the 
more flexible, fluid and non-unionist `salaried' system responded well to, firstly, the structural 
changes in the industry and employment, and secondly, related changes in managerial strategy. 
Declining importance of mass production and rapid growth of new non-union firms were among the 
main structural changes, which were accompanied by shifts in occupations towards white-collar and 
professional jobs, and changing profile of employees, i. e. educated workers with non-collectivist 
values regarding pay and promotion. Managerial strategy changes were influenced by factors such as 
growing workplace militancy since the 1960s, emergence of new technologies, increased instability of 
product markets and demand, and growth in, particularly international, competition from the 1970s. 
Employers' preferences for labour stability and predictability were as a result replaced with concerns 
for reduced labour costs and increased flexibility. These factors were argued to have brought the 
necessary conditions for the re-emergence of US employers' deep-rooted anti-unionist attitude 
(Jacoby, 1997). They applied various methods for de-unionisation in the previously unionised 
companies, including moving operations to non-union greenfield sites in employer-friendly states 
beyond the states where New Deal model was more developed (Kochan et al., 1994). 
The non-union model in the US ranged from 'low road' to `welfare capitalism'. `Low-road' firms that 
avoided unions mainly on cost-cutting grounds exploited low skill peripheral workforce in such 
sectors as agriculture and retailing with low wages (and no benefits), no training, and aggressive 
management. `Employment at will' generally allows US employers to dismiss workers for any reason, 
i. e. they are not legally required to provide evidence for 'fair' dismissals, except for the more recent 
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regulations on equal employment opportunities. External labour markets in the US have been 
therefore very flexible, `a place where anything goes' (Kochan et al., 1994: xiii). 
The sophisticated non-unionism model of `welfare capitalism' however reflected an ideological 
opposition to unions, i. e. `doctrinaire' non-unionism (Foulkes, 1980: 47), which argued that the 
company, rather than unions or the state, should provide for employees their highest expectations, 
including security and welfare (Foulkes, 1980; Jacoby, 1997). Welfare capitalists were not merely 
anti-unionist but they also developed ̀ innovative' techniques to gain the commitment of employees 
while also aiming to keep the unions and state at bay. They for instance adopted distinctive 
remuneration strategies and applications: linked to performance appraisal, thus more flexible 
performance-related pay systems, e. g. profit-sharing and gainsharing schemes, were first developed by 
welfare capitalists. They also acquired employees' loyalty and commitment through tangible benefits, 
e. g. pensions, health care systems, unemployment insurance, as well as use of human relations 
methods, e. g. employee attitude surveys, communication programmes, and individual- and small- 
group oriented psychological approaches (Foulkes, 1980). Moreover, as opposed to the `employment 
at will' practice of `low road' employers, welfare capitalists were found to be pursuing internal labour 
market systems, where long-term employment relations, promotion from within and commitment to 
employment security even during economic downturns were essential features. Given the low 
turnover rates, promise of a career instead of a job, and sophisticated and costly techniques used for 
employee commitment, they have developed sophisticated recruitment and selection techniques to 
ensure the selection of the `right' people, which also meant screening those sympathetic to unions 
(Jacoby, 1997). The internal labour market approach of the non-unionised welfare capitalists, with 
fewer but broader job grades and definitions that allowed for greater flexibility in labour deployment 
between tasks, departments and locations, operated much more flexibly than those in the unionised 
firms where job definitions and grades, career ladders and seniority rules were tightly defined. More 
secure and flexible employees were less resistant to change, which made retraining and adaptability to 
new technologies and production systems (e. g. team-based) easier and quicker (Osterman, 1999). 
The American welfare capitalism model reflects the embeddedness of employment policies and 
practices within a specific institutional environment, where structural and organisational factors, such 
as comparatively stable product markets and demand growth, relatively higher capital intensity and 
lower labour costs, financial success, and leaders and owners with strong anti-unionist attitude with a 
firm belief in the system, allowed its application. However with the changes in the environment, such 
as the intensification of international competition particularly on cost basis since the 1980s, most of 
the welfare capitalists were not able to keep their rather costly internal labour market approach and 
supporting HR strategies. Unionised New Deal firms on the other hand could not respond to market 
needs such as product flexibility and lower costs with the institutionalised tight job descriptions and 
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higher wages. Therefore it is argued that there has been a growing trend in the American industrial 
relations away from both unionised and non-unionised internal labour market employment systems 
towards `low road', contingent (e. g. temporary, agency and contract work) and ̀ core-peripheral' 
approaches (Osterman, 1999). Nevertheless, there is also evidence for the continued application of 
both industrial and welfare capitalist approaches despite adaptations according to the current 
conditions, e. g. the 'hybridised' and ̀ downsized' ILM models for managerial employees found in the 
European subsidiaries of some US MNCs by Butler et al. (2006). 
5.3. US BUSINESS SYSTEM AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSFER OF IR/HRM POLICIES 
The above discussion claims that, firstly, the US business system consists of a distinctive set of 
institutional elements as a result of a unique historical development, and secondly, the influence of the 
interaction of these elements on the development of IR/HRM at the company level has been complex. 
It is argued that the US business system is distinguished by a lesser degree of institutional 
development in many areas, as evidenced in the far weaker role of the state in regulating the 
employment relations, and in the permissiveness of labour and product markets in the absence of 
strong business associations or other inter-organisational networks (Clark and Almond, 2006). 
Pudelko (2006) defines the USA system as a `short-term performance efficiency based on flexible 
market structures and profit orientation' system (p. 137). On the one hand these features can provide a 
greater range of strategic choices available to firms and managers in IR/I-IRM, resulting in a greater 
diversity and changeability in strategies and behaviours. For instance, the market-driven, relatively 
unconstrained nature of the system allows US firms to develop innovative policies and practices, 
which they might want to take to other subsidiaries as a `best' model and source of competitive 
advantage. Moreover such policies developed in an unconstrained, less regulated, 'arm's length' 
system have a higher `context generalisability' than those developed in highly constrained ones. On 
the other hand, American firms can be constrained by other elements of the institutional system, 
particularly the pressure imposed by the `shareholder value' driven financial markets that results in 
short-termism and related consequences for HRM, e. g. downsizing. 
It is worth emphasising once again that the American IR/HRM strategies and systems are deeply 
embedded in the distinctive American business system, as are other national business systems and 
their IHR/IR practices. Although cross-national learning of management practices is well-evidenced 
and changes in the HR systems of for instance Germany and Japan towards the American system are 
found (Pudelko, 2006), systems still retain their context dependence and there are few signs of the 
emergence of a `universal' business model. Therefore transfer of HR/IR systems from one business 
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system to another should be approached with caution, as it is possible only within the constraints of 
the respective national context. 
Within this distinctive national business environment, as the brief discussion above points out, there is 
considerable variance in the IR/HRM approaches among American firms. Their responses to the 
features and constraints at the national level differ, moderated by industrial conditions and company 
characteristics. Moreover, there are a large number of US MNCs and their international subsidiaries, 
where the latter have additional differences that impact internationalisation, in terms of e. g. structural 
factors, corporate history, ownership and leaders, etc. As such, generalisation of the IR/IIRM patterns 
of US MNCs and the extent of their transfer to foreign subsidiaries can be rather superficial. 
Nevertheless looking at the above picture, US MNCs might be expected to be more likely to use 
standardised, formalised and centralised HRM policies, especially regarding performance and payment 
policies and practices (e. g. Ferner et al., 2005a). Given the international dominance of the US 
business system, US MNCs can be more inclined towards transferring their management behaviour 
unchanged to host environments, with an 'ethnocentric' approach, attempting at cross-national 
`isomorphism' (e. g. Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). As such, they are also expected to be quite 
`innovative' in the host environments, regarded as 'innovators' in IBR, and 'exporters' of their 
management applications to other countries (Bloom et al., 2004). In terms of IR, American MNCs are 
expected to avoid unions, and where they cannot, to minimise unions' influence on their management 
policies and practices. Obviously characteristics of the host-country business system will also be 
significant and the outcomes of the interaction will be different in each country and the outcomes are 
unclear. While home-grown HRM policies might be argued to be transferred most easily to 
institutionally more similar environments, US firms might be less likely to tolerate some constraints in 
institutionally more distant countries if they see them as a threat (Clark and Almond, 2006). 
Literature findings moreover suggest that US MNCs are highly inclined not to recognise unions in 
their international operations and show hostility towards collective representations (Ferner et a!., 
2005b). They employ union 'substitution' methods, e. g. extensive internal communication, employee 
involvement and participation, and promotion opportunities, to make non-unionisation more attractive 
for blue-collar workers (e. g. Beaumont and Townley, 1985; Ferner et al., 2001). US MNCs can also 
use suppressive methods, e. g. threatening to re-locate. The host system can influence their reaction to 
unions in unexpected ways: in highly regulated 'institutionally strong' environments, e. g. in Germany 




The interdependent and intertwined features of the US business system create the distinctive 
environment in which American firms' management policies and applications are rooted. The most 
significant of these features are summarised as below: 
The state and " Relatively weak state; where power is devolved to the state level. 
business associations " Regulatory, rather than developmental state. 
" Lack of national industrial policy. 
" Respecting and supporting 'market regulation'. 
" Strongly opposing inter-organisational networks; exercising anti-trust actions. 
" Historically weak business associations, as a result of state's strong 
opposition. 
" Opportunistic and contract-based inter-firm relations. 
The financial system " Equity-based system for financing firms 
" Strong pressure for maximising 'shareholder value' particularly recently; 
resulting in short-termism 
" Supports entrepreneurial business establishments, new product and 
technology development through venture capital 
The educational " Highly stratified education system. 
system and skill " Average mass education with only a few skills developed. 
formation " 'Elite' higher education, especially for managers. 
" Mass production systems have entailed a hierarchical segmentation that 
depends profoundly on managerial organisation. 
" Training is seen more as an individual responsibility than a result of 
coordinated collaboration between state agents, employers and unions. 
" On-the-job training has been narrow, limited, and task-related. 
The IR system and " Deep-rooted anti-unionism. 
labour markets " State has not supported collective action of workers through legislation, 
except the New Deal period. Unionisation has historically been low. 
" 'Industrial' model of ILM approaches reigned in unionised companies, with 
tightly defined jobs, grading systems and wages. 
" 'Low-road' anti-unionism approaches involved low-wages and exploitation 
of labour with suppressive management. 
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" 'Ideological' anti-unionism combined with high road approaches were 
applied in `welfare capitalist' companies. ILM approaches, combined with 
'innovative' communication and benefit practices prevailed in welfare 
capitalists. 
i aoie D. j. components and significant characteristics of the American business system 
The above characteristics of the `arm's length' business system (Whitley, 1999) creates a particular 
environment with certain opportunities for and constraints on the operation of firms. On the one hand, 
as a weakly institutionalised, market-led system it presents a higher level of flexibility and a greater 
range of choices and outcomes for firms. However it also reinforces short-termism, which results in 
negligence of long-term investment. A greater variety of management policies and practices, 
depending on individual responses of firms to the underdetermined institutional framework, can be 
found in American companies. 
American MNCs are expected to show a strong inclination to transfer their distinctive 'home-grown' 
management policies and practices abroad. Such an attitude is encouraged firstly by a deep belief in 
the universality of the American 'way' informed by the early development of organisational 
capabilities at home based on mass production for large markets and managerial capitalism, and 
secondly, in the economic and political hegemony of the USA in the world, i. e. 'dominance effects'. 
However degree of actual transfer and application are likely to be influenced by the constraints 
imposed by different institutional systems in host countries. 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AND LABOUR MARKET ORIENTATIONS OF 
US MNCs IN THE TURKISH BUSINESS SYSTEM 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses US MNCs' orientations in their employment systems in Turkey. It examines the 
extent and nature of the influences exerted by the Turkish business system on the case companies' 
employment strategies. In particular labour market policies and practices, including preferences for 
internal and external labour markets, and the associated approach to work organisation, are 
investigated. 
Various alternatives exist for the same work to be performed using different hiring, training, 
promotion, turnover, reward and unionisation patterns. These patterns, i. e. employment subsystems 
(Osterman, 1987) or patterns (Katz and Darbishire, 2000) can change, as a result of transformation of 
occupations or in response to changes in institutional labour structures. Employment relations in the 
strongly market-oriented US business system are generally described to follow the same logic, where 
talent and employers meet in the marketplace. Therefore high turnover rates and mobility are seen as 
natural where supply and demand for labour meet in external labour markets (ELMs). However 
within the heterogeneous nature of employment system applications in the US business system, there 
has been a long tradition of developing firms' own, particularly managerial, employees within the 
strong internal labour markets (ILMs). From the 1950s until the 1980s, ILM systems were widely 
applied in the more strongly unionised sectors of the American economy and, from the 1960s, a 
growing number of 'high road' non-union firms (Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1994; Katz and 
Darbishire, 2000). Osterman (1999) claims that two ILM models, i. e. 'industrial' and 'salaried' sub- 
systems, prevailed largely in the post-war USA until the 1980s. The more detailed framework of non- 
unionised employment patterns developed by Katz and Darbishire (2000: 10), i. e. IIRM, Japanese- 
oriented, and joint team-based, also involve many elements of ILM. The common aspects of these 
employment systems are, entry to job ladders open only at a few, entry-levels, T&D offered by the 
companies, long-term employment and career opportunities within the same firm, where promotion 
opportunities for climbing up the ladder were saved for 'incumbents'. Early in the 1980s research 
provided evidence that American workers had nearly as much job stability as the Japanese (Osterman, 
1999). Osterman (1999) argued that the post-war institutional structure of the American labour market 
was marked by job security particularly in the 'core' industries. 
However, ILM structures started to experience continued pressure from the 1980s, mainly because of 
reasons related to changes in employment trends, increased competition, technology and capital 
markets. Survey results provide evidence for the 'deterioration' of the American labour market 
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organisation in terms of changes in the norms, career patterns (e. g. declining job tenures, increased job 
turnover and increased dislocation), wage determination, shifts in the external context that governs the 
labour market, and changes in the structure of the economy itself (Osterman, 1999). The absolute 
number of contingent employees among the total labour force has also increased since the 1980s. 
Such findings are interpreted as indicators for weakening ILM approaches that give way to increased 
use of ELM systems in the US firms, even in those that formerly used ILM systems (Capelli, 1995; 
Osterman, 1999). There are even claims for the death of internal managerial careers (Capelli, 1999). 
However, there is also evidence found for continued application of ILMs, though with modifications, 
by US MNCs in their European operations (Butler et al., 2006). Moreover non-unionised employment 
patterns that Katz and Darbishire (2000) argue that spread in the USA retain some ILM features. 
Turning to the host environment, the Turkish labour market features, i. e. unbalanced availability of 
(highly qualified and unskilled) labour, comparatively lower wages, weak unionisation, permissive 
legislative system and pro-business governments, present a discrete environment in which US MNCs 
need to decide upon and operate their employment systems. Another significant feature of the TBS is 
its openness to influence from internal and external institutions and actors in transforming its already 
permissive labour market while trying to achieve major economic (e. g. increasing exports, while 
supporting private businesses, creating economic stability and growth, reducing unemployment) and 
political (e. g. EU membership) government objectives. 
Within the presented framework, this study found evidence for the application of significant aspects of 
ILM models by US MNCs transferred to their Turkish subsidiaries from home systems. Case 
companies in this study were overwhelmingly characterised by ILM approaches applied not only to 
managerial but also blue- and white-collar employees. Although only limited evidence at the US 
corporate level (i. e. from regional HQ) was collected, combined findings of the fieldwork suggested 
that US MNCs transferred their corporate employment strategies that involved ILM approaches in the 
home-environment to their Turkish subsidiaries. The interaction of TBS and sectoral influences both 
necessitated and supported the retention of home-grown corporate strategies in Turkey. Firstly, to 
achieve high productivity and quality standards, imposed by the corporate parents, using complicated 
production technologies and methods transferred from the US, case companies needed to secure highly 
educated and skilled workforce, which was scarce in this host environment. Their main employment 
objective was therefore maximising predictability of labour supply with the necessary characteristics. 
This objective almost imposed the application of developing employees in-house. Secondly, the 
permissive legislative environment and sufficiently low level of labour costs provided a supporting 
rationale for the transfer of corporate ILM models. 
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This chapter starts with an overview of literature on employment systems to set the framework for the 
examination of US MNCs' strategies in the Turkish environment. In the next part, the significant 
features of the Turkish labour market that influence the employment systems are presented, which is 
followed by an analysis of the empirical findings. A summary of findings concludes this chapter. 
6.2. CHOICE OF EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AND US COMPANIES 
Osterman (1988) defines a fine's ILM as comprising "... the rules, administrative procedures, and 
norms that govern the hiring, training, deployment and compensation of labor" (p. 44). In the 'ideal 
type' ILM, employees start at the bottom of a job ladder and are expected to move up over a long 
career with the firm, where the positions at the higher levels are reserved for 'incumbents' and closed 
to the outside. Osterman (1987) defines two main employment subsystems within the ILM approach, 
i. e. the 'industrial' and the 'salaried' models that differ along the four categories of factors that define 
the sub-systems: Job classifications (whether jobs are defined broadly or narrowly) and job definitions 
(rigid or loose, i. e. whether a person doing a job does only those tasks or whether s/he will be expected 
to do other work); deployment (how employees are moved from job to job, i. e. management's 
discretion or seniority-based); security (explicit or implicit promises of lifetime job security or no 
promises beyond the current day's work; and how dismissals are determined, according to some rule, 
e. g. reverse seniority, or management's preference to release whom it chooses); wage rules (whether 
wages are attached to job classifications or individuals). 
The 'industrial' system is characterised by tightly defined jobs with clear work rules and 
responsibilities attached to each classification. Management is free to move individuals between jobs 
but promotions and lateral shifts are typically done by seniority and with workers' consent. There is 
no formal or explicit job security promised and management at least theoretically has the freedom to 
adjust the size of the labour as it wishes, which provides flexibility to the employer. Layoffs follow 
'Last-In-First-Out' (i. e. reverse seniority) rule. Wages are attached to jobs, and are therefore defined 
according to the job classifications (Osterman, 1987). 'The traditional ("New Deal") pattern' (Katz 
and Darbishire, 2000: 25) has dominated the unionised employment pattern since World War 11. 
Although the industrial system theoretically gives employers the freedom of varying their employment 
size at will, it in fact creates an important shield for workers against layoffs through work 
organisation. Tight job definitions mean management cannot easily use this right by re-organising 
tasks or combining jobs. Inability to easily and quickly change the work organisation when 
technology necessitates is the major difficulty of this system, as the experience of US companies in the 
recent decades showed (Osterman, 1988). 
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In contrast to the rigid and tight industrial system, the salaried model is a combination of more flexible 
and fluid administration procedures. Job descriptions are subject to revision by superiors and 
employees are expected to be ready to take on new tasks as demanded. Flexible career lines and job 
descriptions provide internal flexibility to the firm in the deployment of the workforce while the 
former are also consistent with individualised considerations in wage setting. There is more scope for 
merit considerations as wages are not linked to jobs, therefore wages of two individuals in the same 
job can vary considerably. A major feature of the salaried system is the greater commitment to 
employment security: although no absolute or explicit promises are made by employers, there is the 
implicit promise for lifetime or long-term employment. The important point is that employees are 
sufficiently convinced of the sincerity of the firm's commitment, i. e. the 'security pledge', that lay offs 
either will not occur or that the firm will make every reasonable effort to avoid them. In return 
workers provide employers with the flexibility in deployment. Obviously the exact level of security 
depends on the nature of the industry, the firm's history and other variables (Osterman, 1988) 
As the discussion above points out, firms consider three main objectives when deciding upon their 
employment systems, e. g. minimising costs, maximising predictability and maximising flexibility. 
These are potentially conflicting objectives, and trade offs might be needed: for instance, if a 
company's primary goal is maximising flexibility in its staffing levels and deployment, it may adopt 
an ELM approach. It can hire skilled workforce from outside without sacrificing flexibility, if the 
labour market functions properly. But if it does not, the firm will have to give up on predictability, as 
skill shortages and sharp and unforeseen wage changes may develop. Consequently if maximising 
predictability is the most important goal for a firm then it will prefer to adopt the industrial subsystem, 
develop internal job ladders and on-the-job training systems. Similarly, cost minimisation can be 
achieved by secondary systems, which also provide flexibility; however, it also comes at the cost of 
predictability as secondary workers have few attachments and minimal loyalty to the firm (Osterman, 
1987). 
Stable patterns of employment for blue- and white-collar work in the US labour market emerged in the 
wake of the Second World War. Until the 1990s, work organisation in the 'core' firms followed the 
two dominant ILM approaches, i. e. the industrial and the salaried models providing job security 
(Osterman, 1999). Since the beginning of the 1990s however ILM approach is under pressure in the 
USA mainly for four reasons: first, the effects of the shift from manufacturing to service industries, 
hence changes in the number and mixture of people employed in these sectors and skills requirements; 
second, increased competition within tougher domestic and international markets, which raised serious 
cost considerations; third, improvements in technology and their results on not only production 
systems but also management and control that changed business practices radically (Osterman, 1999; 
Claydon, 2004); and fourth, changes in the capital markets, especially the rise of 'shareholder 
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capitalism' that gave way to extensive downsizing and delayering to increase ̀ shareholder value' in 
the short-run (O'Sullivan, 2000) that reduced internal career development opportunities. 
As such macroeconomic uncertainty and management ideology make the job security promise 
problematic and push firms toward higher turnover but less costly systems. Two new 'innovative' 
methods emerged: firstly, the 'core-periphery' model where the salaried model is replaced by the 
industrial one but it covers only a small number of workers while some of the work is shifted outside 
the protected portion of the ILM through various secondary systems (e. g. part-time, temporary and 
contracted workforce). The second strategy comprises of ignoring the conflicting pressures and 
simply trying to force work rule changes by employer militancy or concession bargaining (Osterman, 
1999). 
6.3. INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES OF TURKISH LABOUR MARKET ON 
EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS OF US MNCs 
6.3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOUR MARKET 
The Turkish labour market is characterised by its abundant cheap workforce, which is one of the most 
important reasons for foreign companies to invest into Turkey. Although domestic employers 
complain about high labour costs, mainly on the basis of high redundancy and social security 
payments, for large companies that invest in new, modernised and efficient production technologies, 
the cost of labour is still much cheaper in Turkey in comparison to developed economies and 
European markets. 
However the majority of the labour force is less- or un-educated, and semi- or unskilled. Among first- 
time job seekers, education and skill levels continue to be low: the total schooling rate in secondary 
education (from age 11) in 2001-02 was 43%; total number of graduates from secondary education 
was 683,000 (232,000 of whom were from vocational and technical schools) in 2003-04. The total 
number of university graduates in 2004-05 was 296,000 from vocational and undergraduate 
programmes, and 22,000 from postgraduate (masters) programmes respectively14. Although these 
figures might seem high in absolute terms, education provided is general, quality is low except in a 
few 'better' schools, and skills gained are very few and narrow. Therefore the recruitment pool for 
educated and skilled blue-collar, professional/white-collar and managerial jobs is small, especially for 
foreign-capital companies that require foreign language skills among many other credentials. There is 
therefore an uneven labour market in Turkey: a cheap and large group at the lower end of education 
and skills, and a small group at the higher end of education and skills. 
14 hM: //www. meb. jzov. t r 
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In addition to the above picture, there is some human capital with accumulated knowledge, experience 
and job-specific skills in the Turkish and foreign-capital companies in many manufacturing and 
service industries, mainly because of the comparatively earlier start of industrial development in 
Turkey among the developing countries and the necessity of development through company-based 
training and development programmes given the lack of qualified labour. 
6.3. Z INFLUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Unstable macro economic and political conditions and recurrent economic crises were among the 
factors that influenced labour market conditions in Turkey. For instance the fieldwork for this 
research was carried out between 2002 and 2004, shortly after the worst economic crisis in Turkey. 
The economy got significantly smaller, many SMEs in manufacturing and services went bankrupt or 
shrunk considerably, and many jobs were lost in the financial sector due to bankruptcies and 
restructuring. At the time of the fieldwork, workers were not in a position to job-hop and turnover 
rates were largely dependent on employers' actions. Although exact figures could not be taken from 
all cases, interviewees reported `negligible' voluntary turnover rates, in especially blue-collar but also 
white-collar jobs. Low turnover rates in the case companies can be partly explained by the desirable 
employment conditions provided by the US MNCs in an unstable business environment. There were 
certain sectoral, e. g. hotel industry, or job type, e. g. sales, exceptions in terms of voluntary turnover 
where employees could leave and find jobs in other companies. However almost all of the 
interviewees in this research boasted that as 'responsible, long-term employers' their companies did 
not practise mass dismissals during the unfavourable economic and market conditions of the time. 
It is worth mentioning however that there might have been a certain degree of sectoral bias due to the 
choice of case companies: US MNCs in this study might have not needed to drastically reduce 
employee numbers because of supplying export markets or government institutions, serving certain 
types of clientele, or types of product for which the sales did not decrease during difficult economic 
periods. Finally, a partial explanation for low turnover rates of US MNCs might be found in size of 
their operations in Turkey: although increasing considerably, FDI inflows are still very small, and 
foreign-capital companies provide only 7% of the total employment in Turkeys. The possibility of 
finding similarly good terms and conditions in other foreign-capital firms is less, which might in turn 
inhibit job hopping. 
Is www. occd. ore Share of employment of affiliates under foreign control in which an investor holds more than 
50% of the shares with voting rights. This figure would grow, if other companies where foreign capital has less 
than 50% share were included. There are a few large companies where the share of foreign capital is still large, 
e. g. 49%, but these are not included in this statistic. 
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Providing job security and long-term employment opportunities is in fact aligned with the traditional 
employment arrangements in many of the large institutionalised organisations in Turkey, and with 
employees' expectations. Although `employment at will' and a `low road' approach prevail in the low 
skill / low cost sectors and especially in SMEs, Turkish employees are more accustomed to long-term 
(even life-time) careers /jobs in the large organisation. This is mainly because of the lifetime 
employment practices in the SOEs and government institutions, which are the largest employers and 
traditionally offered such employment. Many of the large and modern companies in the private sector 
have followed the ILM policy by keeping their carefully chosen employees for a long time. Job 
hopping has not been the traditional strategy among Turkish employees for career advancement until 
recently: for instance, when applying for promotional job opportunities, too many job changes were 
not perceived as a positive feature. Again some sectoral influence can be potentially found for the 
prevalence of the opposite approach. Recently in certain sectors, such as finance and banking, FMCG, 
pharmaceuticals, etc., and particular jobs, e. g. sales and marketing, job hopping has been argued to be 
seen more, although concrete evidence is not available. 
Most of the large employers have not preferred poaching as a recruitment strategy either. However, 
sectoral factors became more prevalent recently in specific sectors, such as banking and luxury hotels. 
Employees of companies where extensive T&D opportunities were known to be provided, have been 
highly preferred in the labour market. Similar experiences were reported in FinCO where well- 
developed employees went to other banks and financial institutions during the growth period of the 
Turkish banking industry. However this was also partly explained by the small size of FinCO 
operations in Turkey: higher level career opportunities were not sufficient in number to keep its highly 
qualified and trained employees and managers in the organisation when there had been better career 
prospects. Similarly it was claimed by HotelCO managers that their highly qualified and trained 
employees were sought by other competitor chains in the luxury hotel sector, so ̀ whenever a new 
[luxury hotel] chain opens, our turnover rates soar, as it is difficult to find qualitled employees and 
then train them in this sector r16. Finally, high-level government officers and bureaucrats have been 
traditionally transferred to the private sector after gaining extensive knowledge and experience in the 
state. This practice proves useful particularly for the company's relations with the government and 
bureaucracy, which is very important in the TBS given the significant role of the state (see Chapter 4). 
Employment systems and R&S activities have never been restricted by the legal framework in Turkey. 
In fact, legislation provided a permissive environment for hiring practices: companies can use any 
channels, methods and tools for R&S. There have been no constraints on the number, nationality, 
16 HR Director, HotelCO 
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gender, age etc of workers to be employed by local or foreign-capital companies. There are slightly 
more restricting rules brought by the new labour code effective since 2003 for 'dismissals at will', 
downsizing and complete shutdowns, although it had traditionally been quite flexible for employers. 
Employers had started to complain of 'inflexibility', i. e. difficulty of layoffs, mainly due to the 
provisions of the new labour law (i. e. employers now have to have 'a valid reason' to fire employees, 
which can be unsatisfactory performance or 'unacceptable behaviour in the workplace', but cannot be 
'being a union member and engaging in union activity, or discrimination based on race, colour, 
gender, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy and giving birth, religion, political belief) 
and the high cost of redundancy payments. Relevant clauses state that employees made redundant 
during downsizing or shutdowns should be given priority if the company rehires or restarts business in 
the same sector. However the new law also brought more flexibility for employers in terms of 
'temporary employment relationship', which essentially allows employers to 'transfer' their 
employees to another group or unaffiliated companies for a maximum of 18 months. 
Although most of the large employers in Turkey were initially concerned about the new law, which 
coincided with the fieldwork of this study, HR managers interviewed in the US MNCs were not 
equally anxious. They contended that they had already been applying even more than the new legal 
requirements, e. g. systematic R&S and performance management systems that supported EEO and 
non-discriminatory policies, and provided fair monitoring of performance and decision making for 
dismissals. 
6.3.3. ISSUES INFINDING CANDIDATES WITH TILE REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS 
Case companies in this study did not report problems in recruitment of blue-collar workers at entry- 
level positions. In terms of location, almost all case companies were located in the most industrialised 
and developed parts of Turkey, e. g. around Istanbul and Izmit. Even though they were located in the 
most privileged areas, selection, not recruitment, of the most appropriate blue-collar workforce from 
the candidate pool was an issue, as not all applicants have similar levels of education and skills. This 
problem was particularly significant in the industries where a highly qualified blue-collar workforce 
was needed (e. g. automobile manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, etc. ). When the case companies moved 
plants, they reported providing additional support and financial incentives to be able to take as many 
experienced workers as possible with them to the new location, as it would be more difficult and 
costly to find and train new employees. Such were the experiences of interviewees from AutoC01 
and FMCG 1, where it was claimed that the 'policy is to keep people in the company". 
"Interviews with IR/HR Director of AutoCOI and HR Director of FMCG 1 
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Similarly for white-collar, professional and managerial positions, the majority of the cases investigated 
did not report major difficulties in creating a large candidate pool. They regularly received walk-in 
and online applications, and stored them in their electronic databases for future reference. Again, their 
main problem was about finding the 'right' candidates with the required levels of education and skills. 
For instance, in 2003, Holding! could hire only 39 appropriate candidates after a rigorous selection 
process for its very prestigious management trainee programme from among an initial pool of more 
than 5,000 applicants. Finding candidates with the right combination of education, skills and 
competencies is reported as the most significant problem especially for certain types of jobs. For 
instance, US MNCs reportedly experienced serious problems in attracting highly qualified people 
(with university degrees and especially English language skills) into sales jobs as sales is not regarded 
as prestigious among the highly sought candidates. Such candidates can find 'better' jobs, so they 
either do not take sales jobs or leave after a short while when a better opportunity arises. 
Sectoral factors presented specific problems also for white-collar employees. For instance, in the 
'hotelier' sector for managerial positions, one has to start from the lowest level jobs to climb up the 
career ladder. To become a manager in an international luxury hotel chain, which is at the high end of 
the hotel industry, one has to have certain qualifications. However many eligible Turkish candidates 
did not f ind working in the labour-intensive low level jobs in a hotel (e. g. housekeeping, front office or 
the restaurant) appealing, even if for a limited time with good prospects to move up quickly. Such an 
attitude made it considerably more difficult for HotelCO to fill its entry-level positions with highly 
qualified people who had to match the criteria to be promoted into managerial positions. 
Finally, the location of the plant can cause significant problems for filling managerial and white-collar 
positions. For instance TexCO could not fill the plant IIR manager position for a long time as its 
production facility was located outside Istanbul, requiring either long daily commuting or living in an 
`unpopular' area 18. 
In summary therefore, US MNCs in Turkey had access to an ELM where i) highly-educated highly- 
skilled workforce is scarce; ii) there is a large group of uneducated unskilled workers with high 
unemployment; iii) labour costs are still considerably low particularly in comparison to developed 
labour markets; iv) legislation provides a fairly unconstrained, flexible environment for employers, 
despite the recent changes in labour law; v) employees are traditionally accustomed to and prefer long- 
term employment opportunities; and vi) poaching and job hopping have not been common practices 
until recently, and except in certain sectors and jobs. Although the TBS does not legally constrain 
case companies' approaches to employment systems, it does have certain features that influence 
18 Interview with HR Manager and Plant Manager, TexCO 
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choice of employment systems. In the next section, the reasons for and applications of ILM 
approaches by the case companies will be discussed. 
6.4. EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS AT US MNCs 
6.4. I. ILM ORIENTATION OF US MNCS IN TURKEY 
The ILM approach was reportedly by far the first choice for managerial and white-collar technical 
/specialist positions. When asked about their R&S policies, IIR managers at the Turkish subsidiary 
and regional HQ levels in almost all the studied case companies started by explaining their internal 
recruitment process and `promotion from within' policy. It appeared that US MNCs in Turkey gave 
priority to internal sources for white-collar and particularly managerial vacancies, supported by their 
other corporate HR policies, such as promotion from within, succession planning, early identification 
and promotion of high potentials, and T&D programmes. Moreover, the ILM was stated to be chosen 
also for blue-collar employees (operational, in the case of service sector cases), as they desired to 
retain those carefully selected, in-house trained and developed employees. 
The strong ILM orientation in the Turkish subsidiaries is argued to be the combined result of 
successful transfer of corporate employment approaches and production system strategies from the US 
and the interaction of constraining as well as supporting factors presented by the Turkish labour 
market. Despite the growing evidence for the decline in the application of ILM approaches in the US 
environment, the ILM system was presented by the interviewees at the subsidiary and regional IIQ 
levels as the case companies' US corporate policy. Case companies' policies in pay and PMS, aligned 
to support an ILM approach, were also emphasised as corporate policies transferred to Turkey. 
Although no fieldwork was attainable at the US corporate IIQ due to various constraints (e. g. lack of 
contacts, financial resources and time), the extent of data collected at the interviews conducted at the 
regional IHQ allowed it to be safely argued that there was a transfer of home-country policy to the 
Turkish subsidiaries. 
The transfer of corporate employment policy to the host-country was necessitated and supported by a 
number of factors in the host-country business system. Transfer of highly developed production 
systems together with work organisation (e. g. teamwork) required skilled and experienced labour in 
the case companies. Given the relative scarcity of skilled and experienced labour in the Turkish 
labour market, US MNCs needed to retain their corporate ILM approach in Turkey. Recruiting at the 
bottom levels using sophisticated R&S methods, training in-house for the necessary skills, and moving 
employees up the career ladder while retaining through highly developed pay, T&D opportunities and 
career schemes (see Chapter 7) fitted in with their need for predictable and effective resources. By 
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using these ILM approaches case companies were able to maximise predictability; that is, they were 
able to plan confidently upon the availability of a qualified labour supply at foreseeable prices. In 
addition to these constraining host-country factors, the permissive legal environment, low labour costs 
and cooperative attitudes of employees (and unions) who feared losing their jobs in a labour market 
where high unemployment prevailed provided supporting conditions that helped maintain an ILM 
approach in the Turkish subsidiaries. It is therefore argued that the employment policies of US case 
companies in Turkey were formed as a result of the interaction of sectoral and NBS influences. The 
next section comprises a detailed discussion of the findings of fieldwork on the employment systems. 
6.4.2. INTERACTION OF SECTOR AND NBS EFFECTS AND CHOICE OF EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS 
The core manufacturing cases in this study shared a number of characteristics in their production 
systems and work organisation. Firstly, except TexCO, all (i. e. AutoCOl, FMCG1, FMCG2, 
PharmaCOI) had complex, automated, up-to-date manufacturing systems transferred from the US 
parents. For instance, at AutoCOl, 'USAutol Production System' ('USPS') had been transferred for 
car production, which by definition is one of the most complicated manufacturing systems. Both at 
FMCG 1 and FMCG2, highly automated production systems were built in the new plants. They were 
both claimed to be among the newest plants of USFMCG 1 and USFMCG2 with the latest technology. 
The main difference between these two plants was in the type and qualifications of the employees 
working in the production area: at FMCG 1 only a few but highly skilled technical blue-collar 
employees worked in the operations area (the rest were engineers) while at FMCG2 a large number of 
highly skilled and experienced blue-collar workers ('technicians') were responsible for the whole 
operation of the system while engineers acted as shift and plant managers. Also at PharmaCOI the 
production system was highly automated and quite complex where USllealth's 'Good Manufacturing 
Principles' and 'Good Laboratory Principles' were applied. Garment manufacturing is one of most 
simple production systems, therefore at TexCO, there was a simple production system for an 
uncomplicated product line. 
Secondly, again except in TexCO, work group and teamwork organisations were adopted. At 
AutoCOI, FMCG1, and FMCG2, this work organisation required multi-skilled workers for the 
multiple tasks that defined job groups. At AutoCOI for example, they had transformed the traditional 
assembly line production system into a work group organisation with the transfer of'USPS' where a 
work group was defined as ̀ a small factory unit, in fact a factory in itself, that is responsible for its 
own production planning, output, quality, scrap, etc and any improvements in these1°'. This structure 
needed multi-skilled workers and flexible job descriptions: 'each employee in a work group should be 
19 Interview with HR/1R Director, AutoCO1 
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competent in at least 5 different operations and 5 different employees should be capable of conducting 
each operation in this work uniti20. Done on parallel lines (i. e. output of one work group was not the 
input for the next, as in the case of AutoCO1), at FMCG2, competing work teams were responsible for 
all aspects of production in their own lines, e. g. quality, output levels, scrap, minor maintenance, etc. 
At FMCG1, application of US parent's corporate-wide broad programmes, e. g. 'Momentum' and 
`Starfleet' changed work organisation to team-based. Both in FMCG1 and FMCG2, teams had 
monthly targets for output, quality, scrap, etc and competed to reach them as well as among 
themselves to be the `best team'. At PharmaCOl, although production was still done on the assembly 
line, multiple skills were needed to apply strict 'Standard Operating Procedures' (SOPs) and total 
quality requirements in the production processes transferred from USliealth. Moreover, there were 
various quality circles and cross-functional teams that included both blue- and white-collar workers 
from different levels who worked to improve processes. Teamwork was also encouraged by linking 
performance evaluation to successful teamworking results. Teamwork was also tried at TexCO in the 
1990s: it was a big project conducted in the European plants and involved an enormous investment. 
I lowever it did not work, mainly due to cost considerations and the company went back to the 
traditional garment production system21. At TexCO routine simple process manufacturing was used 
where skill requirements were very low. In short, except in TexCO, complex production systems 
transferred from US parents and work organisation in the core manufacturing cases dictated a multi- 
skilled workforce, who would be flexible to conduct various jobs at different times. 
Thirdly, quality requirements were strict and very high in every core manufacturing case. At 
AutoCOI and TexCO, production was mainly for export. AutoCOI supplied USAutoI's European 
markets for small commercial vehicles, while TexCO's production was delivered to various markets in 
its region through the centralised supply-chain management. At FMCG1, FMCG2 and PharmaCOl, 
production was for domestic markets. However, quality standards imposed by the US parents' TQM 
approach were very high. PharmaCOl had won the highly regarded National TQM award in Turkey 
in 2003, in addition to many corporate awards it had taken from the USIlealth and I lolding3. 
FMCG 1, as a part of its TQM approach, to maximise customer satisfaction, had applied the 
`Momentum' and 'Starfleet' programmes mentioned above to achieve high quality with a customer 
and service focus. Quality initiatives at FMCG1 imposed by USFMCGI were strict: for instance, a 
team of technicians and engineers had to check the standard of production at the Turkish plant against 
the `Golden Product' from the UK, i. e. 'best in class'. FMCG2 had taken ISO certificates and also 
been given corporate awards by the USFMCG2. 
20 Interview with HR/IR Director, AutoCOl 
21 Interview with IR Director, Regional HQ, USTex 
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Fourthly, as a continuation of the high production standards set out by the US parents, all core 
manufacturing cases but TexCO went through rigorous annual audits carried out by large cross- 
functional teams from corporate HQ of their US parents, in addition to meticulous periodical 
(monthly, quarterly, semi annually) calculations and reports monitored closely. At AutoCO1, for 
instance, an international audit team came around March every year, inspecting all the processes in 
manufacturing and related functions (e. g. T&D, health and safety) in about 4-6 weeks. In all of these 
cases, rankings on various dimensions of production and processes among the production facilities in 
the region were done and announced publicly. AutoCOI for instance proudly advertised its top level 
ranking for four consecutive years among all European plants of USAuto1. At FMCG1 `Critical 
Performance Indicators' (CPIs) were reported by all the subsidiaries in the region, which were closely 
monitored. In the comparisons made and announced by the regional IHQ, FMCG1 had received top- 
level rankings continuously. FMCG2 and PharmaCOI also reported outstanding rankings achieved in 
reaching targets assigned by their US parents in various dimensions of manufacturing and quality. 
Only at TexCO were no such corporate applications reported. In short, achieving highest quality 
standards in manufacturing was a shared requirement among these cases. US parents imposed and 
closely monitored the achievement of these standards continuously. 
Looking at the above picture, aside from TexCO, these case companies implemented complicated 
manufacturing systems transferred from their US parents (including the cases of IJVs, i. e. AutoCO 1 
and PharmaCOl), using workgroup / teamwork organisation, where achieving high quality was among 
the key objectives. They were also subject to regular and frequent process and quality audits, and 
rankings by the US parents. To be able to reach their organisational goals of highest quality 
production under these systems, in some cases for export markets, their primary goal in choosing 
employment systems for blue-collar workers would inevitably be maximising predictability based on 
the continuous availability of qualified workforce. To be able to comply with the US parents' (high) 
corporate standards in complicated production systems, they needed educated and trainable blue-collar 
workers, if possible with some general skills. They were however constrained by the labour market 
conditions in Turkey, which is characterised by the scarcity of such labour force. They had therefore 
adopted industrial or salaried ILM models (or a combination of the two), the latter systems also 
fulfilling the secondary goal of achieving flexibility in deployment of the labour and of the abilities of 
the workforce, which was particularly important for the team-based work organisation. Hence it is 
argued that the employment systems of the case companies reflected the influence of the interaction of 
sectoral factors, i. e. the nature of the production systems and skill requirements, and the host NBS 
features, i. e. the availability and cost of such labour in the Turkish market, on the retention and 
transfer of corporate policies in the USA. In the next section, ILM employment systems adopted in 
the core manufacturing case companies will be discussed. 
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6.4.3. ILM MODELS IN THE CORE MANUFACTURING COMPANIES 
In the core manufacturing cases, variations of `industrial' and 'salaried' (Osterman, 1987) ILM models 
were adopted. In AutoCOI a sophisticated example of a unionised industrial system had been applied, 
which also included some elements of `joint team-based' employment pattern (Katz and Darbishire, 
2000). The unionised employment system at AutoCOI was covered by the industry-level group 
collective agreements signed between the Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries 
(MESS), of which AutoCO1 was a member, and the three unions in this sector (Turkish Metalworkers 
Union, United Metalworkers Union and Steelworkers Union), covering over 100,000 workers. Within 
this agreement, a 'contemporary' job grading and wage increase regulation had been developed (in 
collaboration with leading academics in engineering) and put into effect in the majority of the member 
companies from 2002 by the mutual consent of the employers' association and the labour unions 
named above. Detailed and clear job definitions and classifications were developed through job 
evaluations that `evaluate the work done but not the worker who performs it'. Jobs in the metalwork 
sector were analysed, evaluated and graded according to a factor-point system, which was based on 
different levels of 12 factors under 4 groups ('competency', 'responsibility', 'effort', 'work 
conditions') appropriate for each job. Jobs were classified according to their grade points into 9 
groups, where higher points were assigned to higher groups. Wage rules and structures were defined 
within this job grading system and wages were attached to jobs22. 
Narrow job classifications and tight job definitions are argued to be the features of the industrial model 
that make it inflexible for management in job assignments and definitions, therefore presenting a 
problem for variable work or when the technology changes (Osterman, 1988). The model applied 
through the collective agreement in AutoCOI however seemed to offer much more flexibility than the 
model theoretically suggests. Firstly, with the clause concerning 'change of work and workplace', 
management was provided flexibility in the deployment of the work force in similar jobs or nearby 
workplaces of the employer or for temporary changes without seeking the consent of the worker. 
Secondly, the provision in the job grading system concerning 'the change in the nature of the work' 
stated that `jobs whose nature changed due to automation, mechanisation, modernisation, 
technological developments shall be re-analysed, re-defined and re-evaluated', which solved the 
problem of tight job definitions presenting problems when the technology changes. Thirdly, 
provisions on `determination and content of the worker's essential job' stated that workers could 
perform more than one job and the content of the essential job was not limited to one kind of work or 
its definition. It was possible to observe the collaborative attitude of Türk Metal in this collective 
agreement, in line with the arguments of Chapter 8 on IR on the Turkish unions acting within the 
22 Industry-wide Group Collective Agreement, 2002-2004. 
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`social responsibility and mutual gains' framework. Türk Metal seemed to have provided flexibility to 
the employers by agreeing with these clauses. Considering the provisions of the collective agreement, 
it can be argued that the unionised industrial model applied in AutoC01 theoretically granted 
flexibility both in deployment and dismissals. 
In this system the other essential aspect of the industrial model, i. e. employees making their careers in 
the firm, was also observed. `Recruitment, Candidature and Promotion Regulation in Job Grading' 
provided strong evidence that external entry to the system happened at only a few entry levels and 
blue-collar workers pursued their careers in AutoCOI. This regulation specified the rules according to 
which eligible and successful blue-collar candidates from within should be considered for promotion 
and nominated by the management as the first choice when a vacant position became available. 
Therefore current workers were given an implicit job security promise through the promotion from 
within regulation. 
Formal rules concerning dismissals were stated in line with the traditional industrial models. For 
instance, in `mass dismissals', i. e. in the case of firing more than 10 employees, ̀ workers who want to 
leave the job' and `who are still in the probationary period' should be given priority; followed by the 
reverse seniority ('LIFO') rule. The collective agreement followed the legislation for re-hires: fired 
employees should be notified and invited back, if the company rehires within the next 6 months after 
the mass dismissal. Therefore dismissals were done according to formal rules, and decisions were not 
left to management's discretion. 
Although in theory the industrial model provides the company flexibility in reducing staffing levels at 
will when product market conditions change, this was apparently not entirely applicable in the Turkish 
host environment. There was reportedly an implicit promise for long-term employment in AutoCOl, 
which is not traditionally found in industrial models of employment. IIR/IR Director of AutoCOl 
stated that their main objective in staffing was to keep their employees in AutoCOI and during 
difficult periods they used various alternative arrangements (e. g. reducing shifts, paid and/or unpaid 
leaves, transfers to other plants if possible) in collaboration with the union in order not to dismiss any 
workers or at least to minimise lay-offs. One supporting example given was when they had 
transferred and relocated some of the workers to other plants, positions and lines of production where 
available, from a major line of production that was stopped, despite the considerable number of 
dismissals that had taken place. Moreover, during the complete relocation to the current plant, which 
had coincided with the worst economic crisis in the Turkish economic history, when all the markets 
had literally stopped, they had ̀ carried about 3-4 times more employees than they should have'". The 
23 Interview with American CFO, AutoCOI 
108 
American CFO explained that it was in fact a rational decision so as ̀ not to lose all that accumulated 
experience and knowledge in the company throughout the long years these people had worked at 
AutoCOl 'although they were aware that `it had also made us look like good guys'. 
If evaluated only according to rules of the US business system where pressures to maximise 
'shareholder value' have created severe cost control imperatives on many companies, this `good guy' 
approach could have been considered somewhat surprising. However one has to take the conditions in 
the host environment into account: firstly, labour costs are considerably lower in Turkey, even in the 
metal industry where wages are significantly higher than in many other sectors. Therefore labour 
costs still made a manageable portion of total costs. Secondly, AutoCOI needed these experienced 
and trained workers as they were difficult to replace within the Turkish labour market. Thirdly, the 
labour union had apparently been collaborative and provided management with additional flexibility in 
deployment of workers. Fourthly, and very importantly, AutoCO1 was an IJV, with a long past 
history with its strong, active Turkish JVP, Holding 1. Therefore it was not entirely up to USAuto to 
make such significant decisions concerning its workforce in AutoCOl. As a distinctive IJV company, 
AutoCOI apparently had a unique place among USAutoI's foreign investments24. The specific 
organisational features of AutoCOI, i. e. its over 50 years of history and place in the Turkish business 
environment as an Holding]. affiliate, and the tight local labour market conditions for the required type 
of employees, provided the additional rationale for the strategy applied at AutoCOl. The adapted 
version of the industrial ILM model applied in AutoCOI was aimed at maximising workforce 
predictability and flexibility given the constraints and supporting features of the TBS. In short, the 
employment system at AutoCOI was very similar to the 'joint team-based' pattern, which is used 
widely in the US auto industry (Katz and Darbishire, 2000). The model applied comprised many 
elements of this pattern, i. e. semi-autonomous teamwork organisation and union and employee 
involvement in problem-solving and quality improvement, and career development in the company. 
This employment model used at AutoCOl was mainly an established Holding]. policy, while it was 
also in agreement with USAutol's corporate policy in the USA. If it had not been acceptable to 
USAutol, as an equal-equityJVP, it might have had tried to change it. Expatriate interviewees hinted 
that the American JVP would and did not interfere with Iloldingl policies as long as these were 
compatible with the US corporate ones and worked well in the Turkish context. 
The employment models in the non-unionised manufacturing cases of FMCG I and FMCG2 were 
similar to the flexible and fluid systems of 'salaried' ILM model, where much broader and flexible job 
definitions were reported. US parents in these two cases were non-unionist, whose approach included 
some elements of the `welfare capitalism'. In both cases, interviewees at the subsidiary level 
24 Interview with various Directors at Regional HQ, USAutol 
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emphasised managements' commitment to employment security. No absolute or explicit promises 
were made by employers, but there was the implicit promise for lifetime or long-term employment in 
these cases. Interviewees in these cases had stressed that they were able to convince their employees 
of the ̀ security pledge', that lay offs either would not occur or the firm would make every reasonable 
effort to avoid them. Indeed, at both companies, interviewees proudly reported that no layoffs had 
been experienced during the major economic crises. Both at FMCG1 and FMCG2, managements 
were against unions in principle with the traditional argument that they wanted to have a direct 
relationship with their employees without the involvement of a third party, and that they provided 
better terms and conditions than a union could have negotiated, including job security. During the site 
visits, safe and clean working environments with additional services (e. g. food, drinks, sports 
facilities, etc) were observed in these companies. Moreover, direct and continuous communication 
lines for increased employee involvement were also reported. Finally, the promotion from within 
policy was constantly mentioned as an essential aspect of the employment systems applied. These 
were taken as clear indications of the adoption of `HRM' pattern (Katz and Darbishire, 2000) or the 
`salaried' employment subsystem (Osterman, 1987) in FMCGI and FMCG2. 
Adoption of such an employment system for blue-collar workers might be the result of the combined 
influence of the labour market and sectoral characteristics in the specific sub-sector of FMCG2. 
Secondary research based on published material on the FIRM policies and practices of the other three 
(non-American) MNCs in this sub-sector that invested in Turkey more recently provided evidence that 
they too claimed to have adopted a similar high-road ILM approach. They reportedly provided 
favourable working conditions and pay and benefits, and emphasised a preference for an ILM 
approach, stating that they recruited only for entry-level jobs from outside. 
Although a non-unionised model of ILM system was also adopted, there were certainly differences 
between the employment system applications for blue-collar labour at PharmaCOI and the other three 
manufacturing cases discussed above. There were tighter job definitions, which were in fact a 
combined output of the comprehensive production system transferred from the USl lealth and the 
classifications developed and used during the unionised periods. Work rules were clearly defined and 
respective responsibilities were attached to jobs. Despite non-unionisation (see Chapter 8), a high 
road approach and an implicit job security promise similar to those in FMCGI and FMCG2, were not 
emphasised. This can be explained mainly by the high cost-consciousness of US! lealth, the American 
JVP of PharmaCOl. There were obviously significant differences between the two JVPs' objectives 
in choosing the employment systems. While minimising labour cost in a non-unionised work 
environment was understood to be the primary goal in the choice of employment system for USl lealth, 
for Holding3, the Turkish JVP, it was maximising the possibility of having the supply of qualified 
labour in the company to reach the highest quality production in the complicated manufacturing 
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system. The primary objective of maximising predictability was influenced by various constraints 
imposed by firstly, the nature of the production system where skill and education level requirements 
were moderately high, and secondly, by the TBS where scarcity of 'trainable' blue-collar labour 
prevailed. Moreover, Holding3 was known to be one of the most socially responsible employers in 
Turkey, whose many manufacturing companies were unionised, good wages were paid and implicit 
job security and lifetime employment with training opportunities were provided. 
Previously Holding3 had accepted the constraining power of the union in PharmaCOl until the IJV 
was established, especially in terms of increased labour cost and agreed job security, in return for 
predictable effective resources. After the IJV was established however, in compliance with the 
requirements of the new US JVP25, the employment system in PharmaCOI had been revised from a 
unionised `industrial' model to a de-unionised and more flexible 'industrial' model, where secondary 
employment systems, e. g. contracted blue-collar labour, also started to be used, mainly for cost 
reduction and de-unionisation purposes. In addition to the various constraints discussed by Osterman 
(1987), similar to the case in AutoCOI, ownership structure in this case acted as another constraint on 
the employment system choice in PharmaCOl. Although USHealth could transfer its non-unionisation 
policy to Turkey, it was not able to impose a `low wage' pattern, due to the 'strong' local partner who 
had taken the HRM function in the IJV agreement. The management reduced the number of 
outsourced workers after a while and improved the employment conditions (e. g. compensation and 
most benefits, training) of the remaining group to a similar level to those of the permanent employees. 
Despite the no job security promise, PharmaCOI did not lay off any workers during the economic 
crisis either26 but this was more because they did not have to. Considering these features, it is argued 
that the system in PharmaCOI was an amalgamation of the 'bureaucratic' (non-union approach with 
highly formalized procedures, clear and written policies, highly detailed job classifications and job 
evaluation schemes to determine job duties) and 'HRM' (elaborate employee communication, directed 
teams, union substitution) patterns (Katz and Darbishire, 2000: 10,21-24). 
The last manufacturing company among the main cases of this research, TexCO, did not share the 
common characteristics of production systems of the other four discussed above. Garment 
manufacturing is defined as a routine production process where the majority of blue-collar labour 
consists of unskilled and uneducated workers, particularly women. At TexCO, there were not 
complicated production systems and teamwork structures with a multi-skilled workforce (although it 
had been tried unsuccessfully in the European plants), or sophisticated corporate systems of 
benchmarking and monitoring. Output of the Turkish plant was distributed to USTex's various 
25 Interviews with former HR Coordinator Holding3, and HR Manager, PharmaCOl 
26 Was explicitly stated in the 'Company Report' for their application to the National Quality Award in Turkey, 
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markets through the centralised supply chain management, so most of its production was effectively 
for export. Despite the simple nature of its production system, with low skill requirements where a 
small number of mostly uncomplicated tasks can be quickly mastered, and the nature of the Turkish 
labour market, characterised with abundance of unskilled work force, TexCO used unionised industrial 
employment system to achieve its main employment goal of cost effectiveness. 
In line with this objective, TexCO adopted the `industrial' system, while employment at will by 
management with no formal job security could be successfully applied within the TBS. In the absence 
of potential constraints, the low wage employment pattern (Katz and Darbishire, 2000) is widely 
applied in the Turkish textile manufacturing sector, except in some large, more institutionalised 
companies. Given the secure cheap supply of low-skilled workforce and very low unionisation, 
employment at will and low wages continue even in the presence of the new labour law as the majority 
of employment continues to be unregistered in the many SMEs. However at TexCO, not only was 
employment comparatively secure through unionisation and group collective agreements but also by 
the implicit promise of USTex. It was reported by both union officials and company management that 
no systematic or large-scale lay-offs of blue-collar workers had been experienced over the years. 
Turnover among plant workers was reported to be negligible. In a traditionally low-road sector, 
TexCO preferred to stick with a comparatively high-road approach: it apparently provided good 
working conditions, highly regarded benefits, in addition to punctual wage payments and payments for 
overtime, which were not common in the sector. Adoption of the industrial system, combined with an 
implicit promise of job security and a high-road approach particularly in this sector was transferred 
from USTex and its business philosophy, i. e. the administrative heritage of USTex as a `socially 
responsible employer'. USTex plants in the US and Europe had always been unionised27, where 
`traditional "New Deal"' model was applied. Turkish labour market features provided additional 
support for the transfer of US corporate policy. An additional reason for the application of industrial 
model might be the belief of corporate management that cost effectiveness is not always achieved by 
choosing the cheapest employment system. Osterman (1987) argues that potential costs due to errors 
by workers in production might end up outweighing any savings. In fact, the Plant Manager 
interviewed argued along the same lines, that well-paid employees who felt secure in their jobs were 
more productive and made fewer errors, and supported his argument that vital errors resulting in 
significant costs happened very rarely in TexCO. 
6.4.4. ILM MODELS IN THE CORE SERVICE COMPANIES 
The other core cases in this research, namely flotelCO and FinCO, belong to two different sub-groups 
of the services sector. Traditionally in the hotel industry, operations are simple, most tasks are clearly 
27 Source not cited, not to reveal the identity of USTex 
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and tightly defined, and ̀ employment at will' prevails. In the banking industry on the other hand 
operations are complicated, tasks and responsibilities are defined more fluidly, and there are flexible 
career lines. These two sub-sectors broadly classified within services in fact have completely different 
operations, hence employment goals and systems. However, a closer look into the HotelCO case 
revealed more similarities to FinCO's employment goals and systems, mainly because of its sub- 
sectoral features. 
As a successful member of the few international chains of luxury hotels, HotelCO needed a higher 
skilled easily trainable workforce for the delivery of standardised top quality service to an `exclusive' 
clientele in all of its branches around the world. Maximising predictability of the availability of 
qualified labour, especially in this sub-sector where turnover rates are very high (going up to 40% in 
Turkey when a new chain opens a branch in the same city) was therefore Hote1CO's main purpose in 
selecting its employment system. To reach this goal, it adopted a 'salaried' model (Osterman, 1987), 
including most elements of `HRM' pattern (Katz and Darbishire, 2000), which was reported at the 
regional HQ and subsidiary level as transferred from USHotel. All employees, including those ones in 
the operations, were potentially offered flexible internal career ladders supported by extensive and 
continuous T&D activities `to keep up with the changing service and quality trends and expectations 
of our clientelei28. USHotel invested heavily in developing and applying sophisticated R&S policies, 
supported by T&D policies for all of its (managerial and non-managerial) employees29. This corporate 
ILM approach was reported to be transferred to Turkey and additional evidence for heavy involvement 
of USHotel in various other HRM and related policies was found (see Chapters 7 and 8). Sophisticated 
R&S tools were used to hire as highly skilled and educated employees as possible. By offering job 
security, evidenced by reported no lay-offs even during the worst economic crisis times in Turkey 
(although this might have been because their business was not affected that severely due to the specific 
clientele group) and using other methods (freezing re-hiring after voluntary turnover, giving paid and 
unpaid vacations, etc) to keep staffing levels under control, it aimed to achieve greater commitment 
from its employees, which would help maximise its ability to plan upon the availability of qualified 
labour to deliver a top quality / high price service without unexpected disruptions. 
Application of this corporate policy in the TBS faced the same limitation that most of the other case 
companies experienced: scarcity of highly qualified labour. In this particular case, the nature of 
operations was also significant: potential employees did not regard the hotel industry and its traditional 
career ladder, which begins from the entry levels, very highly. Therefore IlotelCO experienced the 
problem of `matching attitude with aptitude' and attracting highly qualified employees as defined by 
its corporate policies. Apart from this, HotelCO did not experience major problems in transferring its 
2s Interviews with HR Director, HotelCO 
29 Interview with HRVP, Regional HQ, HotelCO 
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corporate ILM policy to Turkey, mainly by offering internal career ladders supported by particularly 
reputable T&D schemes, job security, combined with good working conditions and continuous and 
extensive communication channels between management and labour. Cost effectiveness was 
HotelCO's secondary goal in choosing its employment system, mainly because of its specific sub- 
sector where serving its `highly elite' but less price sensitive clientele with the highest quality was 
more important. It was able to balance the labour costs by keeping its salary scheme below the 3rd 
quartile of the market and not offering as many benefits as the other case companies in this study (see 
chapter 8). 
While adoption of a `salaried' or `HRM' employment system at a hotel might arguably be unlikely in 
a traditionally low-skill service sector company, it would be more likely at a global, financial 
institution. At FinCO many elements of the `salaried' employment model were used for its managerial 
and specialist white-collar jobs, particularly for those at the HQ. Its policy was to recruit highly 
educated employees for the bottom level of internal career ladders to maximise predictability of a 
highly qualified labour supply needed for the sustainability of its complex, high technology and 
knowledge-based business. At FinCO too this was reported to be a corporate policy transferred to the 
Turkish subsidiary, which was feasible despite the constraining labour market conditions in Turkey. 
Although the highly educated and skilled labour (with e. g. foreign language and computing skills) that 
FinCO needed is scarce in Turkey, banking is very reputable in that labour market segment. 
Combined with the internationally well-known and highly regarded name, FinCO had a good 
reputation as a preferred employer in Turkey. Therefore hiring highly qualified people from the small 
pool of eligible candidates was not a major problem for FinCO. 
Once hired, these highly educated people were trained and developed through various T&D 
programmes (on-the-job, classroom-based through its separate training company, short and long term 
international assignments and projects, HI-PO programmes, etc. ) as the policy was to develop a 
continuous stream of managers and specialists through in-house T&D schemes 70. Individualised 
career development offered to those eligible was another evidence for the application of'IIRM' 
employment system (Katz and Darbishire, 2000). This policy was adopted by the US parent to be able 
ensure not only the highest quality services but also compliance with the strict international and US 
regulations in the financial sector, which had gained even more significance during the previous 
decade after the well-known large-scale fraud cases. Internal career ladders and T&D schemes for 
managerial and specialist jobs were FinCO's most important tools not only to recruit and hire best 
qualified candidates but also to retain them to reach its employment policy goal of maximising 
predictability. 
30 Interviews with HR Managers and HR Director, FinCO 
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6.4.5. ILMAPPROACH FOR WHITE-COLLAR EMPLOYEES 
The ILM approach was clearly indicated as the preferred choice for employment systems for 
managerial, white collar and specialist / technical jobs in the core cases. The interviewees indicated 
that it was adopted as a corporate policy transferred from the US parents. Within the framework based 
on the constraints imposed by the nature of TBS and production systems and sectors discussed above, 
case companies had the same objective in choosing their employment systems for white-collar and 
managerial employees, i. e. maximising predictability of effective human resources. However 
constraints imposed by the Turkish labour market were even more significant for these groups of 
employees. Highly qualified candidates, e. g. with a degree from a good university, computing skills, 
and foreign language proficiency, and possessing other competencies the companies looked for, are 
members of an `elite' group, who are difficult to attract and retain. Case companies therefore used 
highly sophisticated R&S methods (see below) to source the entry levels of internal career ladders 
with the `right' people who possessed the required qualifications. They moreover invested in highly 
costly T&D programmes firstly, as advertisement tools to attract, secondly, to develop, and thirdly, to 
retain these highly valued managerial and white-collar employees. These HRM policies were well 
aligned with the ILM approach. 
Although an ILM approach was identified as the main choice for white-collar and managerial jobs, in 
some cases, an application of the `core-periphery' model was observed. As Osterman (1988) argues 
`social' technology, i. e. the significance of a particular group of jobs, can be a constraint on the firm's 
choice of employment system. Central, as opposed to peripheral, tasks are more likely to be entrusted 
to people 'from inside' who have had extensive company-specific socialisation. For peripheral jobs 
secondary systems can be adopted, especially for cost reduction purposes. It was evident that similar 
types of jobs could be considered core or peripheral in different sectors, which imposed constraints on 
the choice of employment system. 
At FinCO for instance direct card sales was accepted as a 'peripheral' job, while at FMCG1, FMCG2, 
PharmaCOI and TexCO, similar sales jobs were considered among the 'core' ones. At FinCO 
outsourcing was used for the card sales jobs, where these employees were not even part of I IR 
management's responsibilities. There was high turnover among this group of mostly part-time 
employees, as commitment and loyalty are not theoretically expected of such employees. However, in 
FMCG1, where the majority of staff was employed by distributors, direct sales people who were not 
on FMCGI's payroll were reported to be regarded among the firm's most important 'frontline' 
employees. These employees were managed by FMCG 1's IIR department and it was emphasised that 
they were treated the same as its own employees in terms of R&S, training, and pay. Similarly at 
115 
FMCG2, the sales force, who comprised the largest group of employees, were seen to be among the 
`key group' of employees and included in the sophisticated R&S and T&D programmes as well as 
career management schemes. Likewise at PharmaCOI sales people were considered as ̀ core' 
employees, who in fact needed to be even more qualified than sales people in FMCGI and FMCG2, 
because of the type of product and clientele (i. e. medical) they dealt with. To be able to select even 
better sales people, the HR manager felt the need to improve the selection process by conducting 
interviews with all eligible candidates, without using the initial test results as a screening tool. Sales 
was the core function for TexCo, as the firm positioned itself essentially as a sales rather than textile 
manufacturing company. It raised its selection criteria following the organisational restructuring for 
sales people in the field. They were included in the various HRM policies, and an ILM approach was 
applied for this or `key group' of employees in TexCO. As sales were regarded one of the most 
important functions in these case companies, maximising predictability of a highly qualified sales 
force was the most significant goal in choosing the employment system. 
However, the TBS imposed additional constraints for finding qualified candidates for sales positions, 
which is argued to be another possible reason for choosing an ILM approach. In the Turkish labour 
market, potential employees with the necessary qualifications generally do not regard sales positions 
as prestigious. Therefore the supply of labour is even further constricted for sales, mainly because of 
its low status. Instead of going into sales, which means ̀ a tough, tiring job working in thefield'S1 
before starting the managerial career ladder, they prefer such functions as marketing or finance. 
Therefore case companies experienced a common problem of 'matching attitude with aptitude' when 
recruiting highly qualified people for their sales positions, which were in fact their `key group'. 
The second common problem faced by all the case companies in sales jobs was high turnover rates, 
even with a strong ILM approach. There was high demand in the ELM for highly qualified and 
experienced sales people, whose skills are more generally applicable rather than company-specific. 
Poaching and job hopping were reported to be highest in sales positions in all the cases. Therefore 
companies in this research experienced the common problems of, firstly, attracting highly qualified 
people into sales positions, and secondly, retaining them even with an ILM approach that offered good 
C&B schemes, T&D and career opportunities in their firms. Secondary research in job adverts (in the 
IIR supplements and web based application sites) given by the case companies revealed, firstly, that 
this specific group of employees were the ones most likely to be recruited from the ELM, with 
`relevant experience' required; secondly, among the qualifications sought, the education criterion had 
been slightly relaxed, e. g. `preferably with a university degree' which means candidates with less 
education, e. g. two years of vocational school or high school education, could also apply. As was 
31 Interviews with HR Managers in FMCGI, FMCG2, TexCo 
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admitted by the Sales and Marketing Director of FMCG2, case companies sometimes ̀ have to be 
contented with lower qualifications for sales jobs'. They could not therefore apply a robust promotion 
from within policy with their sales force, even though they wanted to, because of higher turnover and 
lower qualifications. 
These findings suggest that the ILM approach, which is preferred to deal with the Turkish labour 
market constraints, was challenged in sales jobs by the local labour market features. An ILM 
approach adopted to retain scarce skilled labour was not entirely successful in the case of transferable 
skills, i. e. sales. Nevertheless case companies continued with the ILM approach, to develop even a 
small core group of sales force and managers. 
In summary, in this section it is argued that the core cases had in general adopted an ILM approach in 
their employment systems for blue- and white-collar and managerial employees, transferred from their 
corporate policies. This preference was supported by the combined influences imposed by the nature 
of the Turkish labour market where scarcity of skilled and experienced labour prevails, and the 
operations system requirements of the cases for such labour. Comparatively lower labour costs, higher 
flexibility of industrial systems in the unionised cases through the cooperative attitude of unions, and 
adaptability to technology changes more quickly through work group structures were among the most 
important reasons that made the ILM approach easily applicable in Turkey. With the available data 
therefore it was argued that corporate employment systems were transferred to the Turkish 
subsidiaries, also because they fitted with their production system strategies transferred from the USA 
and they were able to pursue ILM as the TBS imposed few constraints on doing so. 
As complementary policies to the ILM employment systems, case companies used sophisticated and 
costly R&S methods to find and hire highly qualified employees with little or no experience at the few 
entry-level points. Following the promotion from within policy, these employees were trained and 
developed, and offered career opportunities, which were used as retention tools. These parallel 
policies and applications are discussed briefly in the last section of this chapter. 
6.5. COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES FOR ILM APPROACH: COMBINED USE OF 
LOCAL AND CORPORATE METHODS FOR RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION 
6.5.1 RECRUITMENT TOOLS USED: COMBINING LOCAL AND IMPORTED 
When case companies recruited from the ELM, whether as the result of an expansion of operations 
(e. g. AutoCO1, FinCO, HotelCO, FMCG3), seasonal or project-based needs (e. g. AutoCO2, lIotelCO, 
DefCO) or the need for regular new in-takes (e. g. TACI, TAC2), they preferred to hire inexperienced 
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employees at the few entry-level ports. They hired experienced, higher level managers or 
professionals (e. g. legal counsellors, bio-chemists, PR managers, etc. ) from the external market only 
when there was not an appropriate candidate from inside (the Turkish company or other subsidiaries). 
The most outstanding exception was TexCO, which had reportedly traditionally adopted an ILM 
approach as a corporate policy: it hired almost all of its current managers from the ELM as a part of 
the restructuring process at this stage in USTex's corporate life, in an effort 'to bring in new blood' to 
resolve the crisis it went through during mid-1990s. 
Informal and low-cost recruitment methods (word of mouth, personal networks and recommendations 
by employees, walk-in applications) were widely used by the US MNCs for both blue- and white- 
collar employees, which was in line with the most commonly used local recruitment channels in 
Turkey (Arthur Andersen, 2001). They also used formal, sophisticated high-cost channels 
(educational institutions, web-based recruitment, agencies and 'head-hunters') for managerial and 
white-collar positions, which suggested that they used a balanced approach between adopting local 
practices and transferring corporate applications. Local subsidiary managements were observed to be 
given some flexibility by the corporate management in using the local tools but for use in combination 
with other standardised recruitment methods and particularly selection processes developed at and 
transferred from (regional or corporate) HQ. As the TBS did not impose any legal constraints on the 
R&S methods used, the most important consideration in the combined use of local and corporate 
methods was the effectiveness of the methods in reaching the best candidates, in scarce supply in the 
Turkish labour market. 
For instance, sophisticated use of IT systems, e. g. web-based recruitment through online application 
centres, could be argued not to be the most effective method for reaching a large number of 
candidates, given the small number of computer and Internet users in Turkey. I lowever, it was this 
small target group they aimed to reach: highly educated and skilled professional and managerial 
candidates, with relevant experience, or new graduates and university students. Likewise, direct 
recruitment from educational institutions, mainly the 'best' universities, was used to reach the 
brightest of fresh graduates selected for entry-level managerial and specialist positions for a long-term 
employment relationship. Sector was an important factor in the use of this channel: for knowledge- 
based services (i. e. auditing, banking, IT) and marketing oriented (e. g. FMCG) companies, graduate 
recruitment was the most important channel for inexperienced entry-level especially managerial 
employees for positions that mainly required the appropriate educational background and certain 
competencies. Also significant were the company characteristics: large Turkish I folding companies 
recruited widely using this 'prestigious' channel and participated in educational collaborations. 
Holdings brought along their flagship companies to the universities, some of which were among the 
case companies of this research, e. g. AutoCOl and PharmaCOl. In these IJV instances, the Turkish 
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Holding affiliation was mostly even more important than the company name or the US corporate 
affiliation. A strong emphasis on the Turkish Holding affiliation was not observed only in one case, 
FMCG2, which was presented strongly as a `multinational' company, (rather than even 'American') 
while mentioning its Holding2 affiliation only in passing. The most significant reason for this is 
argued to lie in its ownership structure and strength of Holding2 as a JVP. Holding2 had a minority 
share and did not participate in management at FMCG2 at all. Holding2 was a weak JVP and had 
accepted its role in FMCG2 accordingly. Turkish and foreign managers at FMCG2 did not consider 
themselves as a Holding2 company while Holding2 did not regard FMCG2 as one of its 'own' 
companies either32. 
Another significant factor for the case companies in deciding which recruitment tools to use was cost. 
TexCO for instance did not use universities or web-based recruitment mainly because it did not have 
the necessary funds33. Obviously also important was need: as many case companies did not hire in 
large numbers at the time of the fieldwork but did so only occasionally when a position needed an 
outside candidate, they found it not worth investing in these expensive recruitment methods. 
Therefore the use of recruitment tools differed slightly according to company characteristics, i. e. size 
and growth, availability of funds. There were not any significant differences in the methods used 
according to ownership structure, therefore similar methods were adopted in WOS and IJVs where 
Turkish JVPs were responsible for HRM. 
One potentially troubling issue about the use of informal low-cost local channels is 'nepotism' and 
violation of equal employment opportunities. There has been a strong tradition in Turkey of nepotism 
(more in the public than in the private sector), which is described as using one's network to obtain 
advantages for one's family, close relatives and relations, without looking at eligibility or 
qualifications. Such nepotism is almost the rule rather than the exception in many areas of the public 
sector, including employment, where people are employed not for what they are but who they know. 
In the case companies, however, it was strongly emphasised that the informal recruitment channels 
were used simply to create a larger pool of best-qualified and eligible candidates quickly and at a low 
cost. All the candidates then had to go through the same rigorous selection processes. The following 
quotation by AutoCOI's HR/IR Director summarised the common emphasis made in the case 
companies: 'Our selection criteria are set and not changed according to candidates'. Adoption of 
local recruitment mechanisms was possibly allowed by US corporate managements only to be used in 
conjunction with the sophisticated and systematic recruitment and especially selection methods. They 
might not have considered the adoption of local systems as a problem as long as the selection 
32 Interviews with HR Manager, FMCG2, and HR Coordinator, Holding2 
33 Interview with HR Manager, TexCO 
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processes that followed ascertained that the best candidates were chosen for their work-related merits, 
not for their personal connections. 
In summary, ELM was used by the case companies to recruit mostly inexperienced entry-level white- 
collar and managerial employees as well as blue-collar workers. Hybridisation of the formal 
sophistication of US parents with the informal, ad hoc mechanisms used in the TBS was observed in 
the American MNCs. The most appropriate system for the targeted group within the labour market 
conditions of Turkey was adopted. The mixture of channels used to recruit from external markets 
indicates that, firstly, US MNCs adopted local practices as long as they did not clash with their other 
HR policies (e. g. no discrimination or favouritism) and provided an efficient and effective strategy to 
reach the target candidates. Secondly, they also transferred corporate tools if these proved beneficial in 
the Turkish labour environment. Thirdly, given the labour market characteristics and infrastructure, 
the host country business system did not limit the use of various local, informal and low-cost, 
recruitment methods in combination with more sophisticated, expensive and 'prestigious' ones for 
reaching the right employees needed within the ILM approaches of the cases. Lastly, no significant 
differences were found between the methods adopted by WOS and IJVs, namely AutoCO1 and 
PharmaCO1, where Turkish JVPs managed HR. 
6.5.2. SOPHISTICATED SELECTIONSTRATEGIES 
Long and complex procedures were used in all of the case companies for selecting white-collar and 
managerial employees, and also for blue-collar employees in some (e. g. AutoCOI, FMCG2, 
PharmaCOl). Sophisticated selection methods were adopted mainly to choose the best available 
employees from the rather limited candidate pools. This was important particularly for the ILM 
approach where the employment relationship was theoretically long-term. The processes, which were 
almost identical across the cases, began with initial screening done on forms, using some standard 
`objective' criteria, e. g. educational background and experience (if relevant), which was aimed at 
selecting the best available candidates from the applicant pool. Tests (cognitive and analytical, 
numerical and verbal aptitude, personality tests, e. g. `Occupational Personality Inventory', etc. ) were 
used for second-level screening after which preliminary interviews usually by the I IR department were 
conducted for managerial and white collar jobs. Eligible candidates were further interviewed by line 
managers from the relevant department. A short-list of successful candidates went through panel 
interviews where line managers were involved. For higher level jobs, interviews with top level 
management in Turkey and at the regional HQ were also conducted, if deemed necessary (e. g. 
interviewees such as GM at TexCO, HR Director at FMCG2 and HR Manager at FinCO could cite 
their own experiences when they had gone through this process themselves when recruited from 
outside). In some cases, e. g. FMCG2, TAC1, assessment centres were used. 
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Assessment centres and various tests were used also for blue collar / operational jobs in the majority of 
the cases where they needed highly qualified candidates (e. g. AutoCO1, FMCG2, PharmaCO1, 
IlotelCO). At AutoCO 1, for instance, they administered specially developed tests, e. g. 'psycho- 
technical', 'on-the-job', 'for specific departments and for general usei34. At FMCG2, as the first step, 
they applied four different tests, i. e. written, arithmetic, mechanic, trouble shooting, to identify the 
skills necessary for various manufacturing jobs (e. g. operator, maintenance, etc)". The 
comprehensive selection methods used were transferred from the US parent companies, developed 
either at corporate or regional HQ and distributed from there to sub-regions and subsidiaries, except in 
the two IJV cases, i. e. AutoCOI and partly in PharmaCOI, where HRM was aligned with that of the 
Turkish JVPs. Methods used in these companies were no less complicated than in the others; in fact, 
there were very similar applications, only they were not transferred from the American JVPs but 
developed in Turkey at the IJV subsidiary or the Turkish JVPs. Additionally, at PharmaCO1, which 
had a somewhat closer though informal relationship with USllealth's HR organisation, some methods 
learnt at the 'Global HR Conference' or through the Intranet and corporate newsletters of the latter 
were transferred and adopted by the HR Director, mainly as a result of her personal interest in 
developing better systems36. Use of such sophisticated selection methods in the Turkish environment 
was not limited by legal or other constraints. The case companies were therefore able to adopt and use 
any methods to select the best available candidates. 
In addition to the screening criteria listed above, case companies had two common criteria for 
selecting their entry-level managerial, white-collar and sales employees: a university degree from one 
of the `best' universities in Turkey and proficiency in English. Although candidates with these 
qualifications were scarce and more difficult to find, they needed to adopt lower criteria only because 
of sectoral and job type constraints. Sectoral influences could be observed at IlotelCO, for instance, 
where the education criterion had to be lowered, from 4-year university to 2-year hotel and tourism 
management vocational (university) schools37. But this was not entirely a local adaptation of the 
corporate policy; the company had the same (i. e. lower) qualifications accepted in other countries as 
well. But for its global `corporate trainee' programme candidates, corporate policy required a 
university degree and was applied strictly in Turkey. Job types, combined with the Turkish labour 
market conditions, were also influential: for sales jobs the same criteria as for managerial jobs were 
required at FMCG1, FMCG2, PharmaCOI, and TexCO but they were not always able to match their 
u Interviews with HR/1R Director and HR Manager, AutoCO1 
33 Interviews with HR Manager, Plant HR Manager, Shift Manager, FMCG2 
36 Interviews with HR Director and HR Manager, PharmaCO1 
37 These can be considered equivalent of former polytechnics in the UK 
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criteria with the qualifications of the applicants. So they occasionally had to lower the criteria, to e. g. 
'38 vocational high school compensated by `successful experience in the field . 
Competency-based selection started to be widely implemented by the majority of the case firms, 
except at FinCO, for their white-collar and managerial employees. US MNCs were apparently among 
the first companies in Turkey to apply this selection method, transferred from their American parents. 
At the IJVs AutoCOI and PharmaCOI very similar systems based on competencies were also 
adopted, developed at the respective Holding HR Coordination units, by involving all the (major) 
affiliate companies and acquiring consultancy from well-known American companies. At 
PharmaCO1, nine core competencies were developed in 1997, long before any other company used 
competency-based methods, as a pilot company (together with two other affiliates) initiated by the I IR 
Coordinator at Holding3, with the involvement of PharmaCOI top management and an American 
consultant firm. Holding3 had subsequently spread the use of this competency-based system to all of 
its affiliates. Competency-based systems had been developed at Holding1 of AutoCOI with a very 
similar approach (e. g. with contributions from other major Turkish Holdings and foreign companies, 
consultancy from a veteran Turkish manager retired from a leading MNC's Turkish subsidiary, and 
participation of affiliates' top-level and HR managements), only more recently. Development and 
adoption of competency-based selection systems were considered as further supporting evidence for 
the leading position of Turkish Holding companies in following the global trends and bringing new 
IHR systems to Turkey. 
In addition to common qualifications sought and competency-based methods used, candidates' 
`suitability to our company culture' was emphasised as another criterion required. In all the cases, it 
was claimed that there was a distinct company culture and that it was very important that the candidate 
fit into this culture. Training and 'moulding' employees within this 'particular' organisational culture 
right from the beginning was cited as one of the most important reasons for selecting inexperienced, 
fresh graduates for entry-level managerial as well as technical positions: 
"People who come to FinCO from another, say Turkish bank, or like myself from another 
American firm in a different sector find it extremely difficult to adapt to this 
organisation's unique culture"39 
Organisational culture in most cases, e. g. FMCG1, FMCG2, TexCO, HotelCO, FinCO, was argued by 
the interviewees to be most similar to the US parents' corporate culture, influenced less by the Turkish 
business environment or the Turkish JVP's corporate culture in the case of FMCG2. At the two IJVs 
where Turkish JVPs were strong and active in management, it was different. While at PhanmaCOI the 
influence of the host- and home-country parents on the culture and identity of the company was not 
u Interviews with HR and Sales Managers/Directors at FMCGI, FMCG2, PharmaCO1, TexCO; job adverts 
39 1IR Manager, FinCO 
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particularly emphasised, it was evident that Holding3 left its imprint more strongly. At AutoCOI an 
individual company culture had been developed throughout its nearly 50 years of unique history, 
which was different from that of either of its JV parents: "I am not Holding!, lam not USAutol. I am 
AutoCOl P'. 40 The distinctiveness of AutoCOl's position and company culture was supported by the 
interviews particularly at the regional HQ of USAutol. Suitability and adaptability to these all 
`specific' firm cultures was found to be essential for the long-term employment relationship suggested 
by the applied ILM policies in the case companies: 
"We offer careers, not jobs, to our employees; therefore they need to be suitable to this 
company's culture for a long-term employment relationship "4' 
To summarise, firstly, when recruiting managerial candidates from the ELM, case companies report 
few significant constraints in administering the sophisticated selection methods using specific criteria 
and competencies transferred from their US parents, except the scarcity of eligible candidates. For 
managerial and white-collar technical / specialist jobs, good theoretical education in especially the 
`elite universities' of Turkey produces competent graduates, the best of whom American (and other 
foreign-capital) companies were able to attract, particularly by using their reputable company names, 
competitive pay and performance management systems, systematic T&D and career opportunities. 
Moreover, for blue-collar employees, where technical education and `trainability' were most 
important, case companies did not state any problems in using the selection methods and criteria, 
while most of them were also developed by and transferred from parent companies. Thirdly, selection 
processes and methods adopted by IJVs where Turkish parents managed HRM were found to be very 
similar to those of the WOS. Fourthly, a combination of sectoral, company and job type 
characteristics resulted in some relaxation of qualifications required within the TBS. 
6.6. RETENTION: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
Given the scarcity of professional and managerial employees with transferable skills, an important 
underlying question is the extensiveness ofjob-hopping and poaching. Part of the answer to how the 
case companies dealt with retention problems and the extent ILM strategy worked in practice lies in 
the development opportunities provided. T&D and career opportunities were used as important 
retention (as well as recruitment) tools particularly for managerial and white-collar employees in the 
case companies. For instance, at FMCG2, it was argued that: 
"In order to retain people in the company, you have to provide them with development 
opportunities. The feeling of `I'm developing in this company' is a very important 
retention tool, together with a good working environment and competitive C&B levels as 
40 Interview with HR/IR Director, AutoCOl 
41 Interview with HR Director, HotelCO 
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well as prospects of a career. It's important to be as transparent as you can in telling an 
employee about the possible career opportunities waiting for him/her in this company. "42 
At FinCO, similarly, T&D opportunities (e. g. `Fin CO is an excellent banking school in Turkey'43), 
opportunity to work in a competitive and challenging environment where successful performance was 
assessed, recognised and rewarded through established systems, international career possibilities, 
along with competitive C&B packages, were emphasised as important tools to attract and retain highly 
qualified employees in Turkey. HotelCO based its policy of attracting and retaining good employees 
entirely on good T&D and career opportunities, without aiming to provide too competitive a C&B 
package. In general, US MNCs studied in this research invested considerable time and financial 
resources in transferring and applying development and career opportunities, which is aligned with 
their ILM policies, as the theory suggests. 
Poaching of highly qualified managerial and white-collar (especially sales) employees by other (not 
necessarily direct competitor) companies in the market was apparently a problem experienced by some 
case companies. FMCG2, TexCO, FinCO and HotelCO specifically mentioned retention problems 
despite providing development opportunities, and, except at HotelCO, competitive C&B packages. 
The main reason laid in the limited career opportunities they could provide in Turkey, as these US 
MNCs usually were not very large, had not been growing and had in general flat organisational 
structures. A good example was TexCO, which could not offer internal career ladders within its flat 
and small organisation, or extensive training schemes because of financial resources available for 
T&D after the corporate-wide restructuring. At this stage of USTex's life cycle, firstly, cost 
effectiveness and, secondly, flexibility in deployment and abilities of its managerial employees were 
the most significant employment system objectives. Within the salaried ILM approach, TexCO 
utilised horizontal moves as a means of developing its managers cross-functionally, which served as a 
retention tool as well. As an example, the HR manager who had explained these was transferred to the 
Sales department in a horizontal move during the fieldwork. 
At HotelCO, the General Manager complained about the problems experienced as a result of their 
recruitment strategy: 
"We recruit too good staff and we cannot look after them and that's a problem in our 
industry, if you don't have a consistency of growth and you cannot promote people, like 
in Turkey, where most of our hoteliers are university graduates. So six months, eight 
months and they come knocking on my door, saying what are you doing here? And 
they're right. That's the downside. Once you recruit too good people, we cannot retain 
them too long. We cannot promote them because pyramid gets very small very fast. " 
42 Interview with HR Manager, FMCG2 
43 Interviews with HR Managers, FinCO 
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New investments in the sector might present another challenge, as had been the case for FMCG2, 
when major international players had recently made considerable investment in its specific sub- 
industry. Some interviewees in FMCG2 argued that some of their highly qualified and experienced 
managerial and sales employees accepted to move to the new companies not for better C&B but for 
promotional job opportunities, which they could not be offered in FMCG2 due to size and 
organisational structure". FinCO lost some of its highly developed managerial staff to other banks in 
the sector, during the period when banking was growing but FinCO was not making additional 
investment in Turkey: "People left when they could find a promotion opportunity with a similar C&B 
package', 45. Therefore sectoral influences as well as company-level issues were evident in retention 
challenges experienced by the cases. 
They dealt with the poaching and job-hopping by offering T&D within a challenging and competitive 
work environment for all, in addition to career opportunities for a limited number of `talented' 
managerial and white-collar employees. At FinCO, continuous and constructive feedback mechanism, 
established formally as part of the PE, `performance-driven company culture' and especially 
international on-the-job and off-the-job T&D opportunities were cited as important tools for the 
retention of especially 'talented' people46. Likewise at FMCG2, 
"We call it [the Performance Management System] 'Advancement Planning' because we 
provide opportunities for our employees who have a potential to advance. It also 
provides T&D opportunities, on-the-job, in international assignments, or through 
courses. " 
While the case companies could not provide career advancement opportunities for every talented 
manager, they used different T&D tools to keep them. At TexCO for instance they used rotation 
between different departments, e. g. horizontal moves, and cross-functional development opportunities 
to retain those employees whom they could not promote to higher levels. Similarly, at IlotelCO, they 
gave employees additional responsibilities at the local subsidiary or sub-regional level. For instance, 
the IHR director was also the Area Director to whom eight other HR Directors within the sub-region 
reported, and T&D manager had been assigned to delivering training in various hotels in the sub- 
region. 
As a result, a strong emphasis on the developmental and career opportunities particularly for 
managerial and white-collar employees could be observed in the US MNCs. This was the 
complementary answer to the challenges presented to the adopted ILM approaches by local labour 
market conditions and company structures. To be able to keep the carefully selected highly educated 
" Interviews with HR Manager, Plant HR Manager, Sales Director, FMCG2 
45 Interview with HR Manager, FinCO 
46 Interviews with HR Director, HR Managers, Regional HR VP, FinCO 
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and skilled employees from amongst scarce candidates in their comparatively small and flat 
organisations, they relied upon developmental and career management policies, when they could not 
compete on above-average C&B packages alone. Especially in certain industries such as FMCG, 
banking, hotel, where foreign investment flowed in, existing as well as newcomer firms were inclined 
to poach qualified and well-trained people. Although similar problems might have been faced in these 
companies' US operations as a result of downsizing and delayering, there was not sufficient data 
collected to claim that these policies adopted in Turkey were in fact transferred from US corporate 
parents. 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, employment systems adopted by the US MNCs studied in Turkey have been discussed. 
Taken as a whole, it was found that policies and applications used were a combined result of US 
corporate policies and influences of the host-country labour market conditions, where industry 
requirements and company characteristics (ownership structure, global restructuring, size and 
structure, etc. ) were also important. It was found that, firstly, all the case companies had a strong ILM 
approach for all groups of employees (managerial, white-collar, blue-collar and sales) where salaried 
and industrial models were used. Similar findings were reported by Butler et al. (2006) for continued 
internal managerial careers in the US MNCs operating in four European countries, although market 
conditions influenced the operation of ILMs. The adoption of an ILM approach in the Turkish 
subsidiaries was therefore explained as a result of fit between firstly the companies' corporate policies 
at home, secondly their goals in employment, i. e. predictability of a continued source of highly 
qualified employees, needed for their complex operations systems and high quality production 
standards transferred from US parents, and thirdly, organisational structures (e. g. teamworking) that 
needed flexible deployment of labour with more skills. There was consistent evidence collected at 
various levels that US corporate policy on ILM employment systems was transferred to the Turkish 
subsidiaries. However, influences of other factors at all levels of the research framework (i. e. host 
country labour market constraints, production systems and work organisation) were also influential. 
I lowever, single country research design does not make it possible to distinguish the influences of host 
and home countries more definitively. If MNCs from another home-country were included, it would 
have been possible to identify with a greater degree of certainty the causal links between the 
influential factors and the labour market approaches used. 
To transfer the ILM approach despite the constraints presented by the tight Turkish labour market, 
case companies used a balanced combination of local (informal and low-cost) and sophisticated (high. 
tech, more expensive, corporate) recruitment tools. To choose the best candidates from the scarce 
educated and skilled labour pool, they transferred sophisticated selection methods developed at the 
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corporate level. Thus the combination of recruitment tools and selection processes used reflected the 
companies' needs to apply the ILM approach in the TBS. Although the nature of the labour market 
presented constraints in the application of ILM strategy, the TBS also provided opportunities for its 
implementation through the comparably lower cost of labour, the collaborative attitude of trade unions 
and permissive legislation. 
Retention of highly sought employees, particularly in certain sectors and job types, though not a major 
problem during economic crises, became a major issue when investment flows provided career 
opportunities in other organisations with comparable C&B packages. While case companies could not 
always provide many career and promotion opportunities because of flat and non-growing 
organisations, extensive T&D possibilities for all, combined with career opportunities for some, were 
used for retention. 
In the IJVs where Turkish JVPs managed HR, no significant differences in employment policies and 
their application were observed, even though these were developed by the subsidiary or the Turkish 
JVP Holding. Similarities can be explained, firstly, by the production systems transferred from the US 
JVPs, which necessitated certain qualifications in the blue-collar/operations employees. Secondly, 
Turkish JVPs that were among the leading organisations of Turkey managed by highly qualified 
management teams seemed to have followed developments and 'trends' in IIRM and updated their 
systems accordingly, sometimes by using US consultancies, while making use of their JVPs' know- 
how. 'Pull' effects and trickle-up trajectories were therefore observed in the transfer and adoption of 
sophisticated American HRM policies and practices. Employment systems, R&S methods and 
retention policies and tools employed in the case companies ended up being very similar, whether 
developed by Turkish or US JVPs. 
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CHAPTER 7. PAY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
INTRODUCTION 
Pay and performance management systems (PMS) are recognised as among the most significant 
functions in HRM. On the one hand, compensation and benefits (C&B) lie at the core of the 
employment relationship, to attract and retain qualified employees. Performance management (PM) 
on the other hand is used to measure and monitor performance in terms of reaching the organisational 
goals, by providing feedback, plans and rewards to enhance performance. Additionally, decisions on 
promotions or redundancy can be based on PM. Remuneration and PMS are therefore central to many 
management goals, including increasing performance and keeping employees motivated. 
In addition to their absolute importance, transfer and application of pay and PM systems by US MNCs 
in Turkish subsidiaries is of particular interest. American companies are known to be 'innovative' in 
developing pay and performance management systems within their unregulated home business 
environment where individualistic work values prevail (see Chapter 5). Various forms of pay policies, 
e. g. Ford's `efficiency wage', gain- and profit-sharing, `broadbanding', developed in the US have 
spread to and received interest in other developed economies. US MNCs have been instrumental in 
the dissemination of these policies and methods, as they tend to transfer their I IRM systems to their 
overseas affiliates. Björkman and Furu (2000) for instance found US MNCs to be more likely to use a 
variable pay mix in their top management reward structure. 'Exporters' of their highly centralised and 
formalised policies in other countries, 'innovator' US firms are in general argued to pursue a 'one 
world, one strategy' approach (Bloom, Milkovich and Mitra, 2003: 1355). In the UK, for instance, 
Fawley Productivity Agreements (Flanders, 1964) marked the establishment of performance-related 
pay at the beginning of the 1960s where the management agreed a 'productivity package deal' with the 
union to increase efficient utilisation of labour. More recently, Almond et al. (2006a) found that US 
MNCs challenged the host-country employment systems particularly by the introduction of pay for 
performance and forced rankings within the PMS, which link individual performance to employment 
security and pay. 
Although US MNCs might have to tailor their pay systems to conform to local tax and labour 
regulations in tighter environments, as ̀ exporters' of their home-grown policies, they are found to 
resist strongly, trying various methods to replicate the home-country systems (Bloom et a!., 2003). 
Nevertheless, there is also evidence of US MNCs having to adapt their pay and PM policies to some 
extent to local hosts. In the case of GM, for instance, variations were found in the introduction of 
`pay-for-knowledge' wage systems at the Austrian and German subsidiaries, as the tighter external 
union coordination of wage determination in the latter resulted in a strong opposition to individual- 
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based payment systems in teamwork structures (Shire, 1994). Almond et al. (2006a) also found 
variations in pay and PM systems across the European subsidiaries of US MNCs depending on the 
nature of specific sectoral or occupational labour markets, as well as unionisation and the limiting 
power of collective bargaining in the subsidiaries. 
While `traditional' workforce management in the USA, which has its roots in the scientific 
management of Frederic Taylor, focuses on controlling employee behaviour strictly through standards 
and measures in output, it ignores the significance of attitudes and values, to establish order, exercise 
control, and achieve efficiency (Walton, 1985). The more recent 'commitment' approach advocated 
by Walton (1985) involves broader jobs that include increasing responsibility, team structures, and 
some elements of ILM approaches, e. g. assurance of job security, priority given to training and 
retraining, increased employee participation. In the 'commitment' strategy therefore coordination and 
control are based on more shared goals, values and traditions (Walton, 1985: 81), and compensation 
policies reflect an emphasis on group achievements, e. g. gainsharing and profit sharing. Individual 
pay is linked to skills and expertise, rather than only job evaluation. More recently, in an overview of 
the 'high performance' paradigm, Godard and Delaney (2000) define Walton's 'commitment' model 
as a more cooperative and participatory model. It has a more participative, developmental approach 
also towards PM, giving employees a voice in the PE process. In application, the 'high performance' 
model links PM to T&D and career and succession management for a longer employment in the firm. 
This 'high road' approach to PM combines control with commitment and involves many elements of 
an ILM employment system. 
Given the importance of pay and PM systems in general and their comparative significance for US 
MNCs, investigating the policies and practices of American cases in Turkey is useful for gaining a 
better understanding of the transferability and application of distinctive US systems in another 
business environment. More specifically, this chapter intends to consider the following questions: 
1. Were US MNCs innovators in Turkey in PM and C&B systems? To what extent did they 
transfer their corporate policies and practices to the Turkish subsidiaries? 
2. To what degree were their policies and practices shaped by the TBS? 
In the first part of this chapter, features of the TBS that influence the application of pay and PM 
systems of American MNCs are examined. In the next two parts, reward and PM systems of the case 
companies are discussed in detail, in an effort to answer the questions posed above. It is argued that, 
firstly, case companies in general had PMS, transferred from corporate IIQ, that were highly 
sophisticated, particularly for Turkey, and that were linked to pay, T&D and promotions. Secondly, 
they did not experience any major legal obstacles or constraints imposed by unions in the transfer and 
application of corporate reward and PM policies to the Turkish subsidiaries. However labour market 
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characteristics discussed in Chapter 6, together with other TBS elements presented below, clearly 
manifested significant influence on shaping particularly reward strategies. PMS approaches adopted 
were aimed at increasing commitment, in congruence with the ILM approaches used (see Chapter 6). 
Thirdly, pay and PM systems were highly centralised and standardised by the US parents. IIome- 
country influences were evident in the closely controlled systems, where only limited flexibility was 
granted to the subsidiary management, e. g. PMS had to be applied above a certain organisational level, 
but below that management could decide whether or not to apply the same system. Fourthly, there 
were not significant differences between the systems and control imposed by US or Turkish parents in 
WOS or IJVs where Turkish JVPs were in charge of HRM. 
7.2. HOST-COUNTRY FACTORS INFLUENCING PAY AND PM SYSTEMS OF 
AMERICAN MNCs 
In Turkey performance evaluation (PE) and performance-related pay (PRP) are fairly recent issues. 
There is no PE or PRP in the public sector, except some primitive tools that have been put into effect 
in e. g. health services where bonuses are paid to all staff from a pool of earned income. In general, the 
white-collar and professional workforce in the public sector receive seniority-based, automatic 
promotions and salaries linked to positions and job grades. Annual pay rises are decided by the 
government at the beginning of each year and the same rate is given to everyone, sometimes with 
exceptions for a certain group e. g. judges or academic staff. Unionised blue-collar workers in the 
public sector are covered by industry-wide collective bargaining. 
In the private sector, PE and related reward systems particularly for managerial and white-collar 
employees have been developed more recently in response to increased competition both domestically 
and internationally. According to a survey by Arthur Andersen among private (mostly large) 
companies from various sectors in 1999,78% of respondent companies had a formal PE system. 
Individual PE, found in 70% of companies, was characterised as a top-down process with supervisors 
evaluating the performance of their subordinates. Although Turkey is classified among the 
`collectivistic' nations by culturalist studies (e. g. Hofstede, 1980), PE is not reported to create any 
problems in terms of loss of face or competition among the group. Although evidence was not 
formally collected in this study, brief informal encounters with lower level managers, as employees 
themselves, and with a few white-collar employees, revealed that employees find it necessary to 
`distinguish between good [performance] and bad [performance]"' and would like to see that their 
good / better performance makes a difference. Especially among the younger generation, 
individualism in the upper socio-economic status groups in urban areas is found to be increasing 
47 Informal interview with an entry-level manager at FMCG2 
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(Kagitciba§i, 1996; Imamoglu and Karakitapoglu-Aygün, 2004). Managerial and white-collar 
employees of large, especially American and other foreign companies mostly come from this group. 
This more `individualistic' inclination helps make PE and PRP more desirable, hence easier to 
establish in Turkey in such organisations as US MNCs where 'competition' is usually a part of the 
organisational culture. 
The Andersen survey (1999) showed that in more than half the respondent companies a percentage of 
pay rises was decided in relation to performance. However these percentage increases linked to the 
results of the PE system have generally been perceived as ̀ negligible' until recently, given the periods 
of hyper-inflation in Turkey: inflation ran at an average of 65% p. a. between 1980-2001, with a peak 
at 124% in 1994 and the `lowest' at 22% in 1982. The following comment was fairly standard across 
the cases: 
"Our American parents don't understand us; we always had a hard time trying to explain 
to them about pay rises to cover too high inflation. They find it very difficult to 
comprehend why we have to make a second, mid-year pay adjustment, to cover the losses 
in real wages because of high inflation. "48 
Annual pay rise schemes in the case companies had to be adapted to Turkish economic conditions, to 
adjust for inflation in order to protect real wages in addition to linking performance to pay. With the 
drastically reduced inflation rate, around 10% in 2005, performance-related pay rises have started to 
be perceived as more `meaningful'. Until recently, PRP in Turkey more generally meant premiums 
and bonuses especially for senior managers and sales personnel. 
As far as the legislative environment is concerned, there are not any restrictions on the choice of 
remuneration systems for any companies in Turkey, including foreign ones. All companies 
established in Turkey, whether with foreign or domestic capital, and all employees working in those 
companies, Turkish or other nationalities, are regarded as legally the same. There are a few significant 
issues that affect the cost of labour and C&B practices in all companies in Turkey, namely, the 
obligatory national social security through the Social Security Institution and minimum wage 
requirements. 
The Social Security Institution (SSK) is the government organisation that provides retirement (lump 
sum and monthly pension) and health benefits for private sector workers. It is legally required to 
`register' all employees with SSK, although so-called 'illegal', i. e. unregistered, employment is 
widespread among SMEs and can be found even in large firms. The cost of labour for employers 
increases by around 19% of the gross salary/wages paid as SSK premiums. I Iowever, unregistered 
workers are not entitled to any health and retirement benefits, and cannot claim redundancy payments. 
41 Interview with HR Manager, FMCG2 
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Unionisation eliminates this problem, as unions do not allow any unregistered workers on site. The 
law is not strictly enforced, as the government turns a blind eye to this situation, in order not to reduce 
the employment provided `illegally'. 
Many of the interviewees in this research emphasised that their companies carefully and consciously 
stayed away from this or any other kind of unlawful behaviour on labour issues in Turkey, even if it 
would have yielded cost reductions. It was claimed that they were not involved in illegal practices 
such as employing unregistered labour, not paying wages on time, paying salaries partly 'in envelopes' 
and registering highly paid employees at lower pay rates so as to reduce social security payments, 
dismissals without redundancy payments, etc., despite the loose enforcement of the law in Turkey. It 
was not among the main goals of this research to find whether or not such illegal practices were indeed 
used by US MNCs, and necessary techniques that would allow such an investigation were not 
employed. Taking respondents' assertions at face value, one speculative explanation might be the 
unwillingness of the case companies to attract negative publicity. Some of them were among the 
largest companies in Turkey, usually listed in the '500 Largest Manufacturing Companies of Turkey' 
(ISO, 2005) in terms of net earnings, sales, exports, etc. IJVs were among the flagship companies of 
their Turkish parents. All of the cases were subsidiaries of well-known MNCs with established brand 
names. Therefore they were under close public scrutiny. If such companies were involved in 
unlawful behaviour, the government could not have turned a blind eye, even if it preferred to do so. 
Additionally, there are still the remains of an `anti-foreign capital' attitude in Turkey. Although it has 
reduced among the public and government considerably, foreign-capital firms do not want to be the 
subject of headlines about unlawful behaviour in their labour practices. 
The widespread problem of illegal employment practices without any health and retirement benefits is 
one side of the story in Turkey. On the other side of the coin, retirement benefits provided by SSK are 
not highly regarded because pensions are very low, not at all enough to maintain living standards 
similar to those attained while in active employment. Health services are not highly regarded either: 
hospitals are too crowded, with long queues and waiting lists, where quality is highly questionable. 
Consequently, large firms that want to attract and retain a highly qualified workforce have started to 
provide wide-coverage private health and life insurance plans for their employees (generally including, 
families). In some of the cases private health insurance plans were paid fully or partially by the 
company for all groups of employees, including blue-collar labour. Life and accident insurances were 
provided according to the position, i. e. for executive management and sales. These insurance plans 
had become common benefits provided in parts of the large corporate sector where the case companies 
considered them as important tools for attracting and retaining good employees. Secondly, private 
retirement plans ('Individual Retirement System' 'BES') have started to be considered in the benefits 
package, although only quite recently, as the system by private funds management started in 2004. 
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The private system is supposed to support the national social security system where individual 
employees pay for their own retirement plans. At the time of the fieldwork, BES had not been started 
yet, so there were no cases that provided private retirement plans as a benefit, except Holding I (of 
AutoCO1), where all the employees (like employees of all Holding! affiliates) were members of the 
Holding! Retirement Fund established decades ago. In most of the interviews, HR managers said that 
once BES began they would consider providing it as a benefit in order `not to lose their 
competitiveness in the market i49. A short benefits survey (see Chapter 3) conducted by e-mail with the 
HR staff interviewees during the write-up period revealed that private pension plans had indeed been 
started in some of the companies recently. 
The second issue that influences the cost of labour is the minimum wage, which is set by the 
Commission responsible at the beginning of every year. This is the minimum monthly pay that all 
firms have to pay to their registered employees. It is usually paid to those workers at the lowest skill 
and education level, usually in the non-unionised firms and SMEs S0 There is an ongoing public 
discussion because of the pressure from the IMF to further decrease the minimum wage, and apply 
differentiation according to regions, i. e. lower wage in less developed regions. The minimum wage is 
important in Turkey as the relatively lower cost of labour is among the major incentives for FDI 
inflow. However there were not any case firms that paid only the minimum wage, even in the lowest 
skilled jobs such as in textile manufacturing and hotel industries. Although cheap labour was one of 
the reasons for investment in Turkey, particularly in some sectors like textiles and FMCG, case 
companies in this research did not adopt a `low road' approach even in specific sectors, e. g. textile 
manufacturing or hotel. In fact, better compensation is found to be the norm among foreign-capital 
firms, which paid more than twice as much as the average of national firms in the 1990s51. Nichols 
and Sugur (2004) explain this by the large size of the foreign-capital firms in the Turkish business 
context, as they claim that the large corporate sector in Turkey in general provides much better reward 
packages than the SME sector (p. 32-33). While this can be one explanation, another related reason, 
particularly for the case companies in this study, can be found in the ILM approach. The case 
companies might have used attractive reward packages either to attract and retain more highly 
qualified employees because of industrial needs (e. g. car production or banking) or because of the 
company `philosophy' of providing fair terms and conditions (higher wages, job security, decent 
benefits, etc) even in the lower skills sectors (e. g. textile or food production). Even paying above the 
average market rates, these companies still had much cheaper labour costs than those in alternative, 
high labour cost countries, for instance when the Turkish plants were a part of the regional supply 
'9 Interview with HR Manager, FMCG2 30 It is 574 YTL for 2007 (average gross figure; net is 411 YTL, which is about US$305 at the ongoing exchange rate of 1.35 
YTL-US$1, April 2007 
51 
www. oecd. orgg 
133 
chain within the European countries. A final possible explanation for de-unionised and non-unionised 
companies can be the motivation to keep the unions at bay by providing already good rewards 
packages and working conditions (see Chapter 8). 
In brief, the constraining factors on the transfer of American MNCs' pay and PM systems to their 
Turkish subsidiaries come mainly in the form of scarce labour supply with the required qualifications 
and increasing job hopping and poaching of highly qualified employees (see Chapter 6). Given the 
few formal obstacles presented by the permissive legal and labour environment of Turkey, the lawful 
and `high road' approach of US MNCs cases is claimed to be linked to their adopted employment 
policies, i. e. ILM, non-unionisation, and fair treatment of employees, also transferred from corporate 
policies. To pursue these policies within the labour market where the qualified labour force is scarce, 
they transferred enhanced reward and PM systems developed at corporate and regional HQ. These 
systems were observed to follow a `commitment' and `high performance' approach, where links to 
promotions, T&D opportunities and career management were established to attract and retain the 
carefully selected employees. 
7.3. REWARD SYSTEMS IN US MNCS IN TURKEY 
This section analyses the interaction of influences of both American MNCs' corporate policies and the 
host country business environment on the design and application of reward systems in the case 
companies studied. Although policies were almost entirely transferred from US parents, their 
application was in certain instances adapted to the Turkish labour market conditions. Salary 
structures, position in the market and influences of corporate policies on the choice of the reward 
strategies are discussed first. Secondly, performance-related pay applications, i. e. salary increases and 
bonuses, are examined. Lastly, benefits policy and types of benefits provided in the Turkish local 
market are discussed. Differences in policy and applications for different groups of employees are 
indicated where relevant. 
It is argued that in general C&B policies and applications for various groups of employees followed 
the American or Turkish (in the 2 IJVs where Turkish JVPs managed C&B, i. e. AutoCOI and 
PharmaCO1) parent's corporate policies. Systems were highly centralised and strictly controlled 
without much if any flexibility given to subsidiary management or deviation allowed. Subsidiary and 
HR management were required to follow market rates and ranges, and benefits types, where the 
52 corporate policy was `competitiveness in the local markets. In some cases, flexibility was given for 
52 Indicated using the same expression by many interviewees in various companies. 
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the application of the policy and systems to employees below the levels of organisation specified in 
the corporate policies. 
While case companies in general did not experience significant formal restrictions imposed by the 
legislative system or unions on the transfer of US corporate reward policies, localisation in pay 
adjustments and types of benefits as a result of the factors discussed above (e. g. hyper-inflationary 
pressures and underdevelopment of the health and social security systems) was observed. Moreover, 
there were not significant differences between the policy and application of WOS and IJVs, i. e. 
AutoCOI and PharmaCO1, where Turkish parents were in charge of C&B systems. Explanations for 
the similarities between C&B (and PM) systems were comparable to those discussed for employment 
systems used by WOS and IJVs (see Chapter 6): American JVPs did not interfere with the application 
of reward management policies as long as the latter were in accordance with, firstly, their home-grown 
corporate policies and, secondly, other HR policies applied in the Turkish subsidiaries. Moreover, 
`pull' effects were observable where leading Turkish companies aspired to keep up with the most 
current developments in the HRM arena. Lastly, the HRM field in Turkey in general has been going 
through significant changes through trickle-up trajectories brought by international (mostly American) 
consulting companies and other MNCs. Many interviewees indicated that HRM in Turkey had been 
(positively) influenced by MNCs in general and US MNCs in particular since the late 1980s with the 
increased inflow of FDI. Significant developments in general can be argued to have moved HRM 
towards more `Americanisation' in some of the largest Turkish companies, especially in those with US 
JVPs. Holding1 and Holding3 are among the leading Turkish industrial conglomerates, operating 
IJVs, that are known to be following and transferring foreign managerial developments into Turkey. 
7.3.1. SALARYSTRUCTURES, POSITION IN THE MARKETAND CORPORATE POLICY 
It is important to start by noting that none of the case companies shared any figures on their pay, 
including actual salary ranges and levels, annual change rate ranges for different employee groups, 
etc., with the researcher. Financial issues, including salaries, are among the most sensitive business 
information for large organisations in Turkey and the case companies were no exception. Although 
they evidently shared this sensitive information with other (sometimes competitor) companies through 
their own networks and by participating in salary surveys, it was not publicly available. Salary survey 
data was in practice available to companies only, as it was extremely expensive. Trade unions had the 
data for only their own members, i. e. small numbers of blue-collar employees, therefore they were a 
very limited source of information to triangulate data. During the interviews at the companies, 
questions about reward systems had to be worded very carefully, and in most (if not all) of the 
interviews, it was important to emphasise that the researcher was not interested in the actual salary 
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f igures or even ranges; otherwise the whole interview might have been jeopardised. Therefore 
discussion of reward systems in this study does not include any figures provided by the companies. 
Following corporate policy and direction, all of the cases formed their salary structures locally based 
on job grading systems and current market rates. Without exception, the Hay job grading 
methodology, with certain adaptations to the company specific conditions, was used, as a corporate 
application. Actual pay rates in these structures were formed by subsidiary management according to 
local market conditions, but they were closely and constantly controlled by regional and/or corporate 
HQ for application and changes. Similarly, Turkish corporate parents (Holding! of AutoCOI and 
Holding3 of PharmaCOl) exerted their policy by preparing salary structures for all of their affiliates 
that consisted of 'broad bands' for all job grades in various job families based on an 'overall earnings' 
concept that also included bonuses, premiums and benefits. These salary bands were argued to be 
broad enough yet reflecting the corporate policy to fit all of their affiliates operating in a vast range of 
industries. Within these 'suggested' bands, which were in fact closely controlled by Bolding 11R 
Departments, case companies were given the flexibility to develop their own salary structures. At 
AutoCOI, for instance, a 'root salary' that was 'not dependent on status or function but decided 
according to job grades and market rates' was Holding l's corporate policy and used for the basic 
salary decisions. By looking at the candidate's qualifications they adjusted the starting salary 
accordingly at AutoCO1. 
Standard corporate policy in remuneration across cases can be summarised with the following fairly 
general comment as 'offering a locally competitive pay package to attract tue best candidates in the 
market"'. It was therefore very important for them not only to design such a salary structure but also 
to keep up with the changes in the ongoing market rates and applications in C&B. Again without 
exception, all the cases participated in salary surveys conducted regularly in the total market, specific 
industries, multinationals, large Turkish holdings and other competitor industries (e. g. FMCG for 
FinCO and TexCO) by international consulting companies, e. g. Ilay, Mercer, Watson & Wyatt, 
Thomas Perrin. Many of the case companies had additional sources of information about market rates 
in C&B. For instance, HoldingI and Holding3 had their own 'networks' consisting of the largest 
companies and multinationals in Turkey where they shared salary structures and ranges. I lotelCO's 
regional HQ used international salary surveys in their industry. FMCG2 was a member of a platform 
where HR managers of MNCs met regularly and discuss various issues, including salary figures. It 
was also a member of another platform in Izmir consisting of HR managers of MNCs in the Aegean 
region, where they shared especially blue-collar wages and salaries. 
53 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 
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When making annual salary increases, one of the most important inputs for adjustments therefore 
came from salary surveys and company networks about the current market rates. At FMCG 1 and 
FMCG2, market `surveillance' was done constantly in order to keep their competitive position. The 
following was typically stated by the senior managers at FMCG2: 
"We should not be competitive only in March when we increase salaries. We cannot 
simply make salary increases in March and keep them for a whole year without checking 
salary levels in the market. If we increase salaries in March and others make considerable 
adjustments in say July we might lose our competitiveness. So we constantly monitor 
salary levels in the market"sa 
At FMCGI, they made their salary adjustments in March and September, so as to take into account the 
most recent increase in rates and salary positions in the market after most of the companies had made 
their adjustments in January and July. Not losing their competitive position in the market was 
especially important for 'frontline employees' at FMCG1 and the sales force at FMCG2, as "our sales 
system and its backbone our sales force are our main competitive edge in Turkey'55- Moreover, sales 
managers and staff were subject to poaching by competitors (see Chapter 6). As argued in the 
previous chapter based on Osterman's (1987) classification, confidently ensuring availability of a 
qualified labour supply at foreseeable prices is the most important goal for companies that choose ILM 
approach. Therefore case companies' efforts towards achieving their general goal of securing a 
competitive position in the market with their salary and benefits structures and staying at that position 
can be understood as directly linked to their preferred employment system in Turkey. 
Within the general policy of `competitiveness in the market', case companies had more specific 
policies in their salary positions in the market, transferred directly from the US corporate I IQ. For 
instance at FMCGI, they had different levels aimed in the market for different positions: 
"Our corporate policy is aiming to be at the median among all companies in the market 
for clerical positions / levels; at the multi-national median for junior management levels; 
and at the multi-national Q-3 for senior management levels. For blue-collar employees, 
we aim to be at least at the median of multinationals and the manufacturing companies in 
the same region where the plant is located , 36 
Application of these market position policies was strictly enforced and closely controlled by regional 
and/or corporate HQ HR. At FMCG2, the following explanation by the J IR Manager was emphasised 
by the other senior managers interviewed: 
"Our corporate policy in compensation is to be in 3`d quartile from the bottom of the 
market wherever you go in the world. This is definitive and you cannot for instance 
... 57 suggest that `but we want to be in the top 80% of the Turkish market. 
54 Interviews with HR Director and GM, FMCG I ss Interview with Sales Director, FMCG2 
56 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 57 Interviews also with HR Director, Sales Director, Plant HR Manager, FMCG2 
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Similarly at TexCO, corporate policy was to be generally at the median, and the 3n° quartile of the 
local market for certain positions and key people they wanted to retain: "this is the definitive global 
corporate policy and cannot be changed or even offered to be changed! "" At FinCO, to reach their 
corporate policy of "paying at the locally competitive rates to ensure that we can hire the best talent 
available in the market' , 
S9 they aimed for the second quartile from the top as well. All the 
interviewees at FinCO, including those at the regional HQ, strongly emphasised that being locally 
competitive in their C&B package and related decisions - i. e. starting salaries, salary structure, annual 
increases, and keeping up-to-date by using survey data - was among their most important corporate 
policies, required to be followed strictly by the subsidiary, and controlled closely by regional and 
corporate HQ. Only at HotelCO, both at the local subsidiary and regional HQ levels, it was claimed 
that their corporate policy never aimed to be the top payer in the industry and "poach people with their 
salaries when opening a new hotel '60. However at the regional HQ, HR Director emphasised that they 
needed to be "competitive in the market, therefore paying at the upper levels". HotelCO was no 
exception in terms of meticulous adoption and use of the corporate policy and being subject to close 
control by the regional HQ. 
Turning to IJVs, AutoCO1 and PharmaCOI had adopted similar corporate compensation policies 
transferred directly from their Turkish parents. For instance Holding1 corporate policy was defined 
as, 
"to design an overall earnings system that is determined according to current market 
rates, aiming to be competitive and fair within the market and the individual affiliate 
company, considering responsibility and authority levels within the company as well as 
differentiating good performance to motivate our employees. "6' . 
This Holding]. policy was adopted at AutoCOI as well, supported by a salary structure where I lay 
methodology job grading and information from salary surveys and Holdingl's networks were 
incorporated. PharmaCOl had also adopted its Turkish parent's corporate policy, which was very 
similar to that of Holding! except that it stated a more definite level, i. e. paying an overall earnings 
package at the median level among its competitors, i. e. other large Turkish Holdings and their 
affiliates as well as multinational competitors. Similar to US parents of WOS, Turkish parents in 
charge of C&B at these two IJVs closely controlled salary structure and levels. Reporting to the 
Holding HR and getting their approvals as the central control and coordination unit especially for top 
level and key positions were usual practices. 
sý Interview with HR Manager, TexCO 
Interviews with HR Manager, FinCO 
60 Interviews with HR Director and GM, HotelCO 61 Interview with HR Coordinator, Holding] and Holding] website 
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Policy transfer from and close control by US and Turkish parents applied to salary structures for all 
employees, including blue-collar in manufacturing and rank-and-file in the services. For these groups 
although the general policy of being competitive was relevant, cost considerations were equally 
important. Although no hard evidence was available for comparison, interviewees at PharmaCOI (de- 
unionised; see Chapter 8) indicated that their blue-collar workers' wages were considerably lower than 
those in the other pharmaceuticals manufacturing company of Holding3, which was still unionised. 
Unions in the relevant sub-sectors claimed that wages for blue-collar workers at FMCG 1 (de- 
unionised) and FMCG2 (non-unionised) were much lower than those in the unionised firms in their 
respective industries. However, the only publicly available data were the average monthly wages of 
unionised workers in different sectors compiled and announced by the Confederation of Turkish 
Employers' Associations (TISK)62: as of July 2006, the weighted average of net monthly earnings 
(including additional payments as agreed in the collective agreements) was 1,572 YTL (or US$ 1,165) 
and the lowest figure (in textiles) was 838 YTL (or US$ 62063). If we assume that non-unionised 
workers earn the minimum wage, the average figure was around three times and even the lowest 
wages in the unionised textiles sector were 50% higher than the minimum wage. The researcher 
however is not in a position to make informed comparisons, as no actual pay information was 
provided by the case companies. 
Although cost of labour in production was equally important for the other two manufacturing 
companies in this study, i. e. the unionised cases AutoCOI and TexCO, pay structures and actual 
amounts were claimed to be considerably better than the average market rates, and (particularly in the 
case of TexCO) their respective sectors as reward structures were designed and applied according to 
the industry-wide collective agreements. At AutoCOI a very sophisticated job description and 
grading system was applied (see Chapter 8). According to the information by TISK, average monthly 
pay in the metalwork sector (in which car production and supply industries are included) was 1,237 
YTL (or US$ 916'4). In comparison to the minimum wage, which is the only available data as a 
benchmark, unionised textiles companies, including TexCO, and metalwork sectors, including 
AutoCO1, can be claimed to have provided considerably better pay than the market rates. 
In summary, there was a high degree of centralisation in the transfer of reward policies consistently 
observed across the case companies, which was in line with other case study findings of US MNCs in 
European countries (Almond et al., 2006b). US parents were found to have a strong inclination to 
establish their corporate salary structures, job grades, and position in the market. Verylimited 
discretion was given to Turkish subsidiary managements in the application of corporate compensation 
62 httrd/www. tisk. orp-. tr/p-osterizclcr 
63 at the ongoing exchange rate of 1.35YTL=US$) in April 2007 64 at the ongoing exchange rate of 35YTL-US$ I in April 2007 
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policies, where the local business environment necessitated adaptations of policies to local levels and 
ranges. To design salary structures and make actual salary decisions, they used the same job grading 
methodology as their corporate parents, participated in salary surveys by international firms as well as 
their own surveys through their local networks, developed and then maintained their salary ranges 
according to the corporate global policy, i. e. `competitiveness in the local market'. Although it is 
difficult to make definitive claims without concrete wage data, the emphasis on 'local 
competitiveness' meant that they paid over the market averages according to their corporate policies, 
e. g. aiming to be in the second quartile from the top or median of the MNCs rate etc. Following 
market rates especially for key positions through survey data very closely was important, as these were 
more difficult to fill and more open to poaching and job hopping. Except for a small number of the 
lowest-skilled, routine and clerical jobs, which the interviewees did not even feel the need to mention 
in most cases, systematic development and continuous inspection of pay strategies and structures for 
managerial and blue-collar jobs were emphasised by the interviewees. Regional and/or corporate I IQ 
constantly monitored these applications and subsidiaries had to get approval for basic salary structures 
at the start-up phase (e. g. at HotelCO when opening a new hotel, they consulted the regional head 
office before finalising their salary structure, which was a 'band range' with minimum, maximum and 
median values for each job grade devised by considering current market rates) or when making annual 
salary adjustments, which is examined in more detail in the next section. 
7.3.2. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE 
Performance was linked to pay through salary increases, bonuses, and awards for individual and team- 
based exceptional success. As such, PRP was strongly emphasised in all case companies. It was 
applied to managerial, professional and white-collar employees in all cases, and to blue-collar and 
operational in some (FMCG1, FMCG2, FinCO and HotelCO). Although PRP was also dependent on 
company performance, assessing, differentiating and rewarding individual success, especially for 
managerial and professional employees, was a very important policy in all case studies, including in 
AutoCOl and PharmaCOl where the Turkish parent's corporate policies were adopted. In the next 
part, the annual salary increase process will be discussed separately for firstly managerial, professional 
and white-collar employees, and secondly for blue-collar and non-managerial employees. 
7.3.2.1. Annual Salary Increases 
Part of the annual salary increases of managerial, professional and white-collar employees was linked 
to individual PE results, while total increases were derived by considering the company performance, 
current market salary figures (by using information from salary surveys) and the inflation rate. When 
hyperinflation was prevalent, until 2003-4, like most other companies in the Turkish market, US 
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MNCs used to make two salary adjustments a year. The first was done at around the beginning of the 
year, which consisted of two separate rates: one for inflation adjustment, given across the board, and 
one performance-related increase rate, different rates according to individual PE results. A second 
inflation adjustment was given at around half-year, where the same increase rate was applied for all. 
In some even more extraordinary years (e. g. the economic crises in 1994 and 2001) when annual 
inflation and devaluation rates hit record levels, some case companies made three or four increases a 
year, of which only one had a performance-related part, and the rest were done to adjust salaries for 
inflationary losses. 
Extraordinarily high inflation adjustment rates applied to salaries made Turkish subsidiaries stand out 
as `outsiders' among US MNCs' subsidiaries and were difficult to explain and negotiate with regional 
offices. However untraditional and unusual it had been for the US parents, case companies were 
nevertheless able to localise the salary increase process according to the Turkish conditions, arguing 
on the basis of compliance with corporate policies of 'keeping competitiveness in the local labour 
market to attract and retain talent'. In the case of FMCG2, they had even negotiated and were able to 
apply higher performance-related increases ("around 10-12% instead of the usual 3-5%") in Turkey 
because "when salaries are increased by 70% 3-5%performance increase does not mean anything to 
anyone " ss 
From 2003, following the gradual fall in the inflation rate in Turkey to 'comprehensible' levels, case 
companies changed their salary increase process to once a year, which, as a couple of interviewees 
from different companies indicated with relief, "had taken us out of the 'outsider' category and put us 
together with the 'ordinary'subsidiaries! " In the new process, an 'individual' single rate, which 
reflected the combined influence of inflation rate, performance results and market conditions (i. e. to 
keep up to the market rates for specific positions, additional or no increases) has been applied once a 
year. In this way, the same rate across-the-board for inflation adjustment at any individual 
performance rating level has been discontinued. Some employees did not even get an increase to 
make up for inflation losses, experiencing decreases in their real salary. Across I folding I companies, 
for instance, annual salary increase rates ranged between 0-55% in 2003, where employees who had 
received no increase (0%) for the lowest level PE rating did not get even an inflation adjustment, 
resulting in a salary cut in real terms. At TexCO, pay rises given in 2003 were between 15-35%, when 
an 18% inflation adjustment rate was assumed. Those who received 15% increase therefore 
experienced 3% reduction in real salaries. Through such annual salary review processes, performance 
results had recently gained an even more significant influence on pay, sometimes resulting in cuts. 
The new approach was in general claimed to have resulted in a more strictly scrutinised reward policy 
6S Interview with HR Manager, FMCG2 
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at the individual employee level within the firms. However companies still incorporated sectoral 
salary levels into their adjustment policies, as the corporate policies of maintaining certain pay levels 
were not reported to have changed. 
The annual salary increases and distribution to individual employees were thoroughly controlled by 
regional and, particularly for executive positions, corporate HQ through the subsidiary IHR budget, PE 
ratings and forced ranking processes. Within the annual budget process, the subsidiary IIR budget 
was submitted, with such details as salary ranges, increase rates, benefits budget, and total, 
compensation cost. All of it needed to be explained by the subsidiary management, negotiated with 
and approved by the regional HQ, who in turn needed to get approval from corporate I IQ. 
The only exception among the case companies where performance was reportedly not directly linked 
to annual salary increase was HotelCO. Interviewees at HotelCO and USIlotel's regional I IQ strongly 
emphasised that there was no linkage between annual salary increases and PE results. Once a year 
salary increases given to all employees were decided according to the past year's financial 
performance, the next year's business plans, the inflation rate and market conditions. I lowever, 
HotelCO's HR Director later explained that individual salary changes within the minimum/maximum 
range in the salary structures for any position depended 'obviously' on the performance of the 
employee, where better performers were moved to higher levels within that band. Therefore at 
HotelCO too PE results were in some way linked to pay rises, but perhaps not using a standardised 
method applied transparently, as in the other case companies. 
Although achieving higher performance and close monitoring were strongly emphasised for blue- 
collar employees in manufacturing, performance-linked annual pay rises for blue-collar employees 
were applied only in FMCG2. They used a sophisticated PE process, very similar to that for 
managerial / professional employees, for 'technicians', i. e. blue-collar workers, at the plant; team- 
based and individual results were linked to pay rises given once a year. At PharmaCOI there was a 
'monitoring' system based on production results for blue-collar workers. However, these were not 
linked to annual pay increases. At FMCG1, there was team and individual PE based on SMART 
objectives in manufacturing but not linked to pay rises. At AutoCOI, although it was stated that there 
was no formal PE process for blue-collars, production targets were continuously monitored and 
successful teams and individuals were rewarded. At TexCO, usual production statistics were 
monitored but there was no PE for manufacturing employees or additional recognition or reward for 
team or individual success. Annual pay rises for blue-collar employees were given according to 
collective agreement rules at AutoCOl and TexCO. 
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It seems that providing competitive C&B packages and good working conditions were adequate in 
most cases to retain their blue-collar and operational workers, as there is negligible job hopping in 
these positions in the large corporate sector that provides much better conditions than the SMEs 
(Nichols and Sugur, 2004). One of the reasons for the fairly sophisticated performance-related pay 
rise system in FMCG2 might be its strong non-unionist attitude: to keep unions at bay, without having 
to use harsh methods, they aimed to keep blue-collar workers motivated and satisfied through this 
scheme. Moreover, the possibility of job hopping by their highly skilled and educated 'technicians' 
was higher than that of the blue-collar workers in the other non-unionised manufacturing cases 
studied, due to the recently intensified inflow of FDI into the same region and sub-sector. Avoiding 
unions was probably also an important incentive for FMCGI (though to a lesser extent with the lower 
required level of qualifications in its operational workers) for including all workers at the plant level in 
the stock-option bonus plans. Individual and team-based pay for performance for blue-collar 
employees was administered largely through awards and (in some cases) bonuses, which are discussed 
next. 
7.3 2.2. Bonuses and Awards 
As is the case in the payment of wages and salaries, there are no rules on the payment of bonuses or 
special awards imposed by law in Turkey. It is common practice among large corporate firms to pay 
bonuses for managerial, professional and highly qualified operational employees (16 monthly salaries; 
one salary as ̀ bonus' every quarter, e. g. at AutoCO1, and ̀ premiums' to top, and sometimes middle, 
management and sales positions). Case companies also provided bonuses and premiums according to 
the policies and schemes transferred from their US (or Turkish, in AutoCOI and PharmaCO1) parents. 
Although the details of bonus payment schemes were never shared with the researcher in any of the 
cases, general policy was the same in all, including AutoCOI and PharmaCOI where IloldingI and 
llolding3 policies were applied. Quoting from the regional IIQ IIR Director of USFin, which 
summarises accounts by many other interviewees at FinCO as well as other cases, the policy was 
"to reward successful performance, i. e. reaching or exceeding targets, by completely 
variable, performance-related bonus. In this way, we direct individuals towards the 
delivery of results by intensifying their efforts to reach the agreed objectives in the PE 
process". 
In the case companies, high performance (evaluated higher than 'above average' or 'as expected') 
was rewarded by bonuses. Bonuses were given mostly to higher level (executive) management 
(although the exact level of management changed from company to company) and sales positions, 
based on individual and subsidiary performance. At FinCO, for instance, a very competitive bonus 
system, based entirely on high performance and transferred from USFin, was applied, especially at 
"Interview with HR Director, USFin EMEA HQ 
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the higher levels of the management pyramid. Similarly at FMCG 1, through the American parent's 
'Executive Compensation Programmes' higher-level managers received an annual managerial bonus 
at the end of the year, linked to their individual PE and the financial performance results of the 
subsidiary. At HotelCO, where USHotel's global corporate policy was applied, annual premiums 
were given to top management that were linked to three performance indicators: achieving certain 
percentage of success rates in the consumer audits ('Mystery Guest' programmes), results of 
employee opinion surveys, and annual financial performance results of the subsidiary. `Annual 
Revenue Premium' ('ARP') for all managerial and white-collar employees, and 'Leadership Share' 
for top management were the global corporate programmes of USTex applied at TexCO in Turkey. 
In ARP, bonuses were calculated as a percentage of individual salaries - 7% for level x, 10% for the 
next level, etc. and "cannot be even suggested to be changed in different local markets6 ". 
At AutoCO1 and PharmaCOI, Holdingl's and Holding3's corporate policies of annual bonuses for 
top-level management depending on company performance were applied, where rates and amounts 
were decided by Holding managements, as in all affiliated companies. One difference between WOS 
and IJVs where Turkish parents managed C&B was in the application of company stocks given as 
bonuses. At FMCG1, FMCG2, FinCO, HotelCO and TexCO ('Phantom Stock' Options, as USTex 
was a private company) corporate stocks and stock options made a significant part of bonus schemes 
for top level / executive management. In fact, more widespread use of ESOPs given at all levels of 
employees was one of the most important policies at FinCO and FMCG 1. At USFin there was a 
recent policy of reducing or altogether eliminating various non-cash benefits, replaced by 
performance-related bonus schemes at all levels of the organisation, where part of the bonuses would 
be paid by company stock. Applying various company stock ownership plans down to the lowest 
level of employees, not only for senior staff, was one of the major corporate policies at USFin at the 
time of the fieldwork. It was argued by European IHQ IHR Director that USFin was very keen to 
replicate its US-based system across its subsidiaries in the region68, in a similar fashion found in the 
US financial services MNE case by Bloom et al. (2003). Corporate HQ was argued to believe in the 
greater power of owning and earning from company shares than that of non-cash benefits in 
increasing motivation and commitment among all employees. Such an application was argued to be 
also in line with reducing costs and increasing stockholders' wealth through higher company 
earnings, which reflected the `increasing shareholder wealth' approach and the related constraints 
experienced in the American business system. This corporate policy was in transitional application in 
67 Interview with HR Manager, TexCO 
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the EMEA region and only for one part of the company so far, and had not yet been brought to 
Turkey". 
At FMCG1 on the other hand including all employees in the `Share Power' scheme, i. e. distributing 
USFMCGI shares as an annual bonus, was local management's decision. As a strict corporate policy 
of USFMCG1, the 'Share Power' scheme had to be applied globally to all managerial employees 
above a certain level. With the discretion given to subsidiary management in Turkey, they had started 
to include blue-collar workers in the `Share Power'. Inclusion of blue-collar workers in 'Share 
Power' (and many other highly-regarded benefit schemes applied to managerial and white-collar 
workers) had started following de-unionisation, and was given as an example of fair and good 
management, as a result of which it was argued that workers `should not need a union7 '. USFMCG 1 
had given the flexibility to apply this (and other) benefit schemes to blue-collar employees71, which 
might be explained in the 'preference' of the USFMCGI's corporate management to keep unions out. 
In the specific case of FMCG 1 therefore corporate policy had not only been transferred but also 
localised in application by subsidiary management with the discretion granted by the regional 1IQ as 
a result of the interaction of US corporate policy (i. e. anti-union) and labour market conditions in 
Turkey (i. e. providing a highly regarded rewards package to attract and retain non-unionised 
labour)72. 
Bonuses and premiums for sales positions were also applied in most cases (except at IlotelCO), 
linked to reaching sales targets and fulfilling quotas. Again, no details of these schemes were 
obtainable, but in all cases they were reported to be directly linked to SMART job-related objectives 
of sales and related positions (e. g. branches in FinCO). It was clearly stated that these schemes were 
applied according to (US or Turkish) corporate policies, within 'hands on' control and approval by 
regional / corporate HQ or Holding HQ. 
In addition to bonuses for various groups of employees, special success awards for non-managerial 
and blue-collar employees were common practice in most of the case companies. The scheme at 
IIotelCO was a globally applied corporate programme transferred to Turkey", whereas the 
programmes for blue-collar workers at FMCG174 and FMCG275 were developed locally. At 
IiotelCO, the scheme had 3 components, recognising and rewarding success at individual ('Stars'), 
69 Interview with Regional Credit Cards Director, USFin EMEA HQ (who later has been transferred to Turkey as the General 
Manager of Commercial Banking) 70 Interview with HR Director, FMCG1 71 Interview with Regional Organisational Development Director, USFMCG n Interview with Regional Organisational Development Director, USFMCG 1 » Interviews with Regional HQ HR Director USHotel, and HR Director & GM, Hote1CO 74 Interview with Regional Organisational Development Director USFMCG I, & HR Director FMCG 75 Interview HR Manager & Plant HR Manager, FMCG2 
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team ('Innovators') and company ('Achievers') levels. `Team of the Month' and ̀ Team of the Year' 
programmes at FMCG1 and 'Recognition of Success' programme at FMCG2 were team-based 
schemes, in which manufacturing employees were recognised and rewarded for reaching and 
exceeding team targets. At AutoCOI and PharmaCOI very similar team-based recognition and 
reward programmes were developed and applied at subsidiary levels (not Holding applications) for 
product and process improvement, cost reduction, increasing customer satisfaction, etc. 
Considering PRP schemes for blue-collar workers in the case companies, it is argued that firstly, 
performance was not linked to pay increases, except in FMCG2. To increase motivation by 
rewarding high performance, companies preferred to use bonuses and awards as well as more non- 
financial recognition tools linked to exceptional group and individual performance. Secondly, local 
subsidiaries were given much more discretion in the design and application of schemes for blue-collar 
workers. These were both corporate-driven and locally developed schemes for manufacturing 
employees used as another tool to "keep these employees motivated and committed", in line with their 
ILM approach (see Chapter 6). Use of performance-related pay increases and bonuses in the non- 
unionised companies was also linked to the attitudes of the US parents. 
73.3. BENEFITS: POLICYANDAPPLICATIONS 
In benefits schemes, a similar general corporate policy of `ensuring competitiveness in the market by 
providing those benefits commonly given in the local market and retention of employees through a 
good benefits package' was generally found across the case companies. In some cases, there were 
more specific policies, such as being `at the median' of the market in FMCG2 or 70`h percentile from 
the bottom of the market in TexCO. At HotelCO, the corporate 'guideline' on benefits policy as 
indicated at the regional HQ was: 
"market, cost and ethics driven, i. e. to be a fair and honest employer, providing whatever 
is necessary and keeps the company in the median among the competitioni76 
Industry-specific conditions were also taken into consideration if relevant, as in the case of I IotelCO 
where it was argued that the `Hotel industry is not renowned for providing a generous benefits 
package'" or at AutoCO I where HR/IR Director stated that 'not much is traditional in the car 
manufacturing industry'. More importantly, application of the general benefits policy was still very 
strictly controlled by regional and/or corporate HQ, although the content and administration was left to 
the subsidiaries. Approval for a new benefit to be included in the package was needed from the 
regional HQ, as in the case of TexCO, where 'they would not approve a benefit which is not given by 
76 Interview with HR Director, USHotel Regional HQ 
n Interview with HR Director, USHotel Regional HQ, & HR Director, HotelCO 
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at least half of the companies in the market'78 or in the case of FinCO where they had recently got 
approval to start working on providing a pension plan as a new benefit after lengthy and detailed 
correspondence with the regional C&B Director and the International Benefits Office at corporate I IQ, 
where all health and pension plans had to be checked and approved before being applied in 
subsidiaries79. While aiming to be competitive in the market, controlling the cost of benefits was an 
important issue for the case companies, especially for FinCO, TexCO and IlotelCO. Both USFin and 
USTex corporate managements were in the process of reducing the benefits globally as a result of a 
corporate policy developed in the USA, by consolidating various benefits (especially health insurance 
and pension plans in the case of USFin) into bonuses and salaries. These changes in the policies had 
already been applied in the US at the time of the fieldwork, however they had not yet been brought to 
the EMEA region. It was argued by interviewees that it would be very difficult, almost infeasible, to 
take back the locally `traditional' benefits in Turkey80. To be able to stay competitive in the local 
labour market they would have to continue providing most of the benefits, as tightly constrained by 
the TBS, such as health insurance and pension plans. 
Looking at the actual application of the general benefits policy, the influence of various constraints in 
the TBS can be observed. A rather homogeneous set of highly regarded benefits was found across the 
cases, provided in order to keep a competitive position among competitors in the market, as these 
benefits are the most important ones expected from a good corporate job by employees targeted by the 
case companies (Table 7.1). Among these were various insurance plans (health, life, accident), 
transportation, free food and beverage services, social and cultural activities (new year dinners, 
company parties and picnics, sports clubs, tournaments, etc. ). It is worth pointing to the rather high- 
value benefits of health (and in some cases life) insurance plans that were in some cases provided for 
all employees, including blue-collar, and families. Such benefits above and beyond those provided by 
the national social security system (SSK) are not traditionally found in small and medium sized 
Turkish companies. However, in recent years 'preferred' employers, generally in the large corporate 
sector, have started to offer these benefits, and US MNCs in this sense acted in line with their 
corporate policy, i. e. attracting and retaining the best talent available in the market by providing one of 
the most favourable benefits, which is now becoming more common among large domestic employers. 
7' Interview with HR Manager, TexCo 79 Interview with HR Director C&B, USFin Regional HQ 
t0 Interview with HR Director C&B, USFin Regional HQ & HR Manager, FinCO 
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Table 7.1. Benefits 
Benefit Types AutoCOI FA1CGI FMCG2 PharmaCOI TexCO FInCO 1lotelCO 
Free Cafeteria Services x X X X X X 
Free Tea x x x x x x x 
Food 'tickets' X X X X X 
Private Health Insurance (incl. 
family) 
X X X X x x X93 
Life Insurance X X X41 X X X 
Private Pension Plans X X X X X 
Turkish Holden Pension Fund X N/A N/A N/A 
Bus Services x x X X X X 7 
Company car x X X X X X X 
Mobile Phone X X X X X X 
La to x x x x x 
New Year Dinner/Part X X X X X X 
Annual Picnic/Dinner x X X X X X 
Sports Facilities, Clubs, Social 
Activities 
x X X X X 
Child care x 
Discounted purchase options of 
company products 
x X X X X 
Lower rate credits from company 
funds 
x X 
Additional annual paid leaves x X X X X X 
Annual Health Check-u s X X X X X X 
Individual Accident Insurance X X X X X X 
Financial and non-financial Awards 
for long-term service (e. g. over 5 yrs, 
10 yrs, 15 s, etc 
x X X X X X X 
Sala /a advances x X X X 
Gifts or bonus payments for 
marriage, new child, death in the 
famil etc. 
x X X 
Supplementary payments for 
children, heating, education, religious 
hol days. 
x X X 
Purchase options of company cars 
and other assets 
x X X 
Annual Social Meetings for Sales Force x X 
111 For managerial and white-collar employees 
t2 For employees in the regions, where there are not company cafeteria services u3 different plans, depending on seniority in the company; A: 3-10 years, b: 10-20 years, C: over 20 years of experience in 
the company; after3 years, starting from the 37'h month, company pays 1/3 of the premiums, including for family members; 
new employees (i. e. until 3 years) can buy A policy and pay in 12 instalments him/herself. "For salaried (not waged) employees only; after 12 months of service; employee can buy the same plan for family members 
at the same price paying him/herself in instalments; company does not pay 
15 For top-level management only 
" For Managers only 
87 For Managers only 
For top-level management only 
Holdingl Pension Plan, for all employees in the affiliates of Holding I, through fioldingl'a wide programme 90 For top-level management only 91 In Istanbul only ,= Depending on the position, e. g. management or sales 93 Not to white-collar & managerial employees at the Plant 
N For General Manager only 
95 Depending on the position, e. g. management or sales 96 Not to white-collar & managerial employees at the Plant 97 Depending on the position, e. g. management or sales 
Employees above Department Head level can use the Hotel's facilities at a discounted rate 99 All employees can use Hotel's restaurants, cafes, etc at 50% discount rate 0° For top-level management only 
01 For employees over 50 
102 For frequent travellers 
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Localisation of policy implementation was further observed in some other benefits stemming from the 
conditions in the Turkish environment (see Table 7.1). Free cafeteria services on site or an equivalent 
benefit for the sales / regional staff (i. e. `tickets' that can be used to buy food in various places) and 
transportation services were typically provided, although these were not common benefits in many 
other countries. In Turkey, the majority of employees travel a considerable distance to work and do 
not have cars. Public transportation is very difficult and time consuming. Therefore case companies 
adopted this local application, and provide their own bus services, which had the additional benefit of 
bringing employees to work on time and comfortably, ready to work with increased efficiency. Food 
services cannot be found around plants, and in a relatively low-income country, free food and 
beverage is considered an important benefit. These two types of benefits are provided in almost all 
large Turkish companies, particularly in the public sector, and case companies were no exception. 
A noteworthy issue was about the application of childcare benefit: according to Turkish Labour Law, 
it is compulsory for companies employing more than 150 female employees (regardless of their age 
and marital status) to provide on-site childcare. However it was provided in only two cases, i. e. 
TexCO and AutoCO2 (only at its Istanbul plant). In some of the cases, e. g. I lotelCO, FMCGI, 
FMCG2, there was not the required number of female employees to make it obligatory for the 
company to provide childcare. However others, for instance AutoCOI, where there were around 
7,000 employees, would definitely be subject to this clause of the law. At PharmaCOI it was stated in 
the e-survey that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the law, without any 
explanation, even though the number of female employees was above 150. In FinCO, the reason for 
not providing on-site childcare facility was explained as the preference of their female employees, as 
professionals with different socio-economic backgrounds from those of blue-collar female workers, 
for `private childcare arrangements'103. This finding contradicts the interviewees' claims that their 
companies did not engage in any unlawful behaviour. The fact that they did not provide childcare was 
probably because the law was recent and not yet strictly enforced. Although some NGOs recently 
started to work towards raising awareness about the legal obligation among the public, businesses and 
even the government to enforce the law, many large and well-known domestic and foreign companies 
were identified as not providing childcare facilities. Although US MNCs, as ̀ fair and preferred' 
employers, could have been expected to provide this benefit in Turkey, even if not required or 
enforced by law, they might not do so in order not to be ahead of competitor firms in providing 
benefits. For instance it was claimed at TexCO that childcare benefit provided for the plant was one 
of the most important reasons for being considered as a highly preferred employer around that region 
by female blue-collar employees. 
103 Interview with HR Director R&S, USFin Regional HQ, who used to be the HR Director at FinCO 
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The analysis of benefits policy and applications revealed no any major differences between WOS and 
UVs where Turkish JVPs managed C&B. Holdingl's benefits policy across its numerous affiliates in 
various sectors was shaped 'for attracting and retaining talented employees in the long-tern' 104. 
1lolding3 also adopted a policy that aimed 'to attract talent by being competitive in the market'. Both 
of them had a further policy of providing the same set of benefits across all their affiliates. Benefits 
such as social and cultural facilities and activities, long term service awards, and most importantly, 
private health insurance and a pension fund for all employees provided at AutoCO I came from the 
'Family of Holding]. Programme'. This reportedly very 'prestigious' holding scheme provided 
additional benefits to its members, such as various subsidised or free services (e. g. banking, insurance) 
and products from Holding1 affiliates. At PharmaCO1, the benefits package was transferred from 
Holding3, which included most of the items in AutoCOl's set of benefits, while no private health 
insurance was provided for waged employees at (de-unionised) PharmaCO 1. Although the benefits 
policy and applications were transferred from the Turkish JVPs, and there were not any benefits 
provided through US JVPs (e. g. stock options), they were not significantly different from those of 
WOS. 
In this section salary structures, variable pay practices (i. e. performance-related salary increases, 
bonuses and awards) and benefits in the studied US MNCs were analysed. It was found that firstly, 
rewards policies were transferred from US parents (or Turkish Holdings, in the case of IJVs) with 
localisation in certain applications, resulting in `hybridisation'. Secondly, US (or Turkish, in IJVs) 
corporate parents closely controlled reward policies and practices in the Turkish subsidiaries, where 
well-defined salary structures, annual increases and ranges as well as benefits packages needed 
approvals. Adaptation of policies to the Turkish conditions were also observed in annual salary 
increases and benefits types. Increased discretion was given to subsidiary managements, especially 
for development and application of performance-linked pay practices for blue-collar employees that 
were used to retain and keep these employees motivated in their respective firms explained by two 
main factors: relative difficulty of finding and retaining better qualified employees and corporate 
inclinations to keep unions out. 
7.4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (I'MS) 
In this section components of PMS for different groups of employees in the US MNCs are discussed. 
Firstly, sophisticated and very similar PM systems and processes for managerial/ professional white- 
collar employees were observed across the case companies, which were transferred from their 
104 Interview with HR Coordinator, Holding] and Holding) website 
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American parents (FMCG1, FMCG2, TexCO, FinCO, and HotelCO) or Turkish Holdings (AutoCOl 
and PharmaCOI). Secondly, these systems and processes were almost identical across the cases, 
whether WOS or IJVs where Turkish parents were in charge of PMS. PMS, together with reward 
systems, were the corporate policy most closely controlled by the US and Turkish parents alike. 
Thirdly, PM involved participatory and detailed PE and career management, and was linked to reward 
systems as well as T&D, identification of high potentials (HI-PO), promotions and succession 
planning as well as redundancy decisions. Figure 7.1 illustrates the general PMS cycle for managerial, 
professional and white-collar employees observed in the case companies. Finally, although PE 
systems were also closely associated with performance and financial measurements, the 
developmental role of PM and career-related aspects were emphasised for the same groups of 
employees at least as much as its linkage to PRP. 
In contrast to the strong emphasis on PE and PMS for managerial and white-collar employees in all 
the cases, it was not described as such a significant process for blue-collar workers, except in FMCG2. 
In fact, in some of the cases, 'no formal PE process for blue-collar workers' 105 was reported, while 
production statistics were continuously monitored and incentives were provided for improvement 
through individual and team-based rewards. PE in manufacturing was not directly linked to PRP in 
terms of individualised annual salary increases (with the exception of FMCG2) and bonuses (with the 
exception of FMCG1), nor to T&D and promotion opportunities (with the exception of FMCG2); as a 
result, it was not perceived as a `proper' PE system by interviewees. In the next section, the 
participatory and developmental nature of the PE process firstly for managerial/ professional and 
white-collar employees, and secondly for blue-collar employees is analysed. 
105 Interview with assistant HR Manager, PharmaCOI 
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Job-related objectives: 
Business (company) objectives 
4 
Departmental / Divisional objectives 
4 
Individual (SMART) objectives 
Competencies 
u 
Assessment of employee's competencies 
u 
Competencies selected to be developed 
yr 
Individual Objectives for PE I Individual Developmental Plans 
Organisational T&D plans 
(Budget, Courses, Schedules) 
Regular Monitoring & Coaching 
Informal Formal (no grading) Formal 
(monthly. quarterly) (mid-year) (end of year) 
GRADING & FORCED EVALUATION I ERSONAL 
RANKING REPORTS I ROFILE 
ROMOTIONS (or Dismissals) I 
IDENTIFICATION OF 'TALENT' OR 
'I11GII POTENTIAL' 
RELATED PAY 
I salary increases & Bonuses 





7.4.1. PARTICIPATORYAND DEVELOPMENTAL PE PROCESS 
Strong centralisation efforts of the US parents were evident in the PE systems that were reported to be 
transferred directly from the corporate HQ. An intensive effort was observed for the standardisation 
of PE forms and criteria at those firms where the application according to corporate policy was left to 
the local subsidiaries (e. g. FMCG2, TexCO, and AutoCOl), while in others the whole process had 
been already standardised across subsidiaries. At all stages, i. e. identification of PE objectives, regular 
monitoring and coaching, and evaluations, a highly participatory approach was described across the 
cases. 
The concept of `performance' in the USA has been extended from strictly measurable business goals 
to include more qualitative assessment of `soft' aspects of individual competency, e. g. teamwork, 
leadership, communication, etc. (e. g. Almond et al., 2006a). Accordingly, PE processes in the case 
companies were found to be a combination of `traditional' and these more contemporary approaches. 
Firstly, two separate sets of individual objectives were identified and agreed mutually by employees 
and supervisors. The first set, the 'traditional' `job-related objectives', was derived with a cascading 
down approach starting with company goals, down to departmental / divisional goals, from which 
individuals identified their own objectives. Top-level management shared the company's targets with 
their employees, and lower level management and employees were encouraged and expected to be 
actively involved in achieving these results by discussing and designing departmental and individual 
objectives. Moreover, when it came to `signing and locking next year's goals onto the PEform, no 
one is surprised as everyone decides his/her aims in collaboration with their managers, considering 
departmental and organisational goals for next year' 106 
In PharmaCOI, for instance, the Business Plan was prepared in a highly collaborative process, where 
the process began with preparing a very detailed Business Plan at the departmental level, developed in 
a bottom-up manner, from individuals to departmental heads, who in turn met in May at the 'Business 
Plan Meetings' organised by the HR Manager, then went back to their departments to further discuss 
objectives, leading to the finalising of the company Business Plan around October. In TexCO, the 
same approach was followed, which ended with employees having prepared their own 'RAP' 
("Results Action Plan") that showed individual objectives derived from departmental objectives using 
a 'waterfall' approach, by also considering 'JPCR' ("Job Purpose Critical Results") which showed the 
critical expected results from each position. 'RAP's need to be discussed and agreed both by the 
employee and manager. At FMCG1 and FMCG2, an almost identical process was followed, except 
106 Interviews with HR Managers, PharmaCOl and FMCG2 
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business goals for the next year were `given' to the GM from the regional IIQ. From those, similar 
top-down and bottom-up processes were pursued. In FMCG2 for instance most of the departmental 
managers and directors invested time and money into taking their direct reportees to an off-site 
meeting where departmental and individual goals were discussed and agreed: 'It is a two-way process; 
it cannot succeed as [a] one-way [process] 107. 'SMART', i. e. 'Specific, Measurable, Aligned, 
Realistic and Timely', job-related objectives were used across the case companies, as much as possible 
to make it easier to monitor and evaluate accomplishments' 108. 
The second, 'contemporary', part of individual goals, i. e. competency-based objectives, were 
understood to be a recent application with more of a developmental purpose. They were related to 
core competencies employees needed to develop or improve to be able to perform better in their 
current position or prepare for the next promotion. At FMCGI, this group was called `human-related' 
objectives and consisted of three main subsets related to teams, project groups and leadership 
competencies, as identified in a 'guide' by the corporate HQ. At PharmaC01, HR department in 
principle suggested two to three core competencies for each employee identified to be developed each 
year, as ̀ we do not believe that one can develop or improve more [compctencies] within a year' 109. At 
IlotelCO, a global corporate policy of introducing competency-based objectives alongside job-related 
ones in the PE were just being piloted at the time of the fieldwork and was to be applied the following 
year only to the managerial levels. At AutoCOI there used to be a company-developed PE process 
with a `managerial competencies' element only for those who were currently managers, but this 
system was being replaced with a 'goal setting and competency-based' approach developed recently 
by Holding1, which would impose competency-based objectives for all employees. AutoCOI was 
among the first affiliates to pilot and apply it. At TexCO and FinCO, there was not a separate group of 
competency-based objectives. However, 'focused' plans for the development of necessary 
competencies to reach job-related objectives were discussed and agreed between the employee and 
manager in the 'Developmental Plan' at TexCO and 'Development Survey' at FinCO. 
This highly participatory and developmental approach was also employed in the regular monitoring 
and coaching process, which was conducted in one-to-one meetings throughout the year (monthly, 
quarterly, or whenever deemed necessary by the employee or manager) informally and at least twice a 
year (mid-year and end of year) formally. In TexCO, for example, 
"Monitoring and counselling meetings should be held ideally each month but it is not 
formally obligatory, meaning no reports or grading are required. However our managers 
know that the better the coaching and assessment by managers, the higher the chances of 
110 promotion and development for the employee". 
107 Interview with HR Manager, FMCG2 10t Interviews with HR Manager, TexCO 109 Interview with Assistant HR Manager, PharmaCOI 110 Interviews with HR Manager and GM, TexCO 
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Informal and formal meetings throughout the year were used to 'see if everything's on track as 
planned' and 'take corrective action if necessary' as well as to `keep you constantly motivated by 
discussing future career and development possibilities and additional action to be taken this year' l 11. 
The last phase of the PE process, i. e. formal evaluation and grading, was similarly reported to be done 
in an open and participatory way, where an in-depth meeting for discussion of results, possible 
development actions, and future prospects was held and reported. At FMCG2, every manager spared 
about half a day for each direct reportee to reflect on and discuss the previous year's performance 
results. At all case companies, formal PE reports were written twice a year, and a 5-scale grading and 
forced distributions (except at HotelCO) were commonly done. 
7.4.2. FORCED DISTRIBUTIONS 
Although pay linked to performance has been an American 'innovation' which has been strongly 
advocated and observed in US firms, 'forced rankings' are argued to be a more recent trend towards 
pushing managers to strictly evaluate employees according to work results or performance (Capelli, 
1995). Almond et al. (2006a) found evidence for the application of forced distributions in some of 
their case-study companies in different European countries. In this study too, convincing evidence 
was found for the use of evaluation ratings and forced rankings in some of the firms studied. 
For formal evaluation and grading, standardised 5-scale rating schemes (see Table 7.2), transferred 
directly from the US (or Turkish, in the cases of AutoCOI and PharmaCO1) corporate parents were 
used in all, with the aim of 'achieving fair and standard evaluations across all subsidiaries" 12. PE 
ratings were linked to performance-related pay increases, as well as to promotions, career planning, 
and redundancy, although implications of PE results for employment security were not emphasised by 
the interviewees. In most cases, including AutoCOl whose PMS has been transferred from the 
Turkish JVP Holding 1, forced distributions were used and strictly applied, particularly in FinCO, 
TexCO, AutoCOI, FMCG2, while applications in FMCG 1 and PharmaCOI were understood to be 
more loose. Managers were instructed to rank employees in relation to each other, to identify a given 
percentage of `high' 'low' and `average' performers. 
tit Interviews with HR Managers, FinCO, TexCO, FMCG2, etc. 112 Interviews with regional HQ HR Directors, FinCO 
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Company Rating scale 
AutoCOl A, B, C, D, E 
F11MCG1 1 to 5, where 1 is the lowest and 5 is the highest 
FMCG2 1 to 5, where 1: 'unacceptable', 2: `needs improvement'; 3: 'full performance', 
4: 'superior', 5: `exceptional' 
PharmaCOl Y: Unsatisfactory ("Yetersiz"); G: Improvement Required ("Geli§me Gerekli"); 
B: Successful ("Ba$anh"); B +: Above Expectations ("Beklenenin Üstü"), 
0: Exceptional ("Olaganüstü") 
TexCO 1 to 5, where 1: unacceptable (around 3%); 2: needs improvement (around 3%); 3: 
full performance (70-80%); 4: superior (10%); 5: exceptional (around 3%). 
FinCO 5-scale rating, Ti to T5, where Ti best & T5 worst performance level (Ti: 10%; 
T2: 25%; T3: 45%; T4: 15%; T5: 5%) 
Hot e 11CO 5-scale [no more detail was given] 
I able 7.2. PE Rating schemes of the case companies; forced ranking distributions given in parentheses where available 
In FMCG2, TexCO and FinCO, a tight control process by regional/corporate HQ was found to be 
imposed on the application of forced distribution, where no flexibility was granted to subsidiary 
managements. HR at regional HQ did not allow any deviations from the given percentage 
distributions for each PE rating category. If not kept within the required limits, regional I IQ I IR 
usually returned the results to the subsidiary HR with a request to 'rework the distribution according 
to the ideal percentages' 13. As a result, departmental and organisational 'calibrations' were done at 
the subsidiary level before submitting the results to the region. At FMCG2 a normal distribution ('our 
famous bell-shaped distribution') was 'aimed' by corporate I IQ. At AutoCO 1, Holding I required and 
monitored forced rankings, but the most strict control was described at the subsidiary I IR/IR Director 
level where only a very few deviations were allowed under very exceptional cases. As a general rule, 
case companies were keen on making fair and accurate PE, as PE systems formed the basis for and 
were linked directly to T&D, career and succession planning systems as well as to remuneration. 
Forced rankings were therefore claimed to be used as a tool to distinguish between good, better and 
not-so-good performers and to distribute rewards, development and career opportunities accordingly. 
In this sense, the rationale for forced distributions was argued by the Regional IIR Director at FinCO 
as follows: 
"We don't like to be too dogmatic, so we talk about 'flexible forced ranking'. Not every 
population can fit neatly. Clearly what we want to say [is] that there is a difference for 
somebody [who] performs above average. So let's try to make a distinction clearly 
between our best employees and our weakest employees and it is only then if we do this 
job properly, it will result in giving compensation correct. What tended to be in the past, 
113 Interview with HR Manager and GM, TexCO 
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we put almost 100 percent population in those two boxes [top 2 ratings]. This is what 
happens; it is socialism, delusion, we get almost everybody the same. " 
One possible outcome of PE and forced rankings is 'managing out' the low performers. It is argued to 
be linked to the `employment at will' assumption that underlines the US employment system. It was 
possible that results of forced rankings were used to inform decisions on redundancy, as Almond et a!. 
(2006a) found to be potentially the case in some of the US MNCs they studied. Interviewees in the 
Turkish subsidiaries usually refrained from mentioning what happened to those with the lowest 
rankings. In fact, typically American application of linking PE results to dismissal decisions was 
legally acceptable in the Turkish environment: the new Labour Law asks employers to have concrete 
evidence for dismissals, one of which is PE records showing poor performance over a period of time. 
In this study, there was very limited evidence found for dismissal of low-level performers on the basis 
of their PE results: at TexCO, when the managerial and white-collar staff were replaced with 'new 
blood' from outside during the restructuring process, past performance results were used. Therefore 
poor performers were asked to leave with their severance payments given. In FMCG2 and FinCO, 
those with the lowest performance results were 'warned' to improve their performance in a given short 
period, say 3 months, after which they were re-evaluated. If they were able to improve performance, 
they continued under close monitoring, with training provided if necessary. Although there was no 
rush for dismissals decisions, low performers were given strong signals. They were usually 'managed 
out', i. e. they left themselves without additional procedures, or were 'invited to resign' and received 
redundancy and severance payments, sometimes with additional payments. 
The participative PE approach and developmental goals of the PE process can theoretically be in 
considerable tension with the forced distributions of evaluation ratings. However interviewees 
reported that these two seemingly conflicting aims created no problems among employees. HR and 
line managers, probably reflecting their own opinions, argued that their employees welcomed the 
challenge of setting ambitious targets and were happy to be fairly and equally evaluated. This can be 
explained by three factors: firstly, these companies might have recruited and selected the `right' 
candidates through their sophisticated recruitment and competency-based selection processes (see 
Chapter 6), i. e. those who would fit into the challenging company cultures with their personal 
characteristics as well as their educational and socio-economic background. Secondly, within the ILM 
approach applied in the case companies by hiring fresh graduates for the entry-level positions and 
promoting them from inside, companies might have been able to 'mould' their employees according to 
the specific company culture, where PE was accepted as a natural rule of the game. Lastly, as PE and 
PMS became more commonplace in the Turkish business environment, especially in the large 
domestic corporate sector and MNCs (for which the findings of this research presented some 
evidence), they came to be perceived by many as generally accepted, a 'requirement of modern 
management' processes. Although reflecting only the management's views, these findings on the 
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related parts of employment system approaches, R&S and PE processes tell us a supporting story 
about the interaction of host- and home-country influences on the transfer and application of 1111 
policies and practices. 
7.4.3. PE FOR BLUE-COLLAR EMPLOYEES 
Formal PE and individual merit pay for blue-collar workers were not applied widely in the USA until 
quite recently (Shibata, 2002). The findings in this study revealed that it was not a common practice 
in the case companies, either, at least for the time being. PE in manufacturing generally meant 
monitoring various production statistics and team-based targets in output, scrap, quality, etc. In 
AutoCOI and PharmaCO1, teams were assigned periodic targets and constantly monitored in reaching 
SMART production objectives. Successful teams were recognised and rewarded by small gifts in a 
ceremony (not in PharmaCO1), published in the company newspaper / bulletins, had lunch with the 
top management (not in PharmaCOI), etc. Good performance results identified in the manufacturing 
process were not directly linked to pay (except in FMCG2, as discussed above) or T&D programmes 
(except in AutoCOI, where the USAuto Production System was used to identify training needs of 
blue-collar workers, and in FMCG2 training needs analysis of blue-collar workers was linked to the 
PE system). At TexCO, no similar schemes (team targets, recognition or reward systems) were in 
place for manufacturing employees in the plant, where only the usual production statistics were 
monitored. 
Therefore a PMS process for blue-collar workers similar to that for managerial and professional 
employees was reportedly applied in FMCG2 and partly in FMCG 1. Application of these highly 
sophisticated, indeed ̀ innovative', systems for blue-collar workers was local managements' decision 
in both companies: their US corporate policies did not involve the application of PMS down to the 
level of blue-collar workers in manufacturing. 
Possible explanations discussed above for the use of performance-related salary increases (FMCG2) 
and bonuses in stock options (FMCGI) for manufacturing workers apply here for the use of a formal 
PE process. Both FMCGI, and particularly FMCG2 had developed and applied these systems within 
the given local market constraint of finding better educated employees and retaining them after in- 
house training. Moreover, in both companies PMS were used to keep these employees motivated by 
challenging targets and rewards systems linked to performance. `Technicians' in FMCG2 were 
considerably better educated and skilled, with 2-year vocational college graduates among them. 
FMCG2 was subject to increased threat of poaching by and job hopping to the other foreign 
investment companies recently established in the same region, offering similar pay and benefits, 
together with promotion opportunities as the new firms needed experienced and trained employees for 
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supervisory levels in manufacturing. Another possible reason for the use of these highly developed 
tools might be to keep unions out, as both US parents were argued to be against unions and were 
classified as ̀ non-unionist' (see Chapter 8). Subsidiary management policies were therefore aligned 
with the strategic aims of the ILM approach and labour relations without unions. 
7.5. CONCLUSION 
This chapter aims to answer two main questions: firstly, whether US MNCs brought any innovative 
PM and C&B systems to their Turkish subsidiaries by transferring their corporate policies and 
practices; and secondly, the extent of the hybridisation of transferred policies and practices as a result 
of the influence of the TBS. It was found that TBS presented minimal legal or cultural constraints on 
the design and implementation of US MNCs' sophisticated remuneration and PM systems. however 
some characteristics of the TBS acted as shaping constraints, where the case companies had to adapt 
their payment and benefit policies to the Turkish conditions. For instance, scarcity of highly educated 
and qualified employees in the Turkish labour market meant that companies needed to use 
sophisticated PMS alongside advanced C&B systems to attract and retain scarce local talent. The 
general corporate policy found across the cases provided the basis for appropriate C&B packages in 
order to keep a competitive position in the labour market where highly qualified candidates were in 
short supply. Therefore it is argued that even apparently permissive business systems can require the 
`localisation' of the home-country policies transferred as a result of such factors as availability of 
skills in the host environment. 
In this respect, firstly, within the transferred corporate reward policies and systems annual pay 
increases had to be adapted to the needs of the hyper-inflationary environment. To be able to attract 
and retain the highly sought qualified workforce, all the case companies were keen on providing 
attractive C&B packages. Secondly, benefits packages were adapted to the Turkish market, where 
many `traditional' benefits that were provided locally by large companies (e. g. bus services, free on- 
site food services, etc. ) were given also by case companies. In addition, other benefits which were 
offered only by a few of the large domestic corporations and were regarded as essential in this specific 
labour market to attract and retain the best talent (e. g. private health insurance) were included in US 
MNCs' competitive benefit packages. These rare instances of discretion given to local subsidiary 
managements comprised the few hybridised applications. Strong centralisation and standardisation in 
all other aspects of reward management systems prevailed. Corporate policies of well-defined and 
continuously updated salary positions in the market, salary structures and ranges defined, and various 
schemes of performance-linked pay (salary increases, bonuses, rewards, etc. ) were meticulously 
controlled by regional / corporate HQ. 
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Thirdly, sophisticated PM systems were transferred from corporate parents and applied in Turkish 
subsidiaries. Highly participatory and results-oriented corporate PE systems were transferred and 
applied without major 'hybridisation'. Localisation was observed in the few examples of PE systems 
for blue-collar workers, which were in fact not applied by US companies until recently. Interestingly, 
these practices were developed in the host-country (by taking corporate PM systems for managerial 
and white-collar workers as examples) to deal with commitment and motivation issues among blue- 
collar workers, while keeping unions at bay was another significant reason. 
Two significant implications flow from the discussion of the empirical findings on PM and 
remuneration systems in the US MNCs. Firstly, the core cases examined in detail adopted very similar 
payment and PM policies and applications, i. e. high-road strategies and sophisticated PM systems 
where no significant differences were observed according to sector. Secondly, there were no 
significant differences between the WOS and the IJVs where Turkish JVPs managed the IIR function. 
The latter cases had almost identical and just as sophisticated PM and payment systems reported to be 
transferred entirely from their Turkish parents. Turkish Holding JVPs had equally strongly ingrained 
and controlled their policies and applications in these affiliates. In both cases, the level of 
advancement of C&B and PMS was comparable to those of WOS where US systems were applied. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the uniformly observed sophisticated payment and 
PM systems. The ILM strategy of these firms (see Chapter 6) is argued to be a main reason for the use 
of competitive payment and benefit structures, applied in tandem with sophisticated R&S systems, to 
attract and retain qualified but scarce workforce. One would still expect to see some differences 
between the low-cost/low-skill and high-skill sectors, where in the former US MNCs could have 
adopted more `low-road' approaches in a country where unskilled labour was cheap and abundant. In 
this respect, the cases in this study might have been biased against certain types of firms for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, large and leading US companies in Turkey were selected for investigation with the 
assumption that they would have established HRM systems. The assumption and the resulting 
selection of cases served this purpose, but perhaps led to a rather homogeneous set of cases. Secondly, 
there were very few cases in the low-cost/low-skill sectors, i. e. TexCO from textile production, 
HotelCO in hotel, and FMCG1 in packaged food sectors, among the core cases; and FMCG3, FMCG4 
and FoodCO among the supplementary cases. In these instances, there were additional, company- 
specific factors: TexCO was an exceptional case because of its American parent's `corporate values' 
and difficult previous experiences in its plants in the underdeveloped labour markets of China, India, 
etc. HotelCO was also unusual as it was in the high-end of the hotel industry, providing a standardised 
luxury service to upper-class clientele globally. It therefore wanted to employ higher-skilled higher- 
educated workforce as much as possible with reasonably low turnover in a sector notorious for its high 
turnover rates. FMCG 1 was in the higher end of a low-skill sector because of its highly automated 
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production facilities. Thus it needed to attract better skilled and educated labour. Moreover, both 
HotelCO and particularly FMCG1 wanted to keep unions out, which made low turnover more 
desirable. Finally, all of these companies had a significant proportion of managerial, white-collar and 
sales posts, for whom highly-skilled, highly-educated but scarce labour was needed. TexCO for 
instance considered itself more in the `fashion garments' sector than `textile production'. Therefore 
the sample might indeed be considered biased towards a certain type of US company in Turkey. Had 
smaller companies in different sectors been investigated, results might have been more diverse. 
Selection of IJV cases was also somewhat biased, for similar reasons: leading IJVs in their sectors 
usually had the leading holding companies in Turkey as their local partners. As already argued (see 
Chapter 6) Holdingl, Holding2 and Holding3 are among the leading Turkish holding companies 
following and transferring recent developments in management. They use IJVs with partners from 
different home-countries as learning opportunities. They act as a channel for the introduction of 
foreign, notably US, management practices into the TBS. Moreover, the Turkish management 
environment has been going through continuous changes through international consulting and other 
professional service companies (e. g. auditing, banks and other financial institutions) where domestic 
companies can learn and adopt new HRM practices and applications relatively rapidly. Combined 
with the other institutional changes, leading Turkish companies are argued to be moving towards 
`internationalisation', i. e. 'Americanisation', in their HRM. Reward and PMS policies and 
applications found in the IJV cases therefore provided strong supporting evidence for `pull factors' 
and 'dominance' effects at the firm level: leading local companies of a developing, 'hybrid 
transitional' country adopted the most recent HRM systems in PM and remuneration with an effort to 
keep up with the latest developments particularly in the USA, the most dominant country globally and 
specifically for Turkey. 
Finally, it evidently easier to establish a direct link between home-country influences and transfer of 
policies and applications for particularly PMS in the core WOS cases. There is abundant evidence in 
the literature for the transfer of standardised and centralised home-grown PMS policies by US 
companies to other countries. Findings of this study provide additional supporting evidence. llost- 
country influences were observed mainly in the application of transferred corporate policies in C&ß 
adapted to the economic and labour market conditions of the TBS. 
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CHAPTER S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims to empirically examine US MNCs' policy and practices in their industrial relations 
(IR) in Turkey. Two main research questions are addressed: firstly, the extent to which the corporate 
policies regarding employment relations and practices are transferred to the Turkish subsidiaries, and 
secondly, the extent and nature of the influences by the Turkish business system on the latter. IR and 
unionisation issues in particular, as well as participation, communication and welfare matters in non- 
unionised cases are the substantive issues investigated. 
IR is a principal research topic in this study as, on the one hand, it is one of the most significant 
substantive HR issues, while it is on the other hand, an essential element of any business system which 
influences the transfer of a wide range of HR policies and applications. As discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5, Turkish and American IR systems have significantly different characteristics developed in 
response to a unique set of historical and institutional arrangements. 
The highly distinctive American IR system developed in its own particular NBS. Although the 
American companies are generally claimed to have taken an anti-unionist stance, the US IR system 
has historically witnessed both union and non-union approaches. State intervention has generally been 
very limited, concentrated in the 'New Deal' period, seeking to bring more order and stability to the 
relationship between labour and employers, while still leaving space for company-led strategies and 
policies. One significant example has been the 'welfare capitalism' model, i. e. `a sophisticated and 
systematic non-unionism', where the company, instead of labour unions or the state, takes care of its 
employees' material and other interests (Jacoby, 1997). On the basis of available research evidence, it 
can safely be argued that American companies are inclined to be anti-unionist in their international 
operations, showing a preference for avoiding collective labour organisations where they can, and 
minimising their influence where they cannot (Shearer, 1967, cited in Kujawa, 1979; Innes and 
Morris, 1995; Ferner et al., 2005b). In addition to non-unionist tactics, US companies are also known 
to use various innovative methods, developed to gain labour's commitment while keeping unions at 
bay (Foulkes, 1980; Beaumont and Townley, 1985). 
Although its history is brief, the Turkish IR system has gone through various phases, as a result of 
changes in economic, political, and institutional factors at both national and transnational arenas. It is 
now argued to provide a permissive environment for employers, where trade unions seemingly have 
lost most of their power particularly in comparison to their position in the 1960s and 1970s (Koc, 
2006; Nichols and Sugur, 2004). With much less power for negotiation, unions have mostly adopted 
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cooperative relations with the employers, demonstrating moderate behaviour for 'mutual gains'. 
While the rate of unionisation is quite low, particularly in foreign-capital companies (Koc, 1999b) 
unionised labour relations still continue in a few US companies, examples of which are included 
among the case studies in this research. 
Given these features of the Turkish IR system, where unionism and collective labour relations have in 
fact significantly different meanings, and the general tendencies of American MNCs developed and 
supported within the home-country business system, the latter's applied strategies and policies in 
collective employment relations provide an important focus for the examination of host-country 
influences on the transfer of management policies. To this end, unionisation policies and applications 
in the case companies are investigated considering the influences of parent-company and host-country 
business system. 
As a background for the analysis of IR in Turkey and particularly in the case companies, this chapter 
begins with an analysis of power in the IR literature. Sources of latent power for the relevant actors, 
i. e. trade unions, employers and the state, and their manifestation in the Turkish IR system are 
discussed within the framework of the literature. The respective power of unions, employers and the 
state has a profound effect on the environment in which American companies apply their unionisation 
policies in their Turkish subsidiaries. Empirical findings on these policies and applications are 
discussed in the next section. Innovative HR techniques in communication and participation 
employed by the non-union case companies to gain the commitment of their labour are presented in 
the last section. 
8.2. POWER IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: LABOUR UNIONS, EMPLOYERS AND 
THE STATE 
8.2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: POWER INIR 
Power is a principal concept in politics, sociology, and economics, as well as in IR. Despite an 
extensive and diverse power literature in politics (and to a lesser extent in sociology and economics), it 
is argued that power has not been to put through conceptual analysis or extensive empirical research in 
IR (Martin, 1992; Kelly, 2000). Although it is widely used in IR, power remains as one of the least 
theorised and researched concepts. Kelly (2000) claims that conceptualisation of power and power 
resources of workers, employers and states is a major problem. Among the significant problems in 
conceptually analysing power in IR are the definition, sources and manifestation of its exercise, levels 
of analysis, and measurement (Poole, 1986; Martin, 1992). Martin (1992) claims that a principal 
reason for the lack of research into bargaining power in 1R is related to these problems, particularly the 
163 
difficulty of measurement. In his review of IR literature where power has been discussed at all, Kelly 
(2000: 10-13) finds that union power is measured mainly in four ways: by using proxy measures (e. g. 
union density, bargaining coverage, strike frequency), by reference to structural determinants or 
correlates (e. g. product and labour markets, strategic position of workgroups in the production process, 
degree of labour substitutability, etc. ), by examining the outcomes of bargaining, and by reference to 
subjective variables (e. g. `willingness to act' or `readiness to strike'). 
In an attempt to theorise power relations in IR, Poole (1986) argues that participation of workers in 
decision-making at several levels (i. e. from individual `on the job' level to enterprise, industry, and 
economy levels) to obtain greater control over various aspects of their working lives is the major 
manifestation of workers' power, i. e. 'manifest power' (p. 16). Poole's (1986) model involves 
workers' participation and control as the manifest power, which is the reflection of the latent power. 
He proposes that developments in workers' participation and control 
"can largely be attributed to differences in the latent or underlying strength of the main 
industrial classes, parties and groups" (Poole, 1986: 29). 
Underlying or latent power is argued to be shaped by the major structural factors, i. e. economic factors 
(employment levels, profit margins, competition levels, industrial concentration, periods of economic 
`disintegration'), technological factors ('technical scale' of the technology in a company, degree of 
complexity and education involved in any given task, micro electronic revolution), and government 
action (legislation on labour issues, its intervention in the economic system). Manifest power (i. e. 
workers' participation and control) is both influenced by and also influences specific values, which are 
in turn shaped by cultural and ideological factors. A similar reciprocal relationship between manifest 
power and values is claimed between cultural and ideological factors and structural factors. Although 
Kelly (2000) claims that Poole's (1986) framework is an example of 'multifactor hypothesis' models 
that involve such an enormous range of variables that it is difficult to identify which ones are more 
important or why, the model can be used to explain most important structural variables that influence 
workers' underlying power, which in turn is manifested in workers' participation in decision-making. 
By considering the influence of structural factors on workers' latent power, and values of these 
different groups of actors, Poole (1986) examines various direct and indirect participation forms 
initiated by managements, workers, trade unions, and governments. 
The bargaining power approach by Martin (1992) has many similar elements to Poole's model (1986). 
Martin (1992) also bases his model on how successfully the parties involved, i. e. management and 
labour, convert their latent power into bargaining power. It comprises comparable elements, i. e. 
environmental factors; values, beliefs and objectives; organisation; processes; and outcomes. Latent 
power is claimed to be based on the control of relevant resources available to each party, which arc 
determined by the environmental factors, equivalent of structural elements in Poole's model (1986). 
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In Martin's model (1992) these are examined under three main categories: firstly, economic elements, 
i. e. product-market and labour-market factors; secondly, 'operating system' variables, i. e. size, 
technology, and payment systems; and thirdly, non-economic contextual factors, i. e. political and 
judicial framework, the media and public opinion, and ideology. It is claimed that latent power is in 
turn converted into bargaining power in accordance with each party's respective values, beliefs and 
objectives. The outcomes of the bargaining process are determined by the latent power of the parties 
and their success in turning, i. e. mobilizing, it into bargaining power in reaching their objectives. 
Kelly (2000) claims that the impact of 'structural' or 'environmental' variables on the balance of 
power is far from obvious, although he acknowledges that these structural variables may facilitate the 
exercise of power while they `do not necessarily generate any awareness of the possession' of power 
or provide the motivation to use it' (p. 11). 
In a more recent theory of power in IR, Kelly (2000) redirects attention to social processes to explain 
how individuals are converted into collective actors willing to create collective organisations and act 
collectively against their employers. Whereas the above theories by Poole (1986) and Martin (1992) 
focus on structural variables and institutions to explain power relations between the main actors, 
mobilization theory offers both a general and a more specific framework to investigate the process 
(Kelly, 2000). The general framework consists of five main conceptual elements, i. e. interests, 
mobilization, organisation, opportunity, and the forms of collective action. The core concepts in the 
specific framework are injustice, attribution and identity, which provide the explanation for the 
emergence (or not) of collective interest definitions. Employers and management, unions and 
workers, and governments are generally agreed to be the primary groups involved in IR, where the 
latter has a significant capacity to influence the employment relationship through legislation. 
This brief literature review presents a few of the most relevant issues and models developed to 
understand the various factors and processes involved in the power relations between the main parties. 
In the next part, power relations between trade unions, employers and the state in Turkey are examined 
within the framework of the three models by Poole (1986), Martin (1992) and Kelly (2000) discussed 
above. This analysis is then used as the macro level institutional framework to explain how IR 
policies of US MNCs are influenced by the TBS by considering also sectoral and firm-level variables. 
8.2.2. ENVIRONMENTAL /STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN THE TURKISH CONTEXT 
In this section, power relations between the three major actors, i. e. the state, employers and workers, in 
the Turkish IR arena are discussed within the framework presented above. According to Poole (1986) 
and Martin (1992), environmental / structural factors provide the resources that the major actors can 
mobilize, i. e. the latent power that can be turned into manifest power. The most significant of such 
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environmental / structural factors in the Turkish context include: i) changes in the economic and 
political systems; ii) government's direct and indirect influences through restrictive legislation and 
executive action; iii) privatisation; iv) changes in the composition of the workforce; and v) the role of 
employers' associations, are discussed to investigate the potential latent power of unions. 
8.2.2.1. Changes in the Economic and Political Systems 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Turkey has gone through various economic and political systems, which 
have influenced the elements of the business system, including IR. The most recent and striking of 
these changes has been experienced since the early 1980s particularly in comparison to the period 
between 1960-1980. Global economic deterioration hit Turkey hard in the 1970s, which coincided 
with ideological and social turmoil. Political and social instability resulted in the third military 
intervention in twenty years in 1980. Turkey experienced yet another change in its economic system 
in a very similar direction as some other countries such as Britain towards a liberalised, export- 
oriented, outward looking and very pro-private sector economy. While the employers within the 
highly protected import-substitution environment had fewer concerns about collective organisation of 
labour and particularly labour costs, they became deeply concerned about these issues within the 
stringent competitive conditions they faced domestically and globally in the unprotected export- 
oriented environment. Pro-business governments started to emphasise the dominance of market 
principles in IR and showed their support through restrictive, even suppressive, legislation and its 
application, by using executive action when necessary. 
8.2.2.2. Restrictive Legislation and Executive Action 
The Turkish state's influence on the legislative environment for collective action has been inconsistent 
throughout the various economic periods. Labour was first introduced to collective organisation by 
the government and helped to get organised in the public sector. In the decade between 1961.1971 
marked by two military interventions, trade unions experienced the most liberal legislative period. 
During this period, new trade unions were established by those who left Türk-1ý on the basis of 
ideological differences. Trade unions were able to organise widely in both the public (especially 
Türk-f$) and private sectors (especially DISK), within the protected economic environment. The 
tolerant period was curtailed by the suppressive practices of the military intervention in 1971. 
However, the relatively moderate legislation continued. Unionisation and wages in the non- 
agricultural sectors in Turkey reached their peak in the 1970s: real non-agricultural wages had risen 
50% and number of union members by five times (Nichols and Sugur, 2004). The military 
intervention in 1980 however completely obstructed collective labour organisation and action in 
Turkey, together with other collective organisations such as political parties, associations, etc. During 
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the first three years, no collective organisation or activity was allowed for trade unions. Later the new 
legislation brought a very suppressive environment for labour unions. The state is claimed to have 
used its power to make it extremely difficult for trade unions to organise and mobilize collective 
action. Trade unions had to start organising almost from scratch, where the new rules were very 
discouraging, such as industrial and company-level thresholds as well as other restrictive (e. g. choice 
of enterprise vs. workplace given to employers) rules in the legislation (see Chapter 4) make it easier 
for companies to hinder collective organisation and not to recognise trade unions. 
8.2.2.3. Privatisation 
Although not as widespread as elsewhere e. g. in the UK, privatisation has been at the top of every 
Turkish government's agenda since the 1980s. It has been slowly introduced and subsequently 
achieved only in specific sectors and SOEs. Trade unions have consistently been against privatisation, 
fearing the resulting job losses and more specifically considerable reduction in their member levels, as 
the public sector has been their (particularly Türk-f$'s) strongest ̀ fortress'. Despite commonly 
experienced downsizing and/or de-unionisation before or after privatisation, unions have not able to 
mobilize widespread public and labour interest and opposition against privatisation. In fact, the public 
in general have been in favour of privatisation, as SOEs were claimed to be over-staffed as a result of 
political decisions rather than economic rationality. 
8.2.2.4. Changes in the Composition of the Workforce 
Between 1960-1980 when industrialisation started to develop in Turkey, scarcity of labour was 
experienced. It was still mainly an agricultural society where 'being a labourer in industry' was not 
highly regarded in the society and the significance of benefits that paid employment brought (e. g. 
social security, health services, retirement pensions) had not been yet realised. Emigration of large 
number of Turkish workers from rural areas to various European countries as ̀ guest workers' 
contributed to the shortage of workers even in unskilled jobs. 
In contrast to the scarcity of labour experienced in the 1960s and 1970s, unemployment has been 
rising since the 1980s to dramatic levels: officially announced unemployment rate is around 12% but 
the actual figure is argued to be considerably higher because of the large informal sector and unpaid 
family employment in agriculture, although solid evidence cannot be provided. Due to internal 
migration of especially unskilled uneducated people from rural to urban areas since the 1980s, as a 
result of social unrest experienced in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Turkey, a high rate of 
population increase, and a shift from agricultural production, there is now an abundance of unskilled 
and low educated workers in large urban areas which has contributed to the high unemployment 
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figures. Illegal, unregistered employment is widespread in many industries, such as textiles, food, 
hotel and construction, particularly in micro and small enterprises, as the government turns a blind eye 
on these applications. 
While a high rate of unemployment and informal employment prevail among unskilled untrained 
workforce, scarcity of highly skilled labour continues. Employees and trade unions in the industries 
where the required level of skills and education is low have much lower power than those in industries 
where higher qualifications are required. Skills shortage in high-skill industries augments trade union 
power and increase union density in some industries (e. g. metalwork). It is more difficult to secure 
and retain union density in low-skill high unemployment sectors, e. g. textiles, hotels and 
entertainment. 
8.2.2.5. Employers' Associations 
In Turkey employers in many sectors (e. g. metal, textiles, chemicals, petrol and tyre) are organised at 
the industry level to collectively represent their member companies. Unlike trade unions, employers' 
associations are not subject to strict legal restrictions. Their management boards consist of veteran 
employers and managers in these sectors. Industry-wide collective bargaining between labour unions 
and employers' associations are common practice in many sectors, where collective agreements that 
cover all the member companies and employees are signed for usually two years. Employers' 
associations are agreed to be very strong against the trade unions that are extremely restricted by the 
legislation. Being a member of strong employers' associations is among the factors that increase 
employers' strength in collective labour relations. 
8.2.3. MAJOR ACTORS AND POWER ISSUES IN TURKISH IR 
Given the structural-economic factors that influence union power, the above discussion reflects that 
trade unions in Turkey experienced their most powerful period between 1961-1980, manifested in 
their ability in securing high unionisation density, organising and participating in various types of 
collective action (strikes, walkouts and demonstrations), achieving an increasing number of strikes, 
and participating in collective bargaining (Nichols and Sugur, 2004). It is argued that trade unions, 
particularly those affiliated with DISK that have close connections with left-wing political parties and 
a strong ideological stance, were able to mobilize working people for the first time on such a large 
scale, during the two decades from 1961 to 1980, based on the perceived injustice by employers and 
the state (governments). The seeds of this extensive mobilization were sown from the late 1960s, 
within the liberal and relaxed political and legislative environment of the 1961 Constitution. The first 
counter-mobilization attempt by the state was in 1971, when the military gave a 'warning' to the 
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government, which had to step down and was replaced by an `impartial' one until the next elections, 
and an extensive campaign of investigation and imprisonment was conducted against intellectuals, 
politicians, and also trade union leaders. Although this slowed down the mobilization of labour at the 
beginning, it lasted only for a short time. The rest of the 1970s saw the most widespread labour 
mobilization in Turkey. But it was stopped in a very harsh way, unlike elsewhere, by a fierce military 
coup in 1980. The society as a whole was suppressed in the following years, and left de-politicised. 
Thus counter-mobilization efforts of the state were exercised through, firstly, legislation and the 
judicial system (i. e. restrictive laws for collective organisation and bargaining, reflecting the 
preferences of employers), and secondly, executive action which created a very suppressive 
environment (i. e. lengthy investigations, torture, trials and imprisonment). The counter-mobilization 
against labour and trade unions by the state through such harsh methods was pursued during an 
economic system change in Turkey while similar changes had been experienced in many other 
countries. It was an appropriate environment for employers to introduce and adopt IIRM, some 
polices of which can be used as counter-mobilization tools, according to Kelly (2000). 
Changes experienced in the environmental factors had considerably weakened the positional, 
organisational and political power resources available to trade unions: union density fell; strikes 
became unheard of for a long time; real wages were reduced by large ratios in comparison to those 
before 1980. This decline in the latent power resources consequently led to a decline in trade unions' 
manifest power. Within this suppressive environment, some confederations and their affiliated trade 
unions were driven towards a cooperative model where labour and management collaborate for mutual 
gains. It is argued that Türk-f§, established with extensive support from the government and had its 
largest membership in the public sector, ̀ has had a pragmatic stance towards political parties, sh(fiing 
with the political tide' (Nichols and Sugur, 2004: 157). Although there are also left-wing and more 
aggressive unions affiliated with Türk-f$ (notably the Petroleum, Chemical and Rubber Workers' 
Union, Petrol-f§) in general Türk-t unions are claimed to have a moderate stance and collaborative 
approach. Together with Hak-t affiliations, these unions appear to have accepted the argument that if 
unions offer cooperation in collective agreements and leaving management to managers, then they are 
more likely to get concessions from managements in return, namely recognition, influence in decision- 
making, and most importantly higher wages and benefits for their members. It is claimed that a deep 
sense of union weakness and decline, as a result of long periods of economic recession, right-wing 
governments and anti-union legislation, lies underneath this cooperative approach (Kos, 2006). 
Having to survive under hostile circumstances, most of the Turkish trade unions, particularly those 
affiliated with Türk-1§ and Hak-1$, found it necessary to adapt to the new situation by looking for 
common or similar objectives with those of employers as they were in no position to challenge the 
latter's priorities and interests. It needs to be noted here that Türk Metal, an affiliate of Türk-l$ and 
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the biggest union in the metal industry (also the one in AutoCOI and AutoCO2 in this study), is 
proclaimed to be the union 'most willing to compromise with the government and employers' and to 
accommodate management initiatives 'to protect the established representative cartel of the union in 
the metal and manufacturing industries' (Büyükuslu, 1994: 244-45). In other words, many unions in 
Turkey have tried to compensate for the loss of organisational and political latent power resources 
through cooperative relations with employers and managements. 
In the above section, IR in Turkey is reviewed within the framework of power issues and actors 
involved. It is argued within this framework that Turkish labour unions have very limited latent, and 
even less manifest power. This significant host-country factor allows companies, including foreign- 
capital ones, to pursue their own goals in employment relations: if they want to avoid unions, they can. 
It is therefore concluded that unionisation in a firm in Turkey depends almost entirely on the attitude 
of management. Collective labour relations in the case companies are discussed within this 
framework in the next section. The most significant questions are whether unionisation or non- 
unionisation was a home-grown corporate policy transferred to the Turkish subsidiary; and how these 
policies were applied. 
8.3. COLLECTIVE LABOUR RELATIONS IN AMERICAN MNCS 
Among the companies studied there were two main attitudes: non- or anti-unionist and union-friendly. 
The absence of constraining influences from the Turkish IR environment was evident, allowing US 
employers to easily transfer their non-unionist corporate attitude. Although some indication of 
occasional use of rough tactics to de-unionise or to keep unions out was found, it was essentially a 
union substitution rather than union suppression approach. Use of innovative methods of 
compensation (see Chapter 7) and participation, to increase and secure employees' commitment, 
combined with ILM approaches (see Chapter 6) and an ideological opposition to unions suggest the 
application of an approach similar to `welfare capitalism' in their Turkish subsidiaries. Ideological 
non- or anti-unionism and employment relations in these cases are discussed first in the next section. 
8.3.1. NON- OR ANTI-UNIONISTATTITUDES 
8.3.1.1. Philosophy: Reasons for Non- or Anti-Unionism 
The analysis of the de- or non-unionised case companies revealed that they shared some common 
features. Firstly, they claimed that it was their employees' preference for de-unionisation or staying 
non-unionised. They would have happily cooperated with a trade union, as long as unionisation was 
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officially achieved according to the legislation as a result of employees' choice' 14. The WiR manager at 
FMCG2 emphasised this policy when he talked about the unsuccessful unionisation attempt at their 
greenfield site by Tek Gida-1 : 
"It was the employees themselves who resisted the union and if it had been our 
employees' wish to get unionised we would have nothing against it but simply respect 
and accept. Respecting our employees' preferences [in unionisation] is a strict corporate 
policy with which we have to comply at the subsidiary level; otherwise we would 
experience serious problems with the headquarters. " 
Secondly, these cases shared a similar corporate `philosophy' of 'avoiding unions if they can'. As 
stated by the HR director at the European business unit level, IR policy in FoodCO was 'generally, 
like in other companies, if we can keep the unions out, we prefer that'. This was a common statement 
across the non-unionist cases by HR directors at regional corporate level, while at the Turkish 
subsidiary level, the interviewees generally emphasised no corporate policy about unions and IR, and 
were not willing to discuss collective employment relations issues. 
The interviewees in these companies (both at the subsidiary and regional HHQ levels) presented a 
strong unwillingness to share their managerial prerogatives. At FMCG I for instance the main issue 
for the management concerning unionisation was: 
"Not being able to directly communicate with our own employees, having to go through a 
third party, even for managerial issues, which are within our [the management's] own 
$ domain that we do not want to share with the union"' . 
This company's previous GM similarly complained: 
"With the union there you had to go and ask the union's permission and also the time the 
union required, stringent conditions for us to apply these things. This is the company, 
these guys [the management], they have a say in it, why do they have to ask the permission 
of the union? " 
In FMCG I even when the trade union was very supportive of the training programmes and direct 
communication between employees and management had started for a new workgroup arrangement, 
management objected to the union's requests to be consulted first before the arrangements were made. 
The HR Director claimed that the union officers would `cause problems even for small stuf that were 
not a big issue and could be agreed quickly on the spot' while the real issue was the resistance of the 
management to share its managerial power with the union. The previous GM argued that: 
"You cannot possibly establish a culture in the company without having direct interaction 
with the employees. You cannot. Mediators between you and your employees just 
suggest that, they don't really work for you. " 
114 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 
115 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 
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This strong attitude against trade unions could be seen as the application of FMCGI's corporate 
`philosophy', which was confirmed at the European regional level, while at the subsidiary level, it was 
not put as explicitly: 
"We as a company will behave towards employees with integrity, respect and openness 
but we believe that we do not need a third party or a go-between person. So we believe 
in a direct relationship between the employee and the manager. "16 
Thirdly, management in these cases shared a strong belief that their employees would in fact never 
prefer to be unionised, because they were already provided with very good financial terms and 
conditions. The following quote by the HR manager at FMCG2 reflected the common arguments of 
management across non- or anti-unionist cases: 
"It was our workers who did not want a union, because they already had much better 
conditions than they would have, had they been unionised. So why would they want a 
union? What more could a union bring? " 
Similar managerial attitudes and corporate ̀ philosophy' were observed at HotelCO. During a 
unionisation attempt, favoured and supported by the Turkish owner of the hotel premises, HotelCO 
management did not take any action against the union as it was HotelCO's unchallengeable corporate 
rule of "not being against unions in principle and always respecting our employees' preference"I 17. 
However, HotelCO management were forced to become involved in the end, because there "was an 
illegal attempt by Oleyi$118 and it was against our workers' will"' 19. It was however clearly 
understood at the European regional HQ that HotelCO had the same 'philosophy' as FMCG 1 and 
FMCG2 of `avoiding unions at all costs and making sure that the employees trust usi120. 
At PharmaCOl, another de-unionised case, the process of de-unionisation was somewhat different. In 
the first instance USPharma insisted on de-unionisation of the plant as a precondition for the 
formation of the IN from the brownfield company. Both the local subsidiary management and the 
union were apparently convinced that the main reason for de-unionisation was `high labour costs'121. 
PharmaCOI in Turkey is a manufacturing outfit rather than a R&D unit, and there exists a substantial 
element of labour in production'22. Moreover, firstly, Petrol-t (the union in PharmaCOI before de- 
unionisation) is one of the most aggressive unions in Turkey, which is successful in obtaining good 
terms and conditions. Secondly, pharmaceuticals is one of the highest paying sectors in Turkey 123. 
Considering these factors, USPharma might have indeed argued for de-unionisation on the basis of 
116 Interview with OMD Director at EMEA HQ, FMCG1 
117 Interviews with HR Director, GM and HR Director at EMEA HQ, HotelCO 
1"The trade union that attempted to get organised 119 Interviews with (subsidiary and area) HR Director and GM, HotelCO, and Toleyi$ union officer. 
120 Interviews with (subsidiary and area) HR Director, GM, and HR Director at EMEA HQ, HotclCO 
121 Interviews with PharmaCOl HR Manager, Assistant HR Manager, previous HR coordinator and current I IR manager of the Turkish 
Holding parent, and union officials 
tu Observations during the factory visit 
123 The average net monthly earnings in the sector, as announced by the Confederation of Turkish Employers' Associations, is 2.314 YTL at 
the ongoing USS exchange rate of 1.35, that is around US$1,700 
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high labour costs, given its highly sensitive and closely controlling approach towards financial 
issues124. Whether it was the high costs or USPharma's anti-union corporate policy, it was evident 
that de-unionisation was not the Turkish JVP's choice: a number of Holding-level managers clearly 
indicated that Holding3 did not have an anti-union stance or policy. Holding3 is known to be one of 
the most socially responsible, labour-friendly and pro-union holdings in Turkey, for which previous 
unionisation at PharmaCOI and continued unionisation in Holding3's other pharmaceuticals company 
and in others in different sectors can be considered as evidence. 
Lastly, IR was generally left mainly to the subsidiary managements, apart from the general corporate 
philosophy or attitude towards unionisation. In the non- or anti-union cases, de-unionisation, keeping 
unions out, etc. were handled by the local management according to the local rules and conditions. At 
PharmaCO1 HR/IR was managed by the Turkish JVP Holding3 while USHealth did not interfere. At 
HotelCO and FMCG2 there were regional IR Directors to `oversee IR issues' while at FoodCO the 
European HR manager had verified that IR issues were left to the local subsidiary managements: 
"We don't have a European expert on industrial relations, or [a] global expert. Not even 
within a business unit, because it is really country specific. Corporate or regional HQ are 
not involved in collective agreements or bargaining, or any strike issues, which is pretty 
much done locally. " 
In brief, it is argued that FMCG1, FMCG2, PharmaCOl, HotelCO and FoodCO12S shared a 
philosophy of avoiding unions. Except FMCG2, these companies made principled statements of 
opposition to unions and indicated a corporate policy of non-unionism, while at least on the surface 
FCMG2 adopted a different IR stance from the other companies. Taken at the face value, 
interviewees' accounts126 indicated that the formal corporate policy of USFMCG2 was to respect 
workers' preferences with respect to unionisation. FMCG2 seemed to be willing to adapt to the 
national IR climate and they were not opposed to trade unions, at least in principle. However this 
policy was later belied by the management's response to efforts at unionisation in its Turkish 
operation (discussed below). Considering various interviewees' accounts at the subsidiary and 
Holding2 level that indicated USFMCG2 was fully in charge of management at FMCG2 and that 
Holding2 did not interfere with management'27, and other evidence for an ideological non- or anti- 
unionist stance, FMCG2 is considered among the cases with a US corporate policy against 
unionisation. 
124 Interviews at the local subsidiary and Holding3 
1=s FoodCO had one hazelnut processing plant at the time of the fieldwork that was still unionised, which is discussed separately later. 
Nevertheless FoodCO is considered anti-unionist, by looking at the evidence collected, at European I IQ and Turkish subsidiary levels. 
126 Interviews with HR Manager and (expatriate) GM, FMCG2 
127 Interviews with HR Manager, HR Director, FMCG2, and HR Coordinator, Holding2 
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8.3.1.2. De-Unionisation and Non-Unionisation: Power, Relations and Tactics 
Bearing in mind the fact that the power of trade unions within the discussed circumstances of Turkey 
in general is not very high, the relative power of the unions involved in the de- (and non-) unionisation 
cases changed according to their sector and their density at the national level. For instance, Oz Gida- 
f$, at FMCG1, owing to the skill and education level requirements and its density in the food sector, is 
not among the stronger unions in Turkey. Although this is entirely the researcher's speculation, the 
reason it was able to get organised in FMCG I initially might have stemmed from the shared 
ideological belief (i. e. conservative Islamist) between the union (and its affiliated Confederation, Hak- 
1$) and the original Turkish owners. Tek Gida-(§ on the other hand is the strongest union in the same 
(i. e. food) sector and also among above the average power level category in Turkey, as it has the 
highest membership level in its industry (including organisation in the SOEs, e. g. tobacco processing) 
at the national level. The two unions in the hotel industry, Oleyi§ and Toleyi$ are among the weaker 
ones in Turkey, mainly because of the low level of skills and training needed in this sector, coupled 
with abundant supplies of such labour. The most powerful union among the de-unionisation examples 
is Petrol-I', the then authorised union at PharmaCO1. As indicated above, as one of the most 
aggressive and demanding unions in Turkey, gaining its strength from the high level of skills and 
education required of workers in this sector, it has always `negotiated tough' and secured very good 
terms and conditions in the companies it had been organised 128. 
Management-union relationships in the de-unionised cases of FMCG 1, FoodCO and PharmaCO1 
were described by both management and union officers interviewed as ̀ neither friendly nor hostile'. 
The following quote by the HR Director of FMCG 1 summarised the situation in all three companies 
where the relations were typical of a `classical Turkish union-management relation that starts and 
ends with the collective bargaining period. Although there had been a few reported incidents of 
conflicts, e. g. work stoppages and strike threats, collective bargaining processes were usually 
concluded without too severe confrontations at FMCG1 and FoodCO. Both Oz Gida-I and Tek 
Gida-f§ were not in powerful positions against employers, therefore they had struggled hard to get the 
best financial terms they could. Even at PharmaCOl management-union relations were reportedly 
mild in general, despite the aggressive and tough stance of Petrol-I' as one of stronger Turkish trade 
unions. 
It is therefore argued that the power level of trade unions in the host-country barely made any 
difference if the company decided to de-unionise (or stay non-unionised), particularly on a 
`philosophical' basis. The ability of the management to take advantage of the legal framework was 
decisive, even in the case of unions (i. e. Petrol-f') with higher sources of latent power, which they 
128 Interviews at Petrol-1g 
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were not able to mobilize. The interviews with Tek Gida-tg, Oz Gida-1 and Petrol-! indicated that 
the managements' attitude in the case companies was determined and the unions were not able to 
negotiate for the continuation of unionised labour relations. Considering that some of the stronger 
Turkish unions were able to mobilise their power through strikes particularly during the first half of 
the 1990s, it was interesting that the interviewees in this study indicated that `when the company 
decided to de-unionise by using the legal f exibility, there was nothing to do for us but leave the 
company' 129. 
For de-unionisation, US MNCs preferred to take advantage of the restrictive legislation, used in 
combination with other 'persuasive' methods, where they `played it by the book" 30. Along with their 
company `philosophy' of respecting their employees' preferences, the interviewees emphasised that 
they deliberately refrained from aggressive or coercive methods. For de-unionisation, in all three case 
companies, i. e. FMCG1, PharmaCOl and FoodCO, the most straightforward method was employed 
first, i. e. changing from `workplace' to 'enterprise' status131. Managements also used other tools that 
were also legal and used widely in the Turkish IR arena. For instance, at FMCG 1 and FoodCO, some 
blue-collar technical workers (e. g. foreman, supervisor etc) were transferred (which mostly included 
promotions) to `technician' positions, with accompanying better compensation packages, either 
because these positions cannot be union members or as an inducement for employees to annul their 
union membership. At FMCG1, using this legal approach was in accordance with another 
unchallengeable corporate policy, i. e. ̀ strictly following the local labour laws and any legislation in 
this respect' emphasised by interviewees at all levels. With the change in its status to 'enterprise' (i. e. 
increased number of total employees in the calculation) and the increase in the number of positions in 
the plants that could not be union members, union density went down to 48% in FMCG1, from its 
previous levels of 100% among blue-collars, 80% at the plant, and 60% at the company level132. 
However when Oz Gida-t took it to the industrial court to be decided whether or not the union could 
have the authorisation certificate, the (HR) management decided to talk to their plant workers directly: 
"As you know, your union does not have the authorisation certificate any more to 
represent you in collective negotiations while the tribunal continues. If they can get their 
eligibility back and if you decide to continue with them, as an American company duly 
respectful for our employees' rights and choices, we will continue to collaborate with 
them and we are ready to sit down for collective bargaining. However for the time being, 
according to the legislation, they are not authorised until the issue is solved at the court. 
We as a multinational company who cares for its employees as a part of its global 
corporate policy do not want to see our employees struggling. However it might be an 
indefinite period of time before all of this can be settled, and the management cannot 
negotiate directly with workers while the issue is at the court and it can actually take 
129 Interviews at Petrol-1g, Tek Gida-14 and Oz Gida-1g. '"Trade unionists' accounts tat According to the law, companies are given a choice to be regarded either as a 'workplace' at its various plant(s), headquarters, sales 
offices etc. separately, or as an 'enterprise' which includes all employees in the whole company (i. e. all blue- and white-collar employees in 
various parts of the company. See Chapter 4. 
132 Interviews with FMCG I HR Director and Union official 
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years to sort out133. But if you end your union membership, we can then offer our terms 
and conditions directly to you. If in the meantime, a positive decision for your union 
comes from the court, we will respect your decision if you want to continue with your 
union at that time. " 
Workers at FMCG 1 in the end terminated their union membership as they needed to receive increases 
in the hyper-inflation environment prevailing at the time to continue earning their living. But the 
management refused to discuss the issue with them while they were still union members, as this would 
have been a breach of the law. The only way out for workers was ending their collective organisation 
and Oz Gida-l§ had to leave, as there was not anything they could do. 
Another widely used legal tool was employed at PharmaCOl for de-unionisation, i. e. utilising sub- 
contracted workforce who by law cannot be union members. Although the proportion of contracted 
labour cannot be more than a certain percentage, it was adequate to reduce the union density in the 
company below the required level. Consequently Petrol-f' lost its authorisation in a perfectly legal 
way that could not even be challenged, despite being one of the strongest trade unions in Turkey. The 
plant was de-unionised through de-authorisation of the existing union. PharmaCOI continued to use a 
sub-contracted workforce subsequently, to prevent any union from getting organised, although the 
management claimed that they treated sub-contracted workforce just the same as their own payroll 
workers' 34. PharmaCOl did not make as much effort as FMCG1 to `convince' its existing employees 
to resign from the union by showing that the management would provide them much better conditions 
without the union in place. 
In almost exactly the same way as with FMCG 1 and PharmaCO1, Tek Gida-fý at FoodCO's sweet and 
starch plant was de-recognised after production was moved to a brand new plant somewhat outside the 
most industrialised region (although unionisation in its much smaller hazelnut plant continued, which 
is discussed below). The firm changed its status to the enterprise, and promoted workers to higher 
positions where they could not be union members, and when the total number of union members went 
below the company threshold level, the union tried to negotiate for their continued existence with the 
management but the latter did not accept. So Tek Gida-f$ lost its authorisation certificate, as a result 
of a completely legal and not negotiable action by the management. Eventually all workers resigned 
from membership and the plant was de-unionised. Although there was not much the union could do 
legally, it could have mobilised its members and its national organisation for negative public reaction, 
especially because there has been an on-going debate and then legal action against FoodCO's new 
sweet and starch factory about the legal approval for its location. FoodCO had had strong negative 
public reaction for other issues with the government, so more damaging publicity about de-recognising 
133 It still continued at the time of the fieldwork 
134 Interview with HR Manager of PharmaCOl 
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the union could have been unwelcome. However the trade union was not able to mobilise any union 
or public action against the management. 
When we look at the de-unionisation instances in these cases, a number of common points emerge. 
Firstly, collective labour organisation was established before the US parents came onto the scene. 
Secondly, all three had the same corporate `philosophy' of `avoiding unions if they can'. Thirdly, 
given the relatively weak power of trade unions within the TBS, particularly the restrictive legislation, 
it had not been too difficult to de-unionise in any of these cases by using legal tactics. 
However there is also evidence for the use of coercive methods by local management if they perceive 
a risk of unionisation. There had been an organisation effort by Tek Gida-f$ at FMCG2, which had 
caused quite some controversy. However the HR manager mentioned it as a very insignificant issue: 
"We had heard that some union officials tried to contact our workers but had not been 
successful. We heard that they [union officials] said that each time they tried, it felt like 
banging your head against a brick wall - our workers were not at all interested. " 
Interviews with a previous HR director and union officials, who had been involved in the issue at the 
time, however painted a different picture of the company's reaction. The strict US corporate policy of 
respecting their employees' choice and local labour legislation in every country has been contradicted 
by the management's reaction in the Turkish subsidiary. The union officials indicated that they were 
met by a very harsh reaction from the management when they first attempted to get organised in this 
plant. Those employees who had become members were laid off, as a threat to the others. Holding2, 
the Turkish JVP, which was not involved in management of the company with its minority share in 
the IJV13S, had been involved in solving this `crisis'. It brought a `think-tank' together at its 
headquarters and lobbied at the highest levels of the government to stop the unionisation efforts. The 
union eventually took the matter to the ILO136 and asked for support from other international trade 
union organisations 'but was isolated nationally and internationally' 137. Given the power of the 
leading US MNC and prominent Holding Turkish JVPs against that of the union, there was not much 
Tek Gida-I could do within the restrictive legislative environment, pro-business state and judicial 
system but give up trying to get organised at FMCG2. Some of the evidence presented by trade union 
officials cannot be verified (e. g. lay-offs, severe behaviour etc) but they suggested that in the face of 
the possible 'threat', FMCG2 management did not refrain from exercising coercive methods that were 
in fact illegal and against the US corporate policy. This raises a question about how far the anti-union 
response was driven by Holding2, the Turkish partner, as opposed to USFMCG2. There is strong 
evidence that FMCG2 was managed entirely and controlled closely by the majority JVP USFMCG2, 
131 Confirmed by FMCG2's HR manager and Turkish parent's HR coordinator 
1M Application to the ILO confirmed from trade union records 
'" Interviews with union officials at Tek Gida-lg 
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where Holding2, as the minority partner, was involved only in strategic issues. It was for instance 
instrumental in establishing good relations with the government and lobbying for legal changes 
necessary for the operation of FMCG2 in Turkey. In this unionisation incident, Iiolding2 was 
reportedly called for help, as indicated above. Although Holding2 is not known for a particularly 
positive attitude towards unions, it is still quite unlikely that non-unionisation was driven entirely by 
it. Considering the evidence available, it is therefore argued that USFMCG2 had a non-unionist 
attitude. 
8.3.1.3. Keeping Unions At Bay 
In addition to driving unions out, managements needed to keep them at bay. As mentioned above, 
one of the shared beliefs in the non- or anti-unionist cases was that the company would provide its 
employees with everything a union could have bargained for so that the employees would never feel 
the need for collective action to ask for more. At FMCGI and FMCG2 particularly, and at IlotelCO 
to some extent, paternalistic and high road approaches together with innovative tools and methods 
were reportedly applied by the management to gain and secure the commitment of employees. 
At FMCG1 for instance management helped the plant workers and their families during the earthquake 
disaster in 1999 (when the company was still unionised) that caused terrible damage in the region. 
Management argued that their dedicated support and help in the aftermath of the disaster when 'the 
union was nowhere to be seen' had been a very significant factor for the workers when it came down 
to making a choice between the union and the management in the de-unionisation process138. This 
account, enthusiastically repeated by a number of interviewees at different times, sounded as though 
management might have cleverly manipulated the situation by using any opportunity they could to 
present and promote their image among its workers. This interpretation has gained significance 
especially after understanding that de-unionisation was decided in 1998 in the 'Strategic Labour Plan' 
to be attained by 2000139. Management's behaviour during this disaster was therefore consistent with 
a wider strategy (de-unionisation) as a result of a corporate ̀ philosophy' ('in a company like FMCGI, 
that provides everything for its employees, we don't need a third party that impairs our 
communication with our employees' 14). 
FMCG1 management had initiated extensive direct communication with labour at the plant before 
starting the de-unionisation process, through regular meetings, e. g. monthly and quarterly meetings 
with the HR Director, `roundtable' meetings with the GM, and a global corporate employee 
satisfaction survey in which blue-collar workers were not previously included. Moreover, at the start- 
13' Interviews with HR Director and GM, FMCG1 
179 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 
140 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI 
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up of these extensive communication programmes, the HR Director of the company came and 
addressed the workforce: 
`I talk to you in the name of the highest level management in our company. Our GM 
knows each and every one of you by name. We want you to be in perfect conditions. 
You are our most valuable and most important asset. We want to invest in you in all 
aspects, career and social development, help with family matters. We want your 
contribution to this company in all ways, and your voice is heard and suggestions are 
heard and incorporated into our management. i14I 
This quotation reflects the much criticised rhetoric of HRM (e. g. Kelly, 2000). However even the 
union official admitted that such an address and all the other direct communication programmes had 
an effect of `almost like a therapy' on Turkish blue-workers who were not used to such behaviour 
from employers and management at all142. Although the workers' perception was not sought in this 
study, blue-collar workers at FMCG1 were most probably highly impressed with the management's 
attitude and behaviour during the earthquake and particularly with the subsequent direct 
communication and employee involvement programmes. Once workers left the union and de- 
unionisation was complete, similar to `union substitution' behaviour described in relation to US firms 
in the UK (Beaumont and Townley, 1985) management offered a very competitive compensation 
package, and continued introducing more communication and involvement policies at the plant level. 
Almost identical communication and involvement programmes were used in FMCG2, PharmaCOI 
and HotelCO. The 'innovative' factor in these programmes was in their application to blue-collar 
plant workers, which was very unusual for Turkey. A group of HotelCO employees from all levels for 
instance ate lunch together with the whole management team, including the GM, where they could ask 
all sorts of questions to these top-level people and the management would share for instance 
information about HotelCO's financial performance. In all four companies, all employees (not the 
managerial and white-collars only) were included in the corporate global employee satisfaction / 
opinion surveys, which was also something unheard of in Turkey, asking lowest level employees 
about their opinions of the management and working conditions. As Poole (1986) claims most of 
these management-initiated direct participation programmes were limited to very low levels of 
decision-making and mostly to directly job-related issues. Nevertheless they were very important for 
plant-level blue-collar workers in Turkey, where the relations and representation even within the 
unions are argued to be non-democratic (Nichols and Sugur, 2004). Such practices by the 
management were therefore very effective in providing employees with evidence of what the company 
could give them that the union could not. 
141 Interview with HR Director, FMCGI HR Director, FMCGI 
142 Interview with bz Gida-11 Official 
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In this section, empirical evidence on IR issues in the non- or anti-unionist cases is discussed. These 
US companies were found, firstly, to have transferred their corporate 'philosophy' of 'avoiding unions 
if they can' and the non- or anti-unionist attitude quite easily to the permissive Turkish IR 
environment. De-unionisation and keeping unions at bay were accomplished without major problems 
mostly by using the flexibility of the legislation that provided great power for employers. Secondly, 
management in these case companies shared the common attitude of unwillingness to share 
managerial prerogatives with unions, and in some cases provided employees with comparably better 
employment terms and conditions (see Chapter 7) so that workers would not feel the need for 
collective organisation around a union. Particularly in the non-unionised cases, management launched 
a proactive strategy to keep unions out by managing employee expectations and the employment 
relationship without actually giving very much. They developed various communication and 
participation methods that were innovative in the Turkish environment particularly for blue-collar 
labour, which did not probably cost that much but made employees feel important and involved. ILM 
approaches used in conjunction with above market average compensation and benefits presented 
additional incentives for the labour to remain non-unionised particularly in the high unemployment 
environment. Within this environment there were also a few cases that were unionised, which are 
discussed empirically in the next section. 
8.3.2. UNIONISED US MNCs IN THE TBS 
8.3.2.1. Reasons for Recognising Unions: US Corporate Philosophy 
Unionised US MNCs in this research were AutoCO1, AutoCO2 and TexCO. FoodCO, although 
included among the anti-unionist cases (see above), had one unionised plant in a different sub-sector. 
This unusual case is discussed separately below. 
In all three cases, no evidence for a non- or anti-unionist US corporate attitude was found. In the 
interviews carried out at subsidiary and regional corporate143 levels, a 'philosophy' or 'preference' for 
`no union IR' was not indicated. USAutoI had unions organised in all its major European and US 
plants. At AutoCO2 all subsidiary managers interviewed strongly argued that USAuto2 did not have 
an anti-union policy. Not even a preference for 'no third parties between us and our employees but 
direct communication' was signalled. In fact unions were perceived as a 'check and balance tool' on 
managerial behaviour14°. TexCO's policy in unionisation in Turkey was transferred from 
USClothing's much emphasised corporate values about `being a socially responsible employer, 
respecting its employees wishes to collectively organise, and pursuing good relations with the union 
143 No interviews were attainable at the regional or corporate HQ levels at AutoCO2 
1N Interview with the AutoCO2 HR Director 
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as well as its employees'45'. In TexCO these corporate values seemed to go far beyond the 
`philosophy' of the non - or anti-unionist cases, where no subsequent comments were made at either 
subsidiary or European corporate levels about a preference for avoiding unions if possible. In fact, all 
of USClothing's European as well as North American plants (e. g. in Spain, France, Belgium) used to 
be unionised, and prolonged negotiations between the unions and management took place to agree 
upon the terms and conditions of terminations when these plants had to be closed down due to cost 
considerations. Evidence suggested that USClothing had a union-friendly attitude that was transferred 
to the Turkish subsidiary as well. 
8.3.2.2. Role of Turkish JVPs 
Turkish JVPs were observed to have supporting roles in the unionisation of AutoCOI and TexCO, 
more so in the AutoCOI case. Unionisation at AutoCOl historically is attributable to the pro-union 
attitude (demonstrated by the existence of unions in many of its companies in a wide range of sectors) 
and the 'legacy' of Holdingl management. During the early 1970s, Holdingl, as a result of a decisive 
opposition from one of its legendary professional managers, adopted the unionisation principle across 
its manufacturing affiliates, based on an argument similar to that by Henry Ford that unions were 
necessary for workers to earn more and be able to buy even the more expensive goods produced by 
Holding! companies 146. Therefore unions were not obstructed in any manufacturing company of 
Holdingl. An IR coordination unit was created within Holding]. directed by another legendary 
professional manager who has after his retirement took leading positions in employers' associations. 
The founder of Holding]. led employers in various sectors for the establishment of employers' 
associations. HoldingI is therefore known to be the leader and adherent of collective labour-employer 
relations in Turkey. 
AutoCOI had started assembling cars under its American parent's license back in the late 1950s as the 
first 'car production' company in Turkey. In the next 5 decades, it gradually grew into one of the 
largest car production companies. It became an IJV with the inclusion of the American parent, 
initially with a minority share and only recently, in the late 1990s, as an equal equity shareholder. 
AutoCOI had been unionised from the late 1960s, even before the Iloldingl-wide principle was 
accepted, in fact since the unionisation first started in the metal working industry. Unionisation has 
been entirely in Holding I's discretion who had assumed management until USAutoI became an 
equal-share JVP and both parents had been involved in management equally. Within the new 
ownership structure HR/IR was still left to the Holding! 's responsibility and its 'legacy' continued in 
t" USClothing's corporate values statement, that was observed during the fieldwork visits on display at the I IQ and the plant, TexCO 
t"6 Source withheld in order not to reveal the identity of Holding I. 
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HR/IR management 147. Although HR/IR Director claimed that AutoCOI `is neither [USAutol] nor 
[Holdings] but an independent enterprise on its own as an IJV' and there were no formal regular 
reporting lines in HR/IR, evidence was found for a strong organic relationship which involved limited 
formal reporting with Holding]. 148. In addition, industry factors and the cooperative attitude of Türk 
Metal (labour union at AutoCOI) have been influential for the continuation of collective labour- 
employer relations, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
In comparison to the AutoCOI case, the significance of the Turkish partners' role in TexCO's 
unionisation had been much more limited, mainly because a number of Turkish partners shared 49% 
(minority) equity among themselves in the IJV. USClothing had the majority share, and the Turkish 
JVPs were not involved in operational management but only in strategic matters. Turkish JVPs, 
among the largest employers in the sector, had comprehensive knowledge of the sector. They were 
moreover among the leading members of the Turkish Textile Producers Employers' Association, and 
had unionised labour in their other companies in the sector. These factors in combination are argued 
to have been positively influential in the unionisation of TexCO particularly at the initial establishment 
stage. It has not been possible to interview the Turkish JVPs of TexCO to find out the reasons of 
favourable attitude towards unionisation. However it is argued that their reasons were related to the 
unbalanced power position of the unions (i. e. much weaker) in the sector against the employers, 
discussed in more detail below. 
8.3.2.3. Role ofAnrerican JVPs 
In the IJVs, the US parents' role in IR was very significant, because unionisation depended on the 
American parents' decision, as argued above for the anti- or non-unionist cases; this was particularly 
so in the PharmaCOI case. PharmaCOl used to be a unionised affiliate of Ilolding3 before it became 
the IJV when USPharmal acquired 50% equity, and de-unionisation was realised while the IJV was 
established as a result of the new American JVP's requirement'49. At AutoCOl, as stated by the IR 
Director at USAutol's Europe HQ, the management link with the Turkish subsidiary was not the 
same strength as with its other WOS, because of the unique IJV history and structure of AutoCOI. Its 
other IJVs had initially been established and owned fully by USAutoI whereas AutoCOI had the 
opposite background. There were no formal reporting lines in IR between AutoCOI and USAutoI's 
European HQ. 
USAutol's influence on IR in AutoCOI was limited to more informal processes, i. e. involving 
AutoCOI's HR/IR Director in quarterly IR/HR meetings in Europe, holding tele-conference meetings, 
141 Interview with expatriate (American) CFO 
tu Interviews with AutoCOl's Holdingl HR Coordinator, expatriate assistant GMs and IIR/IR Director 
149 Interviews with former HR Coordinator, I-Iolding3, HR Manager and HR Specialist, PharmaCOl 
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through which the most significant issues for the American parent, e. g. health and safety, child labour, 
equal opportunities, diversity, etc, were discussed. According to the IR Director at USAutol's 
European HQ, it was very much Turkey-based labour relations managed by the Turkish ('Holding! ') 
HR/IR Director and it was absolutely fine as long as employees were treated in line with USAutoI's 
general codes of conduct. IR in AutoCOI had been managed successfully by the Turkish parent for 
over 40 years and `don't fix it if it ain't broken' was USAuto 1's principle' so 
AutoCOI and PharmaCOI had very similar features particularly in terms of ownership structures and 
IJV establishments with American partners, except unionisation in the former continued while de- 
unionisation occurred in the latter. Unionisation in AutoCOI therefore can be mainly attributed to the 
union-friendly attitude of USAuto 1, while the role of the Turkish parent and industrial factors were 
also important. In the other unionised IJV case, TexCO, unionisation essentially reflected the US 
JVP's union-friendly corporate attitude as a 'socially responsible employer', as USClothing was the 
majority owner who had the full managerial responsibility and control in the IJV. It was also argued 
by the IR Director at EMEA HQ that unionisation originally might have been led by the Scottish 
engineers who first set up the Turkish plant, coming from an area where USClothing had one of the 
most strongly unionised subsidiaries. 
Similar to the non- or anti-unionist cases, IR management at union-friendly US MNCs in this research 
was left to the discretion of the local managements, even at TexCO (IJV) and AutoCO2 (WOS) where 
it was the American parents who had management responsibility. At AutoCOl's European IIQ, IR 
was argued to be one of the most country-specif ic areas for USAuto1, although they had a separate 
division that dealt with `negotiations and labour contracts across Europe, to understand the needs 
and give corporate approval when necessary"51. USClothing also had an IR division at its European 
HQ, but they were not involved in unionisation, collective bargaining or any other daily management 
issues. They had to step in when closing down the plants, and their involvement was claimed to be 
restricted to strategic issues, e. g. ascertaining that employees were treated according to USClothing's 
corporate values. It is therefore found that US MNCs transferred their 'philosophy' in terms of 
attitude towards collective labour relations, i. e. non-unionist or union-friendly, and left the 
management of IR to the local managers to be conducted in line with the corporate codes of conduct. 
It is evident that unionised case companies could also have been de- or non-unionised in the 
permissive IR environment in Turkey. Unionisation in AutoCOI, AutoC02 and TexCO as such was 
therefore considered as a strong evidence for the positive (or at least not negative) attitude of their 
American parents. Particularly for AutoCOl and AutoC02, longstanding involvement in collective 
150 Interview with AutoCOl's expatriate (American) CFO 
131 Interview with IR Director at USAutol's Europe HQ 
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labour relations within the automobile industry in the USA where unionisation is the norm might be 
reflected in their positive attitude towards unionisation at their Turkish subsidiaries. Some of the 
specific factors associated with industry norms and union-employer relations that will help further 
explain the unionisation in these cases are discussed in more detail below. 
8.3.2.4. Industry Factors 
The export orientation in both AutoCOI and AutoCO2 increased the importance of high quality 
production, thus retention of the highly skilled company-trained workforce was especially significant. 
Given the considerably lower labour cost in the AutoCOl (and AutoCO2) plants in Turkey in 
comparison to the rates in the other European plants, achieving and sustaining export quality 
production was more important than cost considerations. Labour market pressures to retain scarce 
skills needed in the car production and supplies sector made an experienced workforce more difficult 
to replace, hence more valuable. At AutoCOI for example they kept around 800 workers from the old 
plant although they knew they would not need them for at least a year until the new plant started in full 
capacity: 
"The workforce here was 15-20 years worth of experience and if we'd laid them off, 
made them redundant, a year later we'd have been down in [the new plant] trying to hire 
new people. We'd have paid these guys a big redundancy payment and then going there 
and hiring new people costs us about the same when it is all said and done. And what 
you've done is you turned away 15-20 years of experience in the transaction. So we did 
not want to do that so we carried probably 700-800 people more than we needed to for a 
year. I am not to say it makes us look like nice guys but it was more to our benefit 
because these guys were experienced people. " 5 
As argued previously, labour market conditions in different sectors can increase or decrease union 
power. In Turkey scarcity of skilled labour was a major labour market constraint that increased union 
power in for instance the auto production industry for companies such as AutoCOI and AutoCO2. 
While TexCO's production was also mainly for export to source its European markets, low complexity 
of production in textiles and abundance of unskilled labour needed in this sector reduced the union's 
power considerably. As argued by top-level union official at TEKSIF: 
"The low skill and education level required in the textiles sector creates most of our 
problems. An uneducated, unskilled person just immigrated from his/her Anatolian 
village to Istanbul can be prepared to start working in a textile plant within a week. 
There are so many others waiting right at the other side of the entrance, ready to accept 
working without any social security insurance or overtime wages, only for the minimum 
wage. As the companies can easily lay off existing workers and start with new ones, who 
do not need to be highly-skilled or highly-trained in this sector, workers are scared to 
become union members, as it can on its own mean losing their jobs. Being a union 
member might cost one his job in Turkey. " 
152 Interview with AutoCol's expatriate (American) CFO 
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In both sectors, i. e. metal production and textiles, there were strong employers' associations. Bi- 
annual industry-wide collective bargaining and agreements were made between the labour unions and 
the employers' associations acting on behalf of their respective members. Although the employers' 
associations, which increased the power of already strong employers, were an important factor that 
reduced the labour unions' power, industry-wide bargaining process actually helped to boost it, 
bringing some balance to the process. However as both managements and trade union officials 
claimed, both Türk Metal and TEKSIF presented very cooperative attitudes during the bargaining 
processes and in their on-going relations with the employers. 
In brief, it is argued that US MNCs were unionised in Turkey mainly as a result of transferring their 
formal worldwide pro-union corporate policy, supported by other broader organisational factors, such 
as pro-union attitudes of Turkish JVPs, and industry factors, e. g. high quality needs for exports and 
skilled and experienced labour to fulfil production needs. Moreover, these companies, as strong 
MNCs and members of the strong employers' associations, did not perceive the much less powerful 
Turkish unions as a major threat. Therefore they did not oppose them as strongly as they would have 
if the Turkish trade unions presented serious threats to their management prerogatives, as might be the 
case for instance with works councils in Germany. This finding was in line with the arguments of 
Colling et al. (2006) who found the most determined opposition by US MNCs to union influence in 
Germany and Spain, where the consequences of allowing unionised relations were potentially broader. 
The highly cooperative attitude of the trade unions involved in these cases might have been another 
important factor for the transfer of the pro-union policy of the unionised case companies, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
8.3.2.5. Cooperative Approach of Trade Unions for `Mutual Gains' 
A very cooperative attitude had been observed in the majority of the unions included in this research. 
Particularly those affiliated with Türk-t (i. e. Tek Gida-t , Türk Metal, TEKSIF, Oleyij) were among 
the most significant trade unions in their respective sector and were `accused' of becoming too 
`employer friendly' by the leftist Confederation DISK. DISK and other leftist unionists argued that 
this attitude had become a major general characteristic of labour unions in Turkey recently and it 
damaged unions' power and outcomes of collective action. Türk-Is and Hak-Is on the other hand 
suggested that it had been a 'transformation of ideological strategy, as a result of being stronger by 
adapting to the changing conditions' 1". Not only managements and employers' association 
representatives but also most trade union officials interviewed in this research criticised `the old 
hostile unionisation' as being destructive in the current era of increasing global competition and 
1S3 Interviews with General Secretary of TOrk Metal and Vice President of liak-11 
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praised the `cooperative' and `flexible' attitude by the unions. Such an attitude was particularly 
important for employers given the instability of the Turkish economic environment. At AutoCOI for 
instance they made around 400 people redundant while moving down to the new plant, where the 
union had cooperated and it was `not a major issue I54" The American CFO at AutoC01 moreover 
cited his experience with the trade unions at the beginning of the major economic crisis: 
"That was one of the things that surprises me here: the flexibility that we had with the 
union. We went to them in December of 2000, with 'here is the data guys and here is 
what's happening'. You could not walk into an UAW plant in North America and say, 2 
weeks before Christmas, and it was before the Bayram 3S here, 'Sorry guys, the market's 
just collapsed. We are out of here next week. We are down for a week. ' That was good. " 
The HR/IR Director of AutoCOI proudly explained that there had been almost no problems during the 
last two years while carrying out the conditions of the collective agreement contract agreed and signed 
between Türk Metal and MESS. While minor problems had been solved at the shop floor level 
between the management and shop stewards or branch level union representatives, for major issues 
management would have had to hold meetings with the union's highest officials in Ankara. IHR/IR 
Director said such a meeting had happened only once in the past two years and gave an anecdotal 
example for smooth and unproblematic relations with the union at the shop floor level: 
"Once I was on the shop floor with HR people from the USAuto I during an annual audit 
when the shop stewards came to talk about a problem. So we quickly discussed the 
matter on the spot, agreed on a solution and they left. Afterwards our corporate people 
asked me who they were, and when I said that they were the union representatives, they 
got even more curious, asking what it was about. When I told them the matter and that 
we solved it, they were really amazed to see that we had discussed and solved it just like 
that and asked me how we could manage this. I explained that our employment and 
union structures here in Turkey are very different from those in Germany, Belgium or the 
States. Our union people know that what we need to do is necessary for this company to 
continue providing jobs. So they make sacrifices when needed. As the employer we pay 
them back when things go well. " 
As argued in Chapter 6, Türk Metal was able to negotiate a good collective agreement for its 
members across the metalworking industry, including those working in AutoCOI and AutoCO2. 
Moreover it collaborated with management in the organisational structure change during the gradual 
replacement of traditional assembly line with USAuto 1's production system in many stages of the 
production that involved work group organisation. Türk Metal's claims for increased power in the 
company with the help of its cooperative attitude was supported by its participation in such issues. 
Similar accounts of cooperative relations with Türk Metal were found at AutoCO2. As a supplier of 
auto parts, AutoCO2's production depended entirely on the orders it received from automotive 
producers, therefore it had to modify its workforce size according to orders received. When there was 
not enough demand, it had to downsize plants, to recruit later when they needed to increase output. 
154 AutoCol's expatriate (American) CFO 
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AutoCO2 had a much less complicated production system than automotive producers but training and 
experience definitely were important for higher quality, export-oriented production. Therefore during 
downsizing and recruitment, AutoCO2 management worked closely with the union, making those least 
`vulnerable' (i. e. most recently employed, younger, unmarried, without children, etc. ) workers 
redundant first and calling those laid off first when recruiting again. During one of the site visits for 
fieldwork at their Istanbul plant, the researcher was able to follow meetings held with union officials 
to announce that the company had won a very large scale long-term project bid from AutoCOI for its 
export production and that they would start recruiting in collaboration with the union. All the 
interviewees at AutoCO2 emphasised the importance of continuous and open communication with the 
union and how that policy had improved their 'mutual gains'. AutoCO2's IIR Director responsible 
from all 3 Turkish plants argued that AutoCO2 had been ahead of all the USAuto2's European 
subsidiaries in terms of establishing and continuing good 'partnership' relations with the union, 
through open communication and mutual trust. 
These findings are along the lines of arguments by Nichols and Sugur (2004) who state that 'Turk 
Metal helps the employers. The employers help Turk Metal. This is the unspoken name of the game. ' 
(p. 179). Moreover Büyükuslu (1994) reports that Türk Metal has welcomed the adoption of 
teamworking, quality circles and the extensive use of direct management-employee committees, so 
much that it more recently organised a joint conference with MESS on TQM and related issues in 
2002 (MESS, 2003). Türk Metal is moreover argued to have a practice of leaving management to 
manage on the shop floor, as a result managers state that it has been 'no problem' and in fact 'they 
understand our problems' (Nichols and Sugur, 2004: 179). The findings of this research confirmed the 
arguments of the previous studies. Highly cooperative attitude and behaviour of the union suggested 
the inclusion of unions in employment relations, with minimal incorporation into management. 
While there were continuous, day-to-day union-management relations at AutoCOl and AutoCO2 
mainly because of sectoral factors, e. g. training needs to upgrade skills, and company-specific factors, 
e. g. recruitment in growing AutoCOI and for the new substantial order at AutoCO2, union- 
management relations were confined to collective bargaining periods at TexCO. Similar to those in 
the metalwork industry, industry-wide agreements between the union and employers' association in 
textiles were signed after usually unproblematic bargaining periods. Management-union relations 
were smooth at other times both at the industry and company levels. The union, TEKSIF, also adapted 
a collaborative model, as the best strategy to survive particularly with its relative (low) power against 
the employers' association within the Turkish environment. 
Most union officials interviewed in this study claimed that Turkish trade unions had adopted 
cooperative and flexible attitudes as a strategy to be able to adjust to the changing conditions 
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nationally and globally. They had argued that showing a cooperative attitude, the unions would make 
the management's job easier in dealing with employees directly and creating a peaceful work 
environment: 
"Our workers will not react negatively if it is us the union that announces that there is a 
need for work stoppage, for unpaid leave due to high level of stock, or even lay-offs. We 
would do such things for employers as we believe, and we can explain this to our 
members, that we are all in the same boat. To have a nice journey together, we all need 
to be positive and co-operative about it. The value added by us the unions will only be 
possible when we can help our members to work efficiently and create a good job 
through goodwill and dedicated effort. "' 56 
"We know that we are all in the same boat" was commonly used by almost all the union officials 
interviewed, as well as by many HR/IR people. Just as Kelly (2000) argues, trade unions seemed to 
have accepted that they could survive in this environment - one that permits employer 'militancy' 
and anti-unionism - only if they cooperated with employers and were flexible enough to attain 'the 
best for a larger number of our members'. 
One last unionised case was the hazelnut processing plant owned by FoodCO, which was a noteworthy 
case given that FoodCO was argued to be among the anti-unionist US MNCs in this research. 
8.3.2.6 Unionisation in an anti-unionist USMNC: The Hazelnut Plant ofFoodCO 
It was an unusual unionisation case at this small plant, as argued previously, in Turkey it is almost 
impossible for a union to get recognition if the employer decides against unionisation. There were 
around 100 workers in this small hazelnut processing plant where production was labour intensive and 
entirely for export, and therefore with high quality standards. When Oz Gida-I first started to get 
organised in the plant, the management reacted very harshly, which was not unexpected given 
FoodCO's strong anti-unionist stance transferred from USFood (see above). It used some coercive 
methods, e. g. laying off those who had become members and threatening others, to keep the union 
out, while it easily replaced workers given the labour market conditions in the rather remote region 
where the plant was situated. The village was somewhat further away from the industrial region and 
there were not many, if any, other employment possibilities for unskilled uneducated women, other 
than peasantry. Although it was not possible to understand exactly how, the union official claimed 
that Oz Gida-lý was able to organise employees strongly enough to oppose the management and create 
unrest in the plant in response to the latter's coercive methods. The union moreover claimed to have 
threatened the management with provoking negative publicity in the media, although it was not clear 
how, as it would have been rather difficult to attain public attention and create negative publicity for 
such a small remote plant. However as an Oz Gida-t official argued, in the end it was their 
cooperative strategy that had convinced the management to accept the unionisation: 
156 Interview with Oz Gida-f$ official 
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"Then we convinced them [the management] initially to discuss the issue, and then for 
recognition and collective bargaining. We convinced them by saying we as the workers 
need this plant more than the American corporation does. It provides a living for around 
500 people considering their families, and this is among the best places to work. In this 
way we were able to convince the management that the union was not a 'monster' and in 
fact very willing to co-operate for the well being of both the company and its workers. " 
The flexible and cooperative, which can also be read as supplicant and compliant, attitude of the union 
might have been influential in its acceptance by the management, but it had not been possible to learn 
the complete story, as it had happened some years ago. The HR director and managers interviewed 
kept the discussion extremely brief about the IR issues, only stating the major 'facts', i. e. that there 
was a union in one plant but not in the other, and it was entirely up to workers to be unionised or not, 
in an attempt to play down the subject. Some of the possible reasons for unionisation might have been 
firstly, the effect of the (in)significance of the business unit on the company's attitude: hazelnut 
processing was not FoodCO's major business in Turkey, sweet and starch was, where they had already 
de-unionised the plant. As a matter of fact, the hazelnut plant was sold subsequently. Secondly, 
location of the plant might also be an important factor, which was supported by the accounts of the IIR 
manager at the European HQ: unionisation in this rather remote plant with a small number of workers 
at comparatively low wages presented no significant threat to the management. Thirdly, FoodCO 
might not have wanted to handle any more negative publicity, especially because of such a small and 
fairly insignificant business, when it already had been in the public domain. It had been criticised in 
the media for its lobbying attempts at the highest government levels for regulation changes in import 
quotas and production subsidies in sugar production to enlarge its market for the substitute (cheaper) 
product it produced at its sweet and starch plant. Therefore it might have compromised by allowing 
this cooperative union in its secondary small business not to stir things up and maintain a low profile 
for the sake of its major business. Although the smallness and remoteness of the plant would have 
made mobilisation of negative public reaction difficult, management might have nevertheless not 
wanted to face even the small possibility. Ultimately, it was down to the cooperative approach of the 
union that FoodCO had allowed unionisation in this hazelnut plant, similar to its experiences in the 
UK where USFood preferred collaboration with a `prettyfexible to deal with' union when setting up a 
new plant, as it did not perceive this union as a major threat'37. It is therefore argued that a 
combination of company-specific and, to a lesser extent, industrial factors shaped the subsidiary level 
IR management in FoodCO, even though USFood's corporate policy of avoiding unions was 
transferred to FoodCO in Turkey. 
157 Interview with HR Director at EMEA HQ, USFood 
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8.4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, empirical evidence on IR issues in the US MNCs in Turkey was discussed within the 
analytical framework of unions' power and of influences exerted by the TBS. Extensive case study 
evidence suggests that, firstly, US MNCs transferred their corporate attitudes in IR, whether against or 
in favour of unions, to their Turkish subsidiaries. The permissive legislative environment, weak 
unions and pro-business governments made de-unionisation and non-unionisation fairly 
straightforward for non- or anti-unionist companies while keeping within the law. This finding was 
consistent with the widespread finding about skilful use of existing legal flexibilities by US MNCs in 
different countries (e. g. Colling et al., 2006). Secondly, detailed IR policies or tools were not 
developed and transferred to subsidiaries from the US parents, except for a few, general guidelines. 
This was probably because IR was still highly regulated in many European countries, which made it 
very much country-specific. Among these guidelines were handling IR according to the local rules 
and regulations by local managers within the framework of their extensive knowledge of the local 
environment. 
The most important factor in collective employment relations of American MNCs in Turkey was the 
US parent's attitude: if it was non -or anti-unionist (mostly hidden in the sub-text of their 
`philosophy') and decided to be de-unionised or stay non-unionised, it was almost impossible for any 
union to continue its organisation because of the permissive legislation discussed above. The Turkish 
IR environment presented unions with difficult obstacles and gave companies extensive flexibility, 
through i) macro (national) and micro (company) level union density threshold rates; ii) changes in 
company status (i. e. workplace vs. enterprise); iii) changes in job classifications; iv) use of sub- 
contracted labour. If these were not enough, coercive but illegal methods could have been used, as 
trade unions were not powerful enough to mobilise workers or public opinion. Pursuing legal 
challenges in the courts takes considerably long time (e. g. see FMCGI case discussion above) and 
usually ends with decisions in favour of employers. 
Some common themes of the American non- or anti-unionist attitude were transferred to the Turkish 
subsidiaries: firstly, an unwritten corporate ̀ philosophy' of 'avoiding unions if/where we can', was 
identified in the non/de-unionised case companies. Secondly, the strict corporate policy of 'following 
the local legislation in employment relations precisely' and respect for employees' preference for 
collective organisation, and willingness to work with the union striving for peaceful relations were 
also stressed. However it was clear in the non- or anti-unionist companies that managements 
`preferred' not to have a third party between themselves and employees, and not to transfer some of 
their managerial power to the unions. Fourthly, a preference for direct communication with 
employees and using innovative methods of communication and involvement, i. e. union substitution 
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methods, were transferred from the home-country policies. The case companies were able to apply 
their `philosophy' and other methods more or less freely in the tolerant Turkish environment. 
The main reason for unionisation particularly in this permissive environment was also American 
parents' corporate attitude towards organised collective labour relations. It is therefore argued that 
unionisation in the TBS primarily reflected company strategy / philosophy rather than union power. In 
the unionised cases, there were supporting industrial and organisational factors, where collaboration 
with unions was perceived as beneficial, not threatening, by managements. Union's greater 'latent' 
power, e. g. in high skill export oriented sectors or in the industries where unionisation has been 
traditionally more widespread (e. g. automobile production), and highly collaborative, even compliant, 
union attitudes, resulted in recognition for the trade union, where managements did not perceive the 
union as a threat to managerial prerogatives. Even in cases where companies adopted a highly militant 
anti-unionist approach managements, in order to keep a low profile, were observed to accept unions in 
return for accommodating behaviour by the union. 
This chapter concludes the discussion of empirical findings of the research. In the next and the last 
chapter, firstly, main findings are reviewed and discussed, and secondly, the wider implications are 
presented. 
191 
CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this research was to examine how IR/HRM policies are formed in subsidiaries of 
MNCs in a distinctive context. In this regard, understanding the extent of transfer and adaptation of 
IR/HRM policies of American MNCs in Turkey, which is defined as a 'hybrid transitional' host 
country defined in terms of its relative strength and openness to global influences on its institutional 
business environment, was the main research aim. For this purpose, cases of American MNCs in 
various sectors were investigated to explore the impact of different influential forces on the transfer 
and application of IR/HRM policies and practices. To understand the multi-layered, multi- 
dimensional and interwoven context of transfer within MNCs, drawing mainly on the comparative 
institutionalist theory, potential impact factors were conceptualised at four levels: host- and home- 
country influences were considered at the macro level, sectoral factors at the meso, and company 
factors at the micro level to research their impact on the fourth level, i. e. IHR/IR functions such as 
employment systems and labour market orientations, performance management and reward systems, 
and employment relations. 
In the first section of this final chapter, the main findings presented previously are reviewed and 
discussed by considering the major influences separately and in interaction with each other to 
understand the formation of IR/HRM policies and practices at the subsidiary level. In the second part, 
the wider implications of the findings are presented, and it is argued that different institutional factors 
found in the distinctive 'hybrid transitional' business system, i. e. that incorporates various elements of 
typologies of business systems in the literature, imply a continuous change that is not only 'pushed' by 
influences of globalisation and transnational institutions, i. e. trickle-down and trickle-up trajectories 
(Djelic and Quack, 2003) but also 'pulled' by those systems as a result of local actors' aspirations to 
reach these ultimate models. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the research limitations and 
implications for future research. 
9.2. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS 
A number of factors at different levels of the analytical framework were found to have direct impact 
on the transfer and adaptation of HHRM policies and practices separately. The results also revealed the 
interplay between these multi-level effects, illustrating the specific nature of the interaction between 
these levels and the impact it has on transfer and application of IIR/IR policies. In the next section, 
influences at different levels are presented separately, followed by the discussion of interaction effects. 
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9.2.1. KEY FORCES OF INFLUENCE 
9.2.1.1. Macro Level Analysis: Host-Country Effects 
It was argued that host-country business systems impose legal and societal constraints that influence 
the transfer and application of policies. One of the main aims of this research was to explore the 
impact of the `hybrid transitional' host business environment on the transfer of IR/IIRM policies. 
Strong country of operation influences were found on the transfer and implementation of IR/lIRM 
policies and practices in the Turkish subsidiaries of US MNCs. These findings are consistent with 
those of previous research on host country influences, e. g. Almond and Ferner (2006), Gooderham, 
Nordhaug, and Ringdal (1998), Schmitt and Sadowski (2003), and Tempel et a!. (2006). 
To begin with, an ILM approach was found to be the widely adopted employment system in almost all 
cases studied in this research, both for the managerial employees and blue-collar workers. While no 
fieldwork could be carried out at the corporate HQ level, sufficient evidence was collected at the 
regional HQ and subsidiary levels to conclude that an ILM approach was transferred to Turkey as the 
corporate policy. However there were also various supporting host-country factors -as well as sectoral 
and organisational factors (see below)- for the transfer and application of such a policy in Turkey. 
Mainly because of local labour market characteristics, particularly the scarcity of the highly-educated, 
skilled and trained labour force needed both for blue-collar and managerial positions, US companies 
needed to recruit and select the best available candidates with a certain level of education and skills for 
entry-level positions, and more importantly, train and develop them internally. Although the tight 
local labour market presented constraints in terms of finding the qualified workforce needed, the TBS 
at the same time provided most of the necessary conditions for the implementation of ILM, including 
comparatively low labour costs, and collaborative unions and workforce. Moreover, there were no 
legal obstacles to the transfer of sophisticated R&S methods from the US parents for selecting the 
most suitable candidates. The interplay of these host-country factors simultaneously necessitated and 
eased the transfer of ILM approaches. 
No legal constraints were imposed by the TBS on the adoption of home-grown policies and practices 
in R&S. The case companies nevertheless showed some localisation particularly in recruitment 
methods, and adopted the informal tools that are widely used by local companies, such as word of 
mouth, personal networks and suggestions by current employees. However, they did not generally 
need to modify their global corporate selection criteria, as they were able to find suitable employees in 
the Turkish labour market, which is comparatively larger than those of many other emerging and 
developing countries. Moreover, graduates of `good' American-type schools and universities are used 
to Western concepts of R&S and HRM. Nevertheless, particular job types, e. g. sales, and sectors, e. g. 
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hotels, are problematic for the application of such global corporate criteria and tools in the Turkish 
environment, again because of attitudes among qualified workforce towards such jobs and sectors. 
Therefore some of the `general' selection criteria, e. g. a university degree, university name, foreign 
language knowledge, were eased due to problems experienced in these case companies in `matching 
attitude with aptitude'. 
In an environment where scarcity of educated and skilled labour prevails, job-hopping by and 
poaching of qualified and in-house developed employees are highly probable. However, career 
opportunities and competitive C&B packages provided by US MNCs, when combined with the 
traditional commitment and loyalty of Turkish employees and the scarcity of similar jobs, usually 
eliminated high turnover problems. The combination of these host-country factors made the 
application of the ILM approach less problematic. Case companies used extensive T&D as well as 
career and promotion opportunities for retention purposes when it became an issue with new 
(particularly foreign) capital investments providing similar career and compensation opportunities. 
It is argued that a wholesale transfer and application of policies is not possible and some degree of 
adaptation to the host-country conditions, and therefore hybridisation, is necessary. Such localisation 
in the application of C&B policies was clearly identifiable, although C&B was among the most 
centralised and standardised HRM function (see below). Within the general corporate policy of 
`staying competitive in the market' case companies provided inflation adjustments during the hyper- 
inflation periods in Turkey, which meant increasing wages and salaries more than once a year. The 
inclusion in employees' benefits packages of some benefits that were traditional in the TBS (e. g. free 
cafeteria and transportation services) and of other, more recent 'innovations' that were highly regarded 
in the Turkish context (such as private health and life insurance) -even where such practices were not 
part of global corporate policy- was another example of the localisation of C&B. Economic 
conditions of the host-country necessitated the adaptation of US corporate policies while case 
companies were strongly inclined towards transferring their reward systems intact, as generally argued 
in the literature. 
Host country NBS are not necessarily constraining; they can provide crucial conditions for the 
successful transfer of corporate policies. In this respect, Turkey presents a legally permissive and pro- 
business IR environment in which US firms had no difficulty in extending their preferred corporate 
strategy, or `philosophy', towards collective employment relations. Where the US parent companies 
had non-unionist strategies, they were able to de-unionise and/or stay non-unionised in the Turkish 
subsidiaries by using the widespread flexibility given to employers by the legislation, which at the 
same time put obstacles in the way of unions. Turkish unions, which are argued to have very limited 
latent power and are characterised as weak in mobilising their power (except under certain sectoral 
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conditions) are rarely able to fight back if the company decides to de-unionise. Some of the classic 
union substitution methods (e. g. promotion to staff positions, increased compensation packages, and 
innovative communication methods) were significant particularly for blue-collar employees within the 
Turkish business environment where high unemployment and low wages prevail, while 
communication between management and employees had traditionally been limited to rare top-down 
instances. 
To sum up, while the legal framework in Turkey was far from being restrictive in shaping US MNCs' 
HR/IR policies in the substantive areas investigated, adaptation and hybridisation of the policies 
shaped in and transferred from the American business system were found to reflect host-country 
features and conditions. Although some of these were constraining, they were also positively 
influential in creating the necessary environment for the transfer. 
9.2.1.2. Macro Level Analysis: Home-Country Effects 
One of the other core issues of this project was to understand which US corporate IIRM policies were 
transferred to Turkey and to what extent. Evidence was found for the successful transfer of many 
HRM policies and practices particularly in PM, reward, and employment systems, and corporate 
`philosophies' in IR, demonstrating distinctive country of origin influences. 
Firstly, both non-unionism and unionised 1R were found in the case companies. As argued in Chapter 
5, this pattern is in line with the home-country traditions, as American MNCs come from a business 
environment where both unionised and non-unionised approaches have been historically experienced, 
although non-unionism has been generally claimed as a distinctive characteristic of American IR 
system (Foulkes, 1980; Jacoby, 1997; Kochan, Katz and Derbyshire, 1986; Osterman, 1999). In the 
majority of the non-union cases, evidence for strong corporate anti-unionism, combined with other 
policies employed in large non-union American companies (Foulkes, 1980) and 'welfare capitalist' 
companies (Jacoby, 1997), was found. Where an unwritten corporate 'philosophy' of non-unionism 
was transferred, ILM employment systems combined with employment security, T&D and career 
opportunities, above market-average employment terms and conditions including pay and benefits, 
and extensive internal communication programmes were also used. These were similar to the 
innovative workplace policies used by non-union American firms in the UK as 'union substitution' 
practices (Beaumont and Townley, 1985). There were two typically 'American' managerial 
arguments cited for the non-unionist approach: that the company can and does provide the best 
employment terms and conditions for its employees' needs, without the interference of unions as a 
third party in employment relations. This argument was underpinned by a concern with maintaining 
managerial prerogatives. The second argument (used in only one of the non-union cases by the US 
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parent as the main rationale for de-unionisation) was based on labour cost considerations. Case 
companies generally preferred to behave ̀ by the book', achieving de-unionisation and keeping their 
plants non-unionised, something easily accomplished within the permissive pro-business legal 
framework, although there was some limited evidence for the use of harsher techniques when 
companies deemed that non-unionisation had to be continued. 
Turning to R&S, sophisticated and standardised policies and methods, including competency-based 
approaches developed at corporate HQ for the careful selection of employees, were transferred to the 
Turkish subsidiaries. US MNCs were 'innovators' in R&S, being among the first to use electronic 
recruitment, links with educational institutions, and competency-based methods in Turkey. 
Assessment centres, psychometric tests and detailed interview processes developed at regional and 
corporate HQ were also transferred. Related host-country factors, such as the absence of legal 
constraints combined with the presence of the necessary technological background, made the transfer 
of these R&S tools possible, although they were used in combination with other local tools (see 
above). 
US MNCs are known to have a tendency for centralised policies, particularly in compensation and PM 
systems, managed through standardised and formalised systems and policies globally (see e. g. Almond 
eta!., 2006). The findings of this study confirmed evidence from earlier research as strongest home- 
country influences were found in the highly centralised application of reward and PM policies and 
practices. Position in the market, salary ranges and benefits were defined by corporate / regional IIQ 
and implementation was closely controlled. Salary structures emphasising individual performance- 
related pay were successfully transferred to Turkish subsidiaries. Share ownership schemes, generally 
for higher levels of management, were one example of American compensation practices observed in 
the case studies. 
Similarly, strictly centralised and standardised corporate approaches to performance appraisal policies 
were applied. Performance was closely monitored through advanced tools and techniques transferred 
from the US parents to the Turkish subsidiaries, such as a `cascading' approach for aligning individual 
and departmental goals with business objectives, a forced distribution system, linkage between 
performance-appraisal and compensation, T&D and career management. Although subsidiary 
managements were given some flexibility in the adaptation of certain policies (see above), the 
implementation of transferred HR policies was subject to strict monitoring by regional and/or 
corporate HQ. 
Host-country factors that influenced transfer mechanisms were also found. Expatriates were rarely 
used; their deployment was limited to start-up periods particularly in greenfield investments. The 
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`quality' of the managerial workforce in Turkey made it possible to hand over the management to 
host-country nationals once the systems (operations, finance and accounting, HRM) had been set up 
by expatriates. High-technology tools (tele-conferences, international databases, electronic reporting, 
Intranets, etc. ) were used through the developed IT and telecommunications infrastructure available in 
the host-country as control mechanisms. Centralised and standardised policies, and close control 
through strict reporting relations within the international and regional structure, in which Turkish 
subsidiaries were the sub-regional HQ in a number of cases, were the other important transfer 
mechanisms, depicting strong country-of-origin factors. 
In summary then, US MNCs transferred most of their corporate policies and practices `embedded' in 
the US business system, to the Turkish subsidiaries. Host-country factors, though evident, were 
relatively few and imposed few constraints on the transfer; in fact, they generally provided backing for 
successful transfer. Host-country factors necessitated hybridisation only in a limited number of areas. 
In addition to the macro-level analysis, sectoral effects were analysed at the meso-level of the 
theoretical framework; these are discussed in the next section. 
9.2.1.3. Meso Level Analysis: Sectoral Effects 
It is generally accepted that industry characteristics have significant influences on shaping IIRM 
policies in subsidiaries and explaining variations in HRM/IR patterns (Coiling and Clark, 2002). 
Industrial influences are regarded more as mediating factors in the institutionalist approach where 
sectors are assumed to be `embedded' in their national business systems (Whitley, 1999). In this 
research, drawing on arguments by for instance Marginson and Sisson (1994) who claim that the 
nature of particular business sectors is more influential on the IIRM practices of MNCs than home- or 
host-country factors, industry is considered as one of the major sources of influence at the meso level. 
Drawing on Porter's (1998) and Bartlett and Ghoshal's (1989) studies on types of international 
competition, it is argued that variations in HRM policies would be found in multi-domestic and global 
industries as a result of more or less independence from HQ (Ferner, 1997). However many multi- 
domestic firms are found to be moving towards more global competition, and there are sub-sectoral 
variations as well. In fact, defining `sector' particularly for multinational firms can be quite 
complicated because of differences across a range of dimensions (Almond et al., 2006), therefore 
cases from a number of sectors were chosen to see the direct and indirect influences of operation / 
manufacturing systems and sub-sectoral variations on the transfer of HRM systems from US parents. 
A few sectoral influences were found in this study, acting in combination with home- and host-country 
factors. Transfer of ILM employment systems can be partly explained in relation to the sector-specific 
use of sophisticated operation systems and work organisation (e. g. teamwork). The need for highly 
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qualified employees for complicated operations and high quality production standards, especially in 
global supply-chain production systems such as car manufacturing, and their flexible deployment in 
teamwork structures, tend to favour ILM approaches. In the industries where such skilled and 
educated blue-collar and/or managerial workforces are needed, use of sophisticated R&S and 
employment systems reflect the need to find, attract and retain such employees, still scarce within the 
Turkish labour market. Moreover, it was found that sub-sectoral variations influenced labour 
requirements as well, as in the case of the high-end hotel sector where luxury chains serve a specific 
group of clientele who expect high-level service standard globally. A strong ILM orientation was 
observed in such companies, where sufficiently qualified employees were selected carefully, trained 
and developed in-house for promotion from within. Employment security and career opportunities 
(where possible) and T&D as well as carefully designed and monitored C&B packages were among 
the HR policies applied for retention. 
Finally, no significant sectoral differences were found in PM policies and applications across the core 
cases. They all adopted centrally controlled sophisticated PM systems, transferred from corporate HQ 
where performance evaluation processes were very similar and results were linked to payment, T&D 
and career planning systems. The uniformity found in the PM systems is explained, firstly, by the 
ILM strategy adopted, and secondly, by certain organisational factors (e. g. size, duration of operations 
in Turkey, etc.; see below) in the core set of cases. 
To summarise, evidence for the direct influence of sector was limited. Sector mainly impacted the 
choice of an ILM approach due to the need for high firm-specific skills. Therefore in this study it is 
found that sector tended to have mediating effects, rather than direct substantial influences, as much of 
the literature suggests. In the next section, evidence for organisational influences, analysed at the 
micro-level of the theoretical framework will be presented. 
9.2.1.4. Micro-level Analysis: Organisational effects 
There are findings in the literature that refer to the importance of various organisational characteristics 
in the formation of IR/HRM policies and practices of MNCs' subsidiaries (e. g. Beechler and Yang, 
1994; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Malnight, 2001; Marginson et al., 1995; McKern, 2003; 
Edwards and Kuruvilla, 2005). Similarly, this study identified a number of micro-level factors as 
influential: ownership type, company `philosophy', size, and age affected the nature of IR/HRM 
policies and practices in the case companies. 
Ownership structure was among the factors hypothesised to be significant in shaping the IR/HRM 
policies of US MNCs in Turkey. Therefore IJVs as well as WOS were selected for comparative 
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purposes. As diversified, large holding companies are a distinctive feature of the `hybrid transitional' 
TBS, attention was paid to IJVs where such holdings were the domestic JVPs. It is argued that the 
different levels of strength of local JVPs in the IJVs (see Chapter 4) were manifested in the level of 
involvement in HR management: while `strong' local JVPs were in charge of the HRM function, 
`weak' local JVPs had a limited degree of involvement only in broad HRM strategy and some 
managerial appointment decisions, while `dormant' Turkish JVPs were not involved in IIRM (or other 
management) functions at all. In the first group, there were very limited relations with the US JVPs in 
HRM, therefore policies and practices were either transferred from the Turkish JVPs or developed in 
the IJV with the participation of Turkish holdings. In the case of weak or dormant local JVPs, US 
partners were totally in charge of HRM and US corporate policies and practices were transferred 
and/or adapted to the local conditions. It is argued that there were two other reasons for US parents to 
leave HRM to the local JVPs. These include, firstly, the nature of entry to the Turkish market (i. e. 
brownfield vs. greenfield), which can also influence the power of the local JVPs and secondly, the 
`Americanised' nature of HRM and the training and qualification of HR (and other) professionals in 
the leading Turkish holdings, which together resulted in the 'contracting out' of IIRM to the local 
partner. 
In the brownfield IJV investments, the IR/ HRM 'tradition' and the Turkish holdings' 'legacy' had 
already been established, as these companies had been previously managed by the Turkish holdings. 
This long-standing managerial tradition provided the local partners with a competitive edge in taking 
on HRM responsibility in the IJV. In the greenfield IJV investments however, both partners started as 
equals, and there was no such an IR/HRM 'tradition'. Therefore US JVPs were able to establish their 
own IR/HRM policies and practices from scratch. 
The other explanation for the entrusting of HRM to the Turkish JVPs was the high level of 
sophistication in HRM and the resemblance between HRM policies and practices in the respective 
holdings and those of US MNCs. In developing 'contemporary' HRM systems in PM, C&B, R&S, 
succession and career planning, the leading Turkish holding companies sought input from American 
(and other foreign) partners and employed the services of American consultancy companies. Their 
efforts therefore resulted in highly `Americanised' HRM systems that were in effect very similar to 
what the American partners would like to have in place. Moreover, HR professionals had 
'Americanised' training and qualifications, and hence a positive attitude towards 'American-style' 
HRM: top managers in those companies with 'elite' educational backgrounds, from either abroad or 
American-style schools and universities in Turkey, where familiarity with American 'mind-set' is 
developed, contributed to the 'Americanisation' of HRM in their companies. The interaction of these 
two significant factors, i. e. attitudes of local managers towards country-of-origin policies and practices 
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on the one hand and 'pull' effects at the organisational level on the other, is argued to have contributed 
to the willingness of the American JVPs to `contract out' HRM to their local partners. 
Company `philosophy' and the corporate founder's attitudes were also significant organisational 
factors in determining IR policies and employment systems. Unionisation in the permissive and 
highly pro-business Turkish environment depended mainly on the company's attitude towards unions: 
if the US parent was against unionisation or had an anti-union attitude, it was unrealistic for the unions 
to attain the necessary organisational requirements as companies had a number of entirely legal 
methods at their disposal to de-unionise or stay non-unionised. Even in the case where the Turkish 
JVP had the HRM responsibility, it was the US JVP's stance against collective employment relations 
that resulted in de-unionisation, despite the strong labour union and union-friendly Turkish JVP. On 
the other hand, it was also mainly due to the US parent's corporate ̀ philosophy' and `corporate 
values' that the case company in the textile manufacturing sector was unionised despite low 
unionisation rates and a weak labour union. In the same case company, the ILM approach in a sector 
with low-skill requirements and in a host country where such labour is abundant was similarly 
explained by the US parent's 'socially responsible' attitude towards its employees. 
Two other organisational level features, age and size of the studied firms, had a direct influence on the 
formation of IR/HRM policies and practices in the host-country. The oldest company among the core 
cases had been in operation since 1959 and the newest since 1994. The considerable length of 
operations of the case companies, in common with many of the large FDI firms in Turkey, resulted in 
well-established and highly developed IR/HRM policies and systems. In terms of size, except 
AutoCOI, the case companies were not particularly large among the US parents' foreign subsidiaries. 
They were however among the key players, particularly in their sectors and in the Turkish economy 
according to various criteria (production, sales, exports, profits). Although their comparatively small 
size made it possible to recruit the best available labour force it did not result in less developed or 
unsophisticated HRM systems or applications. They were able to tap the limited supply of high 
quality labour through such sophisticated policies and practices, in turn making possible the transfer of 
complex parent company production systems and quality standards. 
9.2.2. THE INTERACTION OF DIFFERENT INFL UENCES IN THE TRANSFER AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF HRM POLI CIES AND PRACTICES AT US MNCs IN TURKEY 
The analytical framework developed for this study to analyse how IR/IIRM policies and applications 
of MNCs are shaped in a particular host-country include four forces, namely host- and home-country, 
sectoral and organisational factors, that can work in parallel or opposition. This thesis asserts that the 
interplay between these main forces, rather than any single one of them, is key to the formation of 
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IR/HRM policies and applications at the subsidiary level. Moreover, a precise IIRM strategy (e. g. an 
ethnocentric approach that aims to transfer all home-country practices to the host-country, or a 
polycentric approach adopting local practices) that applies to all IR/HRM policies cannot be identified. 
US MNCs use different strategies in different HRM areas, and strategies are shaped by the interplay of 
relevant factors. Nevertheless, policies in the various HR areas analysed are related to and aligned 
with each other. For instance, the ILM approach was employed in the core cases as a result of the 
interaction of home-country, host-country, sectoral and organisational influences: ILM approaches 
evidently still existed in the US MNCs included in this research, despite the growing claims for their 
decline and replacement with ELM systems in the US. A similar finding was confirmed by Butler et 
al. (2006) for managerial careers in European subsidiaries. In Turkey, the interaction of host-country 
labour market conditions (the availability and cost of necessary labour) and sectoral conditions (high 
labour qualification requirements for sophisticated production systems, teamworking organisation 
structures and stringent quality targets from US parents requiring a trainable and flexible workforce) 
supported the transfer and application of this particular employment system. Had labour market 
conditions been different (e. g. higher cost of labour) or had the supply of labour with the necessary 
qualifications been greater, US MNCs might have adopted ELM or `core-periphery' models in 
Turkey. 
The interplay between these major forces resulted in the transmission and central administration of 
most policies and the localisation of others. For instance, diversity policies were not transferred and 
applied as strictly as in the home-country operations in the permissive legislative host environment. 
Even in those companies where more emphasis was placed on `diversity', it was limited to the gender 
dimension and to managerial positions, disregarding age, disability and sexual preference aspects in 
the Turkish environment. The localisation of recruitment methods, e. g. the use of informal tools such 
as word of mouth, personal networks and suggestions, although they were prone to violating equal 
employment opportunities, could also be explained by the lack of restrictive legislation. Case 
companies were at the same time able to transfer sophisticated corporate policies such as competency- 
based R&S generally without relaxing selection criteria as they could reach a sufficient number of 
candidates with the necessary qualifications to fill the positions in the comparatively small subsidiaries 
where growth was not a business strategy at the time of the fieldwork. They transferred more 
sophisticated corporate recruitment tools, e. g. electronic recruitment and educational links, not only as 
the Turkish environment provides the necessary infrastructure to use such methods but also because 
these were valuable tools for reaching the right kind of workforce for managerial and white-collar 
positions. 
In IR, the interaction of various factors was less significant, while US parent's corporate IR policy 
('embedded' in the home-country business system) was fundamental. Non-unionised IR was 
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applicable straightforwardly in Turkey, usually without necessitating the use of illegal or harsh 
methods, given the host-country factors. Even with relatively stronger labour unions, companies were 
able to de-unionise or stay non-unionised by using the permissive and pro-business legislation. Also 
in the unionised companies it was basically the corporate policy that was transferred. In this transfer, 
various sectoral factors (e. g. skill requirements, quality issues, target markets, labour market 
conditions, and strong employers' associations) interacted to encourage the process. As a result, US 
MNCs might have felt more able to transfer their corporate ̀ preference' for non-unionised labour 
relations. 
Attitudes of the local managers, particularly those in the key positions with `elite' and ̀ Americanised' 
educational backgrounds and mindsets, were a significant determinant of the degree and success of 
transfer of corporate policies to the Turkish subsidiaries. Corporate policies, as developed in the USA, 
were perceived to be the latest trends and as embodying best practice, and managements were eager to 
transfer and apply these methods. US parents were perceived as valuable resources. Therefore US 
MNCs did not experience open opposition from local managers in transferring their corporate policies 
and systems. 
The significance and level of these influences were found to be variable, not static. Changes in 
legislation and economic conditions, for instance, could increase the state's level of influence while 
leading to minor or major amendments in relevant HRM practices. Variations in competition and 
market structures in the industry, and changes in corporate and subsidiary business strategy, could all 
result in a different interplay among these forces. For instance, when the inflation rate started to 
decrease and stabilise, and private pension plans were brought in to reduce the social security burden 
on the state, US MNCs responded by limiting salary increases to once a year, linked entirely to 
performance, and started to introduce contributions to private pension plans. 
To sum up, institutionally disparate host and home business systems do not necessarily preclude 
successful transfer of corporate HRM policies. Given the strong influence of interplay between 
various forces at multiple levels, HRM policies developed in a distinct business system are observed to 
be transmitted to subsidiaries in a very different system, if complementary factors, e. g. permissive and 
pro-business legislation, exist. However some policies might need to be adapted to local conditions, 
given the local power of subsidiaries to resist and to develop their own policies. 
In the first part of this chapter, influences at three levels and their interaction in the transfer and 
formation of IR/HRM policies and applications were discussed. In the next part, the theoretical 
questions are addressed, in particular the significance of Turkey as a host country and the wider 
implications of this research. 
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9.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
National business systems provide different institutional environments for MNCs to develop their 
management policies. They might find permissive, 'weaker' systems easiest to transfer their home- 
grown policies to, while transmission of corporate management practices will be more difficult in 
`closed', i. e. integrated, cohesive, firmly established systems (Whitley, 1992). Particularly with the 
increased importance of transnational influences on national business systems, however, these can be 
considered two extreme ends of a spectrum, where 'hybrid transitional' cases exist. This study argues 
that in some developing and emerging countries, such as Turkey, MNCs can find a mixture of 
institutional factors from both permissive and closed systems. While such host environments, where 
domestic companies are in fact willing to learn from American firms' practices, provide opportunities 
to easily diffuse their novel management practices, they might also present complex situations that 
require high levels of learning and adaptability on the US MNCs' part. 
9.3.1. `HYBRID TRANSITIONAL' HOST-COUNTRY 
A `hybrid transitional' host business system is defined as one that has elements of both LMEs and 
CMEs (Hall and Soskice, 2001), cannot be easily classified within a geographical cluster, e. g. 
'Mediterranean', by considering only some institutional elements (e. g. agriculture as the largest sector 
and extensive state intervention), and is undergoing rapid and considerable change. It is now widely 
acknowledged that even the most densely institutionalised business systems are subject to change, 
therefore all business systems can arguably be defined as 'transitional' to some degree. I Iowever, 
`hybrid transitional' systems are under considerably more pressure than those that have been more 
established for a longer time, i. e. those that can be classified as CMEs or LMEs. Hybrid systems are 
`transitional' as a result of being more open to international influences for change both from 'trickle- 
down' trajectories, for example deriving from regional economic structures (e. g. the EU) and 
transnational economic organisations (e. g. the IMF), and from 'trickle-up' trajectories, e. g. sectoral 
influences, foreign firms, particularly consulting companies, as a result of national efforts for 
improvement and FDI inflows in various sectors (Djelic and Quack, 2003). Another significant 
characteristic of 'hybrid transitional' systems is therefore willingness for change among key 
institutional actors, which results in domestic mechanisms to `pull' in change from abroad. In other 
words, in `hybrid transitional' systems, we can see the 'institutional entrepreneurship' of 'trickle-up' 
actors who are constantly trying to recombine the available institutional elements while constantly 
looking beyond the boundaries of the business system for new elements to incorporate (e. g. Crouch, 
2005). Finally, changes experienced in an established NBS as result of evolution over time normally 
amount to incremental modifications within an existing model, and do not necessarily result in a major 
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move from, say, LME to CME. `Hybrid transitional' systems are in contrast defined as comprising 
elements of various typologies and they may well move from one category towards another, hence 
`hybrid' and 'transitional'. The hybrid nature of such systems makes them more volatile since their 
institutional elements can be recombined in different ways as change occurs. In other words, change 
in hybrid transitional systems may bring about fundamental changes in their underlying identity and 
characteristics. 
In this study, Turkey is presented as an example of a `hybrid transitional' business system. Classified 
generally among the developing countries by many transnational institutions, including the OECD, 
according to various economic indicators, e. g. GDP per capita, growth rate, size of domestic market, 
internal sources of capital, it has a place in the upper group of developing countries. Moreover, some 
elements of its internal strength, e. g. its history of industrialisation and the development of private 
sector, the quality of certain parts of the infrastructure (e. g. communication and IT technologies), and 
its geopolitical location (nearness to Europe and other emerging markets) provide Turkey with a more 
privileged position among the developing countries. However, long-term economic and political 
instability, the continued dominance of the state in the economy, a lack of transparency and 
widespread bribery, ambiguity in the enforceability of regulations, and the low quality and limited 
reach of education are among the factors that have given it a more underdeveloped character. Some of 
these factors are undergoing considerable change, particularly those regarding the role of state in the 
economy, transforming non-market coordination mechanisms towards more market-driven ones. 
While the financial system keeps its credit-based character, with the diminished role of the state, 
increased share of foreign capital, legal arrangements for enhanced control and transparency, it is also 
`pulled' towards more market-driven mechanisms as the main actors are enthusiastic for such changes. 
The unitary education and training system, however, is still underdeveloped and change is experienced 
much more slowly. Business associations are starting to gain more active and powerful positions, as 
particularistic relations with the state start to reduce, even if slowly. The industrial relations system 
remains similar to those in LMEs, where labour unions are weak, labour markets, recruitment and 
selection and performance management are flexible and deregulated. Given these characteristics, the 
Turkish institutional environment is going through a 'hybridisation' process, which is largely triggered 
by influences of globalisation. 
In addition to the 'hybrid transitional' character of the host country, the 'dominance effect' of home 
countries is an important factor in the change process in institutional environments. Both in 'trickle- 
up' and 'trickle-down' trajectories, power and the degree of centrality of a particular country (or group 
of countries) in the formation and stabilisation of transnational rules, are important conditioners of 
how these trajectories work (Djelic and Quack, 2001: 312-319). As argued before, the USA and some 
(rich and highly developed) EU countries are in more powerful and central positions in cultivating, 
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disseminating and imposing transnational rules on other, less powerful, countries. In the case of 
'hybrid transitional' countries, e. g. Turkey, dominance ('diffusion' or `push') effects are combined 
with attraction ('pull') factors, which might also result in easier transfer, and 'hybridisation' of HRM 
policies and practices in the host environment. 
9.3.2. THE TRANSFER OF IR/HRM POLICIES AND PRACTICES INA `HYBRID 
TRANSITIONAL' HOST BUSINESS SYSTEM 
A `hybrid transitional' host country can therefore provide both a permissive and a constraining 
environment for MNCs to transfer (or not) their IR/HRM policies and practices. Firstly, the 
environment can be legally not constraining; on the contrary, there might be a pro-business approach 
where legislation is relaxed for the benefit of employers and enforcement is not strongly pursued. 
This study empirically finds that under such conditions, US MNCs have the choice of transferring 
their preferred strategies and of not transferring those they think they do not need in the host 
environment. An example of the first scenario is the corporate 'philosophy' of non-unionisation 
among most of the case companies. This was easily transferred to Turkey where organising collective 
representation by labour unions is made extremely difficult under the prevailing legislative 
framework. Moreover, performance management systems, including performance evaluation and 
performance-related pay, could be applied in the absence of any constraining legislation. As for the 
second situation, diversity management policies and applications, together with equal employment 
opportunities that are emphasised strongly in the US within a stringent legal framework, were not 
transferred to the legally permissive Turkish environment with its allegedly homogeneous workforce. 
Another explanation for the US company not transferring it diversity policy could be related to the 
costs for the parent: in a weak host context with poor enforcement, it could get away without incurring 
the cost. 
However, the `hybrid transitional' host environment can be constraining through factors other than 
legislation. Based on empirical evidence, this research argues that US MNCs chose to transfer 
corporate ILM employment systems to the Turkish host environment where labour market conditions 
both necessitate and make their application possible. On the one hand, the limited availability of 
skilled and educated labour favours ILM approaches, aligned with other supporting FIRM practices. 
On the other hand, high-cost ILM employment systems are viable in the Turkish environment where 
the total cost of labour is still relatively low, particularly given productivity levels. Even in the 
companies where a rather inflexible salaried system was applied, employers were able to achieve 
cooperation for flexibility with the help of labour unions that collaborated with the management. 
205 
Thirdly, local firms and business associations in a 'hybrid transitional' host country can be much more 
powerful partners than those in less developed or emerging countries. In Turkey, diversified family- 
owned holding companies, as the prominent form of large businesses, in particular have such sources 
of strength as: 
- market power and knowledge; 
- strong links with the state; 
- longstanding experience in the sector; 
- good reputation in the domestic market; 
- distributional expertise; 
- access to financial resources; 
- strong links to business associations. 
In their business partnerships with US MNCs, acting on such sources of power, some Turkish holdings 
were particularly strong JVPs. Their strength was manifested in the degree of their involvement in 
strategic and operational management, in HRM specifically. The 'hybrid transitional' character of the 
business system meant that American companies could have equally strong domestic partners who did 
not accept to act only as ̀ dormant' partners and refrain from intervening in the management of the 
company. Such strong local JVPs shared ownership as well as management responsibilities with their 
American partners. In many cases, this meant that HRM was left (or rather `outsourced') to the 
Turkish parent, and the US parent did not have direct control and influence on HRM policies and 
practices. 
Another feature of a 'hybrid transitional' business environment is the availability of a highly qualified 
managerial workforce and the degree of advancement attained in IIRM. Although 'elite' managerial 
employees are few in number in Turkey, with their education in American-style schools in Turkey or 
abroad, their quality is high. With the help of their 'Americanised' mindset as well as the specific 
'dominance effect' of the USA as the longstanding ally of Turkey, management and IIRM were (or at 
least inclined to be) `Americanised'. `Attraction' (or pull) effects were also highly visible in the 
adoption of 'contemporary', i. e. mostly American, HRM strategies and practices by these major 
holdings in Turkey. Top managements at the holding level were proud to be enthusiastic about 
learning and transferring HRM policies and practices, albeit with some adaptations, from their JVPs 
and then to diffuse these to their affiliates. This could ease partnerships between Turkish and 
American companies in terms of management policies and practices, as managerial understandings 
were very similar, whereas this 'Americanised' 'hybrid transitional' environment might present more 
problems for other home-country MNCs. 
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Finally, sectoral and organisational influences can become more or less salient within the `hybrid 
transitional' host environment. On the one hand, particular operation systems (e. g. complex 
manufacturing systems in automobile production or high-end clientele who expect high quality 
service) require a more skilled and educated workforce in general, while these sectoral features mean 
the adoption of ILM systems within a host environment in which such labour is scarce. On the other 
hand, non-unionist organisational strategy becomes easily transferable in the permissive and pro- 
business Turkish IR environment. 
In summary, US MNCs operating in `hybrid transitional' host systems are faced with a complicated 
environment that consists of elements of various business systems. While providing opportunities to 
transfer their preferred practices, such environments also present frustration and complexity for 
MNCs' operations, which sometimes require flexibility and adaptability. 
9.3.3. VARIETIES OF NATIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
As presented in the discussion of the research framework, the NBS approach within institutionalist 
theory is adopted in this study (Lane, 1995; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). It provides a 
useful analytical tool for the comparative investigation of NBS and the influences of these systems on 
market hierarchies and management practices, emphasising path-dependencies and causal relations. 
However, the NBS approach originally tended to argue that the characteristics of an institutional 
system gained during its development (i. e. industrialisation) period are not subject to changes unless as 
a result of major external shocks and critical junctures, such as wars, political system changes, etc. 
Even though comparative institutionalism more recently recognises continuous and cumulatively 
significant changes in business systems, cross-national typologies may still not describe the extent of 
change sufficiently. 
Moreover the NBS framework is primarily developed for understanding similarities and differences 
among the developed economies. The model, however, neglects ̀ hybrid transitional' systems that are 
defined as incorporating elements of various business systems models by e. g. Whitley (1999) and Hall 
and Soskice (2001) and experiencing continuous change particularly through economic system 
changes and the globalisation process, most of which is in fact `pulled' by the business system. In this 
study therefore the concept of `voluntary institutional dynamism' is proposed as a significant 
characteristic of `hybrid transitional' business systems. Voluntary institutional dynamism reflects a 
combination of 'trickle-up' and 'trickle-down' change processes 'pushed' by transnational institutions 
and influences of the globalisation process (Djelic and Quack, 2001), and a willingness by some of the 
major actors, particularly business, to `pull' in such changes from beyond the national business 
system. In addition to continuous and voluntary dynamism, this study argues that there are other types 
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of national business systems, for those that cannot be easily categorised among `varieties of 
capitalism' (Hall and Soskice, 2001). When analysed in more detail, considering other elements of the 
institutional system and the characteristics of the change processes, Turkey can be more correctly 
classified as a `hybrid transitional' system than as constituting a `Mediterranean' type of capitalism 
with a 'more ambiguous position' (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21). While some of the characteristics on 
which the classification is based have also been rapidly changing, e. g. the share of agriculture in 
employment, GDP, the state's role in the economy, these changes are not yet sufficient to classify 
Turkey either as a LME or a CME. 
Whitley (1999) similarly classifies business systems into five types, each of which supports a different 
type of economic organisation: dirigiste, state-guided, collaborative, arm's length and particularistic 
(p. 54). It is argued that anisanal, allied, cooperative, isolated hierarchy and opportunistic are the 
dominant type of economic organisations favoured by these business system types respectively. 
Applying Whitley's typology, although the Turkish business system can be categorised roughly as a 
state-guided system until the 1980s, starting with the liberalisation of the economy, the business 
system started to change. Particularly since the 1990s and more recently at the beginning of the new 
millennium, the Turkish business system cannot be categorised into a single type but turns into a 
combination of certain aspects of different types in Whitley's classification. The system has not only 
been consistently changing, but economic organisations in Turkey also show some unpredicted 
characteristics, different from those suggested, as a result of various combinations of dominant 
institutions and the interdependences between them and economic actors (Whitley, 1996). For 
example, large, diversified and family-owned holding companies have been developing since the 
1970s and have become one of the most significant types of economic organisations in Turkey, 
particularly since the 1980s, despite the credit-based financial system and strong state influences. 
SMEs at the same time have been flourishing in various sectors within the same economic system. 
More recently, FDI in certain significant sectors (e. g. banking) started to change the characteristics of 
the financial system, although it still cannot be categorised exactly into any typology. Therefore, in a 
`hybrid transitional' national business system, not all traditional theoretical assumptions about the 
causal relations between the major types of firms and the national institutional elements might hold, 
which inevitably affects management behaviour of MNCs. 
The `hybrid transitional' business system was developed as a separate typology according to the 
features of Turkey, as it cannot be readily categorised into previous models. It is argued that `hybrid 
transitional' was not an ad hoc formulation for Turkey and there are most probably other business 
systems that share similar features with it, such as those classified in the 'Mediterranean' cluster by 
Hall and Soskice (2001) and Amable (2003), i. e. France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, which 
cannot be classified within either LMEs or CMEs. Although a detailed discussion of similarities and 
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differences is beyond the scope of this study, there is substantial evidence in the literature that some of 
these countries, for instance Spain, have gone through similar changes as a result of trickle-down and 
trickle-up trajectories (e. g. EU influences and increased FDI) and dominance effects (e. g. Spanish 
managers perceiving American management as the model to which to aspire, see Wachter et at, 2006; 
Almond and Gonzalez Menendez, 2006). Eastern European countries, particularly those that have (or 
aspire to) become EU members recently, might also be classified as 'hybrid transitional' given the 
continuous and drastic changes their systems have been experiencing after the collapse of the 
communist economic and political systems in these countries. It should be noted that as an important 
aspect of `hybrid transitional' NBS, differences and changes might be observed in different elements, 
to differing levels in different countries, as a result of different 'path dependencies' as argued by the 
institutionalist theory, where `fit' between institutional spheres does not necessarily always hold 
(Almond and Gonzalez Menendez, 2006). In other words, 'hybrid transitional' NBS might have 
variations in the elements of their systems along the dimensions such as i) the degree of heterogeneity 
of the 'hybridity' elements; ii) the speed of development and change, reflecting the influences of both 
external pressures and internal developments; iii) the role of internal actors in 'pull' factors: where 
actors might move abruptly to pull institutional elements from outside (e. g. Eastern European 
countries), or alternatively where such pull factors might have operated through a more gradual and 
longer process (e. g. Turkey). Finally, 'hybrid transitional' systems are not necessarily expected to 
move towards either LMEs or CMEs, despite significant 'pull' and ̀ push' factors and 'dominance' 
effects. Instead they might develop different archetypes of NBS, as the consequences of the 
influences on the nature and extent of change are `complex and strongly socially embedded. ' (Almond 
and Gonzalez Menendez, 2006: 421). 
9.4. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Like many other similar studies, this research has been conducted within a limited time period using 
scant financial resources available to a single researcher. Therefore it is inevitably subject to certain 
limitations. Firstly, subsidiaries of only one nationality were studied. Focusing on American MNCs is 
justified on sound theoretical and empirical grounds, and is appropriate to answer the broader research 
question about influences of home- and host-countries on the transfer of HRM policies and practices. 
However, considering companies from other home-countries, especially those with significantly 
different business systems, e. g. Germany or Japan, might provide comparative findings for 
understanding the response of MNCs from different nationalities to the same host-country 
environment. It would also be interesting to investigate JVPs from these countries and the interaction 
with HRM policies of Turkish JVPs. Such comparative research would provide additional evidence 
about the `Americanisation' of HRM in Turkey. Findings might also help differentiate `country of 
origin' influences from `dominance' effects, as the behaviour of American MNCs is strongly 
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influenced by the global economic and political dominance of the USA. With the single-country 
design used and the USA chosen as the country of origin, separating ̀ dominance' effects clearly from 
home-country influences is not always easy or attainable. Although US MNCs were originally chosen 
to investigate both `dominance' and country of origin influences, evidence from non- or less dominant 
countries can provide insight into the corporate attitudes of such companies towards forward diffusion 
of home-grown policies and practices. 
Secondly, companies operating in numerous sectors were researched in order to consider sectoral 
influences. However, not many specific sectoral influences were strongly reflected in the main 
substantive HRM areas investigated. This is possibly due to the biased set of cases selected: they were 
all well-established and large (within the Turkish environment) companies and key players in their 
sectors with formal HRM policies and systems in place. Moreover, they commonly had either 
complex production systems, high quality requirements and export orientations in manufacturing 
companies, or provided complex services with high skill requirements or for highly elite customers 
with high quality expectations. Most significantly, there were no cases from the important sub-group 
of US MNCs that are known to pursue ̀ low-road' HR/IR approaches, e. g. McDonald. While the 
chosen set of cases proved to be important in various respects for understanding the transfer and 
formation of HRM policies, the results display rather uniform patterns of employment systems, R&S 
methods, PM and C&B systems as large and long-established US MNCs form a distinctive group of 
companies, particularly in the Turkish business environment. Findings from more labour-intensive 
companies at the low-cost, low-skill end of the labour market, e. g. fast-food, might provide 
meaningfully different results. 
Thirdly, employees' perceptions of and perspectives on the actual application of policies were not 
sought in this study. Therefore the findings reflect managers' and unions' perspectives. Although the 
investigation of the specific research questions in this study did not require incorporation of 
employees' views and every effort was made for triangulation of information from different sources, 
one should still be aware that the findings do not indicate employees' perception of the application of 
HRM policies, which might be considerably different from those of management. Fourthly, getting 
US corporate HQ's input was not possible due to lack of time, resources and contacts in the `remote' 
HQs with whom HR people in the Turkish subsidiaries had almost no direct relationship; to some 
degree, however, interviews at the regional HQ and expatriates served as a substitute. 
Lastly, one needs to be cautious in making broad generalisations to a large a number of MNCs, even 
though the qualitative case study method adopted here allows theoretical generalisations and is very 
effective in investigating the research questions in considerable depth. 
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It was not possible to extend this particular study to overcome these limitations with the resources 
available to a single researcher. However future research might be broadened by including different 
sectors, small and more recently established foreign firms, and companies from different countries of 
origin. Results of this research could be used to devise a survey to cover a larger number of 
companies, which would illustrate the bigger picture and systematically investigate the interplay 
between NBS, sector and company-specific factors. Additionally, employees' perspectives and 
perceptions could be included for related research questions while getting corporate HQ view would 
result in more reliable, fully triangulated results. 
Finally, future research needs to include more developing and emerging countries to extend the 
countries where empirical research findings are obtained. This would provide the opportunity to test 
not only the institutional theory developed and tested mostly in the developed capitalist economies but 
also to see the differences between the transfer of management policies to developing and transition 
countries that are significantly distinct in terms of institutional characteristics. While focusing on 
countries that are economically similar facilitates comparison, findings from subsidiaries in dissimilar 
countries can offer additional insight and extend the scope of generalisations. Influences of trickle- 
down and trickle-up trajectories as well as 'dominance effects' on the transfer of home-grown policies 
in economically less developed countries are also open for investigation. Research in such countries 
will help refine the 'hybrid transitional' business system typology proposed by this study and assist the 
understanding of dimensions of internal variation and sub-divisions within the model. 
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APPENDIX 1. ACCESS LETTER SENT TO MANAGERS 
Dear Madam/Sir, 
Re: Human Resource Management in American Multinationals in Turkey 
I am a full-time instructor at the Faculty of Business Administration, Bilkent University, Ankara, 
Turkey and a doctoral candidate at the De Montfort University, Leicester, United Kingdom. My 
doctoral research is titled "Transferability of Human Resource Policies and Practices: American 
Multinationals in Turkey". The focus of my research is how American firms manage their workforces 
within the distinctive Turkish business context, and the findings are to be of interest to participating 
firms as well as to the academic community. 
In this research, my interest is primarily in understanding how American companies design, transfer 
and apply their international employment policies and practices to their subsidiaries in Turkey. I am 
particularly interested in the way in which common corporate policies are transferred and, if 
necessary, adapted to the realities of the local Turkish business environment. Possible case companies 
were selected according to a number of criteria, including size, market share, industry, ownership 
structure and unionisation. There are no'good' or bad' cases; choice was done to be able to see the 
possible influences of these various variables. 
Most of the fieldwork in Turkey has been completed during Spring 2002 and Spring 2003 through 
around 6-8 in-depth interviews at each of the 8 `core' case companies (in addition to numerous 
interviews at other companies totalling to 80 at the moment) typically with the senior HR managers 
and other functional managers, as well as general managers, where relevant and possible. To be able 
to develop the research into full perspective cases, interviews with the relevant managers at the sub- 
regional (Business Unit etc), regional (European, Emerging Markets, etc) and/or US headquarters are 
pursued. Interviews with senior managers at the subsidiary and regional corporate levels are 
significant to be able to grasp how policies are developed and transferred, in addition to triangulating 
data from various sources. Therefore research and interviews at both headquarters and subsidiary 
levels (divisional, European or corporate as appropriate) are being conducted. 
In this research ethics is very carefully followed and no real names (of individuals and companies) are 
used; companies are anonymised to the extent possible. No information will be published without 
prior approval of the individuals provided information and published materials will be the thesis itself 
and any other scientific journal articles. Interviews, which are normally 1-2 hours, are taped with the 
informant's approval and transcriptions are sent for information and approval. No sensitive or 
confidential company information is asked for. 
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I hope you will kindly agree to help me in this research, which is still a rare occurrence in my country. 
I, my thesis supervisor Prof Ferner of the De Montfort University, and Bilkent University all take this 
research very seriously and devote quite a lot of time, effort and financial resources into it. It would 
be a significant contribution to international human resource management literature, as similar 
research from developing and underdeveloped countries is also very small in amount. My contact 
details are provided below, if you would have any further questions. 
Very much looking forward to your interest and help in this research, 
Yours sincerely, 
K. Zeynep Girgin 
Instructor, 
Bilkent University 
Faculty of Business Administration 
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APPENDIX 2. Notes for interview with 
senior Turkish HR Manager 
* What does s/he see as the major 
current IR/HR issues in the 
organisation? In the sector? In Turkey? 
Personnel and IR 
Role and responsibility 
- Are responsibilities formally laid down? 
By whom? 
- Reporting line? 
- Division of labour between personnel & IR 
function and line managers 
Relations between personnel function 
internationally 
- Relations with corporate HR: 
- Does the international product division 
have an HR function/role? 
- Any contact with HR function in other 
subsidiaries, in Turkey (if any) -abroad? 
- International (HR) committees, working 
groups: 
- how are they managed/ co-ordinated? 
- Role? 
- Policy making? 
- Role of regional HQ in HR 
* Is there a written manual of personnel policy 
and procedures? 
- Is it adapted from parent-company? 
. What are the differences? 
. Information collected by the HR 
e. g. turnover; costs; absenteeism; 
breakdown by gender, education etc. 
Substantive HR issues 
* How far does the parent company set a 
framework for the Turkish subsidiary's HR? 
For each issue: 
1. Are there any central policies? 
2. Are the Turkish any policies any different 
from other subsidiaries' policies? In what 
ways? Why? 
3. Do HQ take an interest? 
4. Do they know/ask what policies are? 
5. Are new HR policy initiatives discussed 
with them? 
6. Are policies permissive or obligatory? 
Recruitment & Selection 
Methods of recruitment 
- for low-skilled workforce 
- for highly skilled workforce 
Extent of external recruitment 
- Internal labour market model? 
Senior managerial positions 
- Recruitment methods? 
- How is selection done? 
- Role of the HQ: who controls the 
appointment of top-level managers? 
- Extent of HQ involvement: approval? 
- Use of expatriates in Turkey 
- Number of expatriates in Turkey? 
American and third-country-nationals 
(TCNs)? 
- Length of service in Turkey, i. e. long- 
term or short-term? 
- Role they play? 
- Preference for expatriates or Turkish 
managers 
- if/for Turkish managers 
a. Selecting those with a more 
`American-like' mindset (more 
American vs. more Turkish)? flow? 
b. Acculturating in the USA/regional 
HQ? 
Equal Opportunities & diversity 
Is there an EEO policy? 
A diversity policy? 
- Gender (and ethnic? ) diversity 
- Disability policy? 
- Breakdown of % women, disabled, 
ethnic minority etc 
Extent of HQ influence 
Numbers & redundancy 
- breakdown of staff numbers 
by grade, site 
- average length of service 
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- turnover % 
- handling of redundancy 
- use of temporary/part-time staff 
- any commitment to employment security 
Training & Development 




- What kind of training? 
- American style? What are the principles, 
priorities? 
- Any set of standards, i. e. annual 
hours/days? 
- How are needs assessed? 
- HQ input and monitoring? 
Management Development 
- Is there a pool of international managers? 
- How is talent/high potential ('hi-po') 
identified & developed? 
- How are 'hi-po's monitored centrally? 
- International management training 
programmes? 
Performance Management & Compensation 
Performance appraisal systems 
- How is performance appraisal done? 
- By whom? 
- How many levels? 
- Which direction, i. e. only downward? 
360 degree? etc. 
- HQ involvement? 
Compensation 
- How is compensation determined for 
a. blue collar workers? 
b. managerial employees? 
- Is compensation determination any 
different from the parent company 
applications? 
- In what ways? Why? 
- Performance related pay? ESOPs? Profit 
related? 
- Comparison of the level of pay within the 
sector? 
- Any difference from that of domestic 
firms? 
- How is compensation used for the 
retention of highly skilled & managerial 
workforce? 
Non-pay benefits: which ones are used? 
What is the main aim of using them? 
- Company cars 
- Company housing 
- Health insurance 
- Sports & recreation facilities? 
- Symbolic long service awards? 
- Family-friendly benefits? 
- Creche? 
- Private pension plans? 
- Mobile phones 
Industrial Relations & Collective 
Bargaining 
Relations with the unions 
- Union recognition/non-recognition? 
- Which unions? 
- History of IR in the company 
- If the company used to be unionised, what 
were the 
a. motives/reasons for non- 
recognition? 
b. the process of de-unionisation? 
- Are there any influences of the market/ 
sector conditions on union de/recognition? 
- Is the parent company unionised in 
America? In other countries? 
- Role of the parent-company on IR 
Collective bargaining 
- What are the issues of collective 
bargaining: 
- pay 
- employment security 
- bonuses 




- training & development 
- Influence/Intervention of HQ on 
bargaining process and outcomes 
Employee Communication, Involvement & 
Participation 
Communication 
- top-down: briefings, memos, newsletters 
- staff surveys 
- other? 
- Corporate model of communication? 
Participation? 
- Are the company applications any different 
from the parent company's? How? Why? 
- What mechanisms are used for company 
communication & participation? 
Employee Participation & Involvement 
a. how? 
b. in which issues? 
c. unions? 
d. corporate model? 
Management control 
- Long- vs short-term planning horizons 
- Consideration of HR issues within the 
standard planning framework? 
Corporate- vs division-wide 
ANNUAL BUDGET 
- Process: how is the budget set? 
- Who does the business negotiate with? 
- What sorts of targets, ie. bottom-line, 
market-share, growth? 
- How is the budget performance 
monitored? 
- Sanctions if not met? 
- Are targets linked to remuneration? 
HR/ER in the budget process 
Labour costs/ productivity/ no's/training 
- International authority levels 
- who approves: 
- expenditure/investment 
are there standard ROI levels? 
process of investment approval, 
e. g. cost comparisons with other 
sites 
- managerial appointments 
- product ranges (are they standard? ) 
- export decisions 
Information systems 
- What HR/IR information is collected at 
corporate/divisional/regional HQ? 
- Who collects? 
- What do they do with it? 
Work organisation 
- Are there international principles (best 
practice), e. g. 
- teamwork, Kaizen 
e. g. how do project teams work? 
- benchmarking on comparable production 
sites elsewhere 
- standard operating procedures eg, for 
production (standard times etc) 
- quality standards and procedures 
Best Practice 
Management audit 
- Is there a central audit unit (corporate or 
divisional)? 
- What does it do (how, when, where, who) 
- Transfer of practices between countries 
- Who monitors? 
- How transferred? 
- Central (US) unit responsible? 
- Productivity comparisons between plants: 
- Is comparison made of performance in 
different projects? 
- Any areas of 
international standards 
- Standard operating procedures 
- Quality standards (e. g. ISO) 
- International productivity 
initiatives 
'Americanness' of the company 
* In what ways does American influence 
manifest itself? 
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APPENDIX 3. BENEFITS SURVEY 
SOSYAL HAKLAR VAR/ 
YOK 
ACIKLAMALAR & OZEL $ARTLAR (örnegin, 
`tüm tali anlara'; sadece belli calisan gruplari icin, 
mesela 'yöneticilere', `üst düzey yönetime', `satin', 
`beyaz yaka', `pozisyon ve/ya statu geregi', vb.; yada 
yaýa bagli, ömegin, '50 ya$ üstü yöneticiler'; yada 
`yemekhane hizmetinin olmadigi yerlerde' veya 
`sadece Genel Müdürlükte' veya 'sadece Fabrikada' 
vb) 
Ucretsiz yemekhane / kafeterya 
Ucretsiz a/ diger i ecek 
Yemek fi leri ('ticket') 
Ozel sa lik sigortasi 
Ha at si ortast 
Bireysel Emeklilik Sigortasi 
Holding Emekli ve Yardim Sandi Ai 




Ta inabilir bil isa ar 
Yilba i Yemegi / Partisi 
irket pikniAi / gecesi 
S or tesisleri, klü leri 
Kre / Gündüz bakimevi 
irket ürünlerine indirim 
Dü ük faizli kredi olanagi 
Yasanm öngördügünden daha fazla 
illik ücretli izin 
Yillik sa lik kontrolleri (Check-up) 
Ferdi kaza sigortasi 
Ostün ba$an ödülleri (maddi yada 
a imaddi lütfen a ikla imz 
Uzun hizmet ödülleri (ornegin, 5,10, 
15 yil, vs) lütfen örnek veriniz) 
Avans ekme olana i 
Evlenme ve do' m hedi eleri 
$irket arabalan ve diger e§yalari 
indirimli satin alma olana`i 
Sati ekibinin yillik gezileri 
$irket hisse senedi satin alma 
programs (company stock given as 
bonus) 
$irket hisse senedi opsiyonu 
programi (ESOPs) 
Yukanda listelenmemic ba§ka sosyal 
haklar lütfen belirtiniz 
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